著者

小阪 裕城

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_43-176_56, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)

参考文献数

53

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This article examines the American Jewish Committee (AJC)’s postwar planning based on “international human rights”. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Zionist movements had struggled to establish a Jewish state in Palestine as a solution for the so-called “Jewish question”. However, every Jew was not Zionist. There were non-Zionist groups in the United States, which had criticized Zionism. Focusing on the AJC, which was one of the most prominent and influential non-Zionist groups in the United States, this paper tries to answer the question of what the AJC aimed to do in the postwar international arena and why their plan did not work as an alternative to the Zionist solution. While Zionist had sought to establish a Jewish state, the AJC had tried to build an international human rights system as another solution for the Jewish question. They thought their plan could contribute to protection of rights of Jews all over the world. The AJC criticized Zionist because creation of a Jewish state was likely to be utilized by anti-Semitism movements and accelerate exclusion of Jews from each country. Therefore, the AJC sought to build an international system based on international human rights as a solution of the Jewish question. However, the AJC’s postwar plan and activities turned out to be infeasible when the relief of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in the postwar Europe emerged as an urgent task before the AJC. The AJC lobbied Britain to admit those Jewish DPs into Palestine; at the same time they insisted that every country including the United States should reform their immigration law system to accept the DPs. It was necessary for the AJC to let those DPs acquire citizenship of any country under the aegis of international human rights system. In reality, such idea was difficult. First of all, the U.S. immigration law system stood in the way of the AJC’s activities. Having been dominated by the conservative GOP, it seemed that it was not easy for the U.S. Congress to allow the Jewish DPs to immigrate into the United States. In addition, because the severe situation in the DP camps in Europe became worse and worse, and because the extreme revisionist Zionists armed forces such as Irgun had escalated its terrorism in Palestine, the AJC could not help but cooperate with more moderate Zionists group, Jewish Agency. As a result, they supported partition of Palestine and creation of the Jewish state in order to relieve the DPs in Europe as soon as possible. Here we can see the transformation of the AJC’s postwar plan and activities.

著者

芝井 清久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_98-180_110, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

42

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This article explores the mutual interaction of nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in Europe and nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in East Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Previous studies separately surveyed European nuclear proliferation and East Asian nuclear proliferation. These studies,however, focusing on one specific area respectively cannot completely answer the question as to why the Soviet Union and the United States changed their nuclear policies as well as to why the results of the nuclear nonproliferation negotiations in Europe and East Asia became symmetric. This is because there is a clear fact that the Soviet Union supported Chinese nuclear development and the United States planned NATO nuclear sharing and the MLF, which partly allowed West Germany to “possess” nuclear weapons at first. In order to answer these questions adequately, I treat both areas’ nonproliferation negotiations as a series of negotiation and show a new hypothesis that the Chinese nuclear issue was dealt promptly to settle the West German nuclear issues. The Soviet Union, which greatly feared that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons, indicated that it would discourage Chinese nuclear development in return for the United States to do the same regarding West Germany’s nuclear policy. The Soviet Union promoted building trust with the United States and succeeded with the result of West Germany ratifying the PTBT and the NPT. In contrast to Europe, East Asia failed in achieving nuclear nonproliferation. What are the causes of such a symmetric outcome? West Germany and China both needed nuclear deterrence for their national security, especially against threat from the Soviet Union and/or United States. The United States offered West Germany security assurance and kept mutual confidence, but the Soviet Union unilaterally demanded that China abandoned its nuclear development in order to promote nuclear nonproliferation negotitations with the United States without any compensation. This act resulted in losing China’s trust because the Soviet Union’s top priority was to stop West Germany, and thus treated China’s nuclear issues as one of the means to achieve this goal. Does settling West Germany’s nuclear issue in the form of mutual cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union indicate that their negotiations were excellent? If we turn our eyes towards the correlation between European negotiations and East Asian negotiations, we can understand that they are not necessarily superior negotiations like non-cooperative games which all countries gain profit, but rather,unequal negotiations that the cost for the agreement in Europe was passed to negotiations in East Asia, and the European negotiation became one of the causes of the failure of nonproliferation in East Asia.

著者

臼井 陽一郞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_16-182_29, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

37

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The paper revisits multi-level governance (hereinafter: MLG) in the EU in both theoretical and empirical terms. For theoretical reconsiderations, it examines some reasons why MLG has been so attractive to many scholars working on EU politics during almost the past quarter century. Two points are noted:first, MLG studies posit that the transformation of a national sovereignty has emerged in the EU; second, we have found the so-called “a governance turn” in EU studies around the year 2000, which leads our concerns to investigate the EU day-to-day institutional practices. These MLG studies have drawn our attention to the following relative transformations of power: from a state to a societal organization; from a central government to a local/regional government; and from a national government to an international organization. The paper argues that this type of a polity image, in which a national sovereignty has been transformed, is hard to be found in EU’s political practices of MLG.For its empirical survey, the paper analyses the conceptualization of MLG in the EU, drawing on the 2014 Multi-level Governance Charter of the Committee of the Regions and the 2014 Conclusions of the Council of Ministers on Macro-Region Strategies, and then investigates two typical multi-level governance practices of cross-border cooperations: the Macro-Region Strategies (MRS) and the European Neighbourhood Policy Cross-Border Cooperation (ENP CBC). From these examinations of policy documents, the paper suggests an over-interpretation of multi-level governance studies that regards the EU as a multi-level polity. What has been found in the EU is not a legally established multi-level institutional complex, but just only a political slogan that tries to instigates voluntally cooperative practices among various levels of governments.On the basis of these theoretical and empirical considerations, the paper finally pays attention to two critical viewpoints of preceding studies against MLG. The first points out that MLG damages European democracy in terms of both representativeness and accountability; and the second suggests that MLG studies posit a political harmony in horizontal and vertical governmental interrelations and thus underestimates power politics in which an ideology, such as neo-liberalism, becomes prevalent.In concluding remarks, the paper suggests one notable point in MLG, which is an opening of a political field for mutual learning of practitioners going beyond national borders. This multi-level practices are exactly what Ian Manners suggests as a source of normative power Europe in his paper of 2002. What we need to see in MLG is not institutional complexes for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations, but a sustainable training system for learning a partnership among practioners trying to make European policies.

著者

湯川 拓

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_126-176_139, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)

参考文献数

49

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The balance of power has always been conceived as being closely connected with realism, in the conventional International Relations literature. In particular, realists believe that the balance of power is the result of alliances being formed within the international system, by nations in their pursuit of self-interest. In contrast to the conventional literature, this paper emphasizes the role of the balance of power as a behavioral norm, within the international society. To be more specific, it sheds light on the fact that the balance of power provides moral and obligatory standards for the members of international society to adhere to. At the same time, it has also contributed to public interest within international society. Although the normative balance of power first made its appearance in the 18th century, the current balance of power (observed in contemporary international society) does not bear the role of a behavioral standard. Two relevant questions which we should consider then, is (1) at what point in time exactly, and (2) in what way exactly, the balance of power norm waned in terms of influence. This paper aims to answer these two questions. Its main finding is as follows. This paper stresses on the legitimacy of the balance of power norm (within international society) as being key to answering the two research questions above. In the 18th century the balance of power referred to the need to maintain an equal distribution of physical military power, as a norm that was necessary for ensuring stability in the international society. Some necessary conditions for the balance of power to exist as a norm in the 18th century were the absence of disputes over legitimacy, and the recognition (or achievement) of a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the members of international society. When the balance of power came to be established as a norm in the earlier half of the 19th century, it was perceived as contributing to homogeneity in international society. It referred to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international society, vis-a-vis the sustenance of a particular regime, rather than the balancing of physical power. It finally lost its appeal as a norm during the latter half of the 19th century and after the First World War, when new principles of legitimacy such as nationalism and democracy appeared. The various different meanings implied by the term ‘balance of power’ tell us multitudes about the type of world order which was deemed desirable by the international society, under different situations.

著者

池内 恵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.186, pp.186_169-186_172, 2017-01-30 (Released:2017-04-07)

著者

武者小路 公秀

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.42, pp.138-139, 1970-11-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

楠 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_171-174_174, 2015-09-15 (Released:2015-07-28)

著者

大嶋 えり子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_103-184_116, 2016

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<p>Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.</p><p>In the 1990's, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.</p><p>This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called "memory laws (lois mémorielles)", is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.</p><p>I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the "Algerian war law", replaces the term "the operations in North Africa" with "the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco" in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the "repatriate law", pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the "positive role of the French presence abroad".</p><p>This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France's responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.</p><p>The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims'memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.</p>

著者

松岡 智之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_117-184_131, 2016

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<p>With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state's superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the <i>ex-ante</i> uncertainty of any conflict's outcome (namely,the target's defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states' threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.</p><p>Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states' interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that <i>power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself</i>.</p><p>Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state's power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state's existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state's resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state's compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer's resolve is in doubt.</p><p>In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict's outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. <i>Ex-ante</i> uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor's relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. <i>Ex-ante</i> uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.</p><p>For example, while a stronger state's increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer's resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.</p>

著者

稲生 典太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.180-182, 1962

著者

長岡 新次郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.6, pp.26-38, 1958-07-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

44

著者

岡田 勇

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_173-181_176, 2015

著者

若林 千代

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.10-27,L5, 1999

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In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.<br>This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.<br>On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought &ldquo;self-government&rdquo; institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.<br>The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a &ldquo;primary base, &rdquo; for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its &ldquo;self-government&rdquo; program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a &ldquo;democracy&rdquo; and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the &ldquo;prewar political institutions&rdquo; with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a &ldquo;primary base&rdquo; and develop a governing structure that would facilitate &ldquo;exclusive rule&rdquo; by U. S. Forces.<br>The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the &ldquo;Nimitz Proclamation&rdquo;

著者

鶴田 綾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_43-180_54, 2015

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Shared histories are one of the most crucial factors in constructing ethnicity and nationhood. Redefining what to remember in new socio-political contexts is important for nation-building and reconciliation, especially after mass violence including genocide. However, this redefinition poses some problems. First of all, a country's official history has been rewritten and exploited by power; historians have warned that governments exploit history in order to justify their rules and to silence dissenting voices. Secondly, it is not easy to deconstruct a previous version of historical narratives associated with past ethnic violence and replace it with a new one. Rather, the content of the new narratives can be problematic since there is a danger that it may aggravate existing ethnic conflicts. If so, what kind of historical narratives are needed in post-conflict circumstances in order to avoid further violence?For 20 years since the genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994, a vast amount of literature has been published to explore the background and process of the genocide. Recently, scholarly attention has gradually been shifting to post-genocide issues including transitional justice, national reconciliation and state-building. However, we cannot fully understand post-genocide Rwanda without putting it into a historical context and paying attention to the continuity of historical narratives.This article examines the historical narratives in colonial, post-colonial and post-genocide Rwanda. First, the assumption of the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' that the Hamitic Tutsi were superior to the Bantu Hutu and that Rwanda was a centralised kingdom of the Tutsi affected the European policy of indirect rule. Based on the hypothesis, the Tutsi leaders in late colonial Rwanda claimed that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa had lived peacefully as Rwandans and that the Europeans had divided Rwandans into ethnic groups. The first Hutu administration in the post-colonial period claimed that the Tutsi were foreigners and not authentic Rwandans and that, since the Hutu had been so oppressed by the Tutsi, they needed to liberate themselves by means of revolution. President Juvénal Habyarimana, who overthrew Kayibanda and established the Second Republic in 1973, also claimed the Hutu authenticity and the legitimacy of 1959 Revolution. The ideology of the 1959 Revolution was widely publicised and contributed to ethnic division, which together with other political, economic and social factors, led to the genocide in 1994. After the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front regime has returned to the narratives of the previous Tutsi leaders and emphasised pre-colonial 'national unity' and the 'invention' of ethnicity under Europeans during the colonial period and the European manipulation of the Hutu Revolution. Compared with research previously conducted by researchers, all of these historical narratives that powers in Rwanda have had from the colonial era to the present have emphasised certain aspects of the past and neglected the others, partly contributing to the escalation of the ethnic conflict. Thus, in order not to rekindle the ethnic conflict but to avoid future violence, the new historical narrative should be more nuanced and comprehensive.

著者

松嵜 英也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_83-180_97, 2015

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The de facto states in the former Soviet Union established the effective rules of the territories throughout warfare. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transnistria in Moldova claimed independence from each republic. The republics have not reigned these regions to this day. These divided areas have claimed independence, but have failed to gain international recognition. As a result these regions have become the de facto states. Transnistria is of special interest in these entities. Although Transnistria did not become the autonomous republic in the Soviet Union, this region was able to establish "state". How Transnistria did build the de facto state during the disintegration of the Soviet Union?The purpose of this article is to analyze the political process of the state building in Transnistria. I especially focus on the United Council of Work Collectives, known by its Russian acronym OSTK (Ob'edinennyi Soyuz Trudovykh Kollektivov). OSTK took the initiative to separate from Moldova. Previous studies have analyzed diplomatic and military assistance from Russia to Transnistria, autonomous systems in Soviet Union and so forth. However previous literatures have paid little attention to internal political process and the agency which led to Transnistria's de facto separation. In this article, I examine the movement of OSTK about the session from Moldova under the condition that Moldova also separated from the Soviet Union.This article first analyzes the formation of OSTK and the protest against the laws of the language. OSTK was composed of work collectives and established in Tiraspol. Then I conduct process tracing about the state building in Transnistria with a focus on the idea of OSTK. This plan became clearer in connection with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and separation of Moldova from the Soviet Union. Especially after the referendum to remain within the Soviet Union in Transnistria, the idea of OSTK was decided on the formation of the new republic within the Soviet Union.However this was different position from Moldova. Moldova decided independence from the Soviet Union. The gap between Transnistria and Moldova did not fill even after the Transnistria conflict broke out. I also point out that the idea of OSTK justified military intervention from Russia during Transnistria conflict. In this conflict Moldova could not sovereign Transnistria and signed the cease fire agreement. As a result this gap has been frozen. The Conflict has not unresolved and Transnistria survived to this day as the de facto state.

著者

黒田 友哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_85-182_97, 2015

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<p>Today, it seems that the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is at a turning point. During the Cold War era, the status gap between the European Community (EC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was quite large. In fact, the EC was considered to be highly institutionalised and the most developed region, while ASEAN was considered as an association of developing countries. However, in the post-Cold War era, the status of Asia as compared to that of Europe has significantly risen. The establishment of Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 among heads of states as 'equal partners' is a striking example. In addition, ASEAN will have a community in place by the end of 2015, while Europe has struggled from its sovereign debt crisis to such an extent that it showed its eagerness to learn even from Asian countries. Finally, the EU is now expected to play a role as a 'soft power'ally with ASEAN.</p><p>Based on multiple archives (French, German, and EC archives), this article retraces the course of EC/EU–ASEAN relations, from the origins of ASEAN until the establishment of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of 1975, considered as a formal institutionalisation of EC–ASEAN relations. It aims to clarify why and how this formal institutionalisation occurred. Actually, in 1972, an informal dialogue between the EC and ASEAN began. Thereafter, in June 1975 the regional organisations established JSG between the European Commission and the ASEAN member states. It can be interpreted as a precursor to the EEC-ASEAN cooperation agreement signed in 1980, in that this event is in certain times considered as a 'turning point'.</p><p>EC/EU–ASEAN relations have been widely discussed. The existing research derives mainly from political scientists. Most early research has stressed ASEAN as a 'stepping stone' to the 'Asia-Pacific' region, in other words, an economic valuation of ASEAN as the reason why the EC deepened its relationship with ASEAN. Other studies have underlined ASEAN's value as a reliable partner to break an impasse in the North-South negotiations. However, existing literature ignores a strategic aspect. This article establishes the decisive strategic reason for the EC to have chosen a formal relation with ASEAN: to have a substantial presence in a region where US presence declined after the Vietnam War. This viewpoint is especially supported by Sir Christopher Soames, British Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Relations. Focusing on this strategic aspect, based on the method of diplomatic history, this article also tries to analyse the impact of international contexts such as the Asian Cold War and North–South affairs on the EC's decision-making process.</p>

著者

中谷 直司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_111-180_125, 2015

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What was it that eventually put a period to the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the beginning of the interwar years, a treaty that had been the most successful treaty in East Asia to that moment, through two victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First World War of 1914–1918? As many previous works have claimed, was the strong pressure from the United States decisive in terminating the alliance? Or else,as some British works in relatively recent years have argued, was the opposition of the United States no more than the last push to bring down the curtain on the arrangement, if discarding the alliance had already become all but a foregone course in London by the time Washington made clear its opposition?This study will challenge both accounts. First, it will show that the American opposition alone was not and could have not been enough to put an end to the alliance, even though this opposition did indeed create the international dispute itself over whether or not the alliance should be continued. At the same time, the study will deny that London was almost independently decided on the matter. The British government did need something external to help it with its decision; however, that was not the increase of American pressure but the restoration of the credibility of America's commitment to a new international order-building program, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. To this point, American diplomacy had had trouble displaying this commitment, due to the country's failure to join the League of Nations that the US itself had conceived.Therefore, secondly, this work will emphasize the serious dilemma that the British alone confronted in the international politics that led to the lapse of the alliance. That dilemma can be well understood as a variety of the "security dilemma in alliance politics" very well known to IR students. Major previous works,especially in British research, believe that Japan consistently held the alliance to be more significant than Britain did until the last day of the treaty, because the former gained greater advantages through an alliance with the leading power in world politics. However, this study will largely revise this view by describing both Britain's international political dilemma and Japan's diplomatic changeover in the aftermath of the Great War.

著者

藤山 一樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_30-180_42, 2015

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This article explores how the British government agreed in the summer of 1922 to fund their debts owed to the American government during the First World War. Since the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side in April 1917 until June 1919, British debts to the U.S. subsequently swelled to approximately $4.3 billion. After the war, the American government firmly insisted on swift repayment by the Allies of their war debts; and they suggested that U.S. economic assistance for European reconstruction was not to come until the debtor countries settled their debt questions with the U.S.Nevertheless, the British government continued to avoid funding their debts since 1920. Claiming on a general cancellation of all the inter-Allied debts, the Lloyd George government declined even to acknowledge their financial obligations. Chief Cabinet members such as the Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the War Secretary Winston Churchill were concerned with the impact on the domestic economy (and public opinion) of expending a vast sum of money; they also wished the Americans to take a more lenient position over the war debts.A sea change in the British policy of the war debt question came in 1922, when European relations reached its nadir in regard to German reparations. The French sought to enforce on Germany the strict execution of the reparations obligations of the Treaty of Versailles; meanwhile, the Germans, undergoing hyperinflation, persistently demanded a moratorium due to its chaotic economic condition at home. Then, from May to June 1922, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Horne and the British Ambassador at Washington Sir Auckland Geddes convinced the Cabinet that such deadlock in the Continent did require some external assistance from the U.S., the largest creditor nation, and they pressed for an early Anglo-American war debt settlement in anticipation of some U.S. commitment to the European problem. Around the same time, the U.S. Ambassador at London George Harvey assured Lloyd George and Churchill that a debt settlement would lead to Anglo-American cooperation to tackle problems in Europe. In July 1922, the Lloyd George government finally consented to dispatch a British delegation to Washington for starting negotiations on conditions of repaying their debt to the U.S. After the British determined to fund their debts to the Americans, Anglo-American relations again stood on a sound footing, which could be a stimulus to their joint effort over German reparations toward the subsequent Dawes Plan of 1924.

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_68-180_82, 2015

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This article examines how Japan, Britain and China considered the intervention of the League of Nations into disputes between the Powers and China from 1920 to 1931, focusing on the problem of Chinese governmental representation in the League.In 1920, in order to avoid becoming involved in a boycott against Japan, Britain decided to deal with the Shantung Question in the League if this was submitted by China. Britain also considered the intervention of the League as an option after the Washington Conference, because it did not expected much from cooperation with the other Powers.Japan initially left room for dealing with the China Question, excluding the Shantung Question, in the League if the Powers agreed. However, after the Corfu Incident in 1923, in which Japan had been involved as the president of the Council, Japan came to fear being criticized by small Powers in the Assembly of the League in case of a dispute with China. On the other hand, China came to recognize the importance of the Assembly in appealing to world opinion.Thus, there were major differences in the position of these three states. However, the political situation in China altered British attitudes toward this problem. In 1926, the Kuomintang government started the Northern Expedition to overthrow the Beiyang government, the internationally recognized central government of China at that time. While the Kuomintang government expanded its territories and clashed with the Powers, the Beiyang government represented China in the League until its collapse in 1928. Because of this, the League was temporarily paralyzed in dealing with the China Question. Britain, therefore, regarded appeals to the League as useless, so it bypassed the League in sending troops to Shanghai in 1927. When the Kuomintang government submitted the Jinan Incident to the League in 1928, Japan tried to reject the case for the same reasons as those raised by Britain. Japan, securing consent from Britain and the Secretary-General of the League, succeeded in preventing the League from intervening in the dispute.After overthrowing the Beiyang government, the Kuomintang government assumed the right to represent China in the League. Therefore, Britain returned to its former attitude of accepting the discussion of the China Question in the League. In 1931, Japan tried to prevent the League from intervening in the Manchurian Incident. However, the Council accepted the case of China and decided to discuss the matter. This is mainly because the problem of Chinese representation, which had until then blocked the intervention of the League in China, had already been dissolved.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_1-173_14, 2013-06-30 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

44

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This special issue is an attempt to analise transformation and features of postwar British foreign policy in various decades and to review the role it played in postwar international relations, taking perspectives of global history into account. The 11 articles deal with a broad range of topics covering British policies towards Africa, Middle East, Europe, Asia including Japan, the US, the Eastern side of the Cold War, and the UN. They also focus on various fields of policies including decolonisation and cold war; trade, currency and aid policies; conflict resolution; propaganda and cultural relations; opium control; nationality and immigration control; and role of the queen. All these contributions are solid empirical studies based on multi-archival research. The main objective of the postwar British foreign policy can be summarised as maintenance of her influence and prestige as a world power, despite her declining military and economic power of which the government was well aware. For this goal, the British government is observed to have pursued multi-layered pluralisation of its foreign policy as follows. In terms of regional focus, Britain not only tried to balance her relations with ‘the three circles’ which Churchill had called, namely, Empire/Commonwealth, the English-speaking world (especially the US),and united Europe, but also grew to attach importance to further two circles, namely, wider Asia including non-Commonwealth countries, and the United Nations, with all of the five ‘circles’ having overlaps. The field of policy expanded to include keener development assistance, publicity and cultural relations, what can be named as ‘normative diplomacy’, and royal family’s foreign relations, with some utilisation of the experiences before and during WWII. The policy styles also diversified with more emphasis on multilateral relations, coordinating/guiding role as a third power with restraining influence on the US, informality and ‘personal approach’ to promote understanding, and ‘power-by-proxy’ policy not only with the US but also with other third actors such as the UN and Japan. These new approaches seem to have enabled the British government to take a calmer and wider-angled position towards issues in the postwar global society. In addition, due to the history of accepting migrants from former colonies and having interests spread abroad, the British foreign policy has been ‘reflexive’ with domestic repercussions or pressures. In addition, the lasting ‘imperial mentality’ with closed perception of Britishness might prevent Britain from maintaining her global role. As an editor, I hope this special issue sheds a new light on the role of Britain in the global society and will help to attract even more scholarly attention to limitations and possibilities of the British foreign policy.