著者

篠﨑 正郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_17-199_32, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

96

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Michael W. Doyle offers three main explanations for imperial expansion: the first being a metropolitan model, the second emphasising peripheral problems and the third based on the systemic model. The British Empire was dismantled by the early 1970s, but Britain resumed military engagement from the mid-1970s. Although this is not imperial expansion, the second explanation is appropriate: Britain renewed its commitment to the former imperial area because of its involvement in the local crises.Some crises in the former imperial area included those in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Caribbean Sea and the South Atlantic. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy had maintained its presence since 1968, and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was organised in 1974. This squadron and pro-Soviet forces in the littoral states posed a threat to Western interests. In Belize, there was the possibility of an invasion from neighbouring Guatemala in 1975 and 1977, and Britain was obliged to reinforce the garrison; Guatemala was demanding over a third of Belizean territory, and the dispute was not successfully resolved. In the Falkland Islands, the tension between Britain and Argentina increased in the late 1970s, resulting in the British government being unable to withdraw its ice patrol ship, which had merely maintained a token presence, and dispatching a task force during the 1977 crisis. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought a regime change that was no longer pro-Western. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created tension in the Persian Gulf and put both the United States and Britain on alert. Then, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 endangered the passage of merchant shipping through the Straits of Hormuz or within the Persian Gulf, resulting in the United States, Britain and France starting zonal patrols. All these crises lead to a study of Britain’s priority two commitments (i.e. its commitments outside NATO). However, it was not until the Falklands Conflict in 1982 that the British government decided to maintain its power projection capability, including three aircraft carriers.Why did Britain resume its commitment? It is difficult to find the cause in the metropolitan model, since the trade between Britain and the Commonwealth dwindled in the 1970s and the British economy was in decline, often cynically called the ‘British sickness’. It is also impossible to explain it using the systemic model, in light of the fall of Britain and rise of the Soviet Union and the Third World. Therefore, the local crises are the most persuasive argument for the reason for British engagement.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_166-199_174, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

13

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_100-175_114, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

参考文献数

49

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This article traces the historical contexts of international politics study from the 19th century to the present in China, and explores the background and possibilities of ‘China model.’ The China model has been argued in the academic circle in China after the latter half of the 1990s, in order to interpret Chinese foreign policy more clearly and efficiently under its own historical and cultural contexts. It was the 19th century when China started to make contact with the international law and diplomacy. At first, Chinese officials recognized them as tools and device to negotiate with western countries. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese government utilized concepts of modern international relations,such as sovereignty, independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, to protect and maintain its existence as a nation. Such behavior was succeeded by the PRC, such as the five principles for peace. However, the PRC kept a distance with western concepts of international politics, and began to import a series of Marxist theories and concepts it from the Soviet Union. After the Cultural Revolution, the PRC gradually resumed to receive western theories and concepts of international politics. Thus, the PRC basically kept the basso continuo of Chinese diplomacy, such as importance of sovereignty,independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, but its main theories and concepts were from Marxist studies. After new western studies were gradually imported to China, the basic situation did not change very much. After the 1990s, the so-called rising of China, it needed to interpret and explain its policy to the world more efficiently. At that time, Chinese scholars realized that it was difficult to do so by utilizing Marxism and new western studies. Therefore, many started to explore new ways, and promoted the China model with historical and cultural contexts in China to interpret its own foreign policy. However, the arguments regarding this new model were losing its objective and their bearings.

著者

宇田川 光弘

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.186, pp.186_113-186_128, 2017-01-30 (Released:2017-04-07)

参考文献数

38

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After 60 years of the history of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA), two approaches stand out as the main philosophy of Japan’s foreign aid – aid for developing nations’ self-help and human security, as recently expressed in the Development Cooperation Charter of 2015. While ‘self-help’ was much emphasized around the 1990s, when Japan emerged as a top donor, ‘human security’ has been regarded as more important element since the early 21st century.This essay argues that the relationship between self-help and human security has been ambiguous in Japan’s aid policy. While self-help is one of the key concepts in the analysis of the realist approach (such as Kenneth Waltz) in the theory of international politics, human security is in the more liberal or humanitarian tradition. Furthermore, it does not clear who makes ‘self-help’ efforts in economic development. Japan’s aid philosophy assumes that the developing state (or government) makes efforts toward development, but in reality, the government of developing states may not work for the interests of its peoples. In this case, the self-help efforts of individuals may end up with no returns for them. It is pointed out that Japan, relatively homogeneous, regards nation’s self-help as natural and normal, but the introduction of two level analysis – state level and person level – makes clear that many developing states have divisions within the state, and self-help efforts by all sectors of the state rarely happen.In recent years, Japan has more emphasized the importance of ‘human level’ in development, by adopting human security in its development aid. However, there is no coherent explanation or examination how this notion of human security relates to self-help efforts. Human security has become more important in recent years, because the state itself can become the source of threat to peoples, or the state cannot protect its peoples from the various threats, such as infectious diseases, financial crisis, terrorism, and refugees. Despite the fact that Japan introduced human security in its aid policy in the late 1990s, Japan’s contributions to human security area has not been adequately recognized, because the majority of Japan’s aid money is still spent for the establishment of economic infrastructure, and given in the form of yen loan.Emerging donors, including China, often take a similar approach to international aid, emphasizing the respect for recipient countries’ right to independently select their own path of development. It seems odd for Japan to stick to the aid principle similar to that of undemocratic emerging donors, particularly with regard to the fact that Japan’s political relations with China, which received substantial amount of Japanese aid, have been more tensional in recent years.

著者

粕谷 真司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_65-199_80, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

82

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This article explores the British initiative to improve European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early years of the Thatcher government. EPC was a framework for foreign policy cooperation among the member states of the European Community (EC) established in 1970. Despite Margaret Thatcher’s reputation as pro-American and opposition to European federalism, Britain played an active role in shaping EPC’s evolution. In October 1980, Lord Carrington, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, proposed EPC’s improvement. After a year of negotiation, the Foreign Ministers of the Ten adopted the London Report in October 1981. The London Report codified existing arrangements in EPC. It also contained a wide range of improvements such as EPC’s full association with the European Commission and the establishment of a crisis procedure.This article demonstrates that the British initiative had two objectives. First, Britain needed a more effective EPC in order to pursue British and wider Western interests. Britain, under Carrington’s leadership, attempted to launch European initiatives in international problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Britain’s view, these initiatives were intended to complement US diplomatic actions that would serve not only British but also Western interests in general. Therefore, Britain felt the need to improve EPC, as it was neither strong nor stable enough framework to conduct major foreign policy initiatives.Second, Britain expected to overcome its isolation in European integration process by showing its constructiveness in EPC. Since the mid-1970s, Britain had been isolated within the EC as a result of a renegotiation of its EC membership and its absence from the European Monetary System. In the early years of the Thatcher government, acrimonious disputes over the British budgetary contribution led to Britain’s further isolation. By contributing to the development of EPC, Britain tried to prove its “Europeanness” and overcome its isolation in European integration process.This article also reveals that Britain fell into a difficult situation in the course of its initiative. In January 1981, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher launched a major initiative to create a “European Union” through the establishment of “Common Foreign Policy”. The British government feared that support for Genscher’s initiative could be criticized by anti-marketeers in Conservative supporters. Also, Britain worried that Genscher’s initiative could lead to the loss of a flexible character of EPC and lessen freedom in the conduct of British foreign policy. As a result, Britain stopped overtly displaying its “Europeanness”. While Britain contributed to the making of the London Report, it failed to overcome its isolation in European integration through the initiative.

著者

山口 航

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_46-188_61, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

88

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The former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established “the Comprehensive National Security Study Group” in 1979, which mainly consisted of Japanese leading scholars and government officials. However, the term “comprehensive security” was not invented by him, but was already well known to Japanese people at the end of the 1970s.Many previous studies have discussed the concept from various points of view. However, they have not explained in what ways policy-makers accepted it and regarded it as an integral factor in Japanese security policy.This study focuses on the impacts of comprehensive security on policy-makers, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which was in charge of general security issues. It clarifies the situation in which comprehensive security appeared, explains what perceptions the ministry had of the concept, and shows how international and internal factors in those days influenced those perceptions, using declassified Japanese and U.S. government documents.It also pays attention to the different forms of security, focusing the discussion on the attempt to establish the “National Comprehensive Security Council” during the Zenko Suzuki Administration at the beginning of the 1980s. Comprehensive security did not simply comprise military security – i.e. security in the narrow sense – but also economic security, food security and others, i.e. security in the broad sense. At the same time, into comprehensive security was integrated anything that did not otherwise fall into the category of security.These elements contributed to jurisdictional disputes. The differentiation of security led other ministries and agencies to become concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was interested in economic security, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, among others, was concerned with food security.At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manifest interest in comprehensive security. Its main concern was security in the narrow sense because of an administrative dispute with the Japan Defense Agency. This study shows how it started to become involved in comprehensive security, and demonstrates what impact the differentiation of security had on ministries and agencies.Previous studies have regarded the Japanese government as a single actor, and have not revealed the differences between ministries and agencies. This paper demonstrates that for the Japanese government, the concept was not monolithic. Even though ministries and agencies were allied on the surface, they had different opinions and objectives. By investigating the acceptance of comprehensive security, this study aims to clarify the implications of this concept in the context of U.S.-Japan relations in the last phase of the Cold War.

著者

徐 博晨

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_136-197_151, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

39

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China’s lending to many developing countries, including countries of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, is currently of great interest. Many of these loans do not conform to OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance. This article focuses its agenda in the various occurrences in which the Chinese government’s lending policy was criticized in the international community, analyze the reaction of the Chinese government amidst such circumstances, and discuss the risk of foreign aid in the context of controversial between developed donor countries and developing donor countries.China’s external loan, which has been rapidly expanding in recent years, has been mainly invested into the infrastructure construction of developing countries. Due to the opaqueness of its policy process and the attachment with Chinese companies, there is an increasing level of criticisms both from other donor countries such as Japan and from recipient countries. Although there is a view that the “over-lending problem” could be seen as great power politics, this article wants to pay attention to the situation where lender countries, for the first time after the end of the Cold War, act with fundamentally different logic.Many of the developed countries set a strict criteria for recipient countries, and yet implement assistance that provide high-level incentives. On the other hand, China does not care as much about good governance and environment nor about human rights situation, though it does loan with relatively high interest rate. China is not bound by the framework of DAC and the Paris club. Not only does China argue that it should not be criticized for the “over-lending problem” from the viewpoint of development aid, but it even claims that the past development aid model is absurd to follow. By challenging the international norm of foreign aids, China aims to maintain its liberty in development projects and pursue its own political and economic agenda.The size of China’s foreign aid is still small and not competitive with Western donors. Compared to Japan, which has maintained the world’s top spending on aid over the 1990s, China as a donor country has only limited share in global aid expenditures. However, this article argues that the mingling of international politics and presumed agenda with the foreign aid and debt problems, loan from China is affecting international society more than any other non-OECD donors. The international regime of ODA, China’s foreign policy, as well as domestic politics of recipient countries are allowing Chinese loans to raise reaction and influence bigger than their monetary size. While countermeasures against Chinese lending were also deployed by the Western countries including the United States, this distortion that international politics brought to foreign-aided economic development would eventually cause additional risk for both donor and recipient countries.

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_101-200_118, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

48

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This paper focuses on the main theme of this 200th volume of International Relations: What is the ‘common challenge’, and what is the ‘shared approach’ among all scholars who belong to Japan Association of International Relations? The exploration of this macro-scale issue is taken by the perspective of International Cultural Relations, which seems to effectively deal with the core assumption of this theme.To start with, part 1 configures the systematic understanding of the whole questions, which takes the form of typical dialectic of universal/particular dualism of the discipline: globally universal one International Relations on the one side, and nationally divided many International Relations’ on the other. Also, part 1 pays enough attention to the recent tides of multilingualism and multiculturalism within one scholar or within one national IRs. Then it analyses recent researches on the nature of past and future IR in Japan and future vison of Global IR. Those precedent research has not reached to the further important vision of the global structure of IR, and the paper tries to construct that.Part 2 discusses one of the two main accounts of the basic structure of the discipline of science in general, by examining the researches of Hiroyuki Yoshikawa and Ichikawa Atsunobu. The first is about the theoretical aporia of IR, based on the irrelevances which stems from both the nature of social science / humanity, compared to that of natural science, and the consequence of theory making from the different views toward a given area. Also, this analysis seeks to break through such aporia by making a totally new discipline, which should be called Global Relations.Part 3 explains the second one, which is the theory of interaction between two culturally or lingually different disciplines devised by Kenichiro Hirano and Yanabu Akira. The theory is based on the premise that regards the encounter of two disciplines as mutual ‘encounter’ between the unknown, and that emphasize the unique function of Japanese language which accepts any kinds of foreign concepts through translation.Part 4 introduces the same challenge in the field of global history by Masashi Haneda and tries to acquire some useful implication for advancing the discussion. His contention about the ideal image of making global history through multilingual interaction of different system of knowledges, and rendering asymmetrical power structure between English or western languages and non-Western language including Japanese has ample implication to IR world, which has much asymmetrical relations between English language and others. The concluding section summarizes the whole argument and seeks to suggest the future vision for the future of ‘Japanese’ International Relations.

著者

新垣 修

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_65-190_80, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

100

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Armed conflicts between government forces and other armed groups may become humanitarian disasters. As can be seen in the Syrian Arabic Republic, such conflicts are accompanied by large-scale displacement. How do the norms of the refugee regime deal with people who have escaped armed conflicts? This article offers some insights for exploring them by paying attention to the change and formation of norms in the refugee regime.The first section regards an idea of a new approach to fill the gap between the function of the existing norm in refugee regime and contemporary crises caused by armed conflicts. This idea shows that, if the existing norm is amended, individuals who have fled from armed conflicts can be protected as “refugees” in terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). To protect civilians out of their states of origin, this idea proposes the approach to incorporate international humanitarian law (IHL) into the interpretative standards for “refugee” in term of the Refugee Convention.The second section regards an alternative norm of the refugee regime, that is to say, the norm of a temporary refuge. It has been argued that this norm was formed to protect civilian victims such as non-combatants who fled to other states from violence and other forms of threats. One pillar of this argument is that the norm prohibits the repatriation of civilians who crossed a border from a state engaged in armed conflict, where infringements of the principles or rules of IHL frequently occur. It is an intriguing phenomenon that the norm is recently regaining attention at the forums of the United Nations and academia.The third section regards a premise to interpret the language of international law on the norms into the language of international politics. This article explains the principle to restrict access of refugees to the North. This restrictive principle functions to deter the refugee flow from the South.In the final section, this article considers the implications of two norms for refugee regime. Ostensibly, the change and formation of the norms look to extend the scope to protect so that individuals, who flee armed conflict, may be covered. However, it is important to understand how the change and formation of the norms have been promoted in the political context of the asymmetry of power between the North and the South. It is the conclusion of this article that the norms justify the refugee regime to contain people, who are afraid of the tragedy of armed conflict, in the neighboring states and in the South.

著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991

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Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.<br>This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.<br>Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.<br>Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.<br>In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.<br>Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.<br>When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the &ldquo;colonel group&rdquo; after his death.

著者

三宅 正樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.38, pp.105-133, 1969

著者

本多 美樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_161-175_164, 2014

著者

山口 一之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.37, pp.41-53, 1968

著者

クラップ P.

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.52, pp.L5-L41,L3, 1975

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米国政府が琉球列島に対する統治権に固執する立場をとったことは, 多くの面で, 現実を時勢に遅れることなく認知することができなかったことを示す典型的な例である。この立場の擁護論は, もともと1940年代末に打ち出され, 1950年代の冷戦によって補強された。そのさい, 米国の文民及び軍部の指導者たちはともに沖繩を, アジアにおいて朝鮮からフィリピンにつながる米軍の前進基地の要とみなすようになっていた。もちろんそのさい, この前進基地体系は米国の防衛能力の軸をなすものと考えられていた。米国政府内には, すでに1960年代の初期において, 外国の領土の軍事占領を無期限に続けることに対して快よく思わない人も多くいたけれども, 沖繩の軍事的価値を再検討することによって現状の変更を求める協力態勢は1966年までみられなかった。<br>アメリカの考え方が変ったのは1966年から1969年にかけてであるが, それは主として, 琉球列島の統治から得られる特定の軍事的価値と, 日本及び沖繩において増大しつつあった米統治に対する深刻な政治的圧力が取引によって処理可能であるということを慎重に明確化した結果であった。これについての論理的な説明を体系的に求めていく過程で明らかになったのは, 日本の統治下においても沖繩基地の主要な軍事的価値が維持されうるということだけではなく, さらに重要なことに, それが現行の日米安保条約の下で可能であるということであった。沖繩の返還によって失われるのは沖繩における核兵器の貯蔵または展開の権利だけであり, この損失について十分に対処することができた。また, 基地の効用は, 結局は基地が現地住民によって受けいれられるかどうかによって決まることも明らかにされた。さらに, もし返還問題が1970年までに最終的に解決されないのであれば, 日本との安保条約が脅かされる恐れがあった。<br>アメリカにおける沖繩返還論議は, 殆ど政府官僚に限られ, 安全保障上の機密のベールによっておいかくされていた。ニュースとして公表されたのはきわめて少なく, 一般大衆は関心が薄く, 議会から強い圧力がかかったわけでもない。したがって, 論議への主な参加者は返還問題に直接の利害を有する官僚であった。すなわち, 国務省の極東担当局, 駐日米大使, 国防総省の国際安全保障局, 陸軍省, 統合参謀本部であり, 最終的には大統領が加わった。明らかに返還問題は二次的な比重しかしめていなかったのであり, 意見の相違は政府の中級レベルの官僚間で調整された。1969年に, とくに大統領の決定にゆだねられたのは, 核兵器の撤去に対する日本の要求を尊重するという決定だけであった。その時までにこのような決定に対しては, とくに日本との強固な友好関係を維持していくため大統領が自らの責任で行なった決定であっただけに, 軍部からの反対は殆どなかった。

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.28, pp.72-86, 1965

著者

荒 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.210-229,L19, 1999

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General Artemio Ricarte, &ldquo;Vibora, &rdquo; is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.<br>Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the &ldquo;stubborness&rdquo; in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osme&ntilde;a. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called &ldquo;Sakdal Movement&rdquo; in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for &ldquo;immediate, absolute, and complete&rdquo; independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a &ldquo;Quzonista&rdquo; in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.<br>During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.<br>Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, &ldquo;pro-American&rdquo; cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the &ldquo;Peace Army&rdquo;, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.

著者

若月 秀和

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.197-217,L23, 2000

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The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of d&eacute;tente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.<br>The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called &ldquo;d&eacute;tente&rdquo; and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war

著者

小此木 政夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.92, pp.1-16,L5, 1989

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The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.<br>From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept &ldquo;coexistence with Japan&rdquo; but would not permit &ldquo;coexistence with South Korea.&rdquo; With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.<br>However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after &ldquo;squaring up&rdquo; issues from the &ldquo;unfortunate past, &rdquo; &ldquo;limited coexistence&rdquo; short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang &ldquo;game of diplomacy&rdquo; with all its complexity.

著者

高橋 知子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_120-197_135, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

51

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This paper explores its research question on the behavior of China upon its participation in the creation of an international law, where institutions of different issue areas intersect. It establishes a starting point for theoretical research on the relation between the fluidity of international institutions and their effect on states’ interests.As to its potential contribution, firstly, since earlier studies that focus on the institutions’ “evolutions” treat states as homogeneous entities, it is valuable to provide the view from states, who utilize the institutions to pursue their own interests. Secondly, while earlier research on China and international institutions concentrates on the socialization of China in the “western” institutions, this paper highlights institutional fluidity and complexity, and the aspect of China utilizing them from their side. China is a country worth taking up, since it is a state with increasing importance in world order.Methodologically, this research takes up the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which regulates maritime order, and the related international negotiations in establishing an environmental institution on “Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)” under UNCLOS. Qualitative analysis is conducted on the international and Chinese arguments by looking into related minutes, statements and analyses. Related institutions, organizations and international law arguments are also referred to.Having traced international and Chinese arguments on BBNJ initiation, the conclusion is as follows; firstly, they all attempted to preserve their status quo maritime order as the norm, which I labeled as the “first trend”. Meanwhile, there was a “second trend” that aimed at restricting sovereignty by the international institution, which began as an exceptional argument on environmental control over areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). However, when it was time the regulation details be specified, it became clear that they had to agree on concrete points, making it difficult to keep the norm intact. The clash between the two trends is ongoing in the international arena, as can be seen in the discussion on the creation of Area-Based Management Tools, and the specification of Marine Genetic Resources.China was reluctant in undertaking the “second trend” idea at the outset, but gradually committed to its elaboration, as the “third trend” argument on sheer environmental protection also transformed to an issue of maritime order, which questioned whether upholding sovereignty serves as the primary way to maximize state interests. The Chinese interest and the BBNJ process should be further examined by looking at its domestic decision-making process, and the impact of its traditional maritime disputes with surrounding neighbors. Further longitudinal studies should also serve to show how the rising power faces international institutions. However, overall, the “three trends” perspective serve as a heuristic tool to probe the relation of the change in international institutions and state interests.

著者

馬場 優

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_15-198_31, 2020

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<p>The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War. It is said that the cause of collapse was the anti-Habsburg nationalities that inhabited in the Empire and wanted to be independent from the Empire made use of the right of the self-determination that the American president, Woodrow Wilson, declared in his "Fourteen Points" speech in January 8th 1918. But in the article of 10 of the Fourteen Points he insisted that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development". There was not the word "self-determination". What does the word "autonomous" mean for the policy-makers of the Empire and the nationalities? This article examines how the policy-makers of the Empire, specially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, understood and utilized Wilson's principles after the speech of the Fourteen Points in order to rescue their Empire from the crisis of dissolution.</p><p>The Fourteen Points seemed to them a tool for the rescue the Empire. So the then Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, made a speech in support of the Fourteen Points at the end of January. In February the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note in the name of the emperor Charles via Spain to Wilson that the emperor could agree the Wilson's principles in order to bring a peace to Europe. There was a good situation that a negotiated peace would be carried. But in the spring 1918 the United States changed her course and determined to collapsed the Empire. And the German Empire started the military offensive in the Western Front in March. Moreover the meeting between the leaders of the German Empire and the Austria-Hungary in May seemed to the United States that the emperor of the Austria-Hungary became a vassal. When the German offensive failed in August, the Austria-Hungary planned an armistice and peace-talks with the United States on the basis of the Fourteen Points. The policy-makers of the Empire understood that it is important to solve the South-Slav Question to persuade Wilson.</p><p>But in September the United States have already recognized that 1) a state of belligerency exit between the Czecho-Slovaks and Austria-Hungary and 2) the Czecho-Slovaks National Council is a de facto belligerent government. When the Austria-Hungary formally proposed the armistice and peace at the beginning of October, the United States rejected it. The United States insisted that the Fourteen Points was no longer relevant to the future of the Empire. Nevertheless the Austria-Hungary tried to appeal. She declared that she would approve Wilson's opinion about the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. At last she determined to abandon her Allied, German Empire, and to propose a separate peace to the United States. But in the around of Empire the nationalities had declared the independence from the Empire on the ground of the self-determination.</p><p>On 3^rd November 1918 the army of the Empire concluded the armistice with the Entente and the war ended. This was also the end of the Empire.</p>