著者

天野 雅敏 中林 真幸 木山 実 塩地 洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.55-83, 2000-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

木下 順 中本 和秀 柳 敦 山田 徹雄 中村 みゆき

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.84-111, 2000-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.1-21_1, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The foreign activities of sogo shosha (general trading companies) like Mitsubishi-Shoji have been little researched. This article seeks to clarify one of the oversea's activities of Mitsubishi-Shoji. The history of the Paris branch is analyzed and described based on internal documents of the branch kept at the Archives du Monde du Travail in Roubaix and the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute in Tokyo.The History of the Société Anonyme Française Mitsubishi (S.A.F.M.) can be divided into four periods : first period, 1924-1927; second period, 1928-1932; third period, 1933-1938, and fourth period, 1939-1944.During the first period, S.A.F.M. invested in the Dewoitine Aircraft company, but this French company failed in 1926.During the second period, S.A.F.M. attempted diversification of goods for import and export. It left the aircraft industry and succeeded in dealing in agricultural products and other foods. During this period, in order to pay off the deficit caused by the failure of investment in Dewoitine Aircraft, S.A.F.M. pursued a policy of rationalization.It was during the third period that the efforts of saving and rationalization reached a peak. Many employees were discharged, and the Casablanca Office closed. Documents show that during this period S.A.F.M. was interested in Manchurian affairs.During the last period, 1939-1944, the occupation of France by the German army brought about the final decision. S.A.F.M. was closed in permanently in 1944. And in 1960, the newly organized Mitsubishi-Shoji was opened, but this in another history.An English translation of this article will be published in Japanese Year Book on Business History in 2001.

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.46-74, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

This article aims at analyzing the financial crises in the Fukushima region, especially remedy-loan dealings between the 107 Bank and the Fukushima branch of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).Following the 1920 crisis, the BOJ branch gave relief to 107 Bank in the form of remedy loans. But it aimed at helping the silk-reeling and sericulture industries rather than the bank.In addition, it ascribed risks to 107 by securing a guarantee from its owner-managers. By using 107, BOJ checked and screened silk-reeling and sericulture companies. Through these procedures, BOJ was able to guarantee its loan-withdrawals. In 1923, the great Kanto earthquake occurred, and the finance of Fukushima region was also damaged. Thus 107 Bank and silk-reeling and sericulture industries asked BOJ for assistance. It once again helped those same industries. But it ascribed risks to 107 and warehouse companies more stringently than in 1920.A management crisis apparently occurred when the 1927 financial crises spread to Fukushima. BOJ was afraid of a widespread financial crisis throughout the region and helped it without avoiding risks by implementing the government compensation law to avoid the collapse of Fukushima's financial system. A feature of BOJ's assistance was high-speed remedies without screening. Thus we see how eager BOJ was to avoid 107's bankruptcy and a bank-run there, although this wish was in vain.In looking at the 1920s financial crises and the Fukushima branch of BOJ, we note how BOJ was caught between providing assistance and maintaining its credibility. But step by step it came to believe that assistance was more important and consequently sacrificed its credibility. However, it considered loan-withdrawals important too and was eager to guarantee withdrawals to avoid a decline in its credibility-its banknotes-as much as possible.

著者

並河 永

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.29-55, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

27

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper provides a qualitative analysis of the retail service for home electronic apparatus, focusing on TV sets, which were once by far the most widely handled product. In the late 1950s, Japanese TV manufacturers encouraged independent small service shops to join their keiretsu retail groups to provide local repair and maintenance services for their products and promote the sale of their goods to neighborhood customers.In order to support their retailers, manufacturers set up their own service station networks in the 1960s and invested a great deal in keeping their keiretsu retailers informed of new technologies. On the one hand, however, the advent of the transistor color TV in 1968 decreased the frequency of malfunctions and raised the need for equipment and technical knowledge once repairs were required. On the other hand, year by year, manufacturers produced new models that were increasingly maintenance-and adjustment-free.In the 1970s, many retailers tried to survive by door-to-door sales, but after the color TV market had matured by the mid-1970s, there were no longer any products suitable for door-to-door sales. With the severe shortage in the labor force, retailers encouraged their employees to set up their own shops. But by the late 1970s, with a matured market and the growing number of retailers, it became difficult to launch and maintain new stores at profit.It would have been beneficial for the Japanese home electronics manufacturers to retain friendly ties with retailer groups in the era of rapid technical progress, but dealers had to deal with the problem of reallocation of labor forces outside the manufacturer companies.

著者

平本 厚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.56-79, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

Nihon Musen Denshin Kabushikigaisha (Radio Corporation of Japan) was established in 1925 as a semigovernment corporation dedicated to the installation of radio equipment for the international telegraph business conducted by the government. The company's original plan was, however, quite different. Business circles had first intended to establish a company to integrate the international communications business and the manufacturing of radio apparatus, modeled on the giant radio monopolies of the advanced nations. This turned out to be a frustrated attempt, and unlike other advanced nations, a large company in the radio business was never established in Japan.This paper studies the process of the establishment of Nihon Musen and analyzes the reasons for its failure.From the 1910s to the 1920s, several companies entered the radio apparatus manufacturing industry mainly because of the rapid expansion in the market. In connection with the establishment plans for Nihon Musen, which had been supported by almost all influential business groups, Tokyo Electric Co., which was associated with GE, sought to form an organization similar to RCA in the United States, which all interested companies would join.The Ministry of Communications strongly opposed the foundation of such an organization on the grounds that the communications business was by law managed only by the government. Tokyo Electric failed to reach an agreement with Nippon Electric Co., and as a result, Radio Corporation of Japan was permitted only to install radio stations.This incident greatly influenced the Japanese radio industry. It resulted in an apparatus manufacturing industry composed of many small companies, an industrial structure far different from those of other advanced nations.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.80-88, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

ジェレミー デビッド J

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.30-54, 2000-06-25 (Released:2010-05-07)

参考文献数

37

著者

嘉永 欣三郎 道重 一郎 八林 秀一 李 春利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.78-108, 1999-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

上岡 一史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.22-43, 1999-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The major reason for the rapid development of the Japanese steel industry after World War II was the strong competition among six major steel companies. This paper analyzes the formation process of the competitive oligopolistic system, referring mainly to the investment activities of Fuji Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., in the first half of the 1950s.Fuji Steel was established in April, 1950, a split off from Nippon Steel. This company included inherent management problems from before World War II. The first problem was the restoration from war damages, and the second problem was poor steel and rolling mill production capacities as compared to its iron production capacity. The third problem was its limited variety of steel products, which was also biased by market conditions. Therefore, the company aimed to solve these problems through its marketing strategy. The company seized a lucrative opportunity through special procurements for the Korean War. The company planned a large-scale reformation and was relatively successful around 1955 when the Japanese economy began its dynamic growth.Fuji Steel's reformation meant a reduction of the pig-iron supply. The company's long-term production plans, after attaining the reformation's objectives, showed a three-fold increase in what, but only a 160% increase in pig-iron supply. These plans threatened the three major open-hearth furnace manufacturers, Kawasaki Steel, Sumitomo Metal Industries, and Kobe Steel. This was the major reason they began pig-iron production. It was the beginning of the competitive oligopolistic system of the six major manufacturers, which coincided with the completion of Fuji Steel's first reformation.

著者

高岡 美佳

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.44-73, 1999-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The first purpose of this article is to analyze the business development of the convenience store business in Japan since the oil shock. The second is to argue the reason Japanese convenience store enterprises selected the franchise system.The conclusions of this article can be summarized as follows : The basic factor that enabled quick growth of the convenience store business from the 1970s to the 1990s was the favorable business environment, particularly the diffusion of a rapid consumption pattern. In order to win business opportunities, convenience store enterprises (e.g., Seven-Eleven Japan Co.) selected not a regular chain system but a franchise system, because of shortage of human and financial resources.The franchise system of convenience store enterprises was also beneficial to traditional small-size retailers. It is more profitable for many small retailers (e.g., liquor stores) to transform themselves into franchisee shops in convenience store chains. Simply put, the franchise system was adopted because of the mutual benefits for convenience store enterprises as franchisers and traditional small-size retailers as franchisees.Moreover, this article points out the importance of incentive design, which was built into the franchise system of convenience stores business in Japan. This is why the franchise system expanded after convenience stores enterprises solved the problem of shortage of resources.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.74-86, 1999-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

井原 基

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.3, pp.23-48, 1999-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

In consumer chemical industry, the functions near the market, such as distribution, sales and a part of product development, play a key role in international competition. Kao Corporation is said to have excellent production technology and steady marketing ability, but didn't finally succeed in international market. In this paper, we examine the adaptation process of Kao Thailand in attention with its product development, price policy, distribution system, investment on advertisement and promotion.In the 1960-80s, there were many trials and problems in the process of adaptation. Kao tried to build direct sales system to sell in local area, but because of the needs of training on sales staff, short of product line, direct sales system remained insufficient. At the same time, there was difficulty in development of compounding technology for the Thai market because of the difference of social and natural climates with Japan. These problems were mainly due to the relation with joint-venture partner, Taisin Group. Kao can't make use of the know-how and resources of Taisin, which contributed on the diffusion of Kao's shampoo in the Thai market. But in the aspect of production technology, Kao localized its production process including production of raw materials and transferred brand-new chemical plant from Japan.In the late 80s, with the establishment of research facilities, Kao realized adaptive price policy and compounding technology in shampoo business. But the amount of investment on advertisement on shampoo market was few until quite recently. On the other hand, success of 'concentrated detergent', the main product of Kao, was limited because compounding technology was based on Japanese-standard. Throughout these times, decision-making process was centralized to the Japanese headquarter. Thai specific conditions were not easily understandable by Japanese top managers.Kao has succeed in localization of production technology, often the sources of competitive edge in Japan, but had problems in adaptation of its product and marketing in Thailand. Adaptation of technology and organization is key factor in local, at the same time, global competition.

著者

白 寅秀

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.3, pp.49-75, 1999-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

---

This article examines the evolution of Korean retail forms since the 1970s and compares them to those in Japan. Particular emphasis is placed on the issues of changing markets, competition among retail forms, and its relation to the operating system.First, the discussion focuses on supermarkets in Korea during the 1970s and reveals why, in contrast to Japanized GMS (General Merchandise Store) transformation, supermarkets underwent low growth. Two reasons are given for this : the presence of the traditional market as a powerful competitor to the supermarket, and the weakness of the wholesale market compared to its Japanese counterpart.These characteristics of the Korean market serve to underpin the second issue, namely the growth of department stores from the late 1980s to the early 1990s during the emergence of the mass market. In the absence of competition from other modernized retailing, department stores exhibited significant retail growth through the adoption of multiple store operation and personnel dispatch systems.The third issue is about the rapid growth of convenience and discount stores since the 1990s. This part examines why, despite contradictory retail types in terms of margin and location, the two retail forms were introduced and developed around the same time. The year 1990 is identified as a watershed year in that it was around then that producers began to comply with retail price proposals and the government initiated the competition principal in the domestic retail market for foreign companies.This article clearly demonstrates that although the dynamics of retail forms in later developed country show retail innovations, plural paths of adaptation in each retail form are created across national boundaries because of differences in market, competition, and operating system.

著者

石井 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.3, pp.28-51, 1998-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The aim of this paper is to analyze the cause of the sluggish growth in the labor productivity of the shipbuilding industry of the German Democratic Republic-GDR-during the decade immediately following World War II. Particular attention will be placed on the quality of laborers and its management.From 1945 to 1955 the shipyards of the GDR in the Baltic seaport of Mecklenburgs employed some 35, 000 new laborers. Although some of these individuals had been skilled workers, most of the others had been not. So it was necessary to train these laborers, but the vocational training had many problems. To further complicate matters, a number of the skilled workers there began leaving the industry in search of improved working conditions and better wages. Consequently, the GDR's shipbuilding industry was crippled the shortage of the skilled workers.In terms production management, most of the middle management personnel lacked the ability to manage well. Foreman lacked the authority to avoid having their leadership usurped by the organization of labor interest groups-called “Brigade”. In addition to management's inability to lead, socialist competition was not sufficiently regulated. This caused poor production. Furthermore, there was little rationality in setting up wage rate and norm for piece-work wages. These critical factors combined brought about laxity of production.It is true the post-war condition was a cause of the difficulties of the shipbuilding industry after the war, but the defects in production planning, delayed supplies and the poor quality of materials, and a seller's market of labor and goods were important and determining cause of the negative ramifications in both labor and management.

著者

若林 幸男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.4, pp.25-51_2, 1999-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

This paper dealt with a history about the occurrence and the fixation of the blanket recruitment that was peculiar to big busiess in Japan.The employment practices in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha have a long history and it includes most kinds of the recruit methods that had appeared in the big business in modern Japan. This paper intends to make clear main hu-man resources in the early stages of foundation depended not on college graduates but on the staffs who were developed through the apprenticeship. This way to get human resources faced with unexpected problems soon. The business extension to the foreign countries after Chino-Japanese war caused the need of another sorts of human resources. Since then, the training-up of talent in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha was mainly developed through teaching the Chinese word and Chinese business customs study in each China branch. However, within 10 years this system lost its utilities. With the rapid progress of the high and middle educational organizations, the graduates substituted for it. In the first World War, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha set up the personnel department and could meet the demand for all kinds of talent only by employing these graduates. In this case, we must pay attention to following two points. First, the radical change of demand structure for i.e. remarkable decrease of the demand from the government offices was took place in the labor market of the new graduate persons at this time. Second, the supply structure also experienced the change, for the high educational organizations started making reasonable modifications to get the jobs for their own graduates. In it, the most remarkable modification can be found in the academic year, which was changed into the April to March Form from the September to July Form prevailing in Europe and US at present. By corresponding the academic year to the recruiting schedule of the government office, the private business could easily look forward to getting the talent from new graduate's labor market. In this way the junction between the business recruit calendar and academic year was accomplished and the blanket recruitment was fixed.

著者

中林 真幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.4, pp.52-80, 1999-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

59

著者

梶本 元信

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.1-24, 1999-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Today, Barry is a quiet seaside resort town with a population of about 40, 000, located 8 miles southwest of Cardiff. A century ago, this town prospered as the world's largest coal export port; however, it is difficult to see any traces of this past prosperity in the vacant Barry dock today. The aim of this paper is to consider the development of Barry Dock and Railway Company (BDR), the main source of the prosperity of the town of Barry before the First World War. As the name properly indicates, one of the outstanding features of this company was that it integrated a large wet-dock and a railway leading from the dock up to Rhondda Valley, the world's largest coal mining region at that time.The principal impetus of the establishment of BDR was the reaction of the valley's coal owners to the monopolistic and inefficient Bute and Penarth Docks and Taff Vale Railway companies. Due to the increasing rapid development of the coal industry, the dock and railway companies were unable to cope with the demands of the freighters. At the same time, capital accumulation among the coal owners made it possible to construct large alternative facilities at Barry.No sooner was BDR established on 18th July 1889 than it had an immediate impact upon the existing docks and railways. Of all of them, it was the Penarth Dock that was most seriously affected. The amount of coal exported from Penarth was halved in 1890. The profitability of the Taff Vale Railway also declined; its dividends dropped from 15% in 1888 to 2.25% in 1891. Notwithstanding these disastrous impacts, coal exports in the region as a whole increased considerably due to the widening dock capacity and the reduction of railway freight rates. The performance of all rival companies improved in the long run.Although miners' strikes interrupted coal production intermittently, coal exports from Barry dock increased significantly, and BDR was able to maintain high rates of dividends until the end of the First World War. One potential problem in trade composition was the overdependence on coal export trade. It is true that the rate of imports also increased simultaneously with the population increase of the town; however, it never exceeded 7% of total trade. But the effect of this dangerous overdependence on coal trade did not appear until after the end of the First World War.

著者

林 拓也

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.25-52, 1999-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The first purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical factors of the Japanese magnetic recorder (tape recorder and video tape recorder [=VTR]) industry, which developed in the 1950s, and identify the characteristics of the industry. The second purpose is to examine the point at issue, that “the development of the tape recorder industry contributed to the VTR industry.” I first pay attention to the beginning of the development of magnetic recorders in Japan and next analyze the activities of Japanese companies (i.e, Sony, Matsushita, JVC, and Toshiba) from this time.The television industry, the most famous in the Japanese electronic industry, has a pattern of growth of catching up with and surpassing Western countries, but the magnetic recorder industry is different. This industry expanded to meet the demands of Japanese broadcasters who required tape recorders to record their programs. Sony was the only company that first took up the challenge to develop tape recorders. There was no objection from other companies because there was only a small consumer market and only a professional market for tape recorders in the world in the 1950s. As for VTRs, Japanese companies were the only ones to develop helical scan (a technique later adopted by Beta and VHS) VTRs in the world. This means that there were not only products for them to market like tape recorders, but also to develop. These are the characteristics of the Japanese magnetic recorder industry that differ from the television industry.This paper analyzes the point at issue that “the development of the tape recorder industry contributed to the VTR industry” from the viewpoint of technology, staff, and experience in the development of products. It was found that the contribution of the tape recorder industry was of little consequence because of the time lag between the common use of the tape re-corder and VTRs. But in actuality, Japanese companies developed magnetic recorders at almost the same time. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the point at issue.

著者

新鞍 拓生 中村 尚史 市原 博 長谷部 宏一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.53-77, 1999-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)