著者
孫 一善
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.4, pp.32-63,iii, 1993-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

The objective of this paper is to examine changes in the vertical integration of distribution with regard to marketing policy during Japan's High Growth Period (1955-1973). Specifically, I deal with the senmon-hanbaigaishya (calling hansha) a system of selling companies created by the Kao Corporation, a major manufacturer, by the forward integration of wholesale distribution. With the shift in market demand during the High Growth Period from soaps to detergents, two characteristics of the traditional wholesalers became apprent : 1) inefficiency due to excessive fragmentation, and 2) a large discrepancy in size between the various wholesalers. On the other hand, a new force in distribution appeared with the advent in retail business of supermarkets, which used brand-name toiletary products in loss-leader selling. In October 1964, Kao responded to these developments by instituting a program of Resale Price Maintenance (R.P.M.) which reformed trade practices in an attempt to stabilize prices. However, it oved ineffective due to the shortcoming that it continued to use general wholesalers who also dealt with other toiletary products from competing manufacturers. This prompted Kao to take a further step of establishing a network of selling companies, the hansha, that handled only Kao products. Kao's hansha was a vertical integration of existing wholesalers undertaken in response to the fierce competition between toiletary manufacturers following the development of new detergent products as well as an out growth of the R.P.M. strategies that were implemented due to the appearance of supermark retailers. The hansha network of manufacturer's selling companies was established in three steps : initial selling companies, national selling companies, and broad-region selling companies. The initial selling companies were set up from specific whole salers from specific areas. Due to new trading practices implemented by Kao in 1968, national selling companies came into being when all primary and secondary wholesalers participated financially in the manufacturer's selling companies. After the hansha became a nationwide network, a series of mergers by selling companies brought about the broad-region selling companies. The implemetation of Kao's hansha system had a wide impact on the entire toiletary industry. For exemple, it prompted co-operation between small wholesalers as can be seen in the establishment of several jointpurchase institutions. It also caused the creation of broad-region selling companies from the merger of smaller selling companies, prompted one of Kao's competitors to adopt a multi-divisional structure of management, and brought about the establishment of a joint-purchase institution. With this modern system for managing the flow of both goods and information, Kao has been able to defend its position as top toiletary manufacturer in Japan since the oil embargo of 1973.
著者
原 輝史
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.1, pp.1-40, 1993-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

In this paper, the author describes the adoption of the “Taylor System” by the Pont-A-Mousson Company, a representative French manufacturer of iron tubes and other iron products.With the help of the Saint-Gobain Pont-A-Mousson Archives (25, rue de la Valée Maillard, 41000 Blois, France), it is possible to trace the efforts of this company to rationalize their production system.This paper is composed of three sections. The first section analyses the rationalization efforts of the company in the 1910s. Pont-A-Mousson asked the Morinni consulting company of Paris to suggest methods of rationalizing the production system. Morinni submitted a report concerning (a) worker's attitude and discipline, (b) the card system, (c) work time, labour and materials and (d) methods of bolt production.The second section examines the missions of company engineers sent to the United States in the 1920s in order to study the American “Taylor System”. Upon their return, these engineers improved the company's production system, and generated savings in production costs.The third section deals with the slowdown of the pace of rationalization in the 1930s. In this decade, the Bedeaux consulting company of Paris tried unsuccessfully to sell their system to Pont-A-Mousson.The Pont-A-Mousson company was very enthusiastic in adopting the American production system and we may conclude that their efforts produced significant results.
著者
四宮 正親
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.2, pp.1-30,i, 1992-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

The Japanese automobile market in pre-war had been dominated by Japan Ford and Japan GM. So, the aim of automobile industrial policy was to protect the market against foreign companies, to foster domestic manufacturers and finally to control the industry. Specially the army had intended to eliminate the foreign companies after the 1931 Manchurian incident.After the army occupied Manchuria in 1931, heavy-industrialization policy had been executed by Japan there. Aircraft and automobile industries as the war industries had been thought important. Army had intended to protect the automobile market and to foster the automobile industry in Manchuria.The goal of the 1936 Automobile Manufacturing Business Law was to permit the automobile manufacturing business and to eliminate the foreign companies. Furthermore, the law was to protect the automobile market against foreign companies in Manchuria. Substantially it had been prohibited for foreign companies to make inroads into Manchurian market.In fostering the automobile industry in Japan and Manchuria, Manchurian market was very important in these two points : 1. As the market of Japanese automobiles.2. In fostering the auto business in Manchuria.Therefore in order to foster the automobile industry, the operation of foreign companies in Manchuria had never been permitted.
著者
市原 博
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.3, pp.1-33, 1992-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)
被引用文献数
1 1

During the Second World War, the number of workers who were employed by colliery companies had increased. They worked under the supervision of skilled workers who had served for long term and had come to hold the positions of the superintendent.After the defeat of W.W. II, the workplaces of colliery companies were out of order. Labor unions which had been organized rapidly beared the responsibility to maintain the order of workplaces and to control the workers. As a result, they were permitted to participate in management. Since 1949 when controls over coal-mining industry was removed, colliery companies attempted to cut down expenses and to raise efficiency. For they tried to deprive of vested rights of labor unions, many labor-management disputes took place. Red purge that was carried out at 1950 gave a blow to unions. However, managements could not succeeded in their attempts, and labor unions keeped their powerful positions to determine the labor conditions and the treatment of individual worker.In 1950's, coal mine workers improved their stability remarkably. They and their families came to live inside each coal mine in which they were employed. As a result, a feeling of identification with local community was held in common by them.
著者
松本 貴典
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.26, no.4, pp.1-41, 1992-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

The aim of this paper is to examine the trend of Senboku (the southern district of Osaka prefecture) textile weaving industry in the interwar period by analyzing the trend of the management of a textile weaving factory in the district. For the examination, we have investigated the trend of the management of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period. Through this investigation, we can divide the management period of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period into three parts as follows.1 The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced cotton textile goods (1922-25) The management of Nayatake in this period depended heavily upon Senboku county. In short Nayatake carried on most of transactions with cotton yarns wholesale stores, textile wholesale stores, and banks in Senboku county. 2 The management period in which products of Nayatake were diversified (1926-30) Nayatake adopted a product diversification strategy in which Nayatake produced cotton blankets and cotton shawls in addition to cotton sheets in order to get out of depression. So the management of Nayatake in this period was very different from the first period. The term-end profit of Nayatake was improved by adopting this strategy. And also as far as yarns and textile wholesale stores and banks were concerned, Nayatake carried on transactions on a much larger scale than the first period by adopting it. To put it concretely, as far as wholesale stores were concerned, Nayatake depended much more upon Osaka city than the first period. 3 The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced woolen textile goods (1931-38) As the management of Nayatake continued to suffer a decrease in profit for seven semiannual settlement terms, Nayatake needed further diversification of its products. So Nayatake started to produce woolen goods by introducing high-performance wool-looms. Introducing them made Nayatake capital intensive, and a term-end profit was improved quickly. In this period Nayatake tended to sell woolen goods to wholesale stores in Osaka city by check and cotton goods to local wholesale stores on credit. Also Nayatake tended to buy woolen yarns directly from woolen spinning companies and cotton yarns from wholesale stores in both Osaka and Senboku county. As far as attached finished processing was concerned, napping processing depended upon Senboku, and another processing upon Osaka city and an advanced woolen weaving area, Bishu. Moreover Nayatake tended to carry on transactions with banks in Osaka city in addition to local banks in Senboku county. Through the analysis mentioned above, the conclusion of this paper should be noted as follows. Senboku county became the most famous woolen textile weaving area in Japan after World War II. However the conversion from cotton textiles to woolen textiles had already occurred during the period from the 1930s to 1930s. Therefore the interwar period was the very turning point for Senboku which would succeed as the most well-known woolen textile weaving area after the War.
著者
北林 雅志
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.26, no.4, pp.42-70,iii, 1992-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)
被引用文献数
1

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the history of eastern banking was dominated by the depreciation of silver in terms of gold. The continuous decline in the value of silver was a problem for all eastern exchange banks. The Oriental Bank, which was the largest bank in Asia, fell into a business crisis and stopped payment in 1884. Under these circumstances, the Hongkong Bank extended their business, made remunerative profits and became the largest bank in Asia. How could the Hongkong Bank get over the difficulties produced by the exchange fluctuation, and grow up in such bad times? The Hongkong Bank's activities in this era were marked by the Even Keel Policy. One purpose of this article attempts to examine what the Even Keel Policy was through contemporary evidence. Even though the Hongkong Bank adopted the Even Keel Policy, the Bank could not overcome all difficulties. The Bank suffered considerable losses on the exchange business in 1886. The other purpose of this article is to try to investigate why the Bank suffered heavy losses in 1886. The foreign exchange banks had to lay in fund largely at Hankow as preparation for the Chinese tea season. They had remitted a very large amount of their funds to Hankow in Shansi bankers' drafts since 1875. But this mode of remittance was stopped by the Shanghai financial crisis of 1883. Therefore, the Hongkong Bank had to send their fund in the form of “Sycee” to Hankow. In the spring of 1886, the silver panic happened suddenly, when the Hongkong Bank remitted large “Sycee” to Hankow. As a result, the Hongkong Bank could not avoid suffering heavy losses from the silver panic of 1886.
著者
柳 敦
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.1, pp.1-28,i, 1992-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

Cet article a pour objectif d'esquisser la commercialisation des vins en Languedoc, surtout celle des négociants régionaux et de préciser leur rôle au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles; un sujet qui n'a pas été approfondi jusqu'à présent. Pendant la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, le marché vinicole en France était toujours en train de croissance grâce à la construction du chemin de fer et à la perturbation du marché provoquée du phylloxéra. D'après nos documents, ces négociants languedociens ont ouvert le nouveau marché de trois manières de l'accès aux clients. 1. l'installation des succursales dans la zone consommatrice autour de Paris. 2. le voyage en gros et la vente à tempérament. 3. la mise en place de réseaux de représentants. Cultivant ainsi les liaisons commerciales avec les négociants-distributeurs sur les marchés urbains et avec les consommateurs ruraux du fait du manque de réseaux commerciaux, les négociants du Languedoc réussissait de s'implanter. Au début du XXe siècle, la prospérité des négociants est parvenue à son apogée, c'est à dire à l'entrée de leur déclin. En l'occurence, nous trouvons les trois raisons qui suscitent ce déclin. 1. le transport en masse par l'introduction des wagons-foudres, qui élimine les petits négociants (les barricailleurs). 2. la centralisation à Paris des réseaux commerciaux du fait du tarif privilégé du chemin de fer. 3. comme résultat des deux derniers, la pénétration des négociants-distributeurs dans la région; l'achat direct aux producteurs. Ainsi, les négociants régionaux ont bien réussi la mis en place de distribution des vins languedociens sur le marché intérieur de la France et, en outre, procuré aux producteurs une demande plus ou moins assurée. Cepandent, c'est la raison pour laquelle ils ont perdu, plus en plus, leur rôle dans le commerce des vins régionaux face a l'offensive des négociants-distributeurs. Privés de l'initiative au commerce, la viticulture et le commerce vinicole de la région restent soumis au marché et à ses aléas.