著者

斎藤 治子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.89, pp.7-23,L6, 1988

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The study of Greek anti-fascist movements during the Second World War has developed since the 1970s. The Colonels' dictatorship dissolved in 1974 and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), outlawed by the dictatorship, was then legalised. Books and articles written by KKE members who had took part in the anti-fascist movement have been published.<br>The anti-fascist movement in Greece had two aims; national liberation and democratization. In 1936 Prime Minister Metaxas secured the assent of King George II to the suspension of the democratic articles in the Constitution and parliament was adjourned without delay. Metaxas outlawed the KKE, introduced censorship and dealt badly with anti-monarchists. He organized the National Youth Organization on totalitarian lines. This quasi-fascism, however, was not popular among the Greeks because of their traditional individualism. Metaxas, who monopolised seven portfolios in the government, had a less massive party than Hitler had.<br>On 28 October 1940 the Italian ambassador handed to Metaxas the ultimatum claiming some important areas in Greek territory, but the latter said &ldquo;No (0 &chi; &iota; in Greek)&rdquo;. He appealed to the people for fierce resistance against the Italian forces invading across the Albanian-Greek frontier. His rejection of the ultimatum and the appeal set fire to the patriotism of the Greeks. For the first time he succeeded in the unification of the nation. Rank and file, young and old, who opposed the Metaxas' dictatorship (4 August Regime), in the front and the rear fought against the invaders. Soon they liberated the occupied territory, and counter-attacked across the border and occupied the Greek-inhabited southern area in Albania which Greek nationalists had long aspired to. The victory has temporarily identified the people with the dictatorship.<br>In April 1941 the Germans attacked Greece assisting the Italians and in two weeks occupied Athens. King and the government (Metaxas had died in January but &ldquo;4 August Regime&rdquo; succeeded) withdrew to Crete, which the Germans occupied in May, and then to Egypt. They established a government-in-exile in London at first, then in Cairo. In the Axis-occupied Greece a puppet government was established, headed by the ex-commander of the Greek Army.<br>Resistance groups were formed during the occupation. They were led by outlawed KKE members or democratic civilians or republicans. The general secretary of KKE had been imprisoned and the party had been divided. The underground and imprisoned cadres decided to unify the party and to organize the nation-wide resistance movement in order to struggle for national liberation and independence. The struggle was also aimed at the abolition of the &ldquo;4 August Regime&rdquo;.<br>In September 1941 the National Liberation Front (EAM) was founded on the initiative of KKE. EAM consisting of four political parties that declared their common struggle against the occupants. Its slogans were national liberation and people's democracy (laocratia).<br>The main object of the article is the analysis of the interrelation between national liberation and social evolution in Greece.

著者

東郷 育子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.115-130,L15, 2000

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When grave human misery such as genocide is committed in a country, should international society intervene regardless of sovereignty? To intervene in the domestic affairs of another nation has been illegal under the regime of traditional International Law. Recently, however, if a certain government seriously violates human rights of his citizens, or rulers clearly do not have the ability to govern, and the media reports of human catastrophes which arouse public opinion around the world, international society has enough and justifiable reasons to intervene in the concerned state.<br>The Gulf War was an important turning point in several respects that brought reform in humanitarian intervention of the Post-Cold War era. First, international society, especially the major powers, showed they could cooperate in taking military actions under the leadership of the United Nations. Second, the bases of permitting humanitarian intervention matured and the media performed an important function in this trend. Third, in order to realize intervention and persuade public opinion, various efficiencies of intervention, such as &ldquo;zero casualty&rdquo; and air raids, as a major strategy, have been important.<br>Success in the Gulf War introduced a more positive concept of humanitarian intervention. Namely, humanitarian intervention does not solely point to military intervention as a means of conflict resolution, but also includes broader methods such as humanitarian actions to prevent conflict itself and peace-building efforts after conflicts.<br>There still remain some questions regarding humanitarian intervention. For example, how should we set the standards to intervene? How can the operators maintain humanitarian neutrality and justice? What is the goal, and to what extent should intervention go? Only after we overcome these questions will the potential to build accountability for humanitarian intervention develop.<br>Humanitarian intervention in the 21st century must operate under the recognition of human conscience and social justice. At the same time it must pursue not self-interest but universal interest. In the medium to long term, humanitarian intervention must eliminate structural conditions and bases of human rights violation. In the long run, it must contribute to peace building and help the concerned state become independent as a modernized and democratized society. All actors who intervene-not only nations, but also regional organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and citizens-should be responsible for this final goal. The question of how we should undertake humanitarian intervention in this global society is indeed to understand how these actors intervene and work functionally in each role to assist the concerned state suffering human misery.

著者

千知岩 正継

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_114-171_128, 2013

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In recent years, some IR theorists have begun to depart from the assumption of anarchy and to shed light on certain forms of inter-state hierarchy. Stimulated by those new studies, this article engages in a discussion on the legitimacy of a global authority which is expected to preside over 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P)' norms.<br>The first part of this paper clarifies the global authority governing R2P norms, and explains its critical importance. Drawing upon the concept of "right authority" in just war traditions, it is argued that a global authority in relation to R2P is supposed to decide whether certain states fail to fulfil their responsibility to protect, and if necessary, to take responsibility for authorizing military interventions for human protection. This will inevitably determine the nature of global order.<br>The following two sections examine both the United Nations Security Council and a proposed concept of "Concert of Democracies" as possible candidates to be the global authority. As a universally agreed legal authority, the Council is entrusted with the fulfilling of R2P principles, and in fact many commentators saw the Council decision in the case of Libyan civil war as its first successful implementation of R2P. However, the Council has critical legitimacy deficits in terms of its selective function to the intractable question of "for whom should the Council be ultimately accountable and responsible?" As for the idea of "Concert of Democracies" it is a reflection of "liberal hierarchy" based on the solidarity of liberal democracies, and presented as a preferred alternative to the illegitimate and ineffective Council. On the contrary to optimistic expectations, it is demonstrated that its exclusive membership and misguided assessment of liberal democratic states behaviour will undermine this institution's legitimacy.<br>In conclusion I suggest two daunting challenges that the Security Council should overcome as the global authority responsible for putting R2P norms into practice. The first is to translate a plurality of values and interests of the Council members into the unity and effective decision making in times of humanitarian tragedies. The other challenge concerns the need for the Council to seek legitimation not only from member states but also from those people severely affected by the Council action or inaction. This might involve a transformation of the Council from globally acting authority into a kind of cosmopolitan authority based on the approval of "we the people" If this is the case, a new form of the Council authority will need further consideration.

著者

益尾 知佐子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_136-180_145, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

9

著者

立山 良司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.25-39,L7, 2005

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Since autumn of 2000 the circle of violence has derailed the Israel-Palestinian peace process. In order to prevent the resurgence of violence both parties had tried to promote security cooperation and form an effective security regime between them, but failed to do so.<br>It is reported that since 1988 till 1998 thirty-eight formal peace accords were signed, and of them thirty-one failed to last more than three years. Various factors, such as security dilemma, existence of spoilers, and intervention by external parties, cripple the implementation of the peace accords, including the Oslo peace agreement. In addition, the asymmetrical relations between Israel and Palestinians have heavily affected the peace process and resulted in its failure.<br>One of the most salient asymmetrical relations is the difference in the nature of both parties. Israel is an independent sovereign state with very powerful armed forces, and has occupied The west Bank and the Gaza Strip. As such, Israel uses its armed forces under the name of invoking the right of self-defense, and has an almost excusive power to determine a future of the occupied territories. On the other hand, despite the establishment of their own self government, Palestinians are still under occupation and struggling for establishing an independent sovereign state. The asymmetrical future also results in a very wide gap between both parties' perceptions of peace. From Israeli viewpoint, a peace should bring an end of any form of violence and eliminate the threat of military and terrorist attacks. For Palestinians, a peace should realize both an end of occupation and an establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Furthermore over the peace process both parties, i. e. the Israeli Government and the Palestine Authority/PLO, have taken even conciliatory attitudes and policies toward spoilers in their own constituencies with the intention to broaden their power basis.<br>A number of proposals and suggestions for a military intervention by a third party have been made, but no international presence in the occupied territories has been materialized. Taking into consideration the asymmetrical characteristics between the two parities, however, an international presence could make valuable contributions to restoring a peace process in the following two aspects. First, an international presence could ease to a certain extent an asymmetrical feature of the relations and reduce the feeling of vulnerability on both sides. And by doing so, an international presence could narrow the gap of perceptions concerning peace. Second Israel and Palestine are no exception that political leaders manipulate security concerns to solidify their positions and extract additional resources from their society and consequently they create and intensify the security dilemma. The introduction of an international presence could decrease the possibility of this kind of manipulations.

著者

山極 潔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.35, pp.17-35, 1968

著者

石川 一雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.86, pp.1-17,L5, 1987

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Ethnic differences are used to be the single most important source of conflict within states, and they are frequently instrumental in arousing critical situations between countries as well. In present day world, the increase of ethnic diasporas and of antagonistic confrontations between or among politicized ethnic groups in most parts of the world, is changing the social and political milieu of the intra- and international relations more than expected. But, the international and, in particular, the trans-state activities of those ethnic groups, have hardly been addressed by students of comparative politics, or international relations. So that the demand for new scholarly efforts to understand their dynamics to find the peaceful and effective management of conflict become urgent.<br>This paper, responding to the demand, is concerned about the political and social configurations of states as serving units to create or sustain systemic ethnic disadvantages and inequalities. And to convey a sense of the generality of ethnic conflicts and to indicate the necessity of the reorientating basic conceptualizations, simultaneously, such concepts as state, nation, integration, and the formation of institutional arrangements are re-examined.<br>Firstly, using the compact illustration of the configuration of ethnic demands and governmental responses, various policy alternatives are relocated and reviewed on the continuum between complete autonomy and complete assimilation. The illustration tells us that ethnic conflicts cannot be expected to be resolved as long as we coexist with different ethnic groups in a single state, and also international frameworks won't be the final alternative to resolve the conflicts. The complete autonomy of ethnically self-conscious groups and their assimilation into the larger social setting in which they find themselves are both no real resolution of the conflicts. The best way of regulating ethnic conflicts has to be found somewhere in a domestic political arena.<br>Secondly, arguing the impracticability of social and cultural unification model both in segmented societies and in international regional systems, the necessity of pluralistic conceptualization of political integration is discussed.

著者

番定 賢治

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_111-198_126, 2020-01-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

47

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This article focuses on activities of Japanese officials who worked for the Secretariat of the League of Nations (LN), and their influences in the Secretariat as a whole. Not only two Under Secretary-Generals (Inazo Nitobe, and Yotaro Sugimura) were appointed from Japan, but also many young officers (Ken Harada, Tetsuro Furugaki, and others) worked for the LN Secretariat. However, the number of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat and the variation of the sections in which Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat engaged was evidently smaller than those of officers from any other permanent council member States. As for Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat, expertise in policy making is not so much important as ability to adapt themselves to Eurocentric environment of the LN Secretariat, and the main missions of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat were liaison work between the LN Secretariat and Japanese government or Japanese press, and propagation of information about the work of the LN towards Japanese public. However, some Japanese officers were engaged in more various works, such as drafting communiques in some committees of the Assembly, and liaison work between the LN and other Asian nations. Moreover, during their temporary visits of Japan, Japanese officers in the LN secretariat went on lecture trips to promote understanding of the activities of the LN, and Nitobe’s lecture trip from 1924 to 1925 led to the creation of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat Information Section, which enhanced propagation of specific information about the work of LN. When the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) invited the LN Secretariat to its conference, Nitobe insisted that this institute and Pan-Pacific movement would be helpful to support the activities of the LN, and Sugimura and other Japanese officers in the LN Secretariats repeatedly insisted the significance of IPR for the LN. In 1927, two officers of the LN Secretariat (One of them was Setsuichi Aoki, the head of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat) was sent to the second biannual conference of IPR. In 1929, when the third biannual conference of IPR was held at Kyoto, Sugimura himself attended the conference. However, at the time of this conference, Sugimura tried to invite the LN representative in the conference to Manchuria and Korea, which indicates Sugimura’s intention to lead the LN Secretariat to support the political interest of his home country.

著者

湯川 拓

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_126-176_139, 2014

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The balance of power has always been conceived as being closely connected with realism, in the conventional International Relations literature. In particular, realists believe that the balance of power is the result of alliances being formed within the international system, by nations in their pursuit of self-interest.<br>In contrast to the conventional literature, this paper emphasizes the role of the balance of power as a behavioral norm, within the international society. To be more specific, it sheds light on the fact that the balance of power provides moral and obligatory standards for the members of international society to adhere to. At the same time, it has also contributed to public interest within international society. Although the normative balance of power first made its appearance in the 18th century, the current balance of power (observed in contemporary international society) does not bear the role of a behavioral standard. Two relevant questions which we should consider then, is (1) at what point in time exactly, and (2) in what way exactly, the balance of power norm waned in terms of influence. This paper aims to answer these two questions.<br>Its main finding is as follows. This paper stresses on the legitimacy of the balance of power norm (within international society) as being key to answering the two research questions above. In the 18th century the balance of power referred to the need to maintain an equal distribution of physical military power, as a norm that was necessary for ensuring stability in the international society. Some necessary conditions for the balance of power to exist as a norm in the 18th century were the absence of disputes over legitimacy, and the recognition (or achievement) of a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the members of international society. When the balance of power came to be established as a norm in the earlier half of the 19th century, it was perceived as contributing to homogeneity in international society. It referred to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international society, vis-a-vis the sustenance of a particular regime, rather than the balancing of physical power. It finally lost its appeal as a norm during the latter half of the 19th century and after the First World War, when new principles of legitimacy such as nationalism and democracy appeared.<br>The various different meanings implied by the term 'balance of power' tell us multitudes about the type of world order which was deemed desirable by the international society, under different situations.

著者

尾上 正男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.12, pp.40-52, 1960

著者

川端 正久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1977, no.57, pp.120-144,L6, 1977

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From the outbreak of World War II to the present time, people in no fewer than 50 countries have resorted to guerrilla warfare or to other forms of popular armed struggle. The guerrilla liberation struggles were begun in Africa in the 1960's, which provide some of the best examples of national liberation movement. The people of &lsquo;Portuguese&rsquo; Guin&eacute; took up arms to free their country from colonial domination in 1963 under the leadership of the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independ&ecirc;ncia da Guin&eacute; e Cabo Verde), led by Amilcar Cabral, its founder and secretary-general.<br>Amilcar Cabral is gradually gaining recognition as the most original and significant African revolutionary thinker to appear since the death of Franz Fanon and Kwame Nkrumah. This reputation is strengthened by the independence of Guin&eacute;-Bissau. Not only did he make notable theoretical contributions to analyzing the reality of his country in the context of national liberation movements, but he also did so in the area of revolutionary practice. The thought of Amilcar Cabral is of primary importance to the people of Africa in the struggles against colonialism and neo-colonialism now going on across the continent. And further, his theories have a great deal of significance for the people and revolutionaries of the three continents. This paper provides a brief assessment of the thought and behavior of Amilcar Cabral. The first part surveys books and articles on the study of Amilcar Cabral. The second part delineates the chronological summary of Amilcar Cabral. The third part traces in outline the thought and activities of Amilcar Cabral.

著者

五野井 郁夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_168-200_171, 2020

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019

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<p>This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.</p><p>To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor's anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan's challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan's peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.</p><p>Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser's reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.</p>

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_59-195_74, 2019

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<p>Termination of war is a "bridge" between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact "restoration" of interstate relationship presupposes "collapse" of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.</p><p>This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of "the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict" and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.</p><p>First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.</p><p>Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.</p><p>Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.</p>

著者

古城 佳子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.119, pp.217-220, 1998

著者

鈴木 絢女

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_66-185_81, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

30

---

Malaysia used to be categorized as one of the “High Performing Asian Economies” for its track record of high economic growth and macro-economic stability, among others. However, recent debates on the Malaysian economy point to slowing growth, being caught in a middle-income trap, persisting income inequality, budget deficit, and increasing government debt after the Asian Financial Crisis. To overcome these problems, the Malaysian government launched an economic-fiscal-distributive reform package called the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010. However, the implementation of the NEM has been faced with a series of compromises and deadlocks. This is surprising given the prior characterization of Malaysia as a “strong state.”This paper aims to reveal the weakness of the state of Malaysia by shedding light on the persisting budget deficit. Based on federal budget documents, the paper argues that the expanding public expenditure is attributed to the increase in the following: (i) redistributive programs, such as subsidy for gas and oil and cash transfers to the lower-income group as a means to earn electoral support; and (ii) particularistic distributive programs that are often allocated by the Prime Minister, benefit Bumiputera businesses and cronies of the dominant governing party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and consolidate the intra-party power basis. In addition, the Government’s failure to strengthen the revenue base given the fear of losing votes can be regarded as another driver of the persisting fiscal deficit.In spite of the NEM’s target of a balanced budget by 2020, the Malaysian government has been failing to implement fiscal reforms. The paper argues that this is a result of the lack of autonomy of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the voters and the intra-party constituency. Malaysia’s leadership has been increasingly sensitive to the demands of its broad and internal constituents owing to increasing electoral competition since the Asian Financial Crisis, glaringly manifested in the 1999, 2008 and the 2013 General Elections. Such a weak state is a historical by-product of a strong state in the 1990s that marginalized intra-UMNO opposition and laborers in order to implement development policies, and eventually brought about a face-off between the governing party that keeps cohesion through distribution of rents, on one hand, and opposition that expanded its support by exploiting the issues of lack of transparency, freedom and equality, on the other.To regain fiscal balance, the Malaysian government is faced with a dilemma. Decreasing budgetary allocation for the lower income group or the intra-UMNO interests will further weaken the government. Likewise, tax raise will turn away voters who are skeptical about the way their money is used. While the promise of fiscal accountability may persuade some of the skeptical taxpayers, vested interest groups would continue to resist such moves.

著者

増原 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_82-185_97, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

47

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Regarding viewpoints on threat perception and civil-military relations, theoretical analyses have generally concluded that under a high internal threat, civil-military relations are unstable and that a high external threat and low internal threat brings about stable civil-military relations. However, Indonesia’s experiences do not support these analyses. During the war of independence era, under the high external security environment, Indonesia’s civil-military relations were unstable because of the disagreements between the government and military concerning negotiations and the guerrilla warfare against the Netherlands. During the Suharto regime, high internal threats caused stable civil-military relations because the threat perception of the military coincided with that of the government.This paper hypothesizes that it is not external threats and internal threats that influence the stability of civil-military relations but whether or not the government and military share the same point-of-view on threat perception. I will prove this hypothesis by analyzing the threat perception of the government and military in Indonesia during the democratization era.After the decline of the Suharto regime, the military officers resigned from political and administrative posts and abolished business activities during the democratization process. The government and military met with domestic threats (e.g., separatist movements, terrorism, and communal violence). While the government tried to solve separatist movements peacefully, the military urged the government to suppress them forcefully. As a result, the difference in the threat perception between the government and military deteriorated the civil-military relations.However, domestic threats almost ended by 2005, and Indonesia began to deal with external threats. One of them was a territorial dispute with Malaysia. In 2002, Indonesia lost two small islands near the border of Malaysia based on the decision of a judge from the International Court of Justice. After the court decision, Malaysia attempted to expand its claim over the oil-rich sea area, which included the Ambalat block near the islands. The Indonesian government as well as many Indonesian citizens resented the expansion and began to view Malaysia’s territorial claim as an external threat. The military also shifted their threat perception focus from domestic conflicts to the defense and management of the border areas. Another external threat that Indonesia has had to deal with is the territorial conflict over the South China Sea. Since 2008, Chinese fishing boats have often entered the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Indonesia around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea; in 2010, Chinese military ships threatened Indonesian patrol ships that had captured Chinese fishing boats and ordered the Indonesian patrol ships to release the fishing boats.In the latter half of the 2000s, the government and military came to share viewpoints on and perceptions of the external threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity concerning the territorial dispute with Malaysia and the South China Sea conflict. This contributed to an increase in the military budget and stabilized the civil-military relations in Indonesia.

著者

毛里 和子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_146-182_149, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

著者

大原 俊一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_49-189_64, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

59

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This paper argues that the German Historical School is the original main stream of thought in classical international political science in the West, and the methodology of this school makes research in international system through historical approach possible. In the 17th century, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Samuel von Pufendorf discussed international political issues. Subsequently early 19th century, A.H.L Heeren initiated the research of international system through historical approach. The German Historical School has ever afterward been interested in the establishment of “system” in the European international order of the period between the 18th to the early 19th century, namely the maturity of the European “states system,” because it acknowledges that the European “states system” that mainly matured in the 18th century has formed the core of the world order up to the present.The first research field in the area of international system through historical approach is history of thought on international politics as “intellectual history.” In the 18th century, the theoretical evolutions of international law in the German-speaking countries, including studies by noted philosophers Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel, and the intellectual evolutions in the French-speaking countries, including studies by the noted political theorist and philosophers Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, formed the twin main streams of thought in this intellectual history. In addition, the intellectual evolutions in Britain included the studies of the noted philosopher. historian, and economist David Hume, which formed another stream of thought. They recognized and analyzed the formative process of “states system,” thereby influencing it.The second research field is investigation into the formative process of classical diplomacy called “diplomatic history.” In the middle of the 18th century, every great power reformed its own diplomacy, namely performing a “diplomatic revolution.” Then, in the second half of this century, international system of cooperation emerged as a multipolar system among great powers, preparing the way for the Concert of Europe beginning from Congress of Vienna in the early of the 19th century.The third research field is inquiry into the structural development of international system as “structural history”. The main subject of this “structural history” in the period between the 18th to the early 19th century is the transformation of the balance of power. The Machiavellian dynamic of balance of power of the early of the 18th century transformed the static and stable equilibrium in the second half of the 18th century. The above-mentioned intellectual and diplomatic evolutions contributed to this transformation for the European international order.In the maturing process of the European “states system,” thoughts and diplomacies transformed international structure through mutual interaction, resulting in the emergence of “system.” Therefore, the framework of the research of international system through historical approach is regulated by this formative process of “states system.” Every approach and research field relates to each other as the precondition of “states system.” Furthermore, the comprehension and the clarification of “states system” contributes to the understanding of the core function of the international system.

著者

小阪 真也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_118-178_131, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

49

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This paper demonstrates the contribution of Morocco’s on-going comprehensive reparation for the gradual transition of Morocco from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one after the end of the “Années de Plomb”. Previous researches tended to stress a lack of transitions of remained authoritarian regimes in Middle East including Morocco. However, this paper argues that, since 1990s, Morocco has been gradually developing its state system based on the idea of the constitutionalism that has been recently regarded as a source of the legitimacy of the sovereignty in international society. By referring to the broad concept of the reparation in the “Guideline” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, this paper builds a theoretical framework based on the idea of the hierarchical structure of the rule of law which constitutes a core component of the constitutionalism. The idea of the rule of law can be divided into two parts: broad sense and narrow sense. The broad sense of the rule of law means universal value such as human rights which constitutes a fundamental principle and defines specific laws. On the other hand, the narrow sense of the rule of law, which constitutes low level rules, means specific laws that directly rules society. Sovereign states need to build both aspects of the rule of law in order to build a constitutional state system. Based on this understanding, this paper considers that states can build the broad sense of the rule of law through re-confirming human rights norms by providing compensation or restitution as principal activities of reparation. In addition, this paper argues that, in order to take measures for guarantee of non-repetition as a critical elements of the reparation in the “Guideline” in 2005, reparation is interrelated with the institution building that is another mechanism of transitional justice. From this standpoint, this paper considers that states can build the narrow sense of the rule of law through institution building to reform specific laws and legal institutions to prevent future atrocities. Under this framework, this paper argues that the comprehensive reparation in Morocco contributed for Morocco’s transition from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one through re-building both aspects of the rule of law. For building the broad sense of the rule of law, Morocco re-confirmed human rights norms by implementing the reparation programs varied from the monetary compensation to the symbolic reparation under human rights laws. For building the narrow sense of the rule of law, Morocco implemented institution building, as a program for guarantee of non-repetition, to reform the constitution, penal code, and legal institutions. This paper concludes that, as a progress of transitional justice in Middle East, Morocco has been taking steps to a constitutional state through implementation of the on-going comprehensive reparation to build both aspects of the rule of law.