著者
山越 裕太
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.192_44-192_59, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
63

This article analyzes how the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) constructed health governance.Regarding the globalizing world, health governance was primarily discussed after the Cold War and it was clarified that functional cooperation was one of its foundations. However, previous studies have not completely verified how functional cooperation evolved into health governance. Therefore, this article examines the interwar period according to the following questions: what is the significance of the co-existence of the LNHO and the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) in establishing health governance; why did the field of health expand from addressing infectious diseases to various spheres; and how did the LNHO contend with the Great Depression.The first section of the article examines how functional cooperation in the field of health was established and why two international health organizations co-existed during the interwar period. The second section analyzes the driving force of the LNHO in seeking health governance. The third section examines how the LNHO constructed health governance through the Great Depression.The article concludes that the construction of health governance did not progress as effortlessly and linearly as reported in previous discussions. Although it certainly developed based on functional cooperation, during the process of the LNHO expanding its activities to various spheres, the states resisted, concerned about the erosion of sovereignty. However, these resistances were overcome by the logic of functional cooperation that promotes cooperation to the extent that can be agreed. For example, the spheres of standardization, interaction between experts, and medical statistics. Conversely, this process had exogenous opportunities. The LNHO was established under the influence of American foreign policy. Its activities were gradually incorporated because of the co-existence of the two international health organizations. The Great Depression—the turning point—served as an opportunity to reconsider the construction of health governance. It gradually became clear that recovery would be difficult by merely continuing LNHO’s activities as usual. Thus, observing the Great Depression’s widespread effect on economy and agriculture, the LNHO expanded its activities to cooperate with organizations in related fields in order to take unified action. The LNHO was no longer limited to anti-disease measures but was required to resolve new issues that had not been considered traditionally. This development was not caused by the extension of functional cooperation. The process from functional cooperation to health governance was characterized by flexibility and robustness. Therefore, health governance was constructed in the interwar period after several complicated circumstances.
著者
齋川 貴嗣
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.192_60-192_75, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
75

This article examines the ideological transformation of intellectual co-operation in the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (ICIC) of the League of Nations in the 1930s. Since its establishment in 1922 as a consultative body to the Council, the ICIC had carried out various projects in the name of intellectual co-operation, which were taken over by the UNESCO after the Second World War. Although growing attention has recently been paid to the ICIC as a pioneer international organization for cultural exchange, most of the historical studies have been confined to European perspectives. In this respect, this article argues that the ICIC’s idea of intellectual co-operation was fundamentally changed in association with the expansion of its activities to non-European countries, particularly China and Japan.When the ICIC was established in 1922, the work of intellectual co-operation was regarded as a transnational enterprise that should be based on the universality of Western civilization and undertaken by individual intellectuals. However, the original idea gradually transformed. This is shown in the two notable projects that the ICIC had enthusiastically undertaken in the 1930s: the Mission of Educational Experts to China and the Japanese Collection. The Mission of Educational Experts to China in 1931 was the ICIC’s first experience to assist a particular government, and in cooperation with the Chinese government it facilitated the reorganization of the Chinese educational system with considerable emphasis on the construction and preservation of Chinese national culture. In the project of the Japanese Collection that started in 1935, on the other hand, the ICIC introduced Japanese culture in the West with the assistance of the Japanese government. Through these projects, the ICIC became aware that intellectual co-operation should be based on the idea of particular national cultures and implemented by governments.As a result, the ICIC formed and presented its two-faced self-image in the 1930s. Firstly, the ICIC was envisaged by intellectuals like Paul Valéry as the ‘League of Minds’ that placed high hopes on the capacity of Western civilization to integrate different nations in the world from a universal point of view. The ‘League of Minds’ was conceptualized in terms of the idea of universal Western civilization as an extension and sophistication of the idea of intellectual co-operation that the ICIC had maintained since the early 1920s. On the other hand, the ICIC crafted another self-image, the ‘League of Cultures’ that Rabindranath Tagore envisioned as an ideal form of intellectual co-operation. While emphasizing not the universality of Western civilization but the individuality and particularity of national culture, Tagore argued that the ICIC should be an organization composed of different national cultures. In this way, the ICIC was fraught with the tension between these two opposing perspectives on intellectual co-operation in the 1930s.The ICIC thus shifted its emphasis in the idea of intellectual co-operation from Western civilization to national cultures as well as from individual intellectuals to governments in the 1930s. This shift can be characterized as the ideological transition from intellectual co-operation to international cultural exchange. Nevertheless, the antinomies that the ICIC embraced, the tensions between the university of Western civilization and the particularity of national cultures as well as between individual intellectuals and governments, have also been taken over by the present UNESCO.
著者
帶谷 俊輔
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_76-193_91, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
64

This article addresses debates about “Reform” of the League of Nations from the viewpoint of Britain and China. “Reform” of the League was one of the contentious issues among the statesman, diplomats and intellectuals in the 1930s. They focused on the pros and cons of collective security and Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations because the “failure” of the League to stop Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Abyssinia threatened the collapse of the League. There were two major opinions in the debate, “the Coercive League” and “the Consultative League”. “The Coercive League” was the course to reinforce collective security to prevent further aggression. Conversely, “the Consultative League” argument was to weaken collective security and induce Germany, Italy, and Japan to cooperate with the League. Deliberations took place in both the Council, which was led by Great Powers, and the Assembly, in which Small Powers could have greater influence. Therefore, this article deals with Britain as an example of a Great Power and China as one of a Small power.The League was centered on the rapprochement rather than the enforcement in the late 1920s. Article 11 of the Covenant was more important than Article 16 in mediating disputes and reconciling belligerents. Britain administered the League Council through “the Concert of Europe,” which consisted of British, French and German Foreign Minister. The League Council was where the Powers consulted with each other. In contrast, China discovered the value of the Assembly as an arena of world opinion.Japanese invasion of Manchuria from 1931 to 1933 destroyed the credibility of collective security and cooperation between the Powers. Furthermore, the Small Powers were irritated by the indecisiveness of Great Powers, especially Britain. Some officials of British Foreign Office began to consider “reform” of the League for the purpose of weakening collective security and reestablishing the superiority of Great Powers over Small Powers after the Manchurian Incident.The Abyssinian Crisis from 1935 to 1936 accelerated this trend. The League of Nations voted for economic sanctions against Italy, but members including Britain didn’t carry out them fully. However, some Latin American members protested against the sanctions because they disrupted trade with Italy. The League Assembly set up a committee to study “the Application of the principle of the covenant of the League of Nations.” Even though Britain was pro-Consultative, she hesitated to revise the covenant. China was pro-Coercive and concerned about regionalizing collective security. The clash between two opinions left “reform” of the League deadlocked in the end.
著者
詫摩 佳代
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_108-193_122, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
72

The United Nations (UN) system has many functional agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO), in contrast to the League of Nations, which only had about 10 technical agencies. Why does the UN system have so many functional agencies? This is partly owing to the Allies’ functional cooperation during the Second World War. By focusing on the interactions among the related actors, this article clarifies how food cooperation among the Allies was conducted, examines how that cooperation was influenced by the League’s food programme, and identifies its impact on the creation of the UN system.Examining the UN creation process by focusing on food cooperation leads us to the identification of two features of the UN system. The first is that the UN system was not necessarily the outcome of easy belief in international cooperation. Through the inter-war experience, the actors realized the cold reality of competition and confrontation in international politics as well as the necessity of military power for securing the post-war international order. At that time, however, it was quite difficult to come to an agreement on a post-war security scheme, which led them to focus intently on food cooperation as a lubricant.The Allies established the Combined Food Board for the purpose of managing food resources efficiently, through which they established cooperative relationships that formed the basis for the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture (UNCFA) in 1944, the first international conference among them. Behind the conference was the realistic calculation that functional cooperation regarding food would gradually lead to an agreement regarding security problems, and the former was much easier to establish than the latter. That expectation was proven correct when functional agencies, including UNESCO and WHO, were established in succession after the UNCFA, and the Allies finally agreed on a post-war security scheme at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. In this way, war-time food cooperation formed the basis for an agreement on the post-war security system, which was backed by a realistic school of thought.On that occasion, non-state actors such as academia or international bureaucrats played a crucial role, which is the second feature of the UN system. They had high expectations regarding functional cooperation as a breakwater for power politics and the basis for international peace and security. Those actors with similar post-war concepts formed a transnational network under which they materialized their ideas and appealed to Allied policymakers to have them realized. In current international politics, the transnational actors are also playing remarkable roles in such undertakings as the Mine Ban Treaty and the Paris Climate Accord, the beginnings of which can be found as early as the UN’s inception.
著者
藤井 篤
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_123-193_139, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
67

This article examines how the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC) struggled to perform its humanitarian mission in responding to the Algerian War, of 1954-1962. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 define rules concerning the protection of wounded and sick soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians in armed conflicts of an international character, and their Common Article 3 stipulates that these parties should be equally protected during armed conflicts not of an international character. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, it was not clear whether or how this measure could be applied to a colonial conflict, yet from the beginning of the conflict, the ICRC made efforts to offer its humanitarian services to all involved parties in the spirit of the Conventions, trying to preserve its principle of neutrality in the midst of antagonistic politics among parties with an extreme imbalance of power and resources. In order to achieve its mission on the battlefields of Algeria, the ICRC had to approach both the French government, which was determined to defend French Algeria, and the Front of National Liberation, (FLN), which sought the abolition of colonialism and Algerian independence. On the one hand, many Algerians suspected to be terrorists came to be arrested by police or were forced by local governors to live in “accommodation camps,” and with the consent of the French authorities, the ICRC was able to dispatch a total of 10 missions during the war to visit accommodation camps for Algerian prisoners of war and civilians, and investigate the living conditions and treatment of the detainees. As the result of the ICRC’s repeated investigations and reports, considerable improvements were made to the material aspects of living conditions of these facilities, although torture and other violence to Algerians continued in and out of the camps throughout of the conflict. However, the ICRC encountered extreme difficulties in offering the same service to the FLN, which was waging a guerrilla war and so lacked stable camps for French captives in Algeria, and the achievement of its mission to the FLN was therefore very limited compared with their services at the French facilities.
著者
安達 亜紀
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_17-180_29, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)
参考文献数
47

Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been recognized as a leading actor in international environmental politics. In chemicals policy, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals) regulation that came into force in 2007 captured global attention and was recognized as a paradigm shift in chemicals policy. For the most part, the thematically relevant scholarly literature has merely focused on the policy-making process at the EU level. However, one of the most significant features of the EU environmental policy implementation process is that it relies predominantly on member states and private actors within these.In the following article, I examine the process of shaping European chemicals policy by focusing on the relationship between the EU and a particular member state—Germany—regarding policymaking and implementation. Since Germany has the largest chemical industry in Europe, it is widely considered to play an important role in the implementation process. My analysis was based on a policy network approach, which allowed me to put forward the argument that the changes in the policy network since the late 1980s were significant and resulted in the further separation between the processes of policymaking and the prospects of operability in the implementation process.During the 1970s, Germany, which had traditionally featured heavily in cooperation and consultation with the chemical industry, had a highly influential position in shaping EU chemicals policy in accordance with German interests and requirements. To compensate for the government’s lack of expertise and power to formulate and implement policies without agreements from key industry groups, policy networks in which the latter participated were developed. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw the Europeanization of chemicals policy; pioneering states, such as Sweden, gained EU membership. As a result, the policy network of the EU chemicals policy was transformed from a “policy community” to an “issue network.” This prevented the leading actors of the former policy network from retaining the previous chemicals policy, where the priority was operability in the implementation process.This caused tangible tensions between Germany and the EU institutions during the REACH regulation negotiations. The precautionary principle is a guiding principle of environmental policy and often considered an important factor in the ambitious risk regulations of the EU. However, Germany, which had put forward the principle at the EU level, was deemed the main opponent during the REACH negotiation process.
著者
泉 淳
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_15-178_27, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)
参考文献数
32

The recent peoples’ movements seeking democracy throughout the Middle East, often referred to as “The Arab Spring”, are a direct form of public protest against the authoritarian regimes in the region. Although the contexts of the movements differ among the countries, their spillover nature strongly implies that the protests are essentially challenging to the regional order, in which authoritarianism has been so prevalent for decades. The U.S., since the inception of the Cold War, has been deeply involved in regional politics by establishing patron-client relationships with local authoritarians to safeguard its own security and strategic interests in the region. This policy has often been conducted at the expense of democratic ideals and caused an accumulation of frustration among local people to this day. This conflict between America’s security norm and its democratic norm lies deep in the U.S. Middle East policy and has been the subject of academic debates. This paper, along with the most of the preceding analyses, supports the argument that the U.S. has prioritized the security norm in its Middle East policy, but pays legitimate attention to how the U.S. has been shaped by the democratic norm. A general preference for democracy could not be easily abandoned in U.S. political discourse, as it tries to maintain legitimacy and integrity in its policy towards the region. Employing a simple matrix chart, this paper presents a macro view of the relationship between U.S. policy preferences and the past regime transformation in the region, with particular reference to the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes. Provided here is an assumption and its fulfillment that the U.S. has been unwilling to take strong measures to democratize friendly authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for fear that the regimes might lose their pro-U.S. orientation and the regional stability might be put at risk. At the same time, the U.S., mindful of sacrificing its democratic norm and the peoples’ aspiration for freedom, devised a policy of applying gradual reforms to friendly authoritarian regimes. This policy has two apparently opposing features with respect to the same friendly authoritarian clients: on one hand calling for reforms with new institutions (such as MEPI) and increased funding, and on the other, providing substantial military and economic aid or selling arms in huge quantities. This policy mix is effective in maintaining the security interests provided by the friendly authoritarians and, at the same time, satisfying the democratic ideal of the U.S. and the local people to a certain extent, thus giving the U.S. Middle East policy more legitimacy and integrity. This trend of U.S. policy is also noticeable in Obama administration, which is trying to avoid rapid revolution, especially in the pro-U.S. Gulf states. As a result, the democratic movements in the Middle East could not expect much support from the U.S. for transforming the current regional order in the foreseeable future.
著者
末近 浩太
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_1-178_14, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)
参考文献数
32

This special issue, comprising nine research articles and one review article, focuses on ‘Political Changes in the Middle East’. The Middle East today is in a storm of political destabilization, which was triggered by the Arab Spring in late 2010. Regardless of its consequences, such as peaceful democratisation and bloody civil war, the Arab Spring has caused structural changes for both states and society in their domestic politics, which is seemingly leading to a blurring of the lines between regional and international politics. For example, the collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt brought about a realignment in inter-state relations between Egypt and other Arab states, as well as with the US. Thus, Middle Eastern politics and international politics are interconnected, as L. Carl Brown rightly argued thirty years ago. Nevertheless, social science seems to have failed for decades to effectively analyse the interconnections between the political dynamics of the Middle East and international politics. This is mainly because of ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism’, which is deeply rooted in various research fields of social science. It claims that the region is culturally, socially, and historically so unique that it is hard to be studied or understood through general theories of social science, particularly comparative politics and IR; it is, thus, in turn,difficult to contribute to furthering the theoretical development of disciplinary social science, as well as Middle Eastern area studies. Some experts point out that this exceptionalism is due to an intellectual divide between two scholarly approaches—area studies and disciplinary social science. In addition, both approaches, though in a different manner, have a tendency to regard the region as if it is an exclusive ‘miniature garden’ that is insulated from the remainder of the world. As a result, two different approaches have developed separately, one focused within the region, the other, outside the region. In search for a new analytical perspective to bridge such a methodological gap, this special issue attempts to set up two working premises. First, while the Middle East possesses common properties and unifying themes, which ontologically generate its ‘regionness’, and thus can be considered independent and autonomous, it does not exist in a static and uniform way, but has a variable, fluid, and multi-layered presence. Second, the concept of ‘political change’ can be an analytical key to connect various levels of dynamics between domestic, regional, and international politics, as well as to overcome the intellectual divide between area studies and disciplinary social science. In this issue, ‘political change’ is loosely defined as the fluctuation or collapse of long-lasting power equilibrium, such as through democratisation, revolution, civil war, inter-state war, and economic crises. The nine contributions, briefly summarised at the end of this introduction, are all different from one another in terms of their research field, methodology, and case studies. Yet it is clear that all the papers in this issue share a common thesis concerning the above-mentioned problems of ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism’ and the intellectual drive to tackle it. They also seek to take steps towards developing studies on Middle Eastern politics and international politics by focusing on ‘political changes’ in each case.
著者
筒井 洋一
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1988, no.89, pp.42-56,L8, 1988

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of the &ldquo;Antifa&rdquo;, a unique type of labor movement in Germany at the end of the World War II. The KGF in Bremen was one of the most influential Antifas. In contrast to other European countries at that time and to Germany at the end of the World War I, Germay after World War II was not liberated by the people themselves, but by the Allied Powers: most of the Germans were very passive and in the state of political apathy. In such circumstances, the KGF members were rare exceptions, and devoted themselves to the denazification of all the social sectors, the material reconstructions of daily life and the unification of the labor parties.<br>It is true that the KGF arose from the labor movement and spread through it, but finally it went beyond the traditional labor movement: it came to have its own decision and action apart from the labor parties in organizing the members, and it also made much of the so-called &ldquo;basic democracy&rdquo;, which means the decentralized and direct democracy in the lower branch of the organizations.<br>Consequently, it had to face the Military Governments (MG), the German civil administrations and the labor parties. MG and the administrations shared an interest to oppress the KGF, to delay the denazification and to reconstruct the traditional conservative administrations in the pre-Nazis era. At the beginning, the labor parties in Bremen kept step with each other to strengthen the KGF. Unlike most of the rank and file, however, many local leaders were obviously persuaded to pledge loyalty to the national leaders: to K. Schumacher in SPD, to W. Ulbricht in KPD. Their strategies tried to damage the unification policy by the KGF. Members of the split socialist groups criticized furiously this tendency and stood by the KGF. Those who would not agree with SPD nor KPD were too small in number to become the third group.<br>Besides those obstacles inside and outside of the labor movement, the KGF essentially had inner organizational weaknesses. In regard to its member structure, most were recruited from labor movement veterans, not so many from nonpartisans. More importantly, they had no more intentions to make long-range strategy, after having failed to gain unification. Finally they dissolved the KGF by themselves in early 1946. In mid-1940s and 1950s, the labor movement was almost involved in Cold War, neglecting the original ideas of the Antifa. However, we find its analogous type of movement in mid-1960s, when the &ldquo;new social movement&rdquo; appeared.
著者
臼杵 陽
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1994, no.105, pp.30-44,L7, 1994

The aim of this article is to explain the time-lag between two Jewish mass emigrations from Iraq and Egypt in the domestic and regional contexts of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1950s.<br>The Jewish mass emigration from Iraq, on the one hand, suddenly began in consequence of the enactment in 1950 of the law depriving any Iraqi Jew who, of his own freen will and choice, desires to leave Iraq for good of his nationality. On the other hand, the majority of Jews of Egypt, who remained after the Palestine War of 1948, emigrated from Egypt after the Suez War of 1956.<br>Both Iraq and Egypt dispatched their armies to Palestine after British retreat from the mandate, while Israel declared the new Jewish state of Palestine in May, 1948.<br>Iraq and Egypt reacted differently to the repercussion of the 1948 War. Iraq suffered from serious economic difficulties after World War Two, which led to domestic political unrest. The Palestine War provided the Iraqi government with good opportunities to turn the general public's eyes to the Palestine question. After the War, N&ucirc;r&icirc; al-Sa'&icirc;d, the most influential politician in Iraq and advocator of the federation of the &lsquo;Fertile Crescent&rsquo;, utilized the Palestine cause in order to maintain his legitimacy in unstable domestic politics. N&ucirc;r&icirc;'s parochial policy toward Palestine made it more difficult for Iraqi Jews to live in peace. Finally, about twelve hundred thousand Iraqi Jews were forced to emigrate from Iraq to Israel in 1950 and 1951. The oldest Jewish community in the world disappeared.<br>In contrast to Iraq, Egypt did not implement any special policy against Jews of Egypt after the 1948 War. Two-thirds of Jewish population in Egypt did not hold Egyptian nationality. They immigrated to Egypt after the British occupation in 1882. They continued to be foreigners until the nationalization of foreign companies in Egypt after the Suez War. No Egyptian government followed discriminatory policies to the Jews even after the Free Officers' Revolution in 1952. On the contrary, the Officers pursued peace with Israel through secret negotiations after the Armistice Agreements according to recently published researches, which are based upon newly available British, American and Israeli official documents, on Egyptian-Israeli relations.<br>The American policy of the Eisenhower administration influenced both Arab regional politics and secret peace negotiations between Arab states and Israel. The U. S. administration tried to attain a resolution between Egypt and Israel so as to secure a regional cooperation of the Arab states in the south of the &lsquo;Northern Tier&rsquo; upon a concept of the containment of Communism.<br>N&ucirc;r&icirc;, the Iraqi premier, pursued his old concept of the federation of the&lsquo; Fertile Crescent&rsquo; in the framework of the Baghdad Pact under British patronage. British also intended to maintain Imperial hegemony over Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, while Americans considered the Pact as a grand strategy against Communism. This contradiction produced American-British inconsistency in terms of their interests in the area. This situation reflected upon Egyptian-Iraqi confrontatins concerning participation in the Pact and also upon peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel.<br>Israel felt isolated in the above-mentioned regional circumstances. Israel expected the U. S. administration would agree with the supply of armaments. But U.S. were reluctant to supply their arms against Arab interests in their area strategy. Israel, therefore, sought other sources and turned her endeavors to reach an agreement with France.<br>Egypt also sought her arms from the Eastern Bloc, which led U. S. change their Arab policy of supporting Egypt, and finally to the outbreak of the Suez War. After the war, &lsquo;Abd al-N&acirc;sir declared that enemies&rsquo; companies would be nationalized. He also deported British and French nationals includin
著者
土屋 大洋
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_109-125, 2009

This paper analyzes political connections using a method based on network theory. Recent developments in network theory, which have been accelerated by advances in computers and data collection, can be applied to various research areas including physics, information society studies, sociology and other social sciences.<br>This paper uses network theory to analyze networks among U.S. senators who submitted bills related to Japan in the 109th Congress, focusing on cosponsorship of bills. Senators sometimes submit bills with other senators to make them more prospective, to gain more attentions, or just to deal with political bargains. This paper assumes that senators who co-submit bills more often have tighter connections and organize wider networks. Although it is difficult for an outsider to know who has what kinds of connections with whom in politics, it is easier to track who acted with whom in co-sponsoring bills in Congress.<br>The results of the analysis show that Japan-related bills were led by influential leaders in the senate such as Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton and Joseph Lieberman, who played important roles in the 2008 Presidential election. They were active in submitting and co-sponsoring bills and had higher scores in network indexes such as degree, between centrality, and closeness centrality. This implies two possible hypotheses. First, those influential leaders themselves were interested in Japan-related issues. Second, no specific senators were interested in the issues and that is why the influential senators seemed to be leading. These hypotheses should be tested in combination with other analytical methods.<br>Network analysis has three advantages. First, it focuses more on relationships among actors instead of looking at the characters of individual actors. Most of conventional analysis methods look at who actors are and what they do. In contrast, network analysis focuses on who is connected to whom and how. Second, the development of network analysis and data collection could give us alternative perspectives and new results based on large amounts of data. Third, network analysis could be used not only for proving hypotheses, but also for finding new ones.<br>Network analysis can be applied both to case studies in international relations and to enriching the theories of international relations. Actors in international relations vary from nation states (or governments), multi-national or global corporations, non-profit or non-state organizations, and even to individuals. Network analysis tells how they are connected and how they are interacting. It should reveal more dynamic relations rather than stable structures.
著者
西岡 達裕
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_113-192_128, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
28

In November 2016, Republican Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States in a major upset. He was a complete political amateur. Trump won the close election against Democrat Hillary Clinton largely because he carried Rust Belt swing states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. It seemed that his populist, anti-foreign and protectionist rhetoric had attracted white working class voters in the Rust Belt, who had not felt the benefits of globalization.Still, the sudden rise of the amateur politician president is not easy to fully understand. Given that the labor market had recovered from the Great Recession and the U.S. Economy was on a path toward recovery, why and how did American voters give victory to a populist candidate like Trump? To answer that question, we need to understand the 2016 election in the broad context of American history.It is assumed that the rising tide of populism which brought this historic victory to Trump was not the result of a single factor, but rather a set of factors. This article focuses on five factors which have caused populist movements in U.S. history: change in the industrial structure, globalization, a deep recession, distrust of politics, and cultural backlash. This article discusses the 2016 election in association with each of these factors and offers specific examples of populist movements in the past in an effort to reinterpret the contemporary history of the United States.The background of the rise of populism in the 2016 election was public distrust of politics. Outsider Trump successfully convinced voters that he would be an anti-establishment president. If the two major political parties had substantially performed their function of interest aggregation, there would have been no chance for an outsider to win the presidential election. The Republican Party had inherited Reagan’s conservative coalition from the 1980s, while the Democratic Party had inherited Bill Clinton’s center-left coalition from the 1990s. However, the 2016 election marked the end of an era. Trump and his supporters were not so much interested in Reaganism, and Bernie Sanders and the liberal Democrats challenged Clintonism.Since the end of the Cold War, income inequality in the United States has increased markedly, and many people have come to believe that this was caused by liberalization and globalization. American workers have felt left behind by the political system and are demanding major change in that system. At the very least, Trump’s policies should shake up the old architecture of the two-party system.
著者
渡辺 紫乃
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_100-172_113, 2013

China's attitude toward the international order has received growing attention. In the field of foreign aid, the international development assistance regime is organized so that members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), international organizations such as the United Nations, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank share norms and rules of foreign aid. In general, donors are expected to follow these rules when they provide foreign assistance. This paper focuses on the interaction between China and the aid regime and examines the influence of the interaction on each other.<br>As a non-DAC member, China offers foreign aid without being constrained by the aid regime. Since it began in 1950, China's foreign aid has possessed distinctive characteristics and unique practices. Advocating the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, China has assisted authoritarian states or countries under sanctions. China opposes any conditionality but the "One China Policy" to recipient countries. Such an attitude has undermined international efforts to promote necessary reforms and enhance good governance in developing countries. In addition, China's emphasis on pursuing mutual benefits through foreign aid has caused self-interested behavior and has invited severe criticism from the aid regime as well as from recipient countries.<br>Despite concerns from international society, China's foreign aid is an integral part of today's aid landscape. As China's aid presence expands, the aid regime cannot help but engage with China. China's foreign aid and the aid regime are no longer discrete; they communicate bilaterally and multilaterally. The process of interaction has influenced the aid regime significantly. For instance, the World Bank's aid policy toward Africa has incorporated major causes of China's successful development over the last three decades such as infrastructure building and agricultural support. Moreover, China's presence and other emerging donors have led DAC donors to question the validity of official development assistance (ODA) as the mainstream foreign aid. This poses a major challenge to the aid regime.<br>Meanwhile, China has acknowledged growing international concerns over its foreign aid and has started to take concrete measures to circumvent criticism. China has also strengthened its control over Chinese firms engaging aid activities overseas and published the first white paper on foreign aid in April 2011. Despite such efforts, however, there is no full-fledged transformation of China's foreign aid. Instead, China is likely to maintain its foreign aid program without any significant reform in the foreseeable future.
著者
湯澤(下谷内) 奈緒
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_58-171_71, 2013

Building on a growing body of literature in international and comparative politics on transitional justice, this article examines the debate as to whether international criminal justice contributes to peace. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has often been hailed as the culmination of international human rights standards that have been developed and advanced as norms following World War II. Yet the ICC's prosecution activities have been criticized by those who argue that the threat of punishment causes dictators to cling to power, resulting in delaying the end of conflicts or a smooth transition to democracy.<br>This article demonstrates how the "peace vs. justice" debate is rooted in opposing ideas for fostering international peace, both premised on the decentralized nature of international society, and how the tenets for their arguments are being shaken when faced with the reality of international human rights protection. Advocates for international criminal prosecution believe that strengthening centralized law enforcement authority beyond sovereign states will deter future atrocities. Given that a victor's justice is no longer tolerated on one hand and that there is no world government in sight on the other, however, efforts to make credible the threat of prosecution would remain incomplete. Meanwhile those who criticize the ICC as an idealistic endeavor find the basis of international order in bargaining that occurs within sovereign states, but their logic is difficult to sustain because the ICC is making the promise of amnesty, considered crucial to strike a compromise, less credible.<br>The article argues that international criminal prosecution should be understood as part of the international community's efforts to intervene in and improve internal governance of weak, failing or collapsed states. The limits of the ICC lie not just in weak enforcement but in the very act of questioning the legitimacy of leaders who are caught in conflict. International human rights norms encourage democratized states to address past human rights violations committed under previous regimes; however, they do not solve the problem of how to deal with perpetrators who are currently engaged in violence during times of democratization and peace negotiations. To make international criminal prosecution a viable force for the prevention of future atrocities, it must be coupled with assistance to domestic civil society, which has to bear the consequences of these ultimate decisions.
著者
崔 正勲
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_129-181_143, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)
参考文献数
30

Amartya Sen advocated the “Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” or the Liberal Paradox, in 1970. After this, many scholars, such as R. Nozick, A. Gibbard, and J. Blau, tried to prove that his theory was inaccurate in varied manners. However, there has been no critical counter-argument against Sen’s theory, and so his theory has been called a “theorem.” In Sen’s later work, it is argued that the “impossibility” of a Paretian Liberal actually can be overcome. One such method was pointed out by Sen himself six years later: the Paretian epidemic is possibly solvable if an actor of two ones in a Liberal Paradox situation can behave as if it has the assurance-game preference or other-regarding preference, considering others’ rights and the maximization of social welfare. Sen also pointed out that two actors in the Liberal Paradox have the same preference orderings of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which indicates that individual rationality and social optimality can contradict one another. When individual rationality was the decisive factor to make a decision in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the actors would not obtain the most rational consequences in attempting to maximize their payoffs. Meanwhile, they can maximize their social utility if other-regarding preferences take precedence. This article will explore varied implications while applying Sen’s arguments to the First North Korean Crisis, which was an international crisis. Regarding the escalation of tension between the US and North Korea after the end of the Cold War, a contradiction to the Liberal Paradox is found. In the case of the Liberal Paradox, a cycle occurs when two actors who have different preference orderings are confronted totally or partially, and they claim that their preferences should be realized as a social decision regardless of the other’s preferences. While the cycle between the two players can be seen as a deadlock in diplomatic negotiations at the nation-state level, in reality, the US and North Korea showed not only the cycle caused by the crush of the rights legally based on Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but also an escalation of tension beyond the theoretical cycle. That is, in the negotiations, they discussed how to deal with North Korean nuclear development, and they barely avoided a Second Korean War, which would have been the most irrational result. Why and how did the US and North Korea make the choices to escalate tension, possibly leading them to more irrational consequences than the diplomatic stalemate that would have accorded with Sen’s theory? The answer can be found in a hybrid manner between the Liberal Paradox and psychological approaches that posit rational actors can make irrational choices in the decision-making process when actors recognize circumstances in which they face the risk of losing their expected utility. At the end of this article, three implications of applying the Liberal Paradox to the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis will be pointed out.
著者
井上 浩子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_98-185_113, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)
参考文献数
59

This paper examines the development of judicial system building in post-1999 East Timor. Central to the following discussion is an examination of the frictions, overlaps, and interactions between the newly introduced system and locally-maintained laws and social orders. When the judicial system building process commenced, security in local communities was largely maintained by local ‘traditional’ leaders, and conflicts were solved primarily through local conflict resolution mechanisms. Was the local social orders taken into account in the process of judicial system building? If so, how? And how did the local population, living within local social orders, respond to a judicial system built under international intervention?The discussion commences by critically examining the conventional approach to understanding liberal peace-building and state-building. The mainstream literature of international peace-building and statebuilding has often regarded Western democracies as a normative goal of governance, assuming that the construction of liberal-democratic state institutions would, inherently, bring peace and stability to conflict-ridden societies. Such literature tends to overlook the locally-grown ‘traditional’ forms of law,and, moreover, regards the local society and its population as passive objects of the liberal peace-building rather than active participants in the process. Consequently, these conventional approaches tend to fail to appropriately grasp the nature of contemporary state-institution building.Taking local actors and their legal culture seriously, the subsequent sections of this paper examine the development of legal order in post-1999 East Timor. First, the formation of local social orders in Timor-Leste are placed in a historical context that highlights how encounters with external forces, such as Portugal and Indonesia, have resulted in a state of legal pluralism, where a variety of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ laws coexisted in one society. Attention then turns to the judicial system building in post-1999 East Timor. Led and supported by international actors, state-builders tended to focus on ‘modern’ institution building, while overlooking legal plurality, or dismissing the local legal system in East Timor. At first this modern legal system faced difficulties engaging with the local population; the formal courts were rarely used for the purpose of conflict resolution because people continued to rely on local community mechanisms to solve their day-to-day problems. However, in recent years efforts to provide access to justice—such as legal support and financial assistance—have increased interaction between the formal judicial system and the local population. As such, local law and order practices are now in a dialogue with the new institutions, and a process of constructing and reconstructing local legal orders is underway.