著者
高橋 美多
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.1, pp.40-53, 2009-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
24

This paper discusses the recent transfer of technology to Chinese software firms from Japanese software development businesses. Studies of the Chinese software industry agree that its rapid expansion was promoted by strong domestic economic growth and the support of the Chinese government. The literature, however, overlooks an important point: offshore software development has helped China’s software firms acquire advanced technology.Our interviews revealed that, since the end of the 1990s, certain Chinese software firms have conducted not only coding and testing, but also design through offshore development. These firms had had difficulty in obtaining design skills by themselves. This fact suggests that technology transfer to Chinese software firms through offshore software development is an important factor in the rapid expansion of the industry. Based on this awareness, this paper focuses on the division of work between Japanese firms and Chinese firms and describes how technology transfer to Chinese software firms has occurred.The conclusions are as follows. In the 1990s, Chinese software firms conducted coding and testing on offshore software developed in Japan. However, since the end of the 1990s, some Chinese software firms have not only conducted coding and testing, but also design. Chinese firms have thus acquired design skills through joint development with Japan. This fact means that offshore software development from Japan helped Chinese software firms acquire advanced technology.The significance of this paper is that it focuses on the technological progress of the Chinese software industry from the viewpoint of the international division of work, which has been overlooked in previous studies. The entrusting of design to China is not now being implemented on a large scale, but there is a chance that it might grow in the future. This trend will accelerate technological progress in the Chinese software industry further.
著者
宮川 慎司
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.2, pp.27-48, 2022-04-30 (Released:2022-05-24)
参考文献数
62

In the Philippines since the 2000s, the authorities in charge of maintaining local order, such as local governments and the police, have strengthened their crackdown on informality. They have strengthened the claim that informality that deviates from the law is a problem that needs to be solved. However, previous studies on informality in the developing world have argued that authorities do not always exercise strict crackdowns. These studies pointed out that the authorities prioritized the goals they were supposed to fulfill, such as maintaining local order, and that minor deviations were tolerated to achieve these goals efficiently.In explaining the changes in the Philippines in the 2000s, this paper uses the case of electricity theft, which is the use of electricity without paying regular fees. A medium- to long-term analysis was conducted based on newspaper articles from 1986 to 2020 and parliamentary minutes on laws to control electricity theft. The power distribution companies began to crackdown on electricity theft from 1986 on and the percentage of electricity theft was already decreasing in the 2000s. Thus, the incentive for the authorities to participate in the crackdown was considered to be low in the 2000s. However, the authorities began to consider electricity theft as a problem from that period. The factors that led to a change in the authorities’ stance toward informality will be explained by examining this case.A review of the said newspaper articles and parliamentary minutes revealed the following points. From 1986 to 2000, electricity theft had been seen as a problem by the power distribution companies as it was mainly committed by industrial and commercial users and the elite, causing negative effects on economic growth and higher electricity prices. However, since around 2000, electricity theft has been seen as a problem by the authorities because it is mainly committed by the poor and causes damage, such as fires and accidents. The reason the authorities began to see electricity theft as a problem could be attributed to two factors that arose from the economic growth in the late 1990s. Firstly, the use of electricity by the poor has increased and the proportion of electricity theft by them has also increased. Secondly, the middle-income group, who are highly anxious about damage to their bodies and their property, has expanded. Before 2000, electricity theft was considered to be a problem in an economic context, which did not overlap with the objectives of the authorities. However, since the 2000s, electricity theft has been seen as a cause of fires and accidents, and the authorities that aim to maintain local order have an increased need to crack down on electricity theft to achieve their goals. In other words, it can be hypothesized that the situation discussed by previous studies on informality, where strict crackdown is not implemented as long as the goals of the authorities are achieved, has no longer applied in the Philippines since the 2000s.
著者
谷村 真
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.3, pp.1-20, 2012-07-31 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
26
被引用文献数
1

In the Philippines, lack of fiscal discipline has been a major factor behind the nation’s macroeconomic instability. Since the mid-1980s, in particular, expanding fiscal as well as current account deficit has fuelled concerns over external debt sustainability, and has thus made the Philippines dependent on an International Monetary Fund program and Paris Club debt rescheduling.However, the fiscal consolidation policy initiated by President Arroyo’s administration, aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability, has resulted in significant improvements in fiscal balance and a marked decrease in public sector debt. Improvements in the Philippines’ fiscal position have contributed to containing the impact of the global financial crisis on the nation’s economy, while creating fiscal space for stimulus policy measures to counter the global recession.Yet, to date, fiscal consolidation under the Arroyo administration may not have been fully recognized in spite of its significant effect on the economy of the Philippines. Therefore, it is worthwhile analyzing how the Arroyo administration’s fiscal consolidation policy has contributed to improving the fiscal balance and attaining macroeconomic stability, and then proposing policy initiatives that the Aquino administration, which took office in 2010, needs to implement in order to successfully implement the fiscal consolidation policy.Against this backdrop, this paper makes a comprehensive study of the impact of the fiscal consolidation policy under the Arroyo administration and the challenges that remain to be addressed, with reference to past studies on the issue. To this end, this paper firstly examines how progress in fiscal consolidation under the Arroyo administration has contributed to macroeconomic stability and has led to significant improvements in the Philippines’ sovereign creditworthiness. This paper secondly evaluates the administration’s fiscal consolidation initiatives from revenue and expenditure side and points out that the tax reform policy did not bring about the level of increase in tax revenue expected due to a decrease in tax collection efficiency and the failure to enact key bills. Furthermore, this paper outlines that the fiscal deficit widened significantly in 2009 due to the introduction of a stimulus package to cope with the global recession and measures that undermined tax revenue. This paper undertakes a simulation using the debt sustainability analysis framework to quantify the desirable tax revenue needed for further fiscal consolidation and increased capital spending which is necessary for growth enhancement.Based upon the simulation result, this paper finally presents a medium-term scenario with a goal of increasing tax revenue by approximately 2 percentage points of GDP. To achieve this target, this paper emphasizes that the Aquino administration must present, before anything else, a clear roadmap to fiscal consolidation, together with specific policy measures to increase tax revenue, and implement these measures promptly.
著者
菅野 敦志
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.3, pp.41-59, 2005

This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo's 'cultural construction' and his 'Taiwanization' (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang's cultural policy in postwar Taiwan. <BR>'Cultural construction', launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this 'cultural construction' is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter. <BR>The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang's 'cultural construction' and his intention of promoting a 'Taiwanization' policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations. <BR>Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo's landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek's policy of the 1960s. <BR>Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch'en Ch'i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government's national cultural administration. As a result, Ch'en's concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT's cultural policy. <BR>Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo's policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung's first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch'en Ch'ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang's localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan's cultural policy was formed after 1970. <BR>Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the 'tradition' and 'uniqueness' of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch'en Ch'i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government. <BR>Finally, following the 'Local Autonomy Act', enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang's cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo's 'cultural construction' was a significant part of his 'Taiwanization' policy, which can be defined clearly as the 'turning point' in the KMT's cultural policy.
著者
朱 海燕
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.62, no.3, pp.69-85, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-08-24)
参考文献数
42

This paper discusses how China’s relations with other nations, especially with Soviet Russia had an impact on the Anti-Christian Movement in the year of 1922 in China. The Anti-Christian Movement started with the establishment of the Anti-Christian Student Federation (Fei Chituchiao hsüehsheng t’ungmeng). The main purpose of this federation was to protest against the 11th conference of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) at Tsinghua College in Beijing. Previous studies have revealed that the federation was formed by the Socialist Youth Corp in Shanghai. But the debate still continues at the motivation of the federation to start the Anti-Christian Movement. Its relationship with the Great Federation of Anti-Religionists (Fei tsungchiao ta t’ungmeng), another (anti-Christian) federation that had a nationwide influence, has not been fully figured out yet. The present study, examining publications such as newspapers of the time and memoirs, clarifies that: 1) anti-capitalism and anti-Christian thought expressed in the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and the Congress of the Revolutionist Organizations of the Far East were the significant factors which drove the Chinese communists to the Anti-Christian Movement. Considering the fact that the two congresses were held in Soviet Russia against the Washington Conference, the Anti-Christian Movement in 1922, in a sense, was the manifestation of the conflict between Russian Bolshevism and American Protestantism in China; 2) unlike Anti-Christian Student Federation which was founded on socialist ideology in Shanghai, the Great Federation of Anti-Religionists in Beijing was grounded on the Anti-Religion Thought, which emerged during the time of the May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement. It was, however, the communists who took a leading role in the formation of both federations. And they listened to the intention of the leading Socialist Youth Corp in Shanghai; 3) one of the significant factors which contributed to the expansion of the Anti-Christian Movement among students and intellectuals throughout China was the Anti-Religion Thought, which was influenced by an enlightenment thought during the New Culture Movement (Renaissance) among Chinese intellectuals. It may be said that the Anti-Christian Movement was an direct extention of the enlightenment movement started by the New Culture Movement. It became increasingly radicalized, however, as communists began to participate in it with political purposes; 4) the radical anti-capitalistic and anti-Christian thought was finally formulated by the resolusion of the 1st Conference of the Social Youth Corp in Guangzhou in May 1922. Then after the First United Front, the radical thought further spread to the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang).

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著者
磯部 靖
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.1, pp.15-17, 2022-01-31 (Released:2022-02-05)
著者
高 暁彦
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.1, pp.1-14, 2022-01-31 (Released:2022-02-05)
参考文献数
53

In November 1949, with communists heading southward, Kuomintang’s control over southwest China quickly collapsed. What the communists were about to face was a highly militarized society with countless self-defense forces of villages and clans. Though showing their support towards communists initially, most self-defense forces openly revolted once the grain procurement program started.In the spring of 1950, Guizhou, one of the provinces of southwestern China, had become ungovernable, leaving communist work-team members brutally slaughtered and newly established people’s governments ravaged. Official accounts of pacification actions in this region involves peace-preserving action of militia, a locally active military forces of rural proletariat freed by land reform.Arguing Chinese Communist Party’s approach to handle popular unrests during the formative years of the People’s Republic of China was fragmented between central and local level. This article traces the continuity both of personnel composition and activities of local militia units. Utilizing newly available county-level archival resources from Guizhou, the following two questions are to be put under scrutinization. The author first compares central and local level cadres’ different approaches to popular unrest. Central level cadres, by repeatedly issuing urgent orders to their subordinate, demanded not only swift recovery of social order but also complete demilitarization of society. Under these orders, the People’s Liberation Army units and party activists were organized into work-teams and sent into villages where “bandits” were still active. Threatened with “rectification” if demands are not met within certain short period of time by their superior, local cadres decided to legitimize local self-defense forces’ existence, some of which were previously deemed as “bandits”, and utilize their presence to restore order. Self-defense forces thus rebranded first as “people’s armed forces (人民武装)” in 1951 and later the same year as “militia (民兵)”.The author further analyzes the activities of the new militia members. Rioting and looting were rampant during 1951, and in some cases, militia members were overtly hostile towards the local government. To extend its control over the militia, “People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部)”, with its reach into every county under CCP’s control, were set up by the PLA. Active military cadres were sent into PAFDs as directors, and militia captains were gathered at PLA’s compound, politically screened and trained.In general, this article shows CCP’s experience of “internal pacification”, termed by Anthony Giddens. Screening and training secured PLA’s control over local militia units, and institutional expansion, as it is seen from the creation of PAFDs nation-wide, provides the infrastructure for state’s surveillance of the contentious society.
著者
家永 真幸
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.3, pp.1-17, 2009

The idea that pandas are the "national symbol" of China is no more than a historically invented notion. However, even within international politics today, debates concerning whether or not these animals are "Chinese" have arisen as a political issue through their connection with the so-called "Taiwan problem" or "Tibet problem".<br>How is it that pandas have become embroiled in such political controversy, despite not being regarded as important for international politics from a realist perspective? In answering this question, it might be meaningful to reconsider what factors have made the Chinese state legitimate within international society. Therefore, in this article I have tried to reveal how pandas have become a Chinese national symbol, referring to the official archives of the Republic of China opened on Taipei, Nanjing, Chongqing and Chengdu.<br>The Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Nationalist Party first presented pandas to the USA as a part of its "propaganda diplomacy" in 1941, when this animal first became a symbol of friendship between the two countries. This paper reveals that the Nationalist regime used this "panda diplomacy" to forge friendly relations with the USA, while at the same time as attempting to show the "civilized" nature of the Chinese state. Before then, the Chinese government had taken little interest in pandas. This paper also points out that such "panda diplomacy" had been initiated between 1928 and 1949 in the following four historical contexts: (i) the rising significance of the south-west region for the Nationalist regime in the War of Resistance Against Japan; (ii) the rising consciousness of sovereignty in China that insisted that natural resources, including pandas, must be controlled by the Chinese themselves; (iii) the adaptation to the idea of animal protection which had become a criterion of civilized countries; (iv) the demand for widespread support from the US people under wartime diplomacy.<br>In conclusion, I would like to stress that the process by which pandas became a national symbol was nothing more than a process involving China's adaptation to international society, in which the handling of these animals had the potential of constituting a factor in China's "external legitimacy". I believe that this situation is still relevant in regards to the legitimacy of the Chinese state in contemporary East Asia.
著者
一谷 和郎
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, no.4, pp.33-40, 2021-10-31 (Released:2021-11-16)
参考文献数
19

This special feature is based on the plenary session of the FY2020 Autumn Conference (November 7, 2020; Online meeting): “Infectious Diseases in Asia: Pandemics in Past and Present.” The theme for the conference was to consider how Asian countries are coping with the pandemic of COVID-19, the crisis for people around the world. What role do governments play for stopping human and economic losses caused by this pandemic? How is society responding to this new situation voluntarily or under the guidance of the government? And what type of state-social relationship is best dealing with this crisis? In this plenary session, these questions were discussed.COVID-19 is spreading rapidly, and the situation of the world is changing day by day. We believe that this is the time when we need to take a step back from current situation and look back on history. Looking back on the past, infectious diseases have had various effects on human history. Even in modern times, pandemics have often put the world in jeopardy, killing a huge number of people. At that time, what policies did the governments use to repair the damage caused by the pandemic? It was also the theme for the conference to review past infectious diseases and the response of the state and society to them, and to consider how the development of the state and society and the sustainable cooperation beyond the state to defeat pandemic can be realized.As this special feature is based on the plenary session of the conference, it consists of articles by three speakers of the plenary session. The paper by Kohei Wakimura discusses the port quarantine of the Red Sea route during the nineteenth century cholera pandemic. At that time, the Red Sea route was a concern as a transmission route for cholera. The paper by Wataru Iijima discusses China’s response to COVID-19 with a focus on the community. The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the Chinese community, which supported the tough measures of lockdown. The paper by Shozo Sakata discusses the characteristics of Vietnam’s politics and society focusing on the information dissemination conducted by the government during COVID-19 pandemic. He argues that the challenge of infectious disease control in Vietnam since the Nguyen Dynasty has been to acquire the knowledge about epidemic diseases from abroad and to inform its people.In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, we hope that this special feature will serve as a catalyst for comparative research on infectious disease control between each government and society, and for the dialogue between the past and present regarding pandemics.
著者
飯島 典子
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.57, no.2, pp.19-34, 2011

Contrary to popular belief, the Cantonese were not always oriented on working overseas as has been presumed in recent studies of overseas Chinese. In fact, the Cantonese were active investors in the mining business in southern China, especially in tungsten mining in Jiangxi province, the southern border of which is adjacent to the northeast of Guangdong. Although archives from the Qing period contain much about the involvement of the Cantonese in tin mining in the east of Guangdong, little has been investigated of their activities afterwards. However, during 1930s in the Republican era, the Guangdong Ministry of Construction started supervising the development of the newly exploited tungsten mining in Jiangxi by controlling tungsten exports. Traditionally, the southern part of Jiangxi came within the economic sphere of Guangdong, and thus the control of tin mining in Jiangxi by the Guangdong authorities was not considered as economic invasion across the provincial border.<br>The Cantonese spread their mining business as far as Yunnan province. In 1910, the completion of Dian-Yue (Yunnang-Viet Nam) railroad promoted the rapid transportation of tin from Yunnan to Hong Kong through Viet Nam. By the time of the Sino–Franco agreement of 1933, the Chinese had won almost total freedom of residency and business in Viet Nam, which stimulated their local business. From the statistical point of view, based on the number of residences of outsiders in Yunnan during the Republican era, there were relatively few Cantonese in Yunnan but the archives show that the Cantonese were economically the most active group in the mining and export of tin, while the Fujianese left almost no trace in the province.
著者
青木 清
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, no.4, pp.22-38, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)
参考文献数
19

In October 2018, the Supreme Court of Korea ordered a Japanese company to pay four Korean men ₩100 million each as compensation for the damages from forced labor during World War II. In the next month, the Supreme Court ordered another Japanese company to provide compensation for the same kind of damages. They are called “Cho-yo-ko [forced laborers] Judgments” in Japan. These judgments have caused the Japanese Government to impose severe diplomatic actions upon Korea, i.e., restrictions of exports from Japan. Thereupon, the Government of Korea has carried out counter diplomatic policies toward Japan. As a result, it is said that the relationship between Japan and Korea has been the worst it has ever been since World War II.This paper deals with the “Cho-yo-ko Judgments,” which have given rise to this situation. In particular, it examines the Supreme Court judgment in October 2018 and the lower judgments on the case in which the defendant was Nippon Steel Co., because this case has often been reported on by the media and was considered one of the most famous in Japan.First, after giving the outline of this case, the paper introduces the judgments of the case that were delivered in Japan. Originally, two Korean men among the above plaintiffs brought a case forth in Japan against Nippon Steel Co. and the Japanese Government, but the case was dismissed. After that, the plaintiffs, in which two other Korean men joined in, brought a case forth in Korea against Nippon Steel Co. Although the trial court and the appellate court decided against the plaintiff on the grounds that the Japanese judgment should be recognized under the Korean Civil Procedure Act, in 2012 the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision and sent the case back to Seoul High Court. The Supreme Court refused to recognize the Japanese judgments because of the order public of Korea and continuously held that the individual claims of the Korean men were not settled by the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Seoul High Court, which the case was remanded back to, ordered the defendant to pay compensation to plaintiffs in 2013. Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed the High Court judgment in 2018.This paper also deals with Korean judgments. Since there are many legal issues arising in the fields of Public International Law, Private International Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, and Commercial Law, it examines some of these legal issues and how the judgments affected the relationship between Japan and Korea.