著者

大森 一宏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.2, pp.1-30, 1995-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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In this paper we examine the activities of the local trade associations (dogyo kumiai) in the case of pottery industry. In the latter half of the Meiji period, the production of the pottery increased, and some traditional production districts like Nagoya, Seto, Tono, Tokoname, Kyoto and Arita continued to increase their output. Out of these districts we select Seto, Tokoname and Kyoto, and investigate the activities of the trade associations in these three districts.In Seto district a large quantity of tableware was produced and the ratio of the export to the total output was high. In Tokoname the earthen pipe for the domestic market was mainly produced. And in Kyoto much of the ornament was exported to the foreign market. So, judging from the markets for their products and the makeup of them, these production areas can be classified into three different types.The trade association in Seto carried out the inspection of manufuctured goods, held exhibitions and contests, assisted exhibition hall financially, and mined and distributed potter's clay. But a tableware was not inspected by the trade association. In Tokoname the trade association inspected earthen pipe and conducted various researches. And in Kyoto the trade association held exhibitions and contests and supported financially the municipal pottery research center.These three trade associations did not act in the same way. We find that the activities of these trade associations were influenced by the difference of the markets for their products, the makeup of them and the supply side conditions of the potter's clay. And therefore the activities of them contributed effectively to the development of pottery industry in each production district.

著者

平本 厚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.2, pp.1-26, 1994-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Japanese television industry greatly lagged behind the U.S. and the U.K. in technological development in the early 1950s. But the saturation rate of TV in Japan increased in the latter half of the 1950s at a higher rate than those of these two countries in their corresponding expansion periods. The aim of this paper is to make clear the supply side factors which promoted the rapid spread of TV in Japan.The view that standardizing a cheap model would make the spread of TV faster prevailed among those in the TV industry in the early 1950s. Denpa Gijutsu Kyôkai (Radio Engineering & Electronics Association) made a research study to establish what was the standard model and recommended from 10 in. to 14 in. models as popular ones. This affected the assessment of the Commodity Tax on TV, so that the rate on a set with under 14 in. screen was lowered. The proposal of the standard model, the lowered tax rate and market selection made TV production in the late 1950s concentrate on almost one type, namely the 14 in. model. Set makers vied in establishing mass production based on the U.S. technology so as to lower the set price. This concentration made more effective the mass production of, not only the set itself, but also various TV parts, especially picture tubes and glass bulbs which contributed much to reduce the TV cost. As a result, the TV market expanded rapidly in the latter half of the 1950s, so that the Japanese TV industry could develop its competitive power in a relatively short span of time.

著者

孫 一善

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.3, pp.1-34, 1994-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In this study I shall examine the forward integration of distribution (in the perspective of wholesaler-hansha-) focusing on Matsushita Electric corporation during the high growth period in Japan. In the foregoing chapters I have examined selected aspects of intrabrand competition and interbrand competition. In the second section, I discuss the establishment of the first stage of hansha and examine the principle of operation. In the third section. I look at the first stage of hansha to the process of the expansion of the hansha system. In the fourth section, I analyse the relationship between Matsushita and hansha (including existing wholesalers) from the point of view of capital and manager. In the fifth section, I examine the changing functions of the sales offices. Throughout this study it has been clearly observed that (1) Hansha refers to an exclusive dealer who sells certain maker's goods only in certain territories. The former can exclude the competition of multiple makers in the existing dealer system (interbrand competition). The later can remove the intrabrand competition of a certain maker in the same area. Matsushita owns the wholesale channels, most of which came into existence through the use of separation of top level dealers with a long history and accumulated capability to operate. I studied changes that have taken place within the hansha system, the first stage of the development of hansha, and the second stage of the spreading of hansha nation-wide, to the third stage of the restructing of hansha. In particular, in 1961, the second stage of the expansion of hansha can be seen as the turning point. (2) In 1951, Matsushita announced regulation of the hansha, whereby Matsushita was to invest over 50% of capital and to send managers to the hansha. Until 1974, they were unable to reach that goal. (3) Prior to the hansha system, Matsushita was in contact with wholesalers through the sales offices. After the hansha system was instituted, however the sales offices' functions changed, as they attmpted to encourage the hansha, and increase their strength through exclusive dealing and Keiretsu of the dealer shop.

著者

黄 孝春

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.4, pp.1-25, 1995-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The general trading company, Sogo Shosha, is usually defined as “a firm that trades all kinds of goods and services with all nations of the world.” The emergence of the Sogo Shosha in Japan has been heavily written about from different perspectives. Some used models to focus their attention on the internal organizations and management policies. Some stressed the importance of economic circumstances in Japan.In this paper, I explain the formation of the general trading company from the perspective of customer relations. I did a case study on Mitsui Busan (Mitsui Co. Ltd), one of the biggest Sogo Shosha in Japan.From the information I gathered from Mitsui Busan, I have focused on their customer relations around 1959. From there, I have grouped the major customers, who have business dealings of more than ¥0.5 billion a year with Mitsui Bussan, into Mitsui Keiretsu, non-Mitsui Keiretsu, and subsidiary companies. I discovered that Mitsui Bussan's transactions with its major customers were consistent and that they covered a very wide variety of goods and services. It was also discovered that Mitsui Busan had very specific product dealings with specific groups of customers. The formation of Mitsui Busan arose from the transaction and relations with its customers, and thus formed a heavily dependent customer network.In conclusion, the most important factor was their tightly-knit customer relations and network with all its customers. It is a misconception that Mitsui Busan only had strong relations with the Mitsui Group. In actual fact, non-Mitsui Group customers were as highly valued as those from the parent group. Therefore, in analysing the emergence of Sogo Shosha in Japan, it is best to look at the customer relations and network of the Sogo Shosha.

著者

内田 金生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.4, pp.26-57, 1995-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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It goes without saying that economic and industrial growth of prewar Japan had much relied on the development of silk industry. Nevertheless, the previous studies have concentrated upon the research of the growth of export market and business of export products from the view of trade balance of prewar Japan, and unreasonably ignored the importance of domestic market.This paper attempts to clarify the increasing domestic market and consumption of raw silk during the period from 1870s to 1920s by closely examining the various kinds of statistical data including cocoon production as original material. This also tries to analyze a secular trend of the domestic demand, as well as production and distribution process of raw silk in prewar Japan. One of the most important findings in this research is the larger scale of domestic silk market than the estimated figure of the previous researches. The other significant point this paper has made is to show the evidence that the variety and requirement of the domestic market had distinctively differed from export products, accordingly the repeated increase of export had not always induced the decrease of the importance of the domestic market of raw silk in the period.

著者

内藤 浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.4, pp.58-75, 1995-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

平井 岳哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.1-27, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This reseach is focused on the formative period from zaibatsu to enterprise grouping (it is not a vertical group but a horizontal group). After World War II, the zaibatsu dissolution was carried out by Occupation policy. In Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Iwasaki, owner family were removed from the firms, and Mitsubishi-honsha, which was a holding company, was broken up. Without owner family and a holding company, operating companies had been forming a new style of business grouping. The new grouping was consisted of autonomous companies. So it was necessary to have the function of maintaining a body of grouping. But then, it was not long before all of top managers were promoted in their companies. So almost of them did not have enough management skill and experience for interests coordination among a member of the group. Therefore senior managers, who used to be superior to top managers and obliged to retire after World War II, executed the function of interests coordination instead of them. In 1950's, it was senior managers rather than mutual stock holdings and top managers committee among a member of the group that fulfilled the function to band together in Mitsubishi group. And it depended upon human relationship among top managers and senior managers, which was built in the period of the zaibatsu.

著者

佐々木 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.28-54, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.55-65, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

上野 継義

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.1-30,140, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The South Works of the Illinois Steel Company, a U.S. Steel subsidiary, created the safety committee as a main program of the organized effort in accident prevention in 1908. The primary objective of this essay is to describe and document that the company's safety activities on the shop floor level resulted in the labor management reform, and that these activities were led by the chief safety inspectors, more commonly known as “safety men, ” who insisted that the “human factor” was a contributing element in accident occurrence.The safety men faced the same problems that employment managers would have to treat, and shortly realized that no safety devices without improving the employment system seemed to be available to diminish industrial accident rates. In January 1913, the company set up the new managerial position of the Supervisor of Labor and Safety, which integrated both functions of the safety department and the employment department. Arthur H. Young was given charge of this supervisory work. At the same time, the safety men had expanded the scope of the safety committees, so that they organized “combined” committees, a new experiment for improving the relationship between foremen and immigrant workers.From their experience the safety men realized that the safety problem was one of labor management, that no progress in safety could be given without considering the human relationship of employers and employees on the shop floor, and that immigrant workmen were not “backward, crude and ignorant” and could be efficient actors in safety work. Safety men's recognition of this was the most important factor of the successful management reform. In later years, A. H. Young concluded that “one of the by-products of the safety movement” had been the growth of personnel management.

著者

ジェフリー ジョーンズ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.31-55, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

著者

永江 眞夫 井奥 成彦 藤田 誠久 西川 浩司 鈴木 恒夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.56-78, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

小沢 勝之 後藤 伸 幸田 亮一 小澤 一男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.79-104, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.105-117, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

木元 富夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.1-30, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Werner Siemens (1816-92) not only built the greatest electric concern in Germany, he also concerned himself deeply with the enactment of the German Patent Law (1877). It is because he himself was an inventor-entrepreneur and recognized the significance of patents. He stated “the main reason of the rapid growth of our factories is that our products resulted mainly from our own inventions.” In his company, Siemens and Halske & Co., in 1873 an unprecedented controversy came about. That is, the upper engineer Hefner-Alteneck (1845-1904) who invented an epoch-making dynamo stated that he wanted to retire with the invention and set up his own company.At the time the whole German patent law had not been developed yet, and Prussian patent law was not complete, so the rights of employees concerning their inventions were not covered. How did Siemens cope with the situation? Siemens was opposed to Hefner's demand for his regisgnation because “even employeers' knowledge and skill is the property of the company, not to speak of employee-inventions.” However by only an old-fashioned patriarchic authoritarian approach he could not control his employees' loyality. In exchange for the concession of distributing profits, Siemens was able to prevent Hefner from starting his own business. After this trouble in Siemens & Co. every new employee had to sign the special agreement concerning employee inventions. This is an important case in history of business and technology because it was the earliest case of so-called employee-inventions.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.31-54, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to make clear relationship between an international cartel and a domestic cartel in Japan through examining the case of the “Six Companies Agreement” on gasoline of 1932. The member companies of this agreement were the Rising Sun Petroleum, the Socony-Vacuum Corporation, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, the Mitsubishi Oil, and the Mitsui & Company. The Rising Sun belonged to Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell Group, and the Socony-Vacuum was an American company. In those days, the Royal Dutch Shell concluded the international cartel agreement with the Socony-Vacuum. Of the rest four companies, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, and the Mitsui & Company were genuine Japanese companies, and the Mitsubishi Oil was a joint concern of the Mitsubishi in Japan and the Associated Oil in the United States of America.The commonly accepted theory emphasizes the superiority of the international cartel between the Royal Dutch Shell and the Socony-Vacuum to the domestic cartel, that is the “Six Companies Agreement” of 1932 in Japan. The conclusion of this paper, however, denies the commonly accepted theory. It may safely be said that the control power in the gasoline market of the international cartel was restricted within narrow limits in a “medium advanced country” like Japan.

著者

森川 英正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.57-74, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

武井 章弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.1-29,i, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Was Ireland industrialized or de-industrialized in the first half of the nineteenth century? This is an acute question concerning Irish economic history. Under the Union in 1801 and the dissolution of any protective tarrifs in 1824 the major industrial cities of Ireland-Dublin, Cork and Belfast-were confronted with direct competition from the British Isles. Dublin, even de-industrialized, remained as the centre of administration and as a consumers' city, while Cork experienced a serious industrial decline.Belfast also seemed to decline with other cities. However, Belfast which developed the cotton industry had the alternative to survive in a different way. According to Geary's recent work, the Belfast entrepreneurs were competitive with Manchester under the free market in the limited sector. Moreover, as James Kay of Preston invented the wet-spinning process which produced the fine count linen yarn in 1825, fortunately the Belfast cotton spinners had an opportunity to challenge the new business which had more potential in Ireland.It is true that thanks to the linen industry Belfast survived and industrialized unlike Cork and Dublin. However the story was not so simple. In this essay, we examined who and when and in reality under what background did they launch into the linen business. The result of the examination is as follows; firstly, most of the Belfast entrepreneurs who started the linen business were the cotton spinners. Secondly, many of them changed their business in the mid-1830s, not immediately after 1825. Finally, they were prudent enough to wait and see the degree of the innovation and the situation of the linen market, and were also decisive enough to change to the new business. As a result, their business activity gave birth to the rise of the Irish linen industry in the world market and the industrialization in the north of Ireland.

著者

飯田 隆

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.30-54,ii, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper deals with the new capital issue boom in the London capital market during the period of 1918-1920 and how large companies in those days committed themselves in the boom. Previously this boom has been characterized as essentially domestic and prominent with large issue by leading companies. However, it should also be pointed out that there were many speculative issues which were not connected with industrial development in the process of the boom.In order to clarify whether the boom played an important role in domestic capital formation or merely a speculative one, we have analyzed the amount of new capital raised by the issue, and the proportion of capital used for spending on equipment outlays in each issue, utilizing the prospectuses of companies and other documents.As a result of this investigation, we concluded that the boom had a great significance for the development of British industries, especially large companies belonging to the so-called heavy industrial sector. Though many large companies made considerable use of bonus issues during the period, they also expanded their assets substantially by new capital issues in the capital market.However, there were some instances of companies which had to face difficulties connected with the heavy burden of over-capitalization in the 1920's. These companies had to discover means for effective management of huge assets. For these reasons, the postwar capital issue boom had an important role in the rise of the corporate economy in Britain after the First World War.

著者

菅山 真次

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.4, pp.1-31,i, 1993-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The purpose of this papar is to investigate the careers of 158 white-collar workers employed by Yawata Steel in 1900, and to shed light on some aspects of the making of business white-collar employees particular to Japanese industrialization. As far as the white-collar employees studied here are concerned, one can hardly find any who had worked their way up from the ranks of artisans or skilled workers, or who had previously been employed in the traditional sector of commerce. For the most part, the careers of these personnel were limited to white-collar jobs in a broad sense, including various occupations such as business staff employees, government officials, teachers, policemen, and soldiers. A most striking fact is that a significant number of these people had experience in several different kinds of white-collar employment. This indicates that the demarcations between categories of white-collar employment were vague in early stages of Japanese industrialization. In other word, business staff personnal did not yet exist as an independent occupational group but rather fell within the broadly-defind category of white-collar workers. Based on the statistics regarding birthdate and social status, it appears that white-collar jobs were held almost exclusively by persons of samurai heritage at the beginning of the Meiji era, but that such post were becoming increasingly open to persons from all social backgrounds by 1880's. What made these changes in the make-up of white-collar workers possible was the spread of a wide variety of educational opportunities-except for regular secondary and higher schools-open to persons regardless of social status. These ranged from unsystematic education such as individual tutoring, shijuku, short training courses and correspondence schools, to the “irregular” miscellaneous schools called kakushu-gakko, and appecars to have played a critical role in satisfying a considerable demand for white-collar workers, especially in middle and lower levels that did arise in the course of Japanese industrialization.