著者

田口 茂 吉田 正俊 西郷 甲矢人 宮園 健吾 谷 淳 田中 彰吾 山下 祐一 西尾 慶之 武内 大 富山 豊

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

基盤研究(A)

巻号頁・発行日

2020-04-01

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「意識とは何か」という問題は、現代において哲学と科学と医療にまたがる大問題である。本研究の目的は、この大問題に、以下の三つの方法を組み合わせてアプローチすることである。①第一に、「現象学」を一つの理論的な核として、哲学・精神医学・神経科学・ロボティクス・数学の密接な学際的共同研究を行う。②第二に、「意識変容」という正常な意識状態からの逸脱に焦点を当て、変容した意識と正常な意識とを対比することにより、意識の本質的特性に迫る。③第三に、「圏論」という数学的理論を用いて、上述の諸研究から浮かび上がる関係論的構造を分析する。これにより、意識研究を一段新しい次元にもたらす新たな理論的枠組みを提起する。

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.155-168, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

8

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The internalism/externalism debate is one of the most important issues discussed in such areas of contemporary philosophy as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind (philosophy of thought), and epistemology. Husserl’s phenomenology might also be regarded as a kind of internalism since it emphasizes its methodological reduction into the internal sphere of experiences (“phenomenological reduction”). Externalist criticisms against some naive forms of internalist prejudice, however, seem to contain some important insights concerning the concepts of meaning, knowledge, and mental content (or propositional attitudes). Therefore I would like to try to defend Husserl’s basic insight concerning the concept of meaning, by adjusting it to accommodate this externalist insight. This “adjusting”, however, is not a distortion of Husserl’s original philosophy. I believe that it is just a precise explication of Husserl’s own insight as it really is.In order to show this, I will try to survey the early Husserl’s theory of meaning first, bringing out its internalistic features. Secondly, I introduce a kind of externalist criticism relevant to the theory. Thirdly, I would like to try to reconcile them, focusing on the contextuality of experience. Then, finally, I will consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge. I will argue that Husserl can accept the contextualityof meaning from the viewpoint of the contextuality of experience, in a way which does not destroy the objectivity of scientific knowledge.

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.68, pp.155-168, 2017-04

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.242-256_L17, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

8

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In the early Husserlʼs theory of intentionality, he established a sophisticated account for our mental actʼs relation toward its object. Later, some new elements were introduced into the middle Husserlʼs theory of intentionality, such as concepts of “phenomenological reduction”, “noesis-noema correlation”, and so on. His theory is famous for such concepts. But a question remains of what the significance of such changes consists in. To what extent do these two forms of Husserlʼs theory differ? Or,do they differ from each other merely terminologically? In order to answer these questions, the present paper concentrates on the concept of “noema”. More specifically, the central issue is : whether the meaning-object correlation in the early theory corresponds with the noesis-noema correlation in the middle theory.Husserl himself sometimes characterized the concept of noema as “the intended object as it is intended”. Therefore it is natural to interpret the concept of noema as somewhat modified concept of object, construing that noema is ontologically identical with object itself. Indeed, not a few writers think so, like Dan Zahavi, John Drummond and so on. But Husserl also calls noema “meaning”, hence a question arises. Which is noema, object or meaning? To answer this question correctly, the concept of “determinable X” in neoma is essential. I will argue that this concept is the key to understand the reason why the concept of noema had to be introduced, in addition to (noetic) meanings and objects. An essential point is identification of object, within temporal succession of our experiences.

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.155-168, 2017

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<p>The internalism/externalism debate is one of the most important issues discussed in such areas of contemporary philosophy as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind (philosophy of thought), and epistemology. Husserl's phenomenology might also be regarded as a kind of internalism since it emphasizes its methodological reduction into the internal sphere of experiences ("phenomenological reduction"). Externalist criticisms against some naive forms of internalist prejudice, however, seem to contain some important insights concerning the concepts of meaning, knowledge, and mental content (or propositional attitudes). Therefore I would like to try to defend Husserl's basic insight concerning the concept of meaning, by adjusting it to accommodate this externalist insight. This "adjusting", however, is not a distortion of Husserl's original philosophy. I believe that it is just a precise explication of Husserl's own insight as it really is.</p><p>In order to show this, I will try to survey the early Husserl's theory of meaning first, bringing out its internalistic features. Secondly, I introduce a kind of externalist criticism relevant to the theory. Thirdly, I would like to try to reconcile them, focusing on the contextuality of experience. Then, finally, I will consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge. I will argue that Husserl can accept the contextualityof meaning from the viewpoint of the contextuality of experience, in a way which does not destroy the objectivity of scientific knowledge.</p>