著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_100-175_114, 2014

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This article traces the historical contexts of international politics study from the 19th century to the present in China, and explores the background and possibilities of 'China model.' The China model has been argued in the academic circle in China after the latter half of the 1990s, in order to interpret Chinese foreign policy more clearly and efficiently under its own historical and cultural contexts.<br>It was the 19th century when China started to make contact with the international law and diplomacy. At first, Chinese officials recognized them as tools and device to negotiate with western countries. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese government utilized concepts of modern international relations,such as sovereignty, independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, to protect and maintain its existence as a nation. Such behavior was succeeded by the PRC, such as the five principles for peace. However, the PRC kept a distance with western concepts of international politics, and began to import a series of Marxist theories and concepts it from the Soviet Union. After the Cultural Revolution, the PRC gradually resumed to receive western theories and concepts of international politics.<br>Thus, the PRC basically kept the <i>basso continuo</i> of Chinese diplomacy, such as importance of sovereignty,independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, but its main theories and concepts were from Marxist studies. After new western studies were gradually imported to China, the basic situation did not change very much. After the 1990s, the so-called rising of China, it needed to interpret and explain its policy to the world more efficiently. At that time, Chinese scholars realized that it was difficult to do so by utilizing Marxism and new western studies. Therefore, many started to explore new ways, and promoted the China model with historical and cultural contexts in China to interpret its own foreign policy. However, the arguments regarding this new model were losing its objective and their bearings.

著者

山中 仁美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_14-175_26, 2014

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This article explores how the theories and concepts of 'nationalism' were incorporated into the newly introduced study of International Relations (IR) in Britain, arguing that scholars' theoretical attempts to limit the 'hostility of nationalism' eventually gave way to the empirical reality of international politics during the inter-war period. It will focus on a report by a research group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), whose official aim was to provide a 'scientific examination' of the contemporary developments of nationalism that had dominated Europe since the end of the nineteenth century and were believed to 'threaten the very future of civilisation'.<br>During the inter-war years, nationalism was heavily criticised as being a regressive political ideology deemed to be a decisive factor of war. Its dramatic growth became a major issue for the IR academics who were studying the bankruptcy of internationalism. They decided to initiate a collective, comprehensive, and scientific study of nationalism within the newly established London think tank. The debate adopted an early modernist and functionalist approach to the concept of nation and national identity with a historical perspective on the stages of nationalism as an account of the economic and social developments of the nation and nationality. At first, the members of the research group sought to provide a theoretical perspective on the limitation of nationalism. As the international situation became increasingly tense, however, they came to accept the concept of nation and nationalism as a fact, no longer assuming that nation states would disappear nor that nationalism should be condemned as the sole cause of discontent and instability.<br>The group's theoretical studies were highly responsive to the challenges of a deteriorating international environment and theory was gradually reconciled with the empirical reality of international politics. This will defend a historically sensitive approach to the classification of international theories during this period of crisis, avoiding reducing a broader political and social debate to the ahistorical utopian-realism dichotomy of the 'First Great Debate'. Special attention needs to be paid to a wide variety of institutional settings and collective studies that gave rise to the substantive debates on international affairs in inter-war Britain marking a sharp contrast with the situation in the US where IR debates mainly took place in the academic circles of Political Science.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_41-175_55, 2014

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Scholars of international studies in Japan have repeatedly reflected on their excessive susceptibility to the Western academia; they have rigorously "imported" theories from America and Britain whereas they have failed to develop their own. However, few researchers have exemplified how this "importation" has actually been played out. Given that the Japanese recipients of Western theories have not shared academic and other contexts with their original bearers, it is possible that the "importation" have led to idiosyncratic interpretations of these theories.<br>This article examines in which context and in what way Japanese scholars in the middle-war and the early post-war periods read the works of E. H. Carr, the oft-claimed pioneer of Western international relations theory. In the Anglophone international studies academia, scholars have usually labeled Carr realist who had rejected interwar liberal internationalism. His first readers in Japan did not embrace such view. They, in fact, did not read Carr exclusively as international theorist. Carr, for early Japanese scholars, was an empiricist social thinker who attempted to transcend the modern ways of (both domestic and international) politics.<br>Among Carr's writings, the one that first won the heart of Japanese scholars was not<i> The Twenty Years' Crisis</i>, the now acclaimed classic of international relations theory, but <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, its more utopian-oriented sequel. They, in addition, virtually ignored the book's second part, in which Carr provided his prescriptions for the new world order; they rather focused on the first part, in which he discussed the limits of modern political thought. Finishing <i>Conditions of Peace</i>, furthermore, they moved on to <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i>, yet another book on the crisis of the modern European political system. Only after this series of reception, <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> caught a spotlight. As a result, Japanese scholars read the book not so much as an advocacy of power politics as a stepping stone for the future governance of the still antagonistic relationship among states.<br>Thusly, early Japanese recipients of Carr read his works against the backdrop of their own concern about the deadlock of modernity. This insight provides us an alternative way to approaching the history of Japanese international studies.

著者

君塚 直隆

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_155-173_169, 2013-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

44

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Queen Elizabeth II has played an important part in British foreign policy after the Second World War during her extreme long reign of sixty years. The Queen has undertaken 92 State visits and gone around Commonwealth countries all over the world. Moreover, she has hosted more than hundred Heads of States at the Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle since her accession of 1952. Elizabeth has supported twelve Prime Ministers from Winston Churchill to David Cameron when they promoted their own foreign policies among the ‘Three Circles’: United States, Europe and Commonwealth for sixty years. However, the Queen also has promoted her own diplomacy towards foreign royal sovereigns during the same period, in particular when she determined to confer them the highest order of the United Kingdom, the Most Noble Order of the Garter. Since the establishment of the Order of the Garter in 1348, it had only been given to Christian monarchs except for a few Sultans and Shahs from the later Nineteenth Century to the beginning of Twentieth Century. After 1906, the British monarchs have conferred this honour only upon Japanese Emperors as their valuable partners of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the honour of Emperor Hirohito was withdrawn when Japan entered the Second World War in December 1941. Since then, there was no Non-Christian extra Knight of the Garter in the world. Thirty years after, in October 1971, Hirohito visited Britain, and the Queen instructed that the name of the Emperor be formally restored to the list of members of the Garter Knights. It was possible to imagine that she desired the Anglo-Japanese reconciliation and also she has respected a precedent of former British monarchs who created only Japanese Emperors as extra Knights of that Order from 1906. It also means that she has no mind to confer this honour upon any other Non-Christian sovereigns even though their own power and positions in international politics have been strengthened during the Cold War. Actually the Queen never created the Shah of Iran or the King of Thailand as extra Knights of the Garter although they earnestly desired to become knights, because there was no precedent. Elizabeth II has given support to successive UK governments in order to protect British national interests on the one hand, but has gone her own way against policies of governments on the other. It is also a fine example of originality and diversity of British foreign policy after the Second World War.

著者

野添 文彬

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_1-172_14, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

79

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This article aims to examine the US-Japan negotiation process over the reversion of Okinawa in the context of US strategy in East Asia. In November, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard M. Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. This was a highly significant agreement because it settled a war-related issue between Japan and the United States, and thus contributed to the stabilization of the US-Japan alliance. The existing literature has focused on the US-Japan bilateral negotiation process and has tended to emphasize that the US government had achieved a greater level of burden-sharing with Japan thorough the negotiations. Recently, due to the declassification of numerous documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, researchers have begun to explore the policy-making process in the Government of Japan. The reversion of Okinawa was not only a US-Japan bilateral issue, but also had implications for the region due to the fact that the US bases in Okinawa have played important roles in both the defense of Japan and regional security in East Asia. Furthermore, during that period, the Nixon administration reviewed the global strategy of the United States due to various international difficulties such as the ongoing war in Vietnam, Soviet military expansion, and the rapid economic rise of Japan. Therefore, the Nixon administration sought the détente with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the application of the Nixon Doctrine. Despite these facts suggesting the significance of paying attention to the international context, previous works have not analyzed how the process of the reversion of Okinawa was related to the US strategy in East Asia. This article reexamines the reversion of Okinawa by focusing on the US strategy in East Asia during the period from the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration, particularly the policies toward the PRC and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Analyzing documents on US policies toward PRC and ROK as well Japan, this article extends the scope of its analysis from the US-Japan bilateral relations to the international relations in East Asia. This article argues that the US government regarded the agreement of the reversion of Okinawa as an essential step toward reconstruction of her strategy in East Asia, such as the rapprochement with PRC and the reduction of the US military presence in ROK. The US government sought to readjust the US-Japan alliance by settling the reversion of Okinawa since the US placed great value on the US-Japan alliance and also wanted to prevent Japan from pursuing more independent policies such as the development of her own nuclear weapon and to promote Japan’s burden-sharing. In addition to that, the US government succeeded in maintaining her credibility toward her allies by preserving bases in Okinawa. In other words, for the US government, maintaining the US-Japan alliance and preserving bases in Okinawa was an essential prerequisite for her strategy in East Asia. Therefore, the reversion of Okinawa not only settled a war-related issue among the US and Japan, but can also be interpreted as the beginning of the transformation of the international order in East Asia initiated by the US government.

著者

阿部 悠貴

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_73-172_86, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

44

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Constructivist scholarship has contended that social norms constitute appropriate state policy. Given this premise, nevertheless, because there are various norms within a society, it is conceivable that some of them are mutually incompatible and hence will clash with each other on occasions. How do state decision makers react when they are confronted simultaneously by contrasting norms? This paper investigates this question through analysis of Germany’s involvement in the war in Bosnia, wherein policy was influenced by three different normative claims: to address the humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans; to refrain from the use of force; and to maintain international cooperation with its European partners in their joint military operations. In other words, it was exposed to a “clash of norms” emanating from humanitarianism, anti-militarism and multilateralism. This paper argues that the clash of norms propels state leaders to develop international organizations as the existence of well-developed international mechanisms for effective crisis management enables contingencies to be dealt with swiftly: before the situation deteriorates and before norms clash each other. Specifically, this argument is examined by analyzing why the German decision makers, in the light of their experience with Bosnia, came to argue for the reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of addressing “foreign” contingencies, despite the neorealist prediction of its dissolution after the demise of the Soviet Union. The theoretical implications of this paper are discussed against the backdrop of the constructivist studies. The conventional knowledge of constructivism tells us that a new state preference, as well as a new appropriate posture of an international organization, is formed as a certain norm becomes dominant and diffused among decision makers. Thus, “changes” in state policy hinge on the “changes” in normative contexts. Meanwhile, the paper proffers an alternative perspective that because various norms are working simultaneously, state leaders (re)create international organizations so that they can avoid the conflict of norms and live up to different normative claims. Germany, in its response to the situation in Bosnia, deemed it appropriate not only to halt the violence on humanitarian grounds, but also to maintain its foreign policy stance of anti-militarism and multilateralism. That is to say, because the abiding norms remain “unchanged”, they reconstitute the structures of international organizations, as discussions of reforms to NATO within the German decision making circle were informed by this crisis. This paper is intended to advance constructivist understandings on the development of international institutions.

著者

杉之原 真子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_144-171_155, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

21

著者

波多野 善大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1957, no.3, pp.153-182, 1957-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

142

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_17-33, 2012

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The aim of this article is to examine the role of Japanese diplomacy in bringing cooperative relationship among oil-consumers, and how it led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 after the First Oil Crisis (FOC). The foundation of the IEA has an epoch-making significance in itself, as this institution provided a platform in which long-term policy cooperation among oil consumers could be designed and implemented. The IEA obligates signatory states to stockpile a designated certain amount of oil reserves, and it also specifies the Oil Emergency Sharing System in the agreement. This represents an effort for advanced countries seeking cooperation while the postwar international economic order was undergoing to serious changes.<br>Most works on Japanese diplomacy dealing with the FOC period have tended to focus on Japan's stance toward the Middle East. They generally emphasize highlight the anxiety within the government to secure a stable supply of oil as the principal reason for Japan eventually swinging toward pro-Arab policy. However, such narratives do not provide us with a whole picture, since the FOC was not only brought by Arab oil embargo. If we were to fully grasp the underlying cause of Japan's policy behavior in the FOC, we must first take into account a structural change in the international oil market since the late 1960s resulting from the strengthening of oil-producers. In the same vein, it is equally crucial to analyze how the oil consumers in general responded to the oil producers united under the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).<br>After the FOC, cooperation among oil consumer states intensified with Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, and Japan was an active participant during the process. In fact, the Japanese government was the first to announce its intention to participate in the conference. It also actively took part in Energy Coordination Group (ECG) following the Washington Energy Conference, and facilitated ECG in playing a moderating role between Great Britain and West Germany.<br>Japan actively participated in these institutional frameworks since the policymakers shared two perceptions. The first is the recognition that the oil consumers, in order to decrease their vulnerability in oil supply, must unite. The second perception is that it is important for Japan to support the maintenance of a liberal international economic order which would ensure the stable flow of oil supplies. Seen from this context, the Japanese participation in the establishment of the IEA from the first stage is a drastic deviation from past diplomatic practice of passively joining already-existing international organizations. Although Japan's role in G7 for facilitating international cooperation among advanced countries is better known, it is significant to notice that Japan's early participation in establishing cooperative framework in the aftermath of the FOC is the true turning point.