著者
石田 隆太
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.67, pp.153-163, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)
参考文献数
2

This paper examines diverse meanings of the term individuatio (individuation) in Thomas Aquinas’s writings. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the extent to which diverse meanings of individuatio can be found. In On the Book of Causes (Super librum de causis), Lecture 9, Aquinas presents two kinds of individuatio. One is the case where something (i.e. forma) is received in subiectum and becomes individual. The other is the case where something does not need to be received in subiectum, but is already individual. Similarly, Aquinas posits individuatio through matter (materia), and individuatio by itself separately in A Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures (Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis), Article 5. Moreover, in Summa of Theology (Summa theologiae), Part I, Question 3, Article 3, Aquinas indicates that the latter individuatio is the individuatio of form (forma) by itself. From these writings, it is obvious that there are a variety of individuationes in Aquinas’s thought.The second section proposes the possibility of formulating diverse principles of individuation (principium individuationis) according to the diverse meanings of individuatio. The proposal is as follows: the principle of individuation can be formulated as matter in material substances, as form (strictly speaking, a separated form different from being) in angels, and as being (esse) in God. This section mainly discusses some related and important texts from On Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Super libros Aristotelis metaphysicae), Book VII, Lecture 11, and Summa against Gentiles (Summa contra gentiles), Book IV, Chapters 10 and 14. The former discussion examines a difficulty in understanding form as the principium individuationis in angels, and seeks to defend that concept. The latter discussion shows how the concept of principium individuationis is applied to God. From these discussions, we can infer that there are also a variety of principia individuationis.
著者
酒井 健太朗
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2019, no.70, pp.205-219, 2019

<p>Aristotle's <i>APo</i>. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. <i>APo</i>. II 11 considers how the well-known "four causes" should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation. </p> <p>Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes. </p> <p>This paper argues that <i>APo</i>. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes "hypothetical necessity". Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity. </p>
著者
大越 愛子
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1998, no.49, pp.1-14, 1998-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Victims of sexual violence have long suffered from stories which were fabricated by the violence-producing culture. They have been brainwashed that the sexual assault they'd experienced was not a rape but rather a love affair by mutual consent. Victims were raped twice, one physically and again mentally. and the mental trauma was particularly persistent. To redeem their lost human dignity, we must disclose the deception of these phallocentric stories.Starting from Beauvoir, feminist philosophers, such as Irigaray and Kristeva, have been criticizing the phallocentric logics through their analysis of male philosophers. Their analyses show that even Hegel's phallocentric argument can serve feminist needs, if reinterpreted to our advantage.
著者
富山 豊
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.242-256_L17, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)
参考文献数
8

In the early Husserlʼs theory of intentionality, he established a sophisticated account for our mental actʼs relation toward its object. Later, some new elements were introduced into the middle Husserlʼs theory of intentionality, such as concepts of “phenomenological reduction”, “noesis-noema correlation”, and so on. His theory is famous for such concepts. But a question remains of what the significance of such changes consists in. To what extent do these two forms of Husserlʼs theory differ? Or,do they differ from each other merely terminologically? In order to answer these questions, the present paper concentrates on the concept of “noema”. More specifically, the central issue is : whether the meaning-object correlation in the early theory corresponds with the noesis-noema correlation in the middle theory.Husserl himself sometimes characterized the concept of noema as “the intended object as it is intended”. Therefore it is natural to interpret the concept of noema as somewhat modified concept of object, construing that noema is ontologically identical with object itself. Indeed, not a few writers think so, like Dan Zahavi, John Drummond and so on. But Husserl also calls noema “meaning”, hence a question arises. Which is noema, object or meaning? To answer this question correctly, the concept of “determinable X” in neoma is essential. I will argue that this concept is the key to understand the reason why the concept of noema had to be introduced, in addition to (noetic) meanings and objects. An essential point is identification of object, within temporal succession of our experiences.
著者
勝 道興
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.46, pp.120-129,5, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Was bedeutet das Tragische fur Hegel? Es scheint nicht nur Exempel darzubieten, die seine Argumente rechtfertigen, sondern auch eine Momente darzustellen, die sein Philosophieren auf dem ganzen Weg im Grunde bestimmt. Diese Abhandlung versucht das Tragische auf die Tragö-dietheorie Hegels zu erschließen. Darum werden hier Schriften in der Frankfurter Zeit, in der Jenaer Zeit, Phänomenologie und Ästhetik erwähnt. Es zeigt sich schließlich, daß das Tragische mit seinem dialektischen Denken wie eine unterirdische Wasserader durchdringt, die aus die Ursprung der Metaphysik ins dionysische Denken Nietzsches im geheimen schlägt.
著者
巻田 悦郎
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.39, pp.139-150, 1989-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
勝 道興
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.63, pp.185-200_L10, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
参考文献数
29

Der vierte und letzte Teil des Werks Also sprach Zarathustra (1885) von F. Nietzsche nimmt hinsichtlich seines Entstehungsprozesses eine besondere Position ein. Was ist überhaupt die raison d'être des vierten Teils, wenn die Thematisierung der ewigen Wiederkehr im dritten Teil doch hinreichend gelungen ist? Oder wird nicht der Zusammenbruch Zarathustras im Ganzen nachgewiesen, wenn die Verkündung des Wiederkunftsgedankens nicht selbst bis zum vierten Teil schon vollzogen ist? In einem nachgelassenen, „Sils-Maria, vom 26. August 1881” datierten Entwurf, der in die erste Entwicklungsphase der Idee von Zarathustras Überfall gehört, findet sich, neben dem Symbol der Wiederkunft, jedoch auch schon eine Zusammenstellung der vier Bücher (Teile). Von diesem Fragment als Ansatzpunkt ausgehend, geht dieser Aufsatz den nachgelassenen Entwürfen und Plänen zum vierten Teil nach, untersucht die Thematik des „Eselfest” bei den „höheren Menschen” und versucht auf diese Weise, Zarathustra IV neu zu bewerten. Insofern die Entwürfe zur Tragödie von Empedokles, die vor und nach der Entstehung von Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) entwickelt worden waren, als Vorform von Zarathustra angesehen werden können, ist zunächst zu vermuten, dass Nietzsche versucht hat, die Faktoren (d. h. Pest, Tod, Todtenfeier) der Empedokles-Tragödie nochmals in die Motive neuen Zarathustra-Dramas zu übertragen. Der vierte Teil, mit seinen diese Faktoren einschließenden Fragmenten, ist geplant worden, um die Aufgabenstellung zu entwickeln, wie die nihilistische Einwirkung von der Wiederkunft zu ertragen und somit die Versuchung (Mitleid) der „höheren Menschen” zu überwinden sei, und es ist darin die Erwartung ausgedrückt worden, ein Fest (Mitfreude) mit ihnen feiern zu dürfen. Während in Bezug auf jene Aufgabe die höchste Kraft präsentiert wird, mit der alles Leidende als ewig wiederholenswert zu empfinden ist, wird das närrische „Eselfest” mit dem Spiel des doppelsinnigen Symbols in Bezug auf diese Erwartung inszeniert. Endlich wird in Zarathustra IV die Formel der Bejahung in der Verkleidung eines Festes zum Programm gemacht, als Gegengewicht zum „Geist der Schwere” und über die Verkündung der zur Fabel gewordenen Wahrheit hinausgehend.
著者
別所 良美
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.55, pp.20-38,en20, 2004

In den Diskussionen fiber die Globalisierung streiten unterschiedliche Positionen miteinander. Trotz der vielfaltigen Dimensionen uber die Globalisierung geht es im Grande darum, wie man in der heutigen fief miteinander verflochtenen Welt die herkommlichen National-Staaten an ihrem richtigen Platz situieren kann. Das Ideal des globalen and friedlichen Zusammenlebens der Menschen, die heute in unterschiedlichen Staaten and mit vielfaltigen Kulturen and Traditionen leben, kann nur dann verwirklicht werden, wenn jeder Staat, and besonders die letzte Super-Macht, auf seine absolute Souveranitat verzichtet and mit einem neuen Begriff der begrenzten Souveranitat ein System der gemeinsamen Regulierung der Gewalt zu schaffen trachtet. Eine regionale Staatengemeinschaft kann der erste Schritt dazu sein.<BR>In diesem Beitrag wird das oben gennante Thema anhand der Habermasschen Kritik am Iraq-Krieg der USA analysiert. Der Unilateralismus der Bush-Regierung wird eben deshalb kritisiert, weil das Ideal des offen-universalistischen Zusammenlebens der Staaten gerade geschadigt and betrogen wird.
著者
服部 裕幸
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1977, no.27, pp.172-184, 1977-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

D・デーヴィドソンはその一連の意味論研究の過程で「行為文の論理形式」という論文を発表し、そこにおいて注目すべき見解を提出している。その見解とは、行為についての文は個物 (particular) としての事件 (event) の存在に言及するものと解釈されるべきであるというものである。これは、単に言語学的な見地からのみならず、哲学問題としての行為論に対する意義という見地からも、きわめて重要なものであると思われる。本稿では、彼の見解の批判的な検討を通じてこの点を明らかにし、そのことにより行為の問題に多少なりとも光を投げかけたい。
著者
赤松 宏
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1969, no.19, pp.277-290, 1969-03-31 (Released:2010-05-07)
参考文献数
22

This thesis makes a part of theses which expressed as titled “Philosophy toward Concreteness. His linguistic theory was referred as a way to the Philosophy toward Concreteness. Through the study of his works, I tried to clarify my philosophy as possible. Now the meaning of “Concreteness” might remain obscure, which will be solved in the following papers. Here the language could be considered as a means through which the concreteness will be approached. In this paper M.-Ponty happens to be chiefly discussed.M.-Ponty rejects both the empiricism and the intellectualism of languages as insufficient: in the former there is no person who speaks, and in the latter languages are only the adjuncts or the accessories of thought. Both are the same in respect that the language in itself has no meaning. He says the language is the thought”, which means the thought has its existence nothing but in the language. According to his theory as well as that of Jaspers, the language is the accomplishment of thought.The ultimate aim of his theory is, in short, to find out “silence primordial” or the existential meaning, which lies under the conceptual meaning of languages. But in order to find out his existential meaning, first of all, we must clarify the conceptual meaning, which is scarcely referred by him as well as the other. So we must only guess those meanings, which will be clarified in the next papers.
著者
中島 義道
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.43-54_L5, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

Es ist fragwüerdig, die Zukunft wie die Gegenwart und die Vergangenheit als Zeitmodus zu verstehen. Während die Wahrnehmung direkt die gegenwärrtigen Sahen und die Erinnerung direkt die vergangenen Sachen erreichen können, gibt es keinen Bewusstseinsakt, der direkt die zukünftigen Sachen erffassen könnte. Eine zukünftige Sache (A) kann nicht jetzt, sondern erst in der Vergangenheit, in der A „zukunfutig gewesen ist“ , gewährleistet werden. Also, muss man, um zu erfahren,ob A wahr ist oder nicht, immer bis zu dem Zeitpunkt warten, an dem A verwircklicht geworden ist d. h., an dem A den Charakter der Zukünftigkeit verloren hat. Man kann also die zukünftigen Sachen an sich nicht erfassen. Überdies kann man nicht leugnen,,, dass die Möglichkeit besteht, dass die nächste neue Zukunft nicht konnt. Es ist sicher so, dass bis jetzt die Zukunft immer gekommen ist,aber dies beweist keineswegs, dass von jetzt an die (nächste) Zukunft kommen wird.Die Zukunft scheint mir also kein Zeitmodus sondern nur ein Begriff, oder besser gesgt, eine Idee (nach Kant) zu sein.Die Zukunft ist nämlich kein Gegenstand der objektiven Erkenntnis,sondern nur ein Gegenstand unsres menschlichen (subjektiven) Interesses.Wir Menschen wissen gut, dass die Zukunft nicht objektiv existiert,aber sind geneigt, zu meinen dass die Zukunft objektiv existieren könnte und täuschen nus vielmehr absichtlich. Man muss (wieder nach Kant) sagen dass die Zukunft „ein transzendentaler, Schein“ ist.
著者
松葉 祥一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.64, pp.42-55_L5, 2013

Jean-Luc Nancy consid&egrave;re la science-technologie non pas comme un moyen op&eacute;ratoire, mais comme notre mode d'existence, qu'il d&eacute;finit comme &laquo; l'&eacute;quivalence g&eacute;n&eacute;rale &raquo; dans son &oelig;uvre &laquo; L'&eacute;quivalence des catastrophes : (Apr&egrave;s Fukushima) &raquo;. La science moderne a d&eacute;velopp&eacute; un syst&egrave;me de mesure et &eacute;value toutes les choses qui sont finalement mesur&eacute;es d'apr&egrave;s un crit&eacute;rium supr&ecirc;me : l'&eacute;quivalent g&eacute;n&eacute;ral c'est-&agrave;-dire la monnaie. Nancy d&eacute;clare que l'accident de Fukushima a devoil&eacute; la chute de l'&eacute;quivalence g&eacute;n&eacute;rale et la n&eacute;cessit&eacute; de la remplacer par la d&eacute;mocratie des in&eacute;quivalents.<br>Nous allons constater avec Patricia Benner, chercheur en science infirmi&egrave;re que la science naturelle a laisser tomber la temporalit&eacute;, le contexte social, la phase pratique et la corpor&eacute;it&eacute; des choses. La science doit essayer de les retrouver pour lier le laboratoire et la soci&eacute;t&eacute;. La soci&eacute;t&eacute;, de son c&ocirc;t&eacute;, doit contr&ocirc;ler la science par l'&eacute;thique. Ceci n'est cependant pas suffisant, parce que la science d&eacute;passe toujours ce contr&ocirc;le en poursuivant infiniment &laquo; le possible &raquo;.<br>Il faut donc une &laquo; conf&eacute;rence consensuelle &raquo; coop&eacute;r&eacute;e par la soci&eacute;t&eacute; et la science, selon Tadashi Kobayashi. En admettant sa necessit&eacute;, nous y trouvons un probl&egrave;me fondamendale : ceux qui n'ont pas le droit d'y participer sont pr&eacute;alablement enlev&eacute;s. C'est pr&eacute;cis&eacute;ment cette participation ou &laquo; partage &raquo; que Nancy exige pour la d&eacute;mocratie des in&eacute;quivalents.
著者
喰代 驥
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1961, no.11, pp.31-44, 1961-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
能川 元一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.45, pp.263-272,8, 1995-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Le reproche de la «pensée objective», fait par Merleau-Ponty, aboutit à la révision de la notion de «comprendre». Il s'agit de savoir ce que c'est que la «logique de l'invention», qui gouverne le processus de compréhension non-objectiviste. L'analyse de la «parole parlante» et de sa compréhension nous suggère la diversité des fonctionnement des signs qui y participent. Et la part des signes non-dénotatifs, en particulier des signes exemplificatifs (N. Goodman). nous concluons, indique que la logique de l'invention n'est pas comparable à la logique classique fondée sur la notion de vérité.
著者
長澤 英俊
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.56, pp.234-244,13, 2005-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
9

Dummett and Wright doubt the coherence of vague predicates. Dummett claims that the rules for such predicates are themselves inconsistent. Wright takes the sorites paradox to constitute a great difficulty for the view that a user of a vague term follows a rule. Wittgenstein says that rules can be created or modified, if they need to be. Here is a clue to solve the problem of the coherence of vague predicates. But cannot we explain their consistency without recourse to the idea of following a rule? Davidson's theory of inter-pretation sheds light on the question. For, according to Davidson, our linguistic activity presupposes that we should treat an interpretee as a rational being who has a lot of true beliefs about the world. This approach opens up the possibility of thinking of vagueness as a semantic matter. The meaning of a vague predicate depends on the situation in which it is used. But, even if the situation is determined, another kind of indeterminacy (which I think is semantic) remains. Hence the sorites paradox. Epistemicism holds that vagueness comes from ignorance (which I think is also semantic). Does vagueness as semantic indeterminacy or ignorance imply the renunciation of bivalence? Not necessarily. As indeterminacy of translation is compatible with bivalence, so is semantic indeterminacy or ignorance.
著者
和泉 悠
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.69, pp.32-43, 2018

<p>This paper examines the semantics of Japanese generic sentences that involvereference to gender stereotypes and considers how they possibly contribute to thepresence and perpetuation of sexual harassment. The main strategy of the paper is,first, to uncover the possible ways in which sentences that contain the explicit deonticmodal expression in Japanese beki (roughly corresponding to ought) contributeto the cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, and second, to compare theexplicitly modal sentences and generic sentences that contain no explicit modal inorder to show that the latter also express modal, normatively laden contents. As astandard theory of deontic modality, I apply Angelika Kratzer's analysis of ought toJapanese sentences containing beki. For the sake of concrete illustration, I also introduceAsher and Morreau's (1995) analysis of generics and extend it to Japanese examples.The comparison shows that, insofar as the uses of explicitly normative sentencessuch as "All women ought to wear a skirt" contribute to hostile environmentharassment, implicitly normative sentences such as "Women wear a skirt" make asimilar, if not equal, contribution to the legitimization of gender-specific norms. Thepaper concludes with the suggestion that we pay more attention to generic sentenceswith gender-specific terms, and that we use explicit quantifiers and singularterms more often than not to avoid ambiguity and possible inadvertent consequences.</p>
著者
信原 幸弘
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.59, pp.97-114,L13, 2008

Brain science attempts to understand our minds by exploring our brains. What kind of understanding of minds does brain science bring forth? Is it fundamentally different from, or just an extension of, everyday understanding of mind? The aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between these two understandings. Brain science seems to mechanize our minds. It enables us to read or control the mind by treating the brain mechanistically. What, exactly speaking, is it to mechanize the mind? It consists, we may say, in understanding the mind in nomological terms. Brain science explores lawlike relations between brain states and through it attempts to clarify the relations between mental states which correlate with those brain states. So it is the aim of brain science to understand the mind nomologically. As for everyday understanding of the mind, we usually understand it in rational terms by grasping reasonrelations between mental states, though sometimes understanding certain aspects of it nomologically or mechanistically. Here arises the question whether it is really possible to understand the mind both in rational and nomological terms? If rationality is not reducible to nomologicality as Davidson argues in his thesis &ldquo;the Anomalism of the Mental&rdquo;, it is not possible to understand the mind nomologically as long as the mind is what is understood in everyday terms. We had better say that brain science, in fact, does not clarify the mind. It merely clarifies the brain.