著者

畠山 京子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_115-181_128, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

67

---

Japan has been increasing its roles in a security field in the post-Cold War era. For instance, it decided to participate in peacekeeping operations, strengthened the alliance with the US and upgraded the peacekeeping missions to one of the Self Defense Forces’ core mission. In 2011, it mitigated the arms trade ban policy—an alleged hallmark of Japan’s anti-militarist norm. This article draws attention to the factors behind such changes Japan made on the security front by examining the arms trade ban policy announced in 1967. Arguing that Japan’s security policy has been largely constrained by an anti-militarist norm,constructivists have emphasized the significance of non-material factors in explaining a state’s behavior. The accounts seemed persuasive during the Cold War era when Japan shunned playing military roles. However, they failed to retain pertinence when Japan began to expand its military role after the end of the Cold War. In contrast, rationalists argue that a state pursues maximization of national interests; the behavior is determined by cost/benefit calculations. The shortcoming of the rationalist account is, however, that they either ignore or take a normative factor as given, failing to explain whether normative factors had an effect on a state’s behavior. By incorporating power considerations among actors, this article elucidates the factors behind Japan’s preference changes from rationalist point of view. It is argued by constructivists that the announcement of the arms trade ban policy and ensuing compliance were yielded by the internalization of the anti-militarist norm advocated by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had acted as a norm entrepreneur as well as a protector. However, the investigation of the power balance between the successive Liberal Democratic Party governments and the JSP shows that they were driven by cost/benefit calculation. The 2011 mitigation made by the government under the Democratic Party of Japan was also precipitated by the calculation. By then, the power of the Social Democratic Party, a succeeding party of the JSP which once enjoyed certain influence during the Cold War period, had become negligible. As opposed to the constructivist claim, cost/benefit calculations, not the regulative effect of the norm, are the decisive factor operating behind Japan’s decision making process. More importantly, it is the power balance between norm entrepreneur and decision maker that largely influences the process of cost/benefit calculation.

著者

篠崎 正郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_29-42, 2011

---

It is widely believed that the United Kingdom had decided to retreat from &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; in January 1968. It planned to withdraw all its forces stationed in South-Eastern Asia and Middle East by the end of 1971. However, the next Heath government made a small change in this policy, left some forces in the area and maintained military commitment beyond 1971. These forces were finally withdrawn by Harold Wilson who was back in power in March 1974. Few studies, however, mention the British forces in the &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; after 1968. This thesis clarifies the detail and the logic through the policy of retrenchment from 1974 to 1975.<br>The Conservative government decided to maintain military commitment in the &ldquo;East of Suez.&rdquo; First, there were still lots of British bases in South-Eastern Asia, Indian Ocean and Middle East though the force level was reduced. Second, the United Kingdom retained the general capability which would be available to be deployed outside Europe. Finally, there were regional organisations like CENTO or FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) which enabled the United Kingdom to cooperate with the local countries.<br>However, the British economy in the 1970s could not support these commitments. Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Defence in the Labour government, began the Defence Review as soon as he entered office. The principal object of the Review was to reduce defence budget from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP in the next 10 years. The non-NATO commitments were preferred to be cut since the British government tried to concentrate its defence efforts in the NATO area. In addition, he also decided to abandon the reinforcement capabilities outside NATO.<br>The Defence Review was so drastic that it needed consultation with allies. However, the negotiations were not easy. Most countries tried to keep the British forces in the &ldquo;East of Suez&rdquo; because they recognised the importance of the British presence. The United States was concerned about the abandonment of intervention capability outside NATO and desired the British presence in the Mediterranean. As a result, the British government compromised with some of these demands and decided to stay in some areas. Apart from this concession, the British government could carry out the withdrawal as it originally planned.<br>This study indicates the British aspect as an &ldquo;Empire detained&rdquo;. British departure was regretted not only by the United States but also by the Commonwealth countries. Britain's retreat from the Commonwealth marks the transformation of British external policy from the world to the Atlantic community.

著者

金 恩貞

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_28-172_43, 2013

---

The Japanese claims against South Korea provoked an intense legal debate at the first Japan-South Korea negotiations and have resulted in the most contentious issue during the early phase of the bilateral normalization talks in the 1950s. Some previous studies on the Japan-South Korea talks pointed out that there was a period which could be regarded as a gap between the talks, namely between the 1950s, when the Japanese claims against South Korea escalated tension among two countries and brought the talks to a halt, and the 1960s, when the actual negotiation started moving with regard to what and how much the Japanese were going to claim. Other scholars have discussed what may have been the Japanese hidden purpose for the claims against South Korea whereby they sought to reduce the amount of the compensation payable to South Korea as well as to use it as "material for negations" in order to respond to the claims of the Japanese citizens repatriated from the formerly occupied territories. In addition, these claims of Japan to South Korea have been under severe criticism to defend the opinions that Japan had not sufficiently reflected on its control over the Korean Peninsula before and during the war.<br>These previous studies, however, have not revealed the legal logic which supported the Japanese government's claims against South Korea. In fact,most of the literature pointed out that the Japanese government lacked a logical policy, causing a misconception that the Japanese government was consistently adopting a passive attitude toward the talks. Moreover, the studies tend to conclude that the effect of interference of the US and the Japanese politicians' perception towards South Korea were the causes of Japan's change in its policy leading to the waiver of the right to claim against South Korea during the break period and to its settlement in 1965.<br>This study aims to clarify what was the logic of the Japanese claims against South Korea and how it was formed. For this purpose, it focuses on the report written by Professor Yasuo Yamashita, a Law Professor at Nagoya University and a prominent international jurist, which was made before the Japan-South Korea negotiations at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report has played a significant role as a basis for the Japanese legal logic. This paper empirically analyses the main issue of Professor Yamashita's logic and the background of his argument in his report. On the basis of this analysis, this study argues that Japan had a concrete vision and strategy with regard to its negotiations with South Korea from the beginning. Contrary to the previous literature, the findings of this paper identify the existence of consistent policy logic on the part of the Japanese government throughout its negotiations with South Korea and this logic had its origin in the formulation of its claim against South Korea.

著者

岩 志津子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.107, pp.43-56,L8, 1994

---

In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.<br>CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of &ldquo;good will&rdquo; to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.<br>Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.<br>Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous &ldquo;Two Thousand Words&rdquo; was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.<br>In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask &ldquo;brotherly aid&rdquo; was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.<br>Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.<br>At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.<br>In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.

著者

後藤 健生

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.68, pp.128-145,L7, 1981

---

Although trade relations between Japan and Australia have been called &ldquo;mutually dependent, &rdquo; there has been some friction since the so-called oil-shock of 1973. Trade relations can work well only when both the production and the demand of the two countries concerned are balanced. The fall in Japanese consumption is the reason for trade frictions in the 1970s. The beef trade problem is one of these cases.<br>The Australian beef industry developed in the 1960s and half of her production was exported. Japan was the second largest market for them after the United States. In early 1974, as beef consumption, which had increased about eight per cent annually untill 1972, decreased 4.2 per cent in 1973, the Japanese government decided not to import any more until beef prices had recovered. This is the &ldquo;first beef dispute&rdquo;, in which the Australian Labour government did not try to retaliate against the Japanese cutback. After the Japanese resumption of imports in 1975, Australia complained about the piecemeal announcement of the import quota.The Japanese government promised that the announcement would be made twice a year, but it announced only a part of the quota in the fall of 1975. The Australian conservative government warned that the Japanese decision might damage trade relations between the two countries and suggested that as a retaliation it would not extend the Fisheries Agreement. This is the &ldquo;second beef dispute.&rdquo;<br>In Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry attempted to minimize beef imports in order to protect the cattle growers' interests and the beef import policies which were formed under the influence of the farmers' organizations and the LDP leaders who supported them. The most influencial factor to increase the import quota was the pressure from the United States. Briefly speaking, relations with Australia have not been considered in the Japanese policy-making process. On the other hand, the Australian policies were influenced by their own internal politics. The attitude of the Fraser government in the &ldquo;second dispute&rdquo; was tougher than that of the Whitlam government because the Liberal-Country coalition relied on the rural electorate. For instance, Mr. Fraser strongly criticised Japan in the fall of 1977 concerning such a minor problem as the long-term announcement of import quotas as his electoral strategy.<br>The government of both countries must play a more constructive role in trade relations as disputes concerning some commodities can be harmful to the general relations between Japan and Australia.

著者

金 成浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_11-195_26, 2019

---

<p>This article discusses how South Korea's "cross-recognition" policy influenced the political structure of Northeast Asia during the 1980's. The "cross-recognition" means that China and the Soviet Union would recognize South Korea in exchange for the United States and Japan recognizing North Korea. With the recent release of official documents from South Korea, Japan and Russia, etc., it has become possible to analyze this subject in more details.</p><p>To answer the question stated above, this article especially focuses on the foreign policies that South Korea tried to implement with Japan, China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the United States from 1983 to 1987 under the Chun Doo-Hwan Administration.</p><p>Many previous studies discussing the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia paid to attention to the Northeast Asian history following the Seoul Olympics of 1988. In contrast, this study points out the importance of historical events that occurred from 1983 to 1987. Moreover, after analyzing multilateral relationships among Northeast Asian countries, it highlights that the beginning of the change in the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia can be linked the events in 1986.</p><p>South Korea tried to improve relations with China through the Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, from 1983 to 1986. South Korea aimed to establish its position in the international society through the 86' Asian Games and the 88' Seoul Olympics. For the success of these athletic meetings, South Korea viewed the participation of China and the Soviet Union necessary. In 1984, therefore, the South Korean government pursued concrete measures towards successful cross-recognition.</p><p>First, Chun Doo-Hwan asked Nakasone to serve as an intermediary vis-a-vis China. China made informal contacts with South Korea. In turn, North Korea was threatened by South Korea's developing relationship with China, thus tried to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union. Two international dynamics emerged in Northeast Asia consequently. One was the trend toward closer relations among South Korea, Japan, China and the United States. The other was the development of a more intimate relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea.</p><p>However, M. Gorbachev, the then Soviet Union leader, began to implement a new form of diplomacy toward China and South Korea starting from the end of 1985 to the middle of 1986. As a result, North Korea's isolation in Northeast Asia became more serious by the end of 1987.</p><p>In general, when considering the transformation of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, one tends to emphasize the role of Gorbachev. However, this study points out that the new Chinese diplomacy, which had begun before Gorbachev's new diplomacy, also played a similarly important role in the transformation of the structure.</p>

著者

増田 弘

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.60, pp.132-153,L7, 1978

---

The aim of this essay is to examine the political aspects of Japan and United States' economic relations in the 1960's as reflected in the Joint Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which convened nine times during the period from 1961 to 1973.<br>In general, the meetings centered on three themes, (1) the bilateral relations concerning not only trade and economic issues but political issues as well, (2) the multilateral relations concerning these same issues, especially those relations with West European countries and the Communist states such as China and the Soviet Union, and, (3) the cooperation in the development of and aid to Third World countries, especially those of south-east Asia.<br>There was agreement on many points: cooperation in technological and cultural fields, problems involving Western European nations, and the allotment of aid to developing countries. However, practically no agreements were reached on the various problems regarding disequilibrium in trade between them in the latter 1960's In those days, Japanese-U. S. trade, which had previously favoured America, reversed itself so that the United States went into the red and Japan moved into the black. In addition, the Sato Government rejected a proposal for textile export restraints which the Nixon Administration considered vital. And finally, in 1971 came the blow of the so-called &ldquo;Nixon dollar-shock&rdquo;, followed by the surprising announcement of the visit of the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China.<br>Thus, when we consider the origins of the various problems in economic relations between Japan and the U. S., we should go beyond the obvious friction generated by the textile exports issue. Rather we must delve more deeply into two very different to understand the problem fully, perspectives of political reality.

著者

増田 弘

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.71, pp.72-92,L9, 1982

---

From the early 1910s, ISHIBASHI Tanzan, a journalist of the &ldquo;<i>Oriental Economist</i>, &rdquo; consistently expressed his sympathy for both the Chinese revolutionary movements and nationalism while criticizing not only the imperialist Japanese foreign policy toward China but also public trends such as the contempt shown toward Chinese people. In addition, he insisted that Japan should abandon all of its colonies including Manchuria, which was said to be a &ldquo;sacred precinct.&rdquo; He argued from various viewpoints including the political, diplomatic, economic, and strategic. The main reasons were as follows. (1) although Japan possessed rights and interests in China, Chinese people continued anti-Japanese movements because their nationalism was deeper and stronger than the Japanese government and people supposed; therefore, ISHIBASHI insisted that Japan abandon those interests in order to trade and co-operate with China; (2) all the colonies such as Manchuria were virtually worthless in economic terms; (3) to hold Manchuria the Japanese government had to over-expand itself militarily; thus, national life became worse and worse; and (4) as a result of Japan acquiring interests from China, Japanese-U. S. foreign relations worsened and Japan was isolated.<br>The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify ISHIBASHI's opinions, the theoretical structure of his arguments, and the controversial declarations he made during the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

著者

張 雲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_1-184_15, 2016

---

<p>No one doubts that mutual mistrust is responsible for the unprecedented dangerous deadlock between China and Japan. There is a wealth of research on Sino–Japanese mutual mistrust. However, the conventional wisdom typically focuses on unique Sino–Japanese relations in shaping mutual mistrust. Over-emphasizing the uniqueness of Sino–Japanese relations has produced an "unproductive intellectual confrontation". In reality, both China and Japan have demonstrated their intentions and efforts for building mutual trust, but the mutual mistrust has deepened. Why has this seemingly abnormal situation happened? The representative case is the failure of the 3.11 disaster diplomacy between China and Japan. Why was such an unprecedented opportunity lost despite the initial relatively high expectations from the both sides? Furthermore, why did disaster diplomacy not contribute much in improving bilateral trust, but rather seems to have enhanced the mistrust between China and Japan? The existing literature seems to be largely insufficient to provide convincing explanations. It is necessary to reconstruct and re-theorize the research on Sino-Japanese mistrust.</p><p>To these ends, this paper introduces, first, the theories of misperception and mistrust in international relations. Then it uses the failure of Sino–Japanese disaster diplomacy around the 3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake as a case study, showing that even the initial gestures of goodwill could be distorted by entrenched biases to produce even more mistrust. Due to the negative mutual perceptions that began to solidify in 2010, even incoming goodwill messages from the other side have been unconsciously filtered or processed to fit with solidifying misperceptions. The fundamental problem originates in the different over-expectations of China and Japan from disaster diplomacy. The lack of timely and efficient communication enhanced the misinterpretation of the other side's intentions, which was followed by frustration and suspicion. When the public and the media have raised frustration and suspicion, political elites have generally lost domestic space to counter mistrust or tensions between states.</p><p>The paper shows that misperception and mistrust can be replicated unconsciously and unnecessarily in many scenarios. There is both theoretical and policy relevance in this project. The project tries to integrate Sino–Japanese relations research with more general international relations studies. In so doing, it would be helpful to provide an alternative intellectual explanation of Sino–Japanese relations with a more universally acceptable understanding. In terms of policy implications, the project will provide insights as to how the process of the formation of misperception and the replication of mistrust between China and Japan have evolved. Lessons can be drawn from this research in order to avoid or minimize unnecessary misperception in the future.</p>

著者

前田 幸男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_147-187_158, 2017

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.132-149,L16, 2001

---

The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.<br>Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia &mdash;Malaysia including Singapore&mdash; was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empire<br>Nationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.<br>Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.

著者

蓮生 郁代

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_126-185_140, 2016

---

<p>This paper aims to deal with the issue of how to limit abuses of power in global politics where there exists no <i>global</i> centralized accountability mechanism. In order to explore recent developments in pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms in global politics, this article examines the demand for accountability of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter, the Council) and its related reform initiatives.</p><p>It attempts to identify the historical transformation of sub-concepts of accountability demanded of the Council through its reform initiatives. In doing so, it will focus on the following two aspects: One is the transformation of actors involved who have demanded accountability of the Council, and the other is the transition of pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms envisaged by each actor to limit abuses of power by the Council.</p><p>The findings of this article are centered on the following three: Firstly, in the theoretical arena, in addition to the seven accountability mechanisms proposed by Robert O. Keohane and Ruth W. Grant in 2005, this article identifies three new pragmatic accountability mechanisms. These operate respectively to limit abuses of power by the Council, <i>that is to say</i>, a "procedural mechanism," a "troop contributing mechanism,"and a "transparency mechanism." Secondly, as far as the delegation model of accountability is concerned, no signs of improvement in accountability have been seen through the supervisory mechanism, although it is the most traditional and mainstream, since 1965 despite repeated reform challenges. On the other hand, in the delegation model of accountability, more innovative approaches such as the procedural mechanism and the troop contributing mechanism have succeeded in contributing to improving accountability since the 1990s. Thirdly, as it concerns the participation model of accountability, introduction of Arria Formula briefing was epoch-making from the point of view of establishing a relationship between the Council and civil society actors (to be classified as the public reputation mechanism). Such relationship has been further tightened by the efforts made by think tanks and NGOs active in disclosing information on Council activities to the wider public (to be named the transparency mechanism). It was even accelerated by a number of lawsuits claiming the unlawfulness of the targeted sanctions related to the 1267 sanction regime (called the law mechanism).</p><p>The author acknowledges that the demand for accountability of the Council is more and more <i>not</i> confined to the composition of the membership of the Council but rather extends to the construction of pragmatic plural accountability mechanisms. This quest is not only identified in the participation model but also even in the delegation model of accountability of the Council.</p>

著者

井原 伸浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_115-128, 2011

---

Many previous studies on the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) argue that regional countries tried to draw Indonesia into regional affairs in a friendly and constructive manner, since Indonesia had been regarded as a potential great power in Southeast Asia. In reality, however, Indonesia took the initiative in the process of forming ASEAN, and thus other member countries changed their opinions regarding Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation. They began by viewing such participation as negative. The Indonesian government, especially its army, believed that it had a natural right to play a leadership role in regional affairs due to Indonesia's potential power, and regarded the regional cooperative body as one of the vehicles to expand Indonesia's influence. Other regional countries, especially Malaysia, had vague but realistic concerns regarding Indonesia's initiative. They were concerned that Indonesia would play a dominant role in regional cooperation and, in the longer term, utilise the forthcoming regional organisation as a diplomatic tool to gain regional hegemony. There has not been adequate discussion of the way in which Indonesia's initiative in the process of establishing ASEAN caused concerns among the members about Indonesia's motives and preferences. Moreover, even the researches that refer to ASEAN countries' mistrust of Indonesia do not clarify the impact of these concerns on the process of establishing the association and, in particular, how the mistrust was mitigated during the negotiation process.<br>This research hypothesises that as a means of gaining sufficient trust to achieve regional cooperation, Indonesia sought to reassure the other states of its intentions by forming an institution in which unilateral acts by Indonesia were constrained. More specifically, Indonesia sought to reassure other future members of ASEAN by rejecting cooperation which would cause tensions with communist countries who regarded the new organization as anti-communist and a pro-Western defence alliance. Moreover, the proposed organization was reassuring to other future members of ASEAN because it was also structurally difficult for Indonesia to gain a dominant or leading role in it. Moreover, through regional cooperation, Indonesia refrained from using its power to inflame tensions among other countries, blocs and specific peoples inside and outside the region. Further, Indonesia's delegation to the founding meeting of ASEAN in August 1967 told other delegates that Indonesia would allow the maintenance of foreign bases in the region, even after the advent of the new organization. This was welcomed by other members not only because their defence depended on external powers such as the US and UK but also because this military presence would likely keep the expansion of Indonesia's regional influence in check.

著者

加藤 陽子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.110-125,L12, 1995

---

At the end of the Pacific War, there were more than 6 million Japanese (this figure includes not only military and naval personnel but olso civilians) scattered in overseas theaters; Korea, Manchuria, China, the Philippine islands, and the islands of the Western Pacific. At that moment, there was no one who dared imagine that Japanese nationals overseas could get back home safely and smoothly.<br>But in fact, 90 percent of them were repatriated by the end of 1949. In particular, 80 percent of the Japanese in former Japanese occupied territory in China, could return by May 1946.<br>This paper focuses on how the disarmament and repatriation policies for the Japanese overseas were made, and why they could be repatriated so quickly.<br>Who had the supreme responsibility to accomplish the disarmament of Japanese nationals and to provide for their repatriation? The Chinese National government troops under Chiang Kai-shek's rule could not carry out this mission. During the anti-Japanese War, the Nationalist government moved into the western regions, far from the coastal araes, so it took time for them to reach Japanese occupied territory.<br>Only the United States had the power and will to govern all the processes of repatriation. But at the same time, she had to solve other problems. First, she was supposed to maintain the pace of her own demobilization. There was strong pressure to bring Americans out of China. Second, she had to consider Manchurian problems. Generalissimo Chiang asked United States to transfer his army to the northern part of China, as quickly as possible, or the Soviet and Chinese Communist Party would have enterd into the vacuum.<br>In short, the repatriation of Japanese, demobilization of Americans, and transportation of Chinese were absolutely necessary for Washington. In order to carry out all these programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mapped out detailed plans for navigating large numbers of LST and Liberty vessels in December 1945.

著者

松岡 智之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_117-184_131, 2016-03-30 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

59

---

With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state’s superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the ex-ante uncertainty of any conflict’s outcome (namely,the target’s defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states’ threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states’ interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself.Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state’s power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state’s existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state’s resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state’s compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer’s resolve is in doubt.In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict’s outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. Ex-ante uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor’s relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. Ex-ante uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.For example, while a stronger state’s increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer’s resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.209-226,L20, 2000

---

This paper examines how and why the rapprochement of Malaya and Japan after WWII occurred relatively swiftly, despite the legacies of Japan's wartime occupation. The rapprochement began in trade, and developed through Japanese participation in Malayan iron mining and Japan's accession to international organizations such as ECAFE, Colombo Plan and the GATT. It eventually reached the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations following Malayan decolonization. Most of the existing literature on postwar Japan's relations with South-East Asia focuses on the American cold war strategy to keep Japan anti-communist. By looking at Malaya that had been under the British imperial control until the end of the 1950s, this paper attempts to shed a new light on the role of Britain and her Asian policy in facilitating the Japanese return to South-East Asia.<br>Though having helped the early resumption of Malayo-Japanese trade, the British, especially the Board of Trade officials and Lancashire industrialists, came to oppose the rapprochement in almost every form, out of fear of Japanese competition in their South-East Asian stronghold. However, by the autumn of 1954, their opposition was gradually overcome by recognition that Britain was unable to assist Malayan development entirely on its own, with her tight manpower and finances stretched worldwide. The British authorities also recognised the urgency of Malayan development as a part of their programme of smooth decolonization which would preserve as much British influence as possible. Here, the British officials in Malaya and Japan played an important role in persuading their metropolitan colleagues to admit Japan's participation in Malayan development to shoulder British imperial obligations.<br>Meanwhile, Japanese premiers such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke saw closer relations with Malaya as one means of breaking free from the deference to the United States in economic reconstruction and regional foreign policies which dated from the Allied Occupation. They also wanted Japan to be welcomed back to international society by the Asians without being seen as an American pawn. They thus embarked on a new South-East Asian policy in closer cooperation with Britain.<br>The Malayan leaders, gaining authority as decolonization proceeded, saw Japan as a new Asian partner and model in their efforts to secure complete independence from Britain. Especially, the Federation of Malaya's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Kishi played important roles in completing bilateral diplomatic rapprochement by 1961. However, not all outstanding issues between Malaya and Japan were settled in the rapprochement process as the so-called &lsquo;blood debt&rsquo; issue arising from Japan's wartime occupation reveals thereafter. The continuity in prewar and, postwar Japanese involvement in Malaya in terms of personnel and their interests also seemed to leave Malayans suspicious about Japanese intentions.

著者

都丸 潤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.120-139,L13, 2006

---

This paper analyses how British cultural policies in South-East Asia changed its scope and nature from 1942 to 1960 as her rivals shifted in the turbulent postwar international environment. The paper looks at both short-term information campaigns and long-term policies aiming at acculturation or changes in perception conducted by various government offices including Foreign Office and Colonial Office, and by more independent organisations such as the British Council and the BBC.<br>Throughout the period, as with the cases of British political and military policies, the primary objective of British cultural policies in South-East Asia was to retain her informal empire in the region despite the tide of decolonisation and Britain's reliance on American economic and military power.<br>From 1942 to 1947, when the main cultural rivals for Britain in the region were the effect of Japan's Pan-Asianism and American influence, Britain made efforts in &lsquo;projecting&rsquo; her traditional political and artistic culture to Japan and areas which had come under the Japanese military administration. As the Malayan Emergency unfolded and through the establishment of the Communist China, Britain placed weight on defending her empire in and around Malaya by short-term propaganda against communist infiltration from China. She also competed with the expansion of American influence and anti-colonial campaign in the region. The biggest challenge to British influence in the region came between 1954 and 1956 as Afro-Asian anti-colonialism, through the Bandung Conference and the Suez War. This challenge made Britain embark on &lsquo;A New Look for Asia&rsquo; and expand its scope of cultural policies with the idea of cooperation with America, Australia and New Zealand. Britain also stepped forward to &lsquo;project&rsquo; modern Britain rather than &lsquo;a country of cathedrals&rsquo;. She went further beyond &lsquo;projection&rsquo; by helping cultural transfer of British cultural elements such as technology and English as universal language and by focusing policy targets to prospective opinion-leaders.<br>In addition, through the interdepartmental discussion of possible withdrawal from the UNESCO soon after the Suez War, British cultural policy-makers recognized the shortcomings of unilateral propaganda and bilateral cultural cooperation, and realized the necessity to pursue multilateral cultural cooperation through international organization such as the UNESCO in order to retain cultural influence in Asia and Africa.<br>The choice of local elites as the main target, encompassing of Japan within the scope of South-East Asia, and social-engineering efforts for multicultural integration within her colonies are also the outstanding and continuous features of British cultural policies towards South-East Asia during the postwar period until the 1950s.

著者

松岡 完

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.130, pp.160-174,L15, 2002

---

The Vietnam War had hardly ended when intensive efforts to &ldquo;correct&rdquo; the war narratives were commenced within the United States. The challenge to the once seemingly established fact that the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat came to its peak in the middle of the 1980s. Revisionists such as the former and incumbent Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan aimed to cure the Americans of the Vietnam syndrome, and to help them regain their self-confidence and a sense of national integrity.<br>The withdrawal of American troops, the revisionists insisted, should never be portrayed as a surrender, instead merely as an American unilateral decision to leave Vietnam. The defeated, if any, were the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. The United States was actually a winner there, for it helped the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam survive for two decades so that other nations in Southeast Asia could develop their economic and political strength. Moreover, American soldiers were always victorious in any encounter with the Communist guerrilla or regular forces.<br>The revisionists believed that the United States could have won at an earlier stage if only it had used its military power in an overwhelming way. The United States was on the verge of triumph by the end of 1972, almost forcing the leaders in Hanoi to accept American terms in peace talks through its massive bombing attacks in central North Vietnam. Then, suddenly, the revisionists argue, the U. S. Congress, intimidated by an unjustified fear of United States inability to win the war, threw in the towel.<br>Political leaders in Washington came under the attack of the revisionists. The United States lost this war for several reasons, namely because the government was unable to offer the American people a definite war objective, placed exceedingly unnecessary restrictions upon the military, failed to demonstrate sufficient will to win, and was unsuccessful in fully mobilizing the public behind the war effort.<br>American mass media, including television, was another target. The correspondents were criticized for being too young and too inexperienced to grasp the reality of battleground and sometimes too naive to shelter themselves from the influence of the Communists' propaganda. Hence, their reporting across the Pacific contributed to serious increases in anti-war sentiment back home, which in turn caused extreme damage to the American war strategy.<br>The majority of the American people were, however, far from being persuaded by such revisionist arguments. They knew that they had never fulfilled their objective of building a strong and viable anti-Communist regime in Vietnam, that they had been responsible for the South Vietnamese deficiencies, that winning in a shooting war had been irrelevant to the political future of the country, that the results of truce negotiations could hardly have been American triumph, and that blaming politicians and reporters merely was a means to protect the military from further criticism. That is why, to the regret of the revisionists, the memory of defeat in Vietnam still haunts the American people.

著者

鹿 錫俊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_62-187_79, 2017

---

<p>China's transition process in its manner of approaching the Anti-Japan War history (known as the Second Sino–Japanese War in China) in different stages is characterized by the following features. (1) From 1949 to 1978, "history" was understood to be Revolutionary history; the Anti-Japan War history was not accorded much importance and addressing historical facts was determined by political considerations. (2) From 1978 to 1989, even though the Anti-Japan War history received greater emphasis, it was mainly necessary to counter historical revisionist currents in Japan and work toward unification with Taiwan; further, all this while, China was committed to maintaining friendly relations with Japan. (3) The era of rocketing patriotism that began in 1989 witnessed a steady increase in the Chinese emphasis on the history of the Anti-Japan War; thus, currently, along with countering historical revisionism from Japan's viewpoint, domestic political considerations, modifications to foreign policy, and a revised perception regarding the two countries' relationship in the wake of China's rise as a major world power are the main driving forces.</p><p>China's approach to the history of the Anti-Japan War is not a simple historiographical problem; the fact that it is a general problem with a high degree of political sensitivity suggests that, for the reasons provided below, it is one that is fraught with side effects for the Chinese authorities. First, the close relation of the Anti-Japan War's history to a more multifaceted history implies that the rise of interest in the former will not stop with the China–Japan relations but will highlight the Communist Party of China's (CPC) history and its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT). On the other hand, the diversification and increased availability of sources of information indicates that information with a bearing on history can no longer be controlled as in the past. Thus, the expanding interest into historical problems associated with the anti-Japan war's history suggests that the Chinese populace is gaining awareness regarding some historical facts avoided by the ruling authorities until now. Second, applying a "proper view of history," which China had demanded from Japan, is certainly also being demanded from China. Thus, how China recognizes and responds to its own history has been questioned inside and outside the country.</p><p>Manifestation of these side effects is palpable in the China–Taiwan dispute regarding claims to leadership in the anti-Japanese war and the internal Chinese controversy about the authenticity of its "historical nihilism." Considering the China–Japan interactions, China's demand to take a "direct view of history" has not only spurred improvements in Japan's historical awareness but also served to promote improvement in China's own historical awareness.</p>

著者

向山 直佑

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_30-187_45, 2017

---

<p>Since the end of the Cold War, two significant political phenomena have attracted a considerable amount of attention of researchers in political science and related fields: the politicization of history and third-party intervention in domestic jurisdiction matters or bilateral issues. Particularly interesting is the fact that these two not only coexist but are also intertwined in the form of third-party intervention in historical issues.</p><p>Previous studies on historical issues have presupposed that historical issues are bilateral conflicts, leaving studies on the third-party practically nonexistent, and the literature on third-party intervention has largely ignored the motives for it and its effects on the relationship between the intervener and the intervened. This study fills these gaps.</p><p>The case explored in this paper is the issue of genocide recognition of the Armenian Massacre. The predecessor of the Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, allegedly deported and killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians residing in its territory during World War I. The Armenian government and the Armenian diaspora demand that Turkey admit it was genocide and apologize. However, the Turkish government has not offered an apology to date. Consequently, the Armenian side requests foreign governments to officially recognize the atrocities as genocide, while Turkey threatens them with potential deterioration of bilateral ties. This case is the most notable example of historical issues involving third-party intervention and, therefore, the best case for this research.</p><p>The results of this study can be summarized as follows. As for the causes, cross-national and time-series qualitative analyses reveal that the genocide is mainly recognized by countries with a Christian majority and large Armenian communities. International norms of human rights also play an important role.</p><p>Regarding the effects, two aspects of bilateral relationships are examined. First, simple observations of official diplomatic relations show that the Turkish government usually recalls its ambassadors from recognizing countries immediately after recognition, but it sends him/her back after several months, preventing further damage to the relationship. Second, panel data analyses on the amount of bilateral trade and the number of foreign visitors illustrate that there are statistically significant negative effects of genocide recognition, but these effects only last for a few years at most. To summarize, genocide recognition imposes a negative impact on bilateral relations between Turkey and the recognizer in the short run, but the deterioration is only temporary.</p>