著者

小原 明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.1-24, 1998-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of the developmental process of in-house training in Japan. The factors which contributed to the realization of the high economic growth have been discussed from the various viewpoints. We want to consider the significance of an in-house training system which largely supported the formation of diligent employees in this paper, forcusing on the case of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., one of the largest enterprises in Japan.First, in-house training, the training of foreman, in postwar Matsushita were initiated by Kounosuke Matsushita, the president of the company, who was eager to learn management techniques from the US during the rehabilitation period. Then the techniques of Training Within Industry (TWI) and Management Training Program (MTP) were introduced in 1950, and refined to meet the company's context later on.The “Personnel Principles” established in 1957. They demonstrated basic concepts and directions of in-house training, and they paralleled rapid growth of the company in size and its production. The department of in-house training, which eagerly promoted enlargement of in-house training into all workshops and all levels in organizations, was set up in the head office in 1960.At Atami Conference of 1964 all the management problems of the economic slump and mature markets were severely discussed. However, all activities relating to in-house training were stopped for a time, and “The Principles on Long Term Human Development” were set up 1965 after an intensive discussion. Thereafter based on the principles, the department of in-house training in the head office proceeded with the training of middle management and with the promotion of various kinds of job education, at the same time the head of each workshop had responsibilities to train his workers in his own workplace.

著者

加藤 慶一郎 粕谷 誠 公文 蔵人 田中 彰

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.25-49, 1998-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.97-123, 1998-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

高浦 忠彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.1-22_1, 1998-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1975 Prof. H. Thomas Johnson claimed that materially the concept of return on investment [ROI] was the product of the 20th century. In 1984 I criticised his view by showing the existence of calculations of return on capital stock [ROCs] in the 19th century. In response to my article, Prof. Takatera insisted that Prof. Johnson claimed the non-existence of return on total assets [ROA] calculations, while Prof. Takaura asserted the existence of ROCs calculations. So he concluded that Prof. Johnson and Prof. Takaura's positions are not incompatible.In this paper, I reconsidered this problem. I clarify that in the 1830's U. S. corporations used the calculations of ROCs as ROA and as return on equity [ROE] judging from the following data : Maximum profit limitation articles of early New England railroad corporation charters and the questions and answers on ROE in the McLane Report (1833). So I conclude again Prof. Johnson was wrong.

著者

河 明生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.50-74_1, 1998-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It is said that religious and ethnic minorities tend to have an advantage over majority in making profit. However, there seems to be no established theory to explain the reasons for this tendency. The purpose of this article is to clarify this tendency through an analysis of ethnic personality.It is difficult for Japanese to recognize the existence of the Korean first generation in Japan who have superiority in the moneymaking activity.Because it is almost impossible for Japanese to differentiate Koreans from Japanese in outward appearance and they use Japanese name when they are in business. For example, Takeo Shigemitsu the founder of Lotte Co., Ltd. and Hisakichi Yamaguchi the founder of Daiwa-seikan Co., Ltd., ets.There was the ethnical discrimination in employment against Koreans. There was nochoice except lowly tasks, they had to set up business on their own. This circumstance focused not only their but also the next generations' capabilities on a certain industry.The Korean first generation in Japan have ethnocentric idea and take a special pride in their noble ancestors. Their value is based on traditional Korean Confucianism that they have been taught. This teaching worked effectively as a warrentable excuse and motivation when they started business. They had a will to invest in their mother country in order that they may return or send something home with fortune and honor. This became the entrepreneurship of the Korean first generation in Japan.But the second and the third generation differs from the first generation in personality, because they were assimilated into Japanese. This resulted in decline in their ability as entrepreneurship.This fact proves that the difference in ethnic personality in one society is one of the most important factor in establishing the entrepreneurship.

著者

小林 袈裟治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.56-58, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

粕谷 誠

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.3, pp.1-24, 1997-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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It is commonly said that Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (hereafter MBK) increase its trade volume satisfactorily in its founding period, 1876-1896. The first purpose of this paper is to show the change in principal commodities in which MBK dealt by analyzing its profit and loss statements in 1877, 1881, 1885, 1889, 1893, and 1896. MBK dealt mainly rice in 1877, increased the transactions of coal from 1881, that of machinery from 1889, and that of raw cotton from 1893. However it showed a decreased rice trade from 1890. The three main goods in 1896, machinery, coal, and raw cotton, were established in this way.The second purpose is to analyze the activities of MBK's London branch. The City was the center of the world trade in the period under investigation. MBK appointed R.W. Irwin an agent in London in 1877, and established a branch there in 1879. He returned to Tokyo to become the adviser of MBK, and the branch began to employ foreign employees at the agency. At first the branch dealt mainly with rice exported from Japan. It also acquired business know-how about chartering, marine insurance, and trade finance in London. Foreign employees contributed significantly to the establishment of the branch, but their salaries were much higher than that of the Japanese branch manager, so they were all fired till 1883. The volume of machinery transacted by the branch began to increase from 1899, and soon machinery became its principal merchandise. The branch began to borrow from Kleinwort Sons and Co., the first class merchant banker in the City, in 1892. This fact signifies that the branch established credit there.

著者

岡田 徹太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.3, pp.55-77, 1997-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The semiconductor industry dates from after the war, and it has developed remarkably since 1970's. It has such originality as no other industry has.The production of semiconductor of Japan had got ahead of the U.S. on the market share in the world in 1986. But, in 1993, between Japan and the U.S. these positions reversed again. Moreover, Korean companies has caught up with Japan, and a Korean company has won the first share of memory devices. We must define the characteristics of the semiconductor industry in order to make these process clear.The semiconductor industry dates from 1947, when the point contact transistor was invented. Germanium had been used as material of semiconductor at first. It is easily affected by intense heat. Therefore it is difficult to be used for military use, for example, a computer equipped on a rocket missile. The U.S. army expend a subsidy to develop silicon transistor and integrated circuit (IC) which are hard to be broken by intense heat. Consequently, the U.S. has developed earlier than other countries in this field. (Section 1) In Japan, there was scarcely military demand, therefore silicon technology was transferred from the U.S. later, and IC technology did not also develop until civilian demand for desk calculator and so on did. (Section 2) Generally speaking, the development of IC was towed by demand for desk calculator. At that time, however, the total sales of desk calculator hardly increased from 1973 to 1985. Because the price fell down rapidly though the quantity of output increased sharply. This price drop is caused by rising from high integration and ascent of yield rate. Moreover, appearance of technology to use integrated circuits in common amplified this effect. (Section 3) The phenomenon that the total sales is constant in spite of the sharp increase of the quantity appeared in not only desk calculator but also semiconductor devices. But, a case in the semiconductor is different from that in the desk calculator as semiconductor has repeated waves that is grounded on changes of generations under larger scale integration and higher function. The form of development of the semiconductor industry (called Waves of Semiconductor) have peculiarity as follows : First stage; the price of semiconductor manufactures tend to decline constantly according to the increase of cumulative outputs. But the total sales of the manufactures increase while the price is in higher level, because increase of the quantity is taken into account beyond price drop. Second stage; when the manufactures of current generation is main production, the total sales scarcely grow because the price falls sharply notwithstanding the favorable increase of the quantity of outputs. Third stage; when the price become calm in lower level, the demand of the current manufactures accord with saturation and then the generation is shifted toward new one. The quantity of outputs begin to decrease with gentle decline of the price, therefore the total sales decline too. (Section 4) The hypothesis of the Waves of Semiconductor explained as follows : since there is intense competition on current generation of the manufactures, manufacturers must proceed with R&D and investment against next one.

著者

砂川 和範

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.4, pp.1-27, 1998-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1 2

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the business development and entrepreuriship of Japanese computer game companies such as SEGA, Namco, and Nintendo.Until the 1970's, these firms were all once small manufactures of amusement machines or toys. How did such relatively small firms in the urban area grow up to be the profitable corporations we see today?The first step is to analyze how they have been as the leading companies in the fragmented computer game market which has been characterized by frequent changes with increasing speed since the formative years of the industry. Nintendo, the first mover, created its business system based on the strategy of outsourcing in software production and quasi-integration of distributors as “Shoshinkai”. SEGA and Namco tried to attack Nintendo's system using the strategy of building internal software development capabilities, which generated software production organizations which are, in using Michael Cusumano's terminology, 'software factories'.The second step is to analyze the mechanism of the 'software factory' as in the case study of 'AM 2 ken' (the 2nd R & D division of arcade machines) of SEGA. Its origin is intrafirm venture business in the crisis era of the arcade game market in 1985. AM 2 ken has been developing and driving SEGA's innovation since then. Its software production is done by small cross functional teams, and its advantage is based on the communication 'on the shop floor', where old business resources and new technologies are combined. It enabled gestalt change from 'waterfall' model to 'revise' model in grasping the process flow of software production.The study shows that small manufacturers in the urban area pzoneeringly introduced basic hardware technology from US in 70's and created the new market by developing and concentrating on the innovation of software and contents. In this way, relatively small firms could grow by bypassing the demerit of economy of scale. Here is the logic of 'small is storong'.

著者

鶴田 雅昭

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.4, pp.28-50, 1998-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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It is interesting to examine how ANA (All Nippon Airways) has developed during the period of rigid state intervention between the 1960 s and the early 1970 s. In this paper we will investigate their strategy in the period. We will concentrate on the following policies; investment and finance.One of the most significant issues for their development was how to invest in aircraft. They had been in a position to catch up with JAL (Japan Air Lines) in major routes in the period. They achieved this by introducing high performance aircraft more positively than JAL. On minor routes ANA frequently replaced aircraft in order to maintain high performance. Those policies encouraged the opening of new minor routes and stimulated increasing demand for air transport.Another important matter was how to finance the purchasing of aircraft. During the first half of the 1960 s ANA had not yet been in a position to borrow money from banks in the U. S. or even in Japan, except for the Japan Development Bank which did not however offer enough finance for this purpose. Therefore they had to depend on commercial credit from 'Shosha' (Japanese trading companies) or credit from airplane manufacturers. However a good opportunity arose when they purchased jet planes from Boeing Co., Ltd. in 1964. U. S. banks provided funds with lower interest rates. Valuing their aircraft in the terms of accelerated deprecation ANA quickened to repay the loan.It was the characteristic of their business strategy that they used their aircraft effectively and was financed from U. S. banks. These policies enabled ANA to grow to become now the largest domestic airlines in Japan.

著者

高岡 美佳

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.1-35, 1997-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The first purpose of this article is to analyze the business development of the Japanese department stores in the postwar restoration era when the first regulation on procurement of the department stores was legistrated in 1954. And, the second is to argue the process to the consignment system, the largest problem of today's department store management.The conclusion of this article can be summarized as follows.The factor which enabled the growth of Japanese department stores in the period was the positive business environments, particulary westernization of fashion life. In order to capture business chances, department stores leveraged their vertical relationship with suppliers such as this return policy (henpin) and dispatched salespersons (haken-tenin), because of shortage of human and financial resources. However, as this return policy in the postwar restoration era was different from the ruled system (in other words mutualy-agreed system) in the prewar era, suppliers had to owe all the risk of return goods. The regulation in 1954 was made to solve these problems, but it urged department stores adopt consignment system to avoid the occurance of return goods.Adoptation of the consignment system by department stores was also beneficial to the suppliers in two ways. First, suppliers felt urgency to establish the rule of transaction with department stores to prevent opportunism came out from unruled return system. Second, sift from usual procurement to consignment sytem widened the margin of the suppliers.Plainly speaking, the consignment sytem became established due to mutual rationality between retailers and suppliers. In my prospect, it may safely be said that other types of Japan's trade practices came onstage in the same context.

著者

千本 暁子 小川 功 内田 金生 平井 岳哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.36-67, 1997-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

浜 文章 赤坂 道俊 古川 澄明 作道 潤 河 明生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.68-113, 1997-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.114-133, 1997-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.27-40, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this essay is to make clear a key problem of study on the Japanese business history after the Second World War, and to indicate concrete focuses of the study concerned.The key problem of study on the postwar business history in Japan is lack of a whole perspective which covers not only the rapid economic growth but also the collapse of the bubble boom. On the other hand a recent appearance of comparative institutional analysis of economic development, which insists that company activities follow system-wide institutional changes, means a crisis of business history. Therefore, in order to overcome the crisis business history on postwar Japan must have the entire perspective without delay.This essay indicates three focuses of the study as follows;(1) to make clear changes of industrial relations in connection with changes of production control and quality control, (2) to analyze changes of a consuming trend in relation to changes of distributing structure and trade practices, and(3) to examine changes of company finance with reference to changes of investment activities and business results. And, as a conclusion, it emphasizes a new perspective, which should be called as “business history of coping with crises”, and an epoch-making change in the first half of the 1960s.

著者

平井 岳哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.41-55, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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After World War II, the dissolution orders of the zaibatsu was carried out by Occupation policy. In Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Mitsubishi-Honsha, which was a holding company, made efforts to maintain to control many operating companies in spite of its own dissolution. In zaibatsu, there used to be several kinds of committee, which were consisted of top managers and general managers among the holding company and operating companies. Mitsubishi-Honsha would continue to exist these committee informally even under the liquidation.But it had become impossible for Mitsubishi-Honsha to control operating companies, because all of them had became autonomous, independent companies owing to the dissolution of the holding company. For example, Mitsubishi Electoric Corporation carried out to revise wage system, without referring the matter to the general managers committee in advance.Each operating company did not always keep its own autonomy for others. In cases of emergency, they cooperated with others to dissolve the matter such as making stabilizing shareholders by mutual stock holdings. And it was also important for operating companies to preserve of the trade name and trade mark. Because Mitsubishi Shoji, which had preserved all of trade name and trade mark in Mitsubishi zaibatsu, was divided in many companies after the war, so there happened many troubles about them.Generally speaking, enterprise group has two factors such as top managers committee and mutual stock holdings. In case of Mitsubishi, top managers committee had been existing since before the war, differing from mutual stock holdings among operating companies after the war. So each of them had a different function, and top managers committee hardly had the function of large shareholders meeting in case of Mitsubishi in 1950's.The transfomation from zaibatsu to enterprise group in 1950's was represented as the changing of the position of operating companies. In zaibatsu, they were subject to the holding company formally. But in new enterprise group, all of them had became independent companies after the dissolution of the holding company. Therefore the function of top managers committee among members of the group had changed from the control operating companies by the holding company to the exchange of information and the interests coordination by members of operating companies.

著者

森田 克徳

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.65-95, 1996-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.3, pp.1-46, 1996-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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During the interwar period, French government tried to regulate the production and the sale of several industries to overwhelm the economic crisis occured in 1930s.The purpose of this paper will be to analyse the controversies and the effects of the law which was called Loi Le Poullen. This Law of 1936 aimed to regulate the market of French shoe industry which suffered the overproduction. This analysis will inclued 4 sections.Section I will be an analysis of the general situation of French shoe industry of 1930s. During this period, French shoe industry had the conflicts with foreign shoe makers, especially with those of Czecho-Slovakia.The second section will include a look at the discussions about the characteristics of Loi Le Poullen in the House of Representatives and the Senate. This law was discussed in Feburary of 1936 and adopted almost unanimously, and became effective from the 22nd March of that year. It is decided by this law that not only the openning of factories, but also that of stores should be strictly controlled by the government.The third section will analyse the arguments of renewal of Loi Le Poullen which arrived an end on March 1939 after two year's activities. Almost all the interested groups were agreed with it's renewal. The author examines the opinions of the professionnel associations of French shoe industry, National Economic Council and the Ministry of Commerce.The fourth and the last section will be an examination of the real effects of the Loi Le Poullen. Analysing the documents deposited at National Archives at Paris, the author makes it clear that this law was very effective to controll the production and the sale of French shoe industry. This law succeeded to prevent the sudden fall of the prices of shoes in France. But it must be remembered also that this law was very favour to the technical innovations of the industry.

著者

小山 久美子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.3, pp.75-94, 1996-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

上野 継義

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.4, pp.1-31, 1997-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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The passage of workmen's compensation laws in 1910 and the succeeding years gave a powerful impetus to the efforts of specialists in the area of industrial safety. In this environment the “Safety First” movement, which was an organized effort in accident prevention led by chief safety inspectors who were more commonly known as “safety men, ” extended all over the country. Many safety men were not engineers, so there were some critical views to the movement from engineers who had much training and experience in mechanical engineering and systematic management.At the beginning of the movement safety men and engineers had totally different viewpoints in approaching industrial safety. Engineers insisted that industrial accidents could be prevented by safety devices and in no other way, and that designing the safety devices was an engineering problem. Whereas safety men preached that only a few percent of accident cases could be reduced by guarding dangerous places, and that the prevention of the vast majority of accidents was possible through educational methods eliminating the carelessness of workmen.One of the most important features of the educational programs was the safety committee, which was sometimes composed entirely of foreign speaking workmen for “sowing seeds of caution” among them. The effectiveness of the educational methods was gradually accepted by some engineers, especially members of the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers. And the Association supported projects of safety men in the steel industry to found a national organization for disseminating the movement. From these efforts the National Council for Industrial Safety was founded in September, 1913 (one year after renamed the National Safety Council).It is interesting to note that in the course of every-day accident prevention work on the shop floor, safety men realized that any safety work would not gain fruitful results without resolving the problems of industrial relations. In order to organize the communication system between employer and employee they enlarged step by step the functions of the safety committee, at last which became in fact the prototype of the employee representation plan. Arthur H. Young, a prominent safety man, recalled that one of the by-products of the safety movement had been the growth of the industrial relations movement.