著者

天野 健作

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.2, pp.55-68, 2015-06-30 (Released:2015-07-07)

参考文献数

54

被引用文献数

3

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The confrontation between China and India concerning water resources in the Brahmaputra River (known as “Yarlung Zangbo” in Chinese), which flows through both countries, has been deepening in recent years. There have also been diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. This study aims to analyze the conflict and cooperation over the Brahmaputra’s waters.First, the study describes the South–North Water Transfer Project, a multi-decade Chinese infrastructure mega-project that aims to channel the abundance of fresh water from southern China to the more arid north through canal systems. One development included in a western route of this project involves expanding the Brahmaputra. Ten dams have already been completed on this river, and China plans to build the world’s largest dam, even larger than the Three Gorges Dam, on the Brahmaputra. India fears that the project will have a significant impact on the lower river region.Second, the study considers both India’s protest as a lower riparian country and China’s reaction as an upper riparian country. Even though India’s fisheries industry and ecological system are affected by Chinese development on the river, China did not publicly acknowledge its development activities until 2010. Instead it pursued what could be called a silent strategy. Since admitting the project’s existence, China has sought to minimize the impact on downstream countries. However, the initial silent strategy has clearly amplified distrust on the Indian side.Third, the study considers steps toward a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Although there is no binding legal agreement, China and India have established an expert-level committee and provided hydrological information to each other. They have also signed a memorandum of understanding that will guide expansion of their cooperative relationship.As a guide to future work, the study indicates the immaturity of international standards and law to settle a conflict concerning an international river. In this respect, it is important to analyze the applicability of “the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,” which entered into force in August 2014. Furthermore, the study indicates that there is a third country, Bangladesh, with concerns regarding the Brahmaputra’s resources. A water allocation agreement has been signed between India and Bangladesh.When we emphasize only the aspects of conflict taking place regarding this international river, it appears that two large Asian countries are heading toward a collision. However, as shown in this study, China and India are trying to build a cooperative relationship. This situation can be perceived as a case study in international trust-building.

著者

谷川 栄彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.1, pp.41-60, 1957 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

永積 昭

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.15-30, 1967 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

栗原 浩英

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3.4, pp.111-140, 2000 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

中西 嘉宏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.35-54, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

42

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The changes in Myanmar’s political regime, from the transition to civilian rule in 2011 to the post-coup period after 1st February 2021, can be divided into three stages: first, the transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another; second, the progress of democratization; and finally, the re-authoritarianization through a coup d’état and coercive suppression. However, these transitions have also led to unintended consequences. This paper focuses on the interplay and discrepancies between domestic politics and the international political economy, coincidental timing, political trade-offs, institutional design errors, and miscalculations by involved parties, which are often overlooked in a clearcut and linear understanding of political development. The main points of each section are as follows:First, the transition to civilian rule was driven by coincidental timing and the impunity of Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military. The formation of the new government in 2011 marked a tran­sition from an autocratic authoritarian regime to a more competitive authoritarian regime. The retirement of State Peace and Development Council Chairman Gen. Than Shwe and the shift to a collectively led leadership were the essence of this transition, which coincided with a change of U.S. policy toward Myanmar, leading to subsequent reforms and improved diplomatic relations. However, this development was facilitated by a trade-off with the state military’s impunity for past human rights abuses and violations of international law.Second, the advancement of democratization can be largely attributed to inadequate institutional design. The competitive authoritarian regime, constructed during the preceding military rule, lacked sufficient institutional mechanisms necessary for its prolonged sustainability. This deficiency significantly contributed to the electoral triumph of the National League for Democracy in 2015, consequently leading to the establishment of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2016. Of particular importance is the fact that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was expected to maintain power while striking a balance between hardliners of Tatmadaw and pro-democracy forces, was weakly organized as a political party. And the ruling government’s inability to “manipulate” the electoral system and operations to win elections also contributed to the regime’s lack of durability. As a result, an unstable power-sharing arrangement was created in which the Tatmadaw, which sought to protect its own gurdianship in the constitutional order, and the democratic forces that pursue further democratization.Third, while the coup d’état and subsequent crackdown by Tatmadaw have eliminated pro-democracy forces from the top decision-making process on one hand, such actions have been self-undermining the legitimacy and governing capacity. Tatmadaw is planning to return to the competitive authoritarian regime, but this is becoming a mission impossible, because the coincidences that occurred during the former transition in 2011 can no longer be expected, and the aftermath of the coup is not limited to power struggles among elites but has turned into violent social conflicts.The rapid political transformation in Myanmar from the early 2010s to the present is entering a new phase due to the reactionary actions of the junta. This transformation is irreversible, and if democratization were to resume in the country, it would follow a different path than that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership.

著者

岡 通太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.44-61, 2006-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

22

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According to the Agricultural Wage in India, published yearly by the Indian Government, the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remains around Rs. 24–30 per day. This is much lower than the rates in other areas such as northern and peninsular Gujarat, where the rate has risen sharply, reaching Rs. 60 during the 1990s. It is also perhaps surprising that the agri cultural wage in central Gujarat remains low even after the recent increase in rural non-farm employment opportunities that provide wages of around Rs. 60–200 per day. This suggests that the ‘trickledown’ effect of economic development to the agricultural labor classes is not working well. Why does the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remain at such a low level despite the opportunities of high wage, non-farm employment? Why doesn’t the‘ trickle-down’ effect work well in central Gujarat? This paper aims to examine this question through an intensive field survey at a sample village in central Gujarat.The paper addresses this question by considering two factors, one external the other in ternal.The external factor is the limitation of non-farm employment opportunities. If these opportunities are separated from agricultural labor markets by high barriers (e.g. high education requirements), the ‘trickle-down’ effect will not work well. The internal factor is the local informal credit institution. As K. Basu (1983) explained in his ‘inter-linkage theory’, if the agricultural laborer is in debt to his employer with a low interest rate, his wage will also be low because the employee gets the benefit of low interest.Investigation showed that 44% of the agricultural laboring classes (landless and marginal farmers) are working in non-farm sectors, and 40% out of the 44% are employed in high-wage and low-education sectors. No clear segmentation is found. On the other hand, the internal factor has a stronger effect on low agricultural wages. There is a local informal credit institution called Kaymi that exists especially in rural areas of central Gujarat. Under this local institution, 22% of agricultural laborers are in debt to their employers free of interest. Evaluating the benefit of interest-free credit that is enjoyed by these laborers gives their ‘effective wage’ to be Rs. 48, which is close to the wage of non-farm employment. This local institution also affects low wages of the other 78% of agricultural labors. With restricted opportunities for the agricultural labor classes to get formal loans, this local informal institution is the only way for them to obtain credit and ease risk burdens associated with their livelihood. This paper also asserts that this kind of ‘social institution’ has been developed upon long-term social relationships that are based onland distribution inequity, which closely corresponds to caste segmentation.

著者

高橋 孝治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.4, pp.18-35, 2019-10-31 (Released:2019-12-17)

参考文献数

30

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In the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Code was revised on October 26, 2018. In China, RENZUIRENFA system, the judgment by default system and the prompt decision procedure were introduced by this revision. As for this report, an exegesis does the Chinese revised Criminal Procedure Code from these three systems. The defendant confesses it about own criminal act, and there is not an objection about a crime fact pointed out, and RENZUIRENFA system is the system that it is tolerant and processes by law when I agree about the assessment of a case. It is a system of so-called plea bargaining. The prompt decision procedure must conclude a hearing for a person agreeing to RENZUIRENFA and the application of the prompt decision procedure as a general rule for (when you may be sentenced to penal servitude more than one year less than 15 days) for less than ten days on a case acceptance day of the court and must start judgment in the court which you examined. And when the judgment by default system is a crime of the national crime and terrorist activity to harm serious safely that the best People prosecution House ratified when it is necessary to let a trial go promptly in the case of a corruption bribe crime, evidence is certain, and a crime suspect and defendants are enough when I am abroad and are the system that can submit an indictment for people method House when you should investigate a criminal liability by law even if the defendant is absent. About RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure, it was taken effect before Criminal Procedure Code revision experimentally in some cities. Therefore, in this report, I examine the statistics documents of the experimental enforcement. A limit points out the point that there is not the rule in the text is very plain, and what kind of crime RENZUIRENFA system in particular is applied to about the point that I can interpret, the prompt decision procedure in this report even how. And an application is done about the penalty used for political oppression about RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure in the district enforced experimentally. Therefore, political oppression and a crime to get will point out the aggressive evaluation in future from a point to have possibilities to let a trial progress without an investigation and public speaking in China that hard to please. And I point out that I can read it when I take an opportunity of the public speaking away from the defendant because the case by the circumstances of the government “to have to let a trial go promptly” applies about the judgment by default system. And this report settles a conclusion as follows. It is said, “there was the agreement of the defendant” formally by RENZUIRENFA system, and there will be possibility to have that a criminal trial is over in future without letting others inspect the contents of the criminal trial by a prompt decision procedure. In other words, I can impose punishment on the defendant if said, “the defendant agreed to RENZUIRENFA” without stopping by to real evidence. Furthermore, I became able to let a criminal trial progress without giving the defendant the opportunity of the argument by a judgment by default system and a judgment, “it was necessary to let a trial go promptly”. The revised Criminal Procedure Code of 2018 goes away from human rights security when I generalize it.

著者

樹中 毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.1, pp.13-29, 2011-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

56

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Fascism is a totalitarian movement, which, through power centralization by a dictatorial party and a charismatic leader, aims to achieve state unity and a revival of nationhood. In order to study the ‘Sinicization’ of fascism, this paper discusses the appearance and development of an informal elitist organization, the Blue Shirts, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in the1930s. Three levels of power politics are used to analyze the overall appearance of Chinese fascism: (1) party faction politics, (2) domestic military politics, and (3) international power politics. First, with regard to party faction politics, an informal organization appeared and its movement spread. After the Manchurian incident, crisis-conscious young men from the Whampoa Military Academy, in imitation of the Italian Black Shirts, established a core organization, the Lixingshe, within the party. This secret organization abided by the Kuomintang’s (KMT) organizational rule (democratic centralism) and pledged loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek—this pledge can be seen as a form of Führerprinzip. The purpose of this military fascist movement was to spur the undisciplined KMT to improve its core function as well as to elevate Chiang Kai-shek to the status of charismatic leader.Second, in the process of becoming a domestic military power, the KMT regime changed from a Soviet-style party-ruling regime to a fascist dictatorial regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. In addition to vigorously expanding informal elitist organizational movements, Chang established the Pieh-tung-tui, modeled on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA), under the Military Committee, and started the New Life Movement, which took its inspiration from the Italian and German movements to revive nationhood. Through these steps, Chang wanted to institutionalize fascist ideology, i.e. militarization, the Führerprinzip, and the revival of tradition.Third, Chang aimed to achieve a Hitler-style dictatorship and revival of nationhood by linking domestic fascist policies and international power politics.Though ostensibly compromising with the Japanese, Chang had drawn a plan to wage a war of long-term resistance against the Japanese centered on Sichuan Province as suggested by General von Falkenhausen after the Agreement of He-Mei in August 1935. Chang also approached Hitler via General von Seeckt to carry out diplomatic strategies of allying with Germany to combat Japan. Chang’s purpose for drawing on Nazi Germany was not to fulfill a racial revolution or to mount an invasion, but to gain access to the latest German weapons and industrialized defense techniques through trade exchanges, and to tackle the Chinese communists and the Japanese total war regime by acquiring the Nazis’ highly centralized ruling skills. Therefore, Chang established a unique dictatorial ruling regime by combining informal organizational movements and the Military Committee to replace the KMT’s party-ruling regime, which became a mere formality.Because Fascism lacks clear logic and theory, the results of its“ Sinicization” were, first, the augmentation of Bolshevik methods of revolution (democratic centralism, party dictatorship, and the anti-imperialist struggle), which were integral parts of the KMT regime; and second, the manifestation of nationalism, i.e. anti-communism and resistance against the Japanese. Though the informal elitist organizational movement did not successfully set up a fascist regime, Chang excluded resistant elites from the policymaking process through the autonomous dictatorial system, and he benefited politically and militarily when competing with local warlords and the Communist Party.

著者

奧島 美夏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.2, pp.44-68, 2015-01-10 (Released:2015-01-27)

参考文献数

87

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This study aims to describe recent trends in the nurse migration policy of Indonesia. Lagging far behind the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, Indonesia started to send nurses to the Middle East in 1989 only in a small number, mainly because Indonesian nurses had less professional skills and proficiency in English than those from the abovementioned countries. However, Indonesia found its niche in the international health workforce market—low skilled domestic workers such as maids and babysitters, who also work as caregivers for the elderly and the handicapped. Faced with bad working conditions and frequent ill-treatment at their workplace, however, the outflow of domestic workers from Indonesia is decreasing recently, and the country is now encouraging the out-migration of nurses and qualified caregivers who work in hospitals and care centers.For nurses and caregivers to adapt to the work in foreign countries, they need not only to master local language but also understand the local disease structure, learn related law and local work ethics of nursing and caregiving. In a developing country like Indonesia, medical workers often deal with infectious disease and maternal and child health problems. But what is more important in developed countries, where Indonesian nurses and caregivers will be sent, are nursing and caregiving for the elderly and the handicapped. From 2008, Japan started to accept candidates for nurses and caregivers from Indonesia and some other ASEAN countries on the basis of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between Japan and these countries. However, these candidates are facing difficulty in adapting to the work environment in Japan and in passing the examination, which is conducted in Japanese and required to work as qualified nurses and caregivers in Japan. It is argued that the benefit of accepting Indonesian nurses and caregivers to Japan is not enough to compensate for the cost of reeducating them.In this study, Indonesia’s current health policy will be examined and its problems will be revealed. The country’s current nurse migration policy, which is changing under the national goal of human resource development and the increase of out-migration after the Asian economic crisis, will be reported. Finally, the prospects for further changes in the nurse migration policy and challenges it faces will be discussed.

著者

三輪 博樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.4, pp.72-89, 2016-10-31 (Released:2016-11-23)

参考文献数

34

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Since the independence in 1947, India has adopted the federal system of government. In India, most of the states are organized along major linguistic lines. Language-based organization of state boundaries started in 1950s and completed in 1987. However, even today there are many demands for the creation of new states. In this paper, I focused on the case of the creation of Telangana state in the Southern India in 2014, and examined three points: (1) Which socio-economic factors contribute to the movements for new states. (2) How the federal and state governments respond to such movements. (3) What are the conditions for the creation of new states. According to the case of the Telangana statehood movement since 2000s, people’s movements for new states in India today are motivated by not only their political and economic interests or so-called identity politics based on caste, religion, etc., but also their demands for the fair distribution of wealth and educational opportunities and for the preservation of their own dignity and self-esteem. A research group led by Kalpana Kannabiran concludes that the Telangana statehood movement is “the emergence of a new politics that is committed to deliberating over the meanings of democracy and direct action.” The existence of such statehood movements is certainly one of the most important factors which contributes to the creation of new states. Nevertheless, whether they are actually created mostly hinges upon the decisions of the federal government and the major political parties. A new state is likely to be created when (1) most of the major political parties in the old undivided state consider that they can get political benefits from the creation of new state, and (2) the ruling party or parties at the center are one of such major political parties in the old undivided state. Although the existence of the statehood movements is important for the creation of new states, it is in fact only a trigger or just cause for the federal government to start the process of the creation of those states. However, if a “new politics” as Kannabiran et al. says is actually emerging in India and the recent movements for new states are one of such “new politics,” it may become more and more difficult for the federal and state governments to deal with such movements in the same old way.

著者

李 秉哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3, pp.1-19, 2022-07-31 (Released:2022-08-10)

参考文献数

91

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This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

著者

李 秉哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.as22.a01, (Released:2022-06-20)

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This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

著者

白石 昌也 古田 元夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.3, pp.1-37, 1976 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

坂田 正三

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.4, pp.72-84, 2021-10-31 (Released:2021-11-16)

参考文献数

36

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Vietnam became a country the world praised for its successful control of the COVID-19 infection in 2020. The government’s information management was one of the key elements for curbing the spread of COVID-19 in Vietnam. The government proactively disclosed information to the public and the international community regarding the infection’s status, and called on the public through various media platforms to take actions to prevent infection and cope with coercive lockdown.Such postures of information management today are not new, but have descended from the strategies that the regimes have historically employed. The purpose of this paper is to examine the information management strategies in the event of epidemics in Vietnam. The paper first looks back on the history of epidemics and information management in Vietnam from the 19th century to the 2000s, and discusses how the present Communist Party and the government have shaped the strategies of information dissemination and propaganda. The paper then analyzes, focusing on the period of time during which COVID-19 spread in 2020, the contents and impacts of propaganda transmitted through various media platforms.The regimes in Vietnam have always endeavored to acquire scientific knowledge about epidemics because many of the epidemics that Vietnam has experienced were unknown diseases brought from abroad, or traditionally existed calamities whose causes and countermeasures were unknown. Since the outbreak of SARS in 2002, the Vietnamese government has applied strategies to acquire resources and scientific information from the international public health regimes, in exchange for disclosure of information about domestic infection. At the same time, the Communist Party and the government have taken multifaceted media control, utilizing traditional media such as propaganda posters and loud speakers on the streets to the modern information platforms on the Internet and SNS. These platforms are used to inform the population at large of the actions necessary to prevent infection.This paper also reveals that patriotic rhetoric and war-time analogies have often been used to mobilize the public to take actions, thereby representing the political aspects of the epidemic prevention measures. The strong slogans (e.g., “staying home is loving the nation”) conveyed to the public can be interpreted as messages to justify the presence of the Communist Party’s authoritarian regimes and its top-down policy implementation mechanism.

著者

加藤 寿延

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.3, pp.93-100, 1960

著者

張 雪斌

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.3, pp.18-37, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-08-11)

参考文献数

86

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After the end of the Cold War, many countries reviewed and reconsidered their public diplomacy (PD), recognizing the increasing importance of engagement with foreign nations and international opinion. With the rapid rise of China, public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao) became a very important concept in China’s national strategy and foreign policy during earlier periods of the 21st century. Recently, scholars within and outside China are paying attention to the purpose and features of China’s PD, due to the expanding presence of China’s PD and its soft power. However, questions such as “what are the factors that drive China to pursue PD?” or “how have the concept of China’s PD changed?” remain unanswered.
This article analyzed the discourses of Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts through the perspectives of realism, constructivism, and neo-classical realism. As many scholars have mentioned, PD has been recognized as an important asset to enhance soft power and influence for China in the competition with “rivals” such as the US and Japan. The concept of PD, however, did not exist in official documents nor foreign strategy discourses until the early 2000s. This suggests that the appearance and development of China’s PD cannot be described only in the context of balance of power. It is also difficult to explain the developments of China’s PD as a process of complex learning through the view of constructivism. It is clear that Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts are learning about PD and even the concept of “new PD” developed in developed countries, which emphasizes that the role and autonomy of non-governmental actors are essential to the effectiveness and credibility of PD in the era of globalization, and they already have full understanding of the implications of PD from the discourses outside China. Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts, however, refrain from allowing the autonomy of non-governmental actors despite their important role in China’s current PD. Therefore, the process of change in China’s concept of PD should be explained as “simple learning” rather than “complex learning.” This article argues that the view of neo-classical realism is the most effective to comprehend China’s PD. Chinese elites’ perceptions of the international and domestic environment are the essential factor that has changed the concept of China’s PD.

著者

斉藤 良衛

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.2, pp.1-21, 1957 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

板倉 和裕

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.3, pp.37-41, 2021-07-31 (Released:2021-08-12)

参考文献数

2

著者

小林 良樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.87-108, 2008-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

21

被引用文献数

1

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This paper examines the hypothesis that one of the possible reasons for the recent negative perception of Japan in China is the relatively low volume of mutual human exchange between the two countries.Based on an analysis of various opinion poll data, the characteristics of Chinese perceptions of Japan can be summarized as follows:(1) Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese perception of Japan has been consistently negative.(2) Such a negative perception of Japan is stronger in China than in other East Asian countries.(3) In terms of the medium- and long-term trend since the mid-1990s, Chinese perception of Japan has continued to worsen, which is a unique phenomenon unseen in other East Asian countries including South Korea.(4) Those Chinese who have experienced direct contact with the Japanese in general have a more moderate perception toward Japan than those Chinese who have not had such experience.Apart from the historical fact that Japan and China have fought against each other, such a uniquely negative perception toward Japan in China can be attributed to the following reasons:(1) The strengthening of patriotic education campaigns in China since the mid-1990s.(2) The upsurge in anti-China perceptions in Japan since the 1990s (which are reflected back to China).(3) Misperceptions and misunderstandings at an individual level in China, mainly due to the lack of objective knowledge about Japan as well as cultural differences.One of the possible reasons for the misperception and misunderstanding at the individual level in China could be the relatively low volume of human exchange between China and Japan, which is still relatively low compared with the volume of exchanges between Japan and other major Asian countries.For instance, Japan’s “visitor-population ratio” (ratio of the number of visitors to Japan compared to the nation’s population) in 2006 is as follows: China, 0.04% (one visitor per 2,500people); South Korea, 4.14% (one visitor per 24); Taiwan, 5.61% (one visitor per 18); Hong Kong, 5.04% (one visitor per 20); Singapore, 3.12% (one visitor per 32).Data analysis indicates that the current negative perception of Japan in China is unique compared with similar perceptions in other East Asian countries.There are several reasons for such a situation in China, and the current situation may not be due to only one reason.Nevertheless, the enhancement of human exchanges between the two countries could be useful to prevent any increase in mutual misunderstanding as well as for managing any outbursts of negative feelings.

著者

木下 恵二

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.1.2, pp.18-32, 2012-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

43

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This paper analyzes the objectives, content, and causes of the bankruptcy of the national policy practiced by the Sheng Shih-ts’ai regime in the 1930s, and examines how it influenced the identity of the Uygur people in south Xinjiang.Under the patronage of the Soviet Union, Sheng introduced ‘Soviet model’ national policies, which helped the development of each ethnic group’s culture in Xinjiang. These policies were based on the theory that the development of individual ethnic groups would eventually lead to the formation of a new unified nation. ‘Uygur reformers’ gave a degree of support to these policies, and education based on the native language developed.In Kashgar region, native inhabitants planned to establish autonomous power through an education movement. However, these attempts at political and cultural autonomy conflicted with the reinforcement of control by the provincial government in 1936. The provincial government permitted development of the culture of ethnic groups, but did not allow these groups to have any autonomy.Sheng’s political objective was to resist the Japanese invasion by relying on Soviet aid. After establishing his regime in Xinjiang, his principal political ambition was to become the political leader of the socialists in China, and if possible, the political leader of the whole of China.Therefore, he expressed his loyalty to Stalin from a relatively early stage. The purge that Sheng initiated in October 1937 was based on his fear of a coup, and was an imitation of Stalin’s purges. National policy, however, broke down because of it.The Uygur people in south Xinjiang, who faced oppression, were forced to participate in the campaign against Japan. Many of them, however, anticipated that outsiders, such as Japan and the Nanking nationalist government, would overthrow the provincial government. The least they hoped for was political and cultural autonomy. Sheng’s regime specified certain issues that needed to be settled in order for the central government of China to integrate Xinjiang.