著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.39-59, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

82

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How should today’s Japan-ROK relations be interpreted which is said the worst in their history? This paper discusses the logic of Moon Jae-in administration from the perspectives of its “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy.”Under the constraints of the nation’s division and the Cold War, ROK successfully maintained the “justification” of politics as a result of its democratization that took place immediately after the economic development. However, this “justification” was maintained with the lack of political “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” the dilemma of which was inevitably brought to the surface after the end of the Cold War and the democratization.It was brought to the surface with the movement of going back their history in a way of trying to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” of their politics by liquidating remnants of “pro-Japanese,” the collaborators with the Japanese colonial government. It was Moon Jae-in administration that played the central role of such movement, the administration that was born as a result of the “Candle Revolution,” which led president Park Geun-hye to her impeachment and dismiss.President Moon Jae-in took it as his mission to establish the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” and to bring ROK back to the state of what the nation needs to be like, by eradicating deeply-rooted evils and wiping out “the pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests.”After the liberation, those “pro-Japanese” collaborators were supposed to be condemned, but they were instead protected under the Cold War and turned into a power of pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests, as the mainstream of the politics and society, by colluding with the authoritarian governments for the sake of anti-communism and economic development. The true liberation and decolonization process, according to the logic, become complete only when successfully having eradicated those pro-Japanese and replaced the mainstream in order to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which has been long absent and undiscussed.Such movement grew into the denial of “ROK lead by conservatives,” taking place with the eradication of the deeply-rooted evils. It was not necessarily targeted at Japan but inevitably involved the issues of comfort women and forced labor as diplomatic problems, which was crucial for Moon Jae-in administration because it stands on the denial of Park Geun-hye. For Moon Jae-in, Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965 lacked both “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which was nothing but the deeply-rooted evil.If the eradication of pro-Japanese conservatives is expanded to the denial of ROK by conservatives, and furthermore, if Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations is treated as deeply-rooted evils, it could lead to a political situation that will deny the Japan-ROK relations over the past half century and will call for a drastic reconstruction of the relations from the very beginning.

著者

伊豆山 真理

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.84-96, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

38

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Myanmar’s coup in 2021 surfaced India’s long-time challenge of democracy assistance in Myanmar. Resurgent debate on democratic value versus geopolitical interest as guiding principle for Myanmar policy has its origin in 1988 transition. India sided with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic leaders but turned to “two track policy” around 1993. Since then, phased engagement with military government evolved while uneasily searching for new format of democracy assistance.China’s expanding influence in Myanmar is often cited as India’s main geopolitical interest. However, India’s interest has been shifting over time, so it is too simplistic to see China factor as constantly dominant. This paper traces changes in weight and format of India’s democracy assistance. It focuses on geopolitical interest pertaining to land border, firstly necessity of border control and consequent importance of cooperation from Myanmar’s military regime, and secondly, land connectivity which Myanmar provides as gateway to ASEAN.Myanmar’s place in India’s “Look East” and later “Act East” is quite interesting. India's vision for its Northeastern area development was tied to its neighbor. Connecting Northeast to ASEAN through Myanmar was the key to its Look East policy. Thus, engaging military government of Myanmar became legitimate as a part of ASEAN connectivity. India’s diplomacy under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized democratic value than ever as India started to identify itself as rising “democracy.” The feature of India’s democracy assistance debate then was that democratic transition was presented as the mean for economic development. Also, democracy assistance was thought to be best done through building institution.Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced “Act East” policy at East Asia Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw in 2014. Under the Act East, India prioritized Bangladesh and Myanmar as recipients of capacity building. We can observe that India set to compete with China at this stage. Capacity building is a convenient policy tool which includes building education centers such as IIT and transferring submarine to Myanmar navy. India also supplied Covid-19 vaccine to Myanmar as humanitarian assistance.Regarding democratic value versus geopolitical interest, the real test for India is Rohingya crisis. Refugee and migrant in the Northeast is problematic as it has ramifications on citizenship issue. India changed its tolerant policy in 2017 and defined Rohingya as “illegal migrants.” Instead of extending asylum in India, India provided humanitarian assistance to Rohingya in Bangladesh as well as in Rakhine state.

著者

田中 康友

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.29-60, 1999 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.98-103, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)

参考文献数

12

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For China, H.K., Macau and Taiwan, discussed here, are not part of provincials/autonomous administrative divisions, but are special administrative regions. Articles in this feature, discuss new political trends in this specific region. In these three regions, we can find some similar phenomena and different situations. The first point is about national security and freedom/democracy. Chinese government strengthens the thread of cyber attack, and importance of national secret intelligences and social security. Such discourses lead the new regulations and acts to manage and sustain democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism, especially in Hong Kong. Facing with these new policy, Hong Kong people have so much negative behavior that they insist on deciding matters on Hong Kong by people there. However, such a situation is not found in Macau society where some matured social network is developed. And Taiwan’s case is also different from Hong Kong’s case, if the national government manages and sustains the democracy or constitutionalism, people would be against it by some activities like Sun Flowers movement, and express their opinions toward the administration by the vote at the elections. The second point is about social diversities and splits. As economic growth and democratization in these regions, both social diversities and splits are created so seriously among generations, genders, and between urban and rural areas. Such social diversities and splits influences the political activities, like Sun Flower movement in Taiwan and umbrella movement in H.K.. These movements had proposed strong objections to the government, but the activist couldn’t unify these movements and institutionalize them into a political power. On Taiwanese presidential and member of parliament election in 2016, most of Sun Flower activists vote for the DPP candidate on presidential election, but those were partly scattered on the member of parliament election. So it’s so difficult to find the great common divisor among small segments of the society, and the definition of “democracy” and “constitutionalism” in these societies. The final point is about Chinese stance to such phenomena in this region. As Hong Kong’s case, Chinese governments kept its authority to make interpretation on the situation and to decide the Yes or No on the problems, especially in Hong Kong and Macau. People in Hong Kong cannot decide their situation at present and in the future, in the contrast to people in Taiwan, where they can decide their future by themselves.

著者

阿古 智子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.9-29, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

原 不二夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.79-94, 1991 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

田嶋 淳子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.4, pp.70-74, 2011-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

水上 祐二

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.66-78, 2007-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

23

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The major cities in Southeast Asia have been greatly affected by the phenomenon of overurbanization, a result of rapid industrialization stemming from a surge in foreign direct investment starting in the 1980s. Despite an increase in labor demand in the modern industrial sector, the labor market in these Asian cities still continues to involve finding employment in an informal sector of small and independent businesses.The urban informal sector (UIS) has traditionally been interpreted as that part of the labor force not employed in the modern industrial sector. The existence of the UIS has been explained by external factors such as rural–urban labor migration. Citing the example of Thai stall keepers, this paper in contrast ascribes the continued existence of the UIS to internal factors including socio-economic conditions such as income.The paper’s author independently conducted an interview survey of stall keepers at five locations in Bangkok (Victory Monument, Pratunam, Wongwian Yai, Huai Khwang, andRamkhamhaeng) between August and September 2003. The survey sample consisted of a total of 115 individuals.According to this survey, the main characteristics of these stall keepers were that many were native to the city, and the younger generation in their 20s had a relatively high level of education.The average income of stall keepers was about 16,000 baht per month: this is higher than both the private average wage for Bangkok (9,500 baht) and the average income for Bangkok(10,000 baht). Analysis of the income distribution of stall keepers indicates a mixture of lowerincome earners (making less than 8,000 baht/month) and higher-income earners (making over30,000 baht/month).Factors determining the income of stall keepers were also analyzed. Income was not correlated with length of time in business, age, business hours, and amount of investment. The onlycorrelation in these data was between income and level of education.This analysis indicates that: (1) stall keepers have a relatively level of high income, and the ability to earn such a high income is a factor that perpetuates the UIS; and (2) stall keepers’ incomes are correlated to their level of education. Being able to earn a high income through ability facilitated by education is a reason why even highly educated people become stall keepers.This is a factor for individuals finding employment in the UIS regardless of whether the level of education in Thailand rises or the trend to obtaining higher academic credentials progresses.

著者

白石 愛子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.1, pp.59-92, 1975 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.55-70, 1968 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

平川 幸子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.95-99, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

石井 明

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.3, pp.60-63, 2018-07-31 (Released:2018-08-28)

著者

砂山 幸雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.1-48, 1989 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

横山 宏章

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.4, pp.111-118, 1995 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

田中 明彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.1, pp.32-44, 2023-01-31 (Released:2023-02-17)

著者

宇野 重昭

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.3, pp.1-25, 1960 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

石塚 迅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.103-118, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)

参考文献数

41

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In this paper, on the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, I reexamined the connection and disconnection between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution (thought and system). The constitutional review was employed as the focal point in this discussion.First, the constitutional review has two meanings: the protection of human rights and the protection of constitutional order. The constitutional review is one of the crucial elements of constitutionalism. Its system and operation are a measure of realization and retention of the constitutionalism.Second, the Chinese constitution enacted in 1982 was based on the bitter experiences of the Cultural Revolution. In order to protect human rights and constitutional order, various discussions were held to decide what kind of constitutional review system was to be established. Furthermore, the Chinese government and CCP rejected the judicial review and chose their own version of constitutional review that is carried out by the People’s Congress.Finally, there is a gulf between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution. The Chinese constitution imposes the duty of upholding and abiding by the constitution not only to the government but also to its citizens. At the same time, it is reluctant to ensure the relativity of individuals’ values. At the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Chinese government and CCP criticized the students and intellectuals for joining the protest and openly violating the constitution. This accusation symbolizes the gap between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution.

著者

SIDDIQA Ayesha

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.4, pp.32-46, 2022-10-31 (Released:2022-11-25)

参考文献数

19

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The post-Cold War had appeared to Frances Fukayama as an age for ascendency of liberal democracy. Indeed, one could observe a change of mood around the world marked by lesser tolerance for military authoritarianism which is why military regimes were seen on a decline. In Pakistan, known for a politically powerful military, it took the generals a bit more than a decade after the end of the Cold War to realize that direct intervention was not welcomed. October 1999 was the last that a general took charge of the state. General Pervez Musharraf’s rule ended in 2008 dovetailing into return of democracy the same year. The change was far more significant—Pakistan’s electoral democracy got anchored as governments were removed through elections rather than use of non-Parliamentary methods. This shift cannot be termed as a transformation but a variation since non-Parliamentary institutional methods were used to not allow prime ministers from completing their terms. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani was removed from office by the higher judiciary in June 2012 followed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in July 2017, and later Prime Minister Imran Khan in March 2022.The army, which in 1997 lost its power to sack governments through constitutional means in the form of article 58(2)(b) of the 1973 Constitution that was revoked by the then civilian government, used the higher judiciary to keep governments unstable. It was not that after 2008 the army had learned a lesson and was willing to surrender power but that it found a new way to maximize control of state power and resources without undertaking direct intervention. The military shifted from control of government to managing governance. Stability in electoral democracy is a new benchmark. The status-quo will remain and political players will not gain more ground until and unless they build institutional capacity. So, while Fukayama could imagine that all players in Pakistan have accepted liberal democracy as a norm, such acceptance is primarily superficial. The military remains dominant in power politics and civilian forces still subservient. Pakistan, in fact, offers a model of hybrid military rule in which political governments provide cover to military’s de facto control of the state.

著者

周 俊

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.3, pp.19-36, 2021-07-31 (Released:2021-08-12)

参考文献数

78

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Neibu Cankao (NC) is widely recognized as one of China’s classified internal bulletins, yet little is known about its functions and how it shaped the central-local relations in the country. NC began its publication by the Xinhua News Agency in 1949 as a daily bulletin, documenting sensitive domestic topics which were not suitable for public release, such as riots, cases of corruption, accidents, and outbreaks of infectious disease. Its circulation was limited, with only senior cadres of the CCP being granted access. Despite its similarity with the Soviet bulletin system, NC was a product of the CCP’s own attempt at solving the information dilemma of its dictatorship, and thus served as an important tool for gathering information. It also played a crucial role in the supervision of lower cadres, while at the same time providing the central committee of the CCP—and more importantly, Mao Zedong, with a way to exert influence on policymaking. However, the full realization of its functions faced several challenges. First, the Xinhua journalists responsible for NC were often mistrusted, as most of them were highly educated young people, who lacked revolutionary experience and came from bourgeois families. Second, NC’s independence was hampered by the increasing inferences of local party committees. Though the journalists could criticize local party committees and were backed by Hu Qiaomu (or more precisely—by Mao), in 1953 Liu Shaoqi granted the committees with permission to review NC manuscripts, because he believed them to be more trustworthy. These local interventions put journalists in a very risky position, especially when they disagreed with local authorities or made critical comments on local issues. This led to NC’s becoming a mouthpiece for local party committees, rather than a political tool of the central party committee. Finally, Mao used to constantly send instructions on policymaking to senior cadres via NC, reminding them of what they should focus on. This forced journalists to shift their attention from issues they considered important to what were essentially Mao’s concerns. In sum, NC was stuck between the pressures from both the central and the local committees of the party, which ended up putting it at a constant risk of disfunction. Ultimately, the plight of NC was a reflection of the structural problems in the CCP’s rule.

著者

嶋田 晴行

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.3, pp.45-58, 2010-07-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

33

被引用文献数

1

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Nine years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, the hope and optimism that the Afghan people held prior to the presidential election in 2004 seem to have declined. The deteriorating security situation has demanded the reconstruction and expansion of the security sector (national army and police) as the top priority. In fact, some measures, such as increasing the number of army and police staff members, have been taken, but the improvement in the quality is at a standstill. Accordingly, the dependence of the security sector of Afghanistan on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has been increasing.Even though there has been no distinct change in the fragile fiscal structures, which historically rely greatly on external assistance, a policy of upgrading the facilities, equipment, training, and salary levels in the security sector will create further pressure. Moreover, questions will be raised about the sustainability.In order to achieve successful state-building, restoring security and confidence in the government is crucial. In addition, it is necessary to establish a self-reliant fiscal structure. Nevertheless, things have not progressed well due to the worsening security situation in Afghanistan. However, because of increasing casualities and fiscal pressure, scepticism about assistance to Afghanistan has grown among the countries that have provided considerable inputs to Afghanistan. As a result, the governments of Canada and the Netherlands have announced timelines for withdrawal of their military units. Moreover, even the US declared its intention to start withdrawal of its military presence in the summer of 2011 in exchange for a short-term additional dispatch and further assistance to the Afghan security sector.Such a strengthening of assistance in the Afghan security sector would be a ‘localization’ of the security affairs and an ‘exit strategy’ for foreign stakeholders. However, this strategy cannot be achieved in a short period of time. Eventually, dependency on external resources will continue.Such dependency will result in an unstable situation in Afghanistan because external assistance tends to fluctuate due to political and economic reasons. Therefore, drawing a blueprint for Afghanistan’s future is a difficult task. However, stabilization in Afghanistan will contribute to regional stabilization in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Appealing to external stakeholders to share the burden and accept long-term involvement with Afghanistan is the key to success in Afghan state-building.