著者

相澤 康隆

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.121-135_L8, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

19

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In Book 7 of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains how a man can do what he knows to be wrong. Traditionally, Aristotle's account of akrasia is interpreted in this way: when someone acts from weakness of will, he doesn't know that what he does is wrong and that he should not do it. For example, when a diabetic eats something sweet because of his appetite, he doesn't know that he should not eat it.However, some objections have been made against this traditional interpretation. First, Aristotle seems to think that some akratic people know they should not do such and such (1150b19-22). If he thinks this, the traditional interpretation contradicts his text because on that interpretation an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such. Second, on the traditional interpretation there can be no conflict of motives. If an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such, he has no conflict between reason and appetite. However, it is quite clear to us that when we act from weakness of will, we have a conflict of motives.These objections can be answered by making few modifications to the traditional interpretation. It is true that an akratic person doesn't know at the time of his act that he should not do such and such. However, he knows it before he acts. If the traditional interpretation is modified in this way, the above objections can be answered. First, in 1150b19-22 Aristotle thinks some akratic people know before they act that they should not do such and such. Second, an akratic person does have a conflict of motives before he acts. He does have a conflict between reason and appetite before he acts, though at the time of his act he no longer has it.Making these modifications to the traditional interpretation, we can interpret Aristotle's account of akrasia consistently.

著者

金杉 武司

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.201-216_L11, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

9

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It is generally thought that the motivation for an action can be explained in terms of a desire (or evaluative judgment) and a belief. It is not clear, however, what kind of explanation is the explanation of the motivation for an action. This paper takes up and considers the validity of two answers to this question from different perspectives: the causal theory of action and the anti-causal theory of action. Construing practical reasoning as a simple practical syllogism, Donald Davidson argues that the motivation for an action can not be fully explained by the rationality of practical reasoning and needs to be explained by the causal relation between a beliefdesire pair and an action (the causal theory of action). Practical reasoning, however, can not be construed as a simple practical syllogism. An agent should be construed to start with a prima facie judgment about the desirability of an action and to work to reach an all-things-considered (ATC) judgment before reaching a conclusion in practical reasoning. Under such a construal, Davidson's argument that the rationality of practical reasoning can not fully explain the motivation for an action loses its validity (the anti-causal theory of action). It appears prima facie, however, that the causal theory of action is required for explaining the motivation for an akratic action. An akratic action is a free action that is contrary to an ATC judgment about the most desirable action reached at the time of performing it, and it is thus generally considered that the motivation for an akratic action is not determined by practical rationality. Rather, it is more plausibly determined by causal powers of individual desires (or evaluative judgments). Under the causal theory of action, however, an akratic action can not be construed as a free action since, under the theory, an akratic agent is a passive being who is at the mercy of the causal power of desires and hence does not have autonomy in the sense of a capacity to determine his/her motivation voluntarily, which is required for a free action. In order for an akratic action to qualify as a free action, it must be an action that is contrary to a comprehensive ATC judgment and, at the same time, arises because of a cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgment in favour of it. Furthermore, the motivation of an action, in general, must be explained by a practical rationality that includes cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgments (the anti-causal theory of action).

著者

秋元 ひろと

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.62, pp.73-86, 2011-04

著者

藁谷 敏晴

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.31, pp.223-234, 1981-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

黒崎 政男

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.35, pp.130-140, 1985-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

長谷川 三千子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1973, no.23, pp.162-173, 1973

著者

中本 幹生

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.142-156_L10, 2013

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Obwohl das Problem des &Uuml;bergangs von der Natur zur Freiheit das zentrale Thema der <i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> darstellt, ist es doch nicht befriedigend gel&ouml;st. In den bisherigen Interpretationen h&auml;lt man oft das &uuml;bersinnliche Substrat f&uuml;r den Grund der Einheit von Natur und Freiheit und f&uuml;r das Wesen des &Uuml;bergangs. Dieses Substrat ist zwar selbst die Einheit von Natur und Freiheit, aber wenn wir vom &bdquo;&Uuml;bergang&ldquo; der beiden sprechen, setzen wir schon voraus, dass Natur und Freiheit getrennt sind. Deswegen ist es f&uuml;r die Interpretation des &Uuml;bergangs nicht hinreichend, dass man auf das &uuml;bersinnliche Substrat einfach nur verweist. Wir m&uuml;ssen sicherlich auch die Logik des &Uuml;bergangs zeigen, welche die Trennung von Natur und Freiheit voraussetzt. Diese Abhandlung l&ouml;st dieses Problem mit der Logik der Analogie; zun&auml;chst zeige ich, dass die Analogie, die auf der Identit&auml;t des Verh&auml;ltnisses zwischen Endursache und Wirkung (=nexus finalis) beruht, bei der Formulierung des Sch&ouml;nen und des Organismus in der &bdquo;Kritik der &auml;sthetischen Urteilskraft&ldquo; und auch in der &bdquo;Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft&ldquo; ein Schl&uuml;sselbegriff ist, und dann verdeutliche ich, dass im Abschnitt &bdquo;Von der Sch&ouml;nheit als Symbol der Sittlichkeit&ldquo; und auch in der &bdquo;Methodenlehre der teleologischen Urteilskraft&ldquo;, in der Kant sich mit dem Problem des &Uuml;bergangs besch&auml;ftigt, diese Analogie den &Uuml;bergang von der Natur zur Freiheit erm&ouml;glicht. In einem solchen Sinn besch&auml;ftigt sich die <i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> als Ganzes mit der Aufgabe dieses &Uuml;bergangs.<br>Der letzte Grund der Einheit von Natur und Freiheit besteht wahrscheinlich im &uuml;bersinnlichen Substrat. Aber wir Menschen, welche die intellektuelle Anschaung nicht besitzen, haben keine Einsicht in das Substrat. Diese Logik des &Uuml;bergangs aufgrund des Begriffs &bdquo;nexus finalis&ldquo; zeigt die Logik des &Uuml;bergangs vom Standpunkt des Menschen als einem Wesen, das diese intellektuelle Anschaung nicht besitzt.

著者

田村 圭一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.55, pp.206-217, 2004-04

著者

中川 久嗣

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.49, pp.271-279, 1998-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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ミシェル・フーコーの思想を前期と後期に分けるよく知られたやり方に従うならば、『知の考古学』 (L'archéologie dusavoir, 1969) は、前期最後の著作として位置づけられ、一般には知のシステム性へと向けられた彼の前期の思想内容を方法論的レヴェルで総括したものと言われている。そこでのフーコーの主要な眼目は、言表や言説の特殊な規則性とその自律的性格を明確化し、それに基づいて知の特殊な布置の構造を、実定性やアルシーヴや歴史的先験性といった諸概念を用いて分析する、いわゆる考古学的方法論の理論化を行うことであった。ところでドレィファスとラビノーの研究 (以下、D/Rと略記) は、フーコーの前期の考古学を、あまりにも自律的な言説の構造に捕らわれ過ぎた点で方法論的失敗であるとし、フーコーがそれを放棄して権力分析を目指す後期の「系譜学」へ移行したことをより高く評価する。実際フーコー自身、考古学にかわって系譜学を自らの方法として全面に打ち出すようになるであろう。しかし前期フーコーの思想と言われるものは、D/Rの言うように、本当に失敗であり、つまりは意味のないものなのであろうか。本稿ではこのような視点から、構造主義に最も強く影響されていたとされるこの時期の著作『知の考古学』における「言表/言説」と「実定性」の概念を取り上げ、そのうちに、後期の権力論へと続いてゆく基本的な考え方と可能性が存していることを明らかにしようとするものである。

著者

稲垣 諭

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.139-151, 2006-04

著者

林 誓雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.249-263_L14, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

16

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Hume insists that the rules of justice are established by a convention, that is, ‘a general sense of common interest’, not by our ‘promise’ or ‘consent’ as the social contract theory advocates. Nonetheless, Hume's theory is sometimes regarded as a kind of social contract theory. Furthermore, Hume is often interpreted as a kind of utilitarian, since he says that utility is the chief foundation of justice. One of the reasons why such interpretations arise, in my view, is that Hume uses the words ‘interest’ or ‘utility’ very ambiguously in his arguments. Because of this ambiguous usage, it is difficult for us to understand clearly the specific contents of such phrases as ‘common interest’, ‘public interest’, and ‘public utility’. As the result, the readers of Hume's works are put into confusion. In this paper, I attempt to clarify what Hume means by these terms in order to resolve this problem. First, considering the relation of ‘common interest’ and ‘public interest’, I maintain that they are different kinds of interest. Second, I turn to consider what Hume means by ‘public interest’. In considering ‘public interest’, I draw attention to the distinction of societies which Hume makes: the distinction between a small society (such as the family) and a large one. Given this distinction, we will see that there are two kinds of ‘public interest’: one applicable to a small society and the other to a large one. Finally, I show that what Hume means by ‘public utility’ is not ‘public interest’ but ‘the common interest’ by which we human beings establish the rules of justice.

著者

佐藤 和夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1980, no.30, pp.158-169, 1980-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

水野 俊誠

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.315-328_L18, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)

参考文献数

19

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Three main theories exist concerning the concept of happiness: the hedonism theory, the desire fulfillment theory, and the objective list theory. The hedonism theory states that happiness has pleasure or pleasurable mental states as its only required component. According to the desire fulfillment theory, happiness is obtained when one's desires are fulfilled. In the objective list theory, the pursuit of certain things contributes to happiness, regardless of whether these are desired or lead to pleasurable mental states.John Stuart Mill is often labeled a hedonist because he wrote, “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”. However, some of his writings also indicate that he accepts the desire fulfillment theory and the objective list theory as well. Many different interpretations have therefore been presented concerning Mill's concept of happiness, and in this paper I examine some of the main interpretations and clarify Mill's concept of happiness.I propose that Mill's fundamental position is hedonism, but argue that his concept of happiness was consistent with some elements of the objective list theoryes. When considering elements of the objective list theory, he admits that happiness comprises the pursuit of certain things for themselves; however, he does not agree that such things contribute to happiness regardless of their pleasantness.My interpretation of Mill's concept of happiness is consistent with the evolution of his thought as it developed away from Benthamic hedonism and later incorporated Romanticism.

著者

上野 千鶴子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.62, pp.11-34, 2011-04

著者

岡部 勉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.33-46, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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The origins of the current philosophy of action, it might be said, are G. E. M. Anscombe (Intention, 1957) and D. Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes, 1963). But I suspect we are now in a dark forest, not to say desert, remote from those origins. From the 1980s, philosophers have accumulated books and papers on intentionality and on causation. I contend that the philosophy of action must be appropriately connected with the philosophy of mind, on the one hand, and with the philosophy of language, on the other. I make enquiries in this paper whether arguments about intentionality, which is said about action, consciousness, and language likewise by philosophers, can give a basis for the connection expected among those; and whether arguments about causation can contribute towards giving such a basis.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.50, pp.42-60, 1999-05-01 (Released:2010-05-07)

参考文献数

44

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人が学ぶのは技巧ではなく、正しい判断を学ぶのである。もちろん規則はあるが、それは如何なる体系もなしておらず、ただ経験を積んだ者のみがそれを正しく適用することができる。それは計算の規則とは異なっている。ここで、最も困難なのは、この不定な規則を正しく、しかも改変を加えることなく、表現へともたらすことである。[ヴィトゲンシュタイン『哲学探究』第二部.xi]

著者

若林 明彦

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.201-209,8, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

21

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Die beiden Begriffe "docta ignorantia" und "coincidentia oppositorum" bei Nikolaus Cusanus and die Idee der Humanitat bei Pico della Mirandora ubten Einfluβ auf die Humanitat bei Ernst Cassirer und den Aufbau seiner Philosophie. Auf der einen Seite entdeckte Cassirer die sym-bolische Funktion der menschlichen Erkenntnis in jenen beiden Begriffen bei Cusanus and erwies die Harmoniezwischen den verschiedenen symbolischen Formen durch ein methodisches Prinzip, "coincidentia oppositorum". Auf der anderen Seite bekam er bei Pico die Glaube an die reine Schopferkraft des Menschen and an die Autonomic dieser Schopferkraft, namlich die Idee daβ der Wille zur Gestaltung das Sein bestimmt and setzt.

著者

茶谷 直人

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.132-134, 1999-04

著者

茶谷 直人

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.51, pp.160-169, 2000-04

著者

藤沢 令夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.24, pp.1-23, 1974-05