著者

内記 香子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_135-200_150, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

84

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The aim of this paper is to explore interdisciplinary international relations (IR) and international law (IL) research on the study of international courts. After the “legalization” theory, the study of international norms or regime complex has received much attention in the IR literature. However, the study of international courts has received less attention. The study of international courts is one of promised areas for research collaboration between IR and IL scholars. In particular, given that we have seen many instances of “backlash” against international courts, such an interdisciplinary approach is clearly needed.This paper provides insights for explaining the relationships between states and international courts. In particular, it addresses how control mechanisms that states impose on the independence of international courts actually operate. There are two existing IR frameworks relevant for the analysis on international courts. One is the legalization concept (and the compliance theory as an effectiveness of legalization) and the other is the principal-agent theory. However, both theories are incomplete to explain the relationships between states and courts. Drawn upon recent work of Dunoff/Pollack and Creamer/Godzimirska, this paper highlights the importance of two insights for analyzing the interactions between states and courts: one is institutional design choices for creating courts and the other is standards for assessing the legitimacy of courts.This paper takes up a recent case of the WTO dispute settlement system in crisis in order to explain why these two insights are important for studying international courts. This paper is not intended to directly address the recent issue of the selection process of the WTO Appellate Body’s members. Rather, this paper attempts to explain how the consideration of court design and standards of legitimacy can help understanding the current crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system.

著者

ゴールドスタイン ジョシュア・S 梅本 哲也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.85, pp.151-192, 1987

著者

川本 謙一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.43, pp.1-24, 1970

著者

高橋 伸夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1990, no.95, pp.63-78,L9, 1990

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The purpose of this paper is to review the changing patterns of Chinese communist perception of the world during the 1950s, focusing on the rise and fall of the theory of intermediate zone. The theory was first articulated by chairman Mao Zedong in an interview with an American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate zone means the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union. The theory contended that not the East-West conflict but the conflict between the American imperialism and the oppressed people of the world formed the main contradiction in the present situation. This view was accompanied by a characteristic notion of international security. According to Mao, it was the bold struggle against imperialism that would promote &ldquo;peace&rdquo; among world great powers. Such a notion marked a contrast with the Soviet attitude which saw &ldquo;The Great Alliance&rdquo; as essential in securing world peace.<br>With the increasing pressure from Moscow to unify ideology within the socialist camp, the term &ldquo;intermediate zone&rdquo; vanished from the Chinese documents since late 1948. But the logic of the theory still influenced the perception of the Chinase leaders until 1952.<br>There were remarkable changes in the framework of Chinase world view after 1953. Firstly, the notion of peaceful coexistence was introduced into the Chinese policy papers. Secondly, the evaluation of neutralism was adjusted. Thirdly, the demarkation of the socialist camp was redefined. These changes altogether modified the previous notion of international security underlying the theory of intermediate zone. Namely, the idea that people's bold struggle against imperialism in the intermediate zone would reduce the probability of world war was replaced by the notion that consultation among the great powers was indispensable for promoting world peace. With this notion on international security, Chinese communist theory proceeded to the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence.<br>In 1958 the theory of intermediate zone was revived. While it emphasized the necessity of daring anti-imperialist struggle in the intermediate zone as it did in the late 1940s, it did not discard the idea that the coordinated effort between the communist nations and the Asian nationalist regimes was effective in eradicating the influence of American imperialism from Asia.<br>The revival of the theory of intermediate zone brought about a discrepancy with regard to the notion of peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and Russians. Although such a discrepancy was relative in character, it was destined to deepen by the transformation of the world system in the late 1950s.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005

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This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on &ldquo;the Middle East in International Relations&rdquo; and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.<br>The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.<br>The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.<br>The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.<br>The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012

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Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?<br>In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.<br>As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the &ldquo;satanic&rdquo; moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.<br>Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.<br>In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.

著者

佐藤 栄一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.80, pp.31-46,L8, 1985

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This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.<br>First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of &ldquo;assured destruction.&rdquo; Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.<br>Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's &ldquo;flexible response strategy&rdquo; to Richard Nixon's &ldquo;realistic deterrence strategy&rdquo;; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's <i>Report of the Secretary of Defense</i> published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of &ldquo;strategic sufficiency, &rdquo; then &ldquo;targeting system, &rdquo; and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting &ldquo;countervailing strategy.&rdquo;<br>Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of &ldquo;damage limitation, &rdquo; another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.

著者

宮岡 勲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_69-179_82, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)

参考文献数

76

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Since the Gulf War, the United States has built up a joint information system, which is interoperable among the military services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The application of information technology to the military system has contributed to maintain the prominent position of the United States in international politics. According to Kenneth Waltz’s theory, however, the United States cannot sit on its laurels. His balance-of-power theory leads us to expect states to emulate the successful policies of others. João Resende-Santos has developed a “neorealist theory of emulation.” This theory contains two noteworthy points. First, the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation vary in accordance with the level of threat in the surrounding security environment. Second, when the option of relying on the capabilities of other states through alliance formation (external balancing) is available, the perception of reduced threat weakens the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation. In other words, emulation, as well as innovation, is regarded as one form of arms buildup relying on one’s own capabilities (internal balancing). However, is the level of threat in the surrounding security environment a really decisive factor of emulation? Do the timing, speed, and scale of military imitation vary with the region of the world? Moreover,don’t states emulate others for the formation and strengthening of an alliance? By verifying these questions,it is possible to contribute theoretically to research on the international diffusion of military technology and ideas, especially the diffusion of information revolution in military affairs, on which little research has been conducted. This article attempts to refute Resende-Santos’ arguments, by analyzing the diffusion of the joint information system of the U.S. Armed Forces to two allies, the United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this analysis, I make two points. First, even in regions where the levels of threat in the surrounding security environment are different, the military emulation of similar timing, speed, and scale may occur. Second, states emulate others not only for their own military buildup but also for the enhancement of their alliance through ensuring interoperability. The body of this article is divided into three sections. First, I describe the development of the joint information systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan during the post-Cold War period. Second, I suggest the diffusion of the joint information system from the United States to the other two countries and present a framework for analyzing emulation, a concept that is similar to but different from diffusion. Third, I consider the emulation of the U.S. military system by the United Kingdom and Japan in more detail.

著者

山尾 大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_29-194_45, 2018

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<p>U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought about not only distortion of state building, but also the problems that affected political turmoil in the Middle East as well as international politics. This paper aims to argue the impacts that the U.S. invasion of Iraq had toward the process of Iraqi state building and toward regional politic in the Middle East, by focusing first on external factors brought about by this invasion, and second on internal factors caused by political rivalry among Iraqi political elites.</p><p>This paper makes three main findings. First, the new regime had no choice but relying on cooptation policy to local leaders in order to stabilize its government, which was quite similar to the mechanism of rule by the former authoritarian Baʻthist regime. The reason of this similarity can be found in the fact that the regime change was brought about by the foreign invasion, and thus new regime had to be constructed by former-exile political elites who did not have any support bases of constituencies within local community. In addition, the introduction of the Western democratic system that political representation should be equal according to population of ethnic and sectarian groups resulted in manifestation of sectarian difference. These external factors caused problems in the building of political institutions.</p><p>Second, Iraqi internal actors deconstructed democratic institutions brought in from outside and began to utilize them according to their own interests. The fact that democratization was proceeded without the establishment of state institutions made it possible for Iraqi actors to use these democratic institutions for their own political purpose. Thus, the new regime had no choice than becoming authoritarian in order to stabilize its government. Moreover, it was unavoidable for international society to ignore this authoritarian regime as it prioritized stability of Iraq.</p><p>Third, this tendency, however, resulted in the spread of opposition movements within Iraq and subsequent loss of control of opposition-led areas. It was these areas where so-called Islamic State penetrated in and agitated sectarian conflicts among Iraqis.</p><p>Hence, it can be said that sectarian conflicts spread inside and outside Iraq as a result of the interaction of the fact that U.S. invasion brought about problems in democratic institutions and the fact that Iraqi internal actors utilized these institutions for their own interests. In other words, when the problems that were brought about by external factors are used as political tools of internal actors, specific problems to the country become manifest, which results in spreading to regional politics in a very violent manner.</p>

著者

青野 博昭

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.16, pp.86-96, 1961

著者

横手 慎二

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.23-36,L6, 2001

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In this paper I will analyze the domestic aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy with a special attention to the Far Eastern states: Communist China, North Korea and to some extent Japan. (I am preparing a more detailed study on the post-W. W. II Japan-Soviet relations in another form.)<br>Many scholars including G. Richter pointed out the existence of the different opinions among the Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin years. However, these studies are overly concerned with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and less attentive to the impact on the Soviet leaders of the other new line which Khrushchev forwarded forcefully, the denunciation of Stalin and his policy. It was the July 1955 plenum of the CC of the KPSS where Foreign Minister Molotov and the First Party Secretary Khrushchev collided over the problem for the first time. Molotov asserted that the Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev should not have accepted the argument of the Yugoslavia party that it was no other than Stalin who was responsible for the rupture of the relations between the two countries. Khrushchev was skillful enough not to make a direct criticism against Stalin at this time only by making long citations from Lenin's writings and ascribing Molotov's objection to his face saving deeds. After Khrushchev's secret speech on the cult of Stalin at the 20th KPSS congress in 1956, Molotov, clearly realizing that both the Chinese and the Korean party leader-ships were bitterly critical against Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist position, was determined together with Malenkov and Kaganovich to relieve Khrushchev of his post of the First Party Secretary. But again Khrushchev displayed great shrewdness by convening the CC plenum and sweepingly dismissing them from their posts as the anti&mdash;party group in June 1957.<br>The important point is that Molotov, having faithfully supported the Soviet-China collaboration policy during the past years, claimed at this plenum that Khrushchev's foreign policy of putting the first priority on the US-Soviet Relations would make the policy of the cohesion of the communist camp difficult. The deterioration of relations between the USSR and the two communist countries of North East Asia, which clearly contrasted with the gradual progress in the US-USSR relations in the following years, fully demonstrated the sharpness of Molotov's argument. By the end of the 1950s, Communist China grew far apart from the USSR. At the same time, North Korea, though moving to conclude its alliance treaty with the USSR, went its separate way with its own unique ideology. (And Japan started to strengthen its security relations with the US.) With these developments in the background, some of the party leaders, who were discontented with Khrushchev's policy, came to realize the validity of Molotov's arguments. We know now that Polianskii, who took the lead in pushing Khrushchev out from the top of the party in the October plenum in 1964, made a party report to the effect that the Khrushchev's US-first policy did damage to the policy of cohesion of the communist camp: especially, to Soviet-China relations. Some of the naive politicians in Moscow thought that they could make use of the dismissal of Khrushchev in order to repair the relations with Communist China. Polianskii, Shelepin, Trapeznikov and others faithful to the communist ideology strongly supported the policy of rapprochement with China. But they met vehement opposition from Andropov, Zymyanin and others who were in charge of the foreign affairs in the CC departments and the Foreign Ministry. These opponents were concerned with the negative effects on the peaceful coexistence policy by adopting the policy of collaboration with Mao Ze-tong, who looked fanatically anti-capitalist in their eyes<br>Thus, Moscow's foreign policy choices in the 1960s were constrained as either a detente policy with the US or that of collaboration with China because of the domestic ideological situation created after

著者

島田 俊彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.34, pp.106-109, 1967

著者

臼杵 陽

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.89, pp.180-184, 1988

著者

臼杵 陽

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.95-107,L11, 1999

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This article focuses on one of the most controversial questions of politics and religion in Israel, that is to say, on the controversial dispute about conversions to Judaism. These is controversy between Orthodox Jews, who have monopolized such Jewish religious matters as conversions and marriage ceremonies in Israel, and Reform and Conservative Jews who have not been officially authorized to carry out conversions and perform weddings in Israel. While Reform and Conservative Jews are the majority among Diaspora Jewry, especially in the United State, they are a minority among Israeli Jews. Reform and Conservative Jews in the United State are entitled to immigrate to Israel as Jews in accordance with the Law of Return, but they are not recognized as &ldquo;true Jews&rdquo; by Orthodox Jews in Israel. The Reform and Conservative Jews are forced to convert again to Orthodox Judaism if they are to enjoy their religious life as equals to the Orthodox brethren in Israel.<br>In January 1998, Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu appointed then Finance Minister Yaakov Ne'eman as chairman of a committee to try and seek a compromise solution among the three major denominations of Judaism (Orthodox, Reform and Conservative) on the question of conversions of Jews and on other religious matters in Israel. The debate of the Ne'eman committee, which was composed of representatives of the three denominations, poured oil on fire with regard to this decisive question of &ldquo;Who is a Jew?&rdquo;, that is to say, who has authority over the question of the definition of a Jew in Israel.<br>First, this paper analyzes the monopoly enjoyed by Orthodox Jews in official religious institutions such as Ministry of Religion, the Chief Rabbinate, Rabbi Courts, and Local Religious Councils in light of the relationship between state and religion. Second, the paper discusses, in the context of the relationship between religion and politics, the political roles of a Sephardi orthodox religious party, &ldquo;Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians)&rdquo;, which has tried to propose legislation establishing a conversion law and a local council law to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset). Third, the paper examines the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee and its repercussion among the concerned parties in Israel and the United States. A preliminary unsigned copy of the commitee's recommendation in November 1998 proposed to set up a joint institute for conversion studies at which Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis would all teach, but actual conversions would be performed only by Orthodox rabbinical courts.<br>In conclusion, since the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee was vehemently refused by the Orthodox-controlled Chief Rabbinate Council, despite the approval of the recommendation by the Knesset, Reform and Conservative movements continued to struggle for the plurality of Judaism in Israel and against the Orthodox monopoly. They petitioned the High Court of Justice to instruct the appointment of Reform and Conservative rabbis in Local Religious Councils.

著者

戸田 真紀子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.159, pp.159_27-40, 2010

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Recently the scholars studying conflict theories or peace building in Africa have tended to neglect the historical perspective of Africa. Without knowing the history of traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms, including slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, we cannot accurately understand serious problems with which African people are now confronted.<br>Coups d'etat are common in Africa. Nigeria in particular, an oil-rich African giant, has experienced the military rule for about twenty-nine years since its independence. Why did the Nigerian officers decide to seize the power? Why did they desire to keep the power for such a period of time? And, why don't they intend to withdraw from the political arena? To answer these questions, we should consider the impact of British rule in Nigeria.<br>The Nigerian army was originally established to conquer the native kingdoms and chiefdoms under the policy of British colonization. British rulers sometimes undermined the &ldquo;rule of law.&rdquo; Later the Nigerian army became the tool for traditional rulers, who started to work for the British rule in order to suppress their own people. New rulers of independent Nigeria learned how to use the military to defend their vested interests during 1960 through 1966. Therefore, it is the negative legacy of British rule that civilian and military regimes had not maintained &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; to save the lives of Nigerian people. So many civilians, being involved in armed conflict between Nigerian army and rebellions, were killed by the army.<br>Samuel Huntington showed two conditions to avoid military intervention. According to him, the civil-military relation may be destroyed if the governments would not be able to promote &ldquo;economic development&rdquo; and to maintain &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; and if civilian politicians would desire to use the military power for their own political ambitions.<br>As to the &ldquo;economic development,&rdquo; approximately 80% of Nigerian people suffer from poverty, whereas the retired generals enjoy their political power as well as financial business with a plenty of money. As mentioned above, the aspect of &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; has been also neglected by the regimes. After independence, civilian regimes used the military for their political interests and led the army officials into the political arena.<br>Therefore, as suggested by Huntington, military intervention may be caused in Nigeria again if the Fourth Republic would neglect the importance of promoting &ldquo;economic development&rdquo; and of maintaining &ldquo;law and order.&rdquo; The Fourth Republic also needs to keep the army out of politics and the politics out of the army to avoid military intervention. Actually it is difficult to meet these conditions, because the group of retired generals still has strong influence over political and economical arenas.

著者

武田 知己

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_7-200_22, 2020

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<p>Japanese diplomacy is often regarded as a diplomacy without grand strategy. This paper doesn't see it that way. The paper finds Japanese diplomacy rich in strategies. In general, a strategy is to make through the interaction between the international perception and identity. The paper focuses on the idea of Japanese Bridge-Building Diplomacy among many and discusses how the idea was coined and shows it had undergone various vicissitudes until the 1950s.</p><p>An early 20th century version of Bridge-Building strategy was coined by Shigenobu Okuma under the name of Fusion of East and West Civilizations. In his theory the Western civilization reached the United States and the Eastern civilization reached Japan and these two civilizations came into contact with the Perry's arrival to Yokohama Bay in the middle of 19^th century. The Japanese with this miraculous encounter, in Okuma's theory, had a vocation to bring Western superior civilization to the East. This idea was translated into Japanese China policy and inherited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and such leaders of the ministry as Shigeru Yoshida and Mamoru Shigemitsu. Although the idea was fully performed neither in the early 20^th century and in the 1950s, this paper shows the possibilities of the revival of the strategy in the coming era of the US-China confrontation in the 21th century and argues the value of inheriting the idea of Bridge Building Strategy as "unfinished self-portrait" of Japanese Diplomacy is eminent.</p>

著者

番定 賢治

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_111-198_126, 2020

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<p>This article focuses on activities of Japanese officials who worked for the Secretariat of the League of Nations (LN), and their influences in the Secretariat as a whole. Not only two Under Secretary-Generals (Inazo Nitobe, and Yotaro Sugimura) were appointed from Japan, but also many young officers (Ken Harada, Tetsuro Furugaki, and others) worked for the LN Secretariat. However, the number of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat and the variation of the sections in which Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat engaged was evidently smaller than those of officers from any other permanent council member States. As for Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat, expertise in policy making is not so much important as ability to adapt themselves to Eurocentric environment of the LN Secretariat, and the main missions of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat were liaison work between the LN Secretariat and Japanese government or Japanese press, and propagation of information about the work of the LN towards Japanese public. However, some Japanese officers were engaged in more various works, such as drafting communiques in some committees of the Assembly, and liaison work between the LN and other Asian nations. Moreover, during their temporary visits of Japan, Japanese officers in the LN secretariat went on lecture trips to promote understanding of the activities of the LN, and Nitobe's lecture trip from 1924 to 1925 led to the creation of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat Information Section, which enhanced propagation of specific information about the work of LN. When the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) invited the LN Secretariat to its conference, Nitobe insisted that this institute and Pan-Pacific movement would be helpful to support the activities of the LN, and Sugimura and other Japanese officers in the LN Secretariats repeatedly insisted the significance of IPR for the LN. In 1927, two officers of the LN Secretariat (One of them was Setsuichi Aoki, the head of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat) was sent to the second biannual conference of IPR. In 1929, when the third biannual conference of IPR was held at Kyoto, Sugimura himself attended the conference. However, at the time of this conference, Sugimura tried to invite the LN representative in the conference to Manchuria and Korea, which indicates Sugimura's intention to lead the LN Secretariat to support the political interest of his home country.</p>

著者

岡倉 徹志

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.73, pp.28-43,L8, 1983

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The purpose of this paper is to present a brief account of the political changes in Syria since the Baa'th first came into power in 1963 and the development of inner-politics from the beginning period of the Baa'th regime to the present. It is also designed to offer an interpretation of these developments to help explain the kaleidoscopic character of the changing relationships among power-centers.<br>In particular, this paper attempts to elucidate the following points: Firstly, in a major intra-party split that took place in February 1966, the moderate wing of the Baa'th party was purged by radicals; this political coup signaled the party's further turn to the Left in policy. These changes only further alienated conservative and pious Islamic opinion. However, the regime's mounting clashes with the West and Israel have temporarily disoriented Muslim opinion.<br>Secondly, after General Hafiz al Asad's rise to power in 1971, the question arises as to how he managed to revise Syria's domestic and foreign policies. By late 1976, however, the regime's policies were faltering and domestic grievances were accumulating; relations between the Baa'th and urban centers of opposition again began to sour, a disaffection that gradually built up into the anti-regime explosions of 1970-80.<br>The regime's intervention in Lebanon&mdash;in paticular, its drive against the Palestinians and the Sunni Left&mdash;required it to suppress domestic opposition, thus weakening its own support base, and antagonizing segments of Sunni opinion, which viewed it as an Alawite suppression of Sunnis in favor of Christians. Most dangerous of all, the intervention seriously exacerbated sectarian cleavages in the army. By the late 1970s, the regime's foreign policy increasingly appeared to have reached a dead end.<br>Finally, the political Islam, the main alternative. to the Baa'th, is now trying to undermine the regime led by the Alawites. If a realignment of political forces, pitting the whole Sunni community on the basis of sectarian solidarity, in alliance with all other disaffected elements, against the numerically much inferior Alawites entrenched in the regime can be attained, the Syrian political scene will change completely its impact affecting the politics of the Fertile Crescent. But this would require breaking the cross-sectarian coalition at the center of the Baa'th state; destroying military discipline and party solidarity; and detaching the peasant, worker, and employee elements at the Baa'th base.

著者

板橋 拓己

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_67-200_83, 2020

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<p>With respect to the international negotiations on the German unification in 1989/1990, not only the massive publication of memoirs by contemporaries, but also the release of historical materials by governments concerned has advanced the elucidation of the event. Existing studies, however, tended to characterize the German unification on October 3, 1990 as "goal" and to assess who contributed to it. On the other hand, more recent studies have shifted the research interest from the "happy end narrative". In other words, they came to regard German unification not as "goal" or "end" but as "start" or "formative phase" of the post-Cold War European international order.</p><p>While sharing the view that the German unification process is a period of the formation of the post-Cold War European international order with the latest research, this paper focuses on the issue of NATO (non-)enlargement. Using newly available diplomatic sources, the author tries to reevaluate the role of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister of the FRG. What is clear from this approach is the differences of visions within the West German government concerning how to end the Cold War and what kind of new international order should be created, and the impact of these differences on actual international politics.</p><p>As shown in this paper, it can be said that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Genscher had consistently envisaged "the ending the Cold War by emphasizing reconciliation with the Soviet Union." The Bush administration, on the other hand, placed top priority on the survival of NATO. After the Camp David talks in late February, the Bush administration and Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the FRG, began to seek "the ending the Cold War based on the preeminence of the United States or NATO."</p><p>Kohl, who strived for the swift reunification of Germany, put priority on cooperation with the United States on security issues. Nevertheless, Genscher continued to stick to his vision. Due to Kohl's rebuke and the Bush administration's pressure, he no longer spoke of the NATO's non-expansion to the east after April 4, 1990, but repeated arguments for strengthening the CSCE and changing the nature of NATO. Ironically, it was Genscher's idea that was subsequently effective in convincing the Soviet Union of a unified Germany's full membership in NATO. Genscher contributed to the end of the Cold War in terms of the "victory of the West" by advocating his vision of the end of the Cold War as a "reconciliation with the East" even after it lost its reality.</p>

著者

細川 真由

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_64-198_79, 2020

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<p>The previous studies have not considered Wilsonianism in relation to French diplomacy, but after the World War I, France played a key role in the League of Nations, from which its advocate, the United States of America, has been absent. Therefore this paper focuses French policies for the League of Nations in order to reexamine "Wilsonianism." From 1919 to 1924, French leaders at first had bad feelings toward the League of Nations or the "New Diplomacy," but they gradually have accepted such conceptions.</p><p>First, this paper examines French leaders' attitude for Woodrow Wilson or his idea for peace. In the Paris Peace Conference (1919), French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, was suspicious of Wilson and his idea, and required the military alliance with the United Kingdom and the United States. And also, he persisted in the military occupation of the Rhineland. On the other hand, at the commission drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations, Léon Bourgeois advocated establishing an international force. However, their proposals were discarded, because the United States had rejected the peace treaty and the Covenant.</p><p>Second, this paper considers French attitude for the League of Nations from 1920 to 1923. During this period, France has looked for a more powerful mechanism of the national security, but each of French attempt for the security was deadlocked. However, in 1923, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Projet de traité de garantie mutuelle) was submitted to the Assembly of the League of Nations. This draft has tried to enforce disarmament and collective security as one, but it broke down because of the British opposition.</p><p>Finally, this paper focuses the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Protocole pour le réglement pacifique des différends internationaux) in 1924. This protocol was strongly supported by the new French prime minister Édouard Herriot. He looked for the alliance with the United Kingdom at first, but British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, rejected his offer. Therefore, Herriot sought to put his plan into practice at the League of Nations. However, after all, this protocol broke down, too.</p><p>As stated above, France has sought to strengthen the collective security, either at the League of Nations or at the bilateral level. From 1919 to 1924, each of French attempt for the security turned out a failure. However, in this period, France gradually accepted the principle of "New Diplomacy." And in this background, there is the unstable domestic situation, such as the fall of franc or the frequent changes of government. Under the circumstances, for France, the value of the League of Nations has steadily been raised.</p>