著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

『人文×社会』編集委員会

雑誌

人文×社会 (ISSN:24363928)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.1, pp.107-123, 2021-03-15 (Released:2021-06-07)

著者

横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)

参考文献数

56

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In his “Demonstratives”, David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.103-108, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.259-273, 2018

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<p>The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) states that ifany individuals exactly resemble each other, then they are necessarily identical. Intuitively,the PII seems valid, but Max Black attempted to refute it by introducingthe possibility of a symmetry universe in which two iron spheres <i>c</i> and <i>p</i> can resembleeach other exactly. This counterexample (hereafter BU) seems easy to ruleout using a weak discernibility strategy (hereafter WD) according to which <i>c</i>, beingspatially separate from <i>p</i> and not from <i>c</i> itself, is not indiscernible from <i>p</i>. WD, however,leads to 'the presupposition problem', because obtaining <i>c</i> as spatially separatefrom <i>p</i> presupposes the distinctness of <i>c</i> and <i>p</i>. In this discussion, I will give an outlineof a defense of the validity of the PII that evades the presupposition problemthrough the elucidation of some aspects of 'identity'.</p><p>In my view, 'identity' has two aspects: one is simply self-identity as a universalmonadic property (hereafter identity-1), and the other is identity as an equivalencerelation entailing indiscernibility (hereafter identity-2). The basis or ground for identity-1obtaining with regard to an individual <i>x</i> can be called the individuator for <i>x</i>,but it is no wonder that the individuation and articulation of <i>c</i> and <i>p</i> are prior to orground for obtaining <i>c</i> as spatially separate from <i>p</i>. So far as the PII is concernedwith identity-1, it may not be valid. However, we can characterize identity-2, followingDavid Wiggins's lead, in terms of what is called the sortal dependency of identity-2and the extended Locke's Principle (hereafter ELP), according to which, for anysortal concept <i>F</i>, <i>x</i> falling under <i>F</i> is identical with <i>y</i> falling under <i>F</i> if and only if <i>x</i>is the same <i>F</i> as <i>y</i>, and <i>x</i> is the same <i>F</i> as <i>y</i> if and only if a) <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> share <i>F</i> and b) <i>x</i>is not spatially separate from <i>y</i>. If ELP is valid, we can regard BU as merely a generalcase to which WD is applied. And if the Wigginsian idea of the sortal dependencyof identity-2 is also right, there is no longer a presupposition problem. I hence conclude that the PII is valid to the extent that it is concerned with identity-2.</p>

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.1-17, 2018

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The aim of this paper is twofold. The one is to make intelligible identity-relativism (IR) and its accompanying theory of proper names by making amendments to Peter Geach's corresponding theories. I argue that his IR can be reconstructed as a hidden variable theory of 'identical' and that a kind of ontological deflationism is needed to make his semantics of proper names compatible with IR. The other aim is to show that even IR with the seemingly refined semantics and ontology bears a serious problem of the requirement for an absolute identity. I argue that IR cannot by itself solve the problem.</p>

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.137, pp.115-143, 2016-03

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投稿論文

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

宗教哲学会

雑誌

宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.87-100, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-11-02)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper demonstrates and develops Peter Thomas Geach’s identity-relativism as an analytic theological theory that provides a promising understanding of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. According to identity-relativism, it is the case that the Father and the Son are distinct persons while they are the same God, for numerical identity is to be relativized by what is commonly called sortal concepts such as divine persons and God. To show the consistency of this theory, I proceed to the discussion in the following way. In Section 1, I provide an overview of what is called the logical problem of the Trinity and its solutions proposed thus far. In Section 2, I introduce Geach’s identity-relativism as a theory applicable to the Trinity, and show its notable advantage of avoiding both polytheism and modalism in solving the logical problem. In Section 3, based on an account related to counting Gods and its criterion, I propose possible responses to criticisms of identity-relativism and suggest the simplicity of God taken as a sortal concept. In Section 4, by specifying a logical mechanism that enables the compatibility of identity and distinctness between the Father and the Son, I argue that identity-relativism provides a superior explanation to the Trinity in comparison to similar theological accounts such as constitutionalism and the strategy of sameness without identity. Through this series of discussions, I aim to show how to be an identity-relativist about the Trinity, namely how to reconcile the Trinitarian theology with identity-relativism.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.1-17, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

26

---

The aim of this paper is twofold. The one is to make intelligible identity-relativism (IR) and its accompanying theory of proper names by making amendments to Peter Geach's corresponding theories. I argue that his IR can be reconstructed as a hidden variable theory of ‘identical' and that a kind of ontological deflationism is needed to make his semantics of proper names compatible with IR. The other aim is to show that even IR with the seemingly refined semantics and ontology bears a serious problem of the requirement for an absolute identity. I argue that IR cannot by itself solve the problem.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.259-273, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

26

---

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) states that if any individuals exactly resemble each other, then they are necessarily identical. Intuitively, the PII seems valid, but Max Black attempted to refute it by introducing the possibility of a symmetry universe in which two iron spheres c and p can resemble each other exactly. This counterexample (hereafter BU) seems easy to rule out using a weak discernibility strategy (hereafter WD) according to which c, being spatially separate from p and not from c itself, is not indiscernible from p. WD, however, leads to ‘the presupposition problem’, because obtaining c as spatially separate from p presupposes the distinctness of c and p. In this discussion, I will give an outline of a defense of the validity of the PII that evades the presupposition problem through the elucidation of some aspects of ‘identity’. In my view, ‘identity’ has two aspects: one is simply self-identity as a universal monadic property (hereafter identity-1), and the other is identity as an equivalence relation entailing indiscernibility (hereafter identity-2). The basis or ground for identity-1 obtaining with regard to an individual x can be called the individuator for x, but it is no wonder that the individuation and articulation of c and p are prior to or ground for obtaining c as spatially separate from p. So far as the PII is concerned with identity-1, it may not be valid. However, we can characterize identity-2, following David Wiggins’s lead, in terms of what is called the sortal dependency of identity-2 and the extended Locke’s Principle (hereafter ELP), according to which, for any sortal concept F, x falling under F is identical with y falling under F if and only if x is the same F as y, and x is the same F as y if and only if a) x and y share F and b) x is not spatially separate from y. If ELP is valid, we can regard BU as merely a general case to which WD is applied. And if the Wigginsian idea of the sortal dependency of identity-2 is also right, there is no longer a presupposition problem. I hence conclude that the PII is valid to the extent that it is concerned with identity-2.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.189, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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In his essay “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, John McDowell argues that the extensions and applications of such thick terms and concepts as courageous or selfish cannot be determined without the understanding of a particular perspective based on such noncognitive states as evaluative attitudes or emotions. This distinctive feature of thick terms─it is called ‘shapelessness’─is often thought as a challenge to moral noncognitivism, according to which moral values or judgments can be explained by noncognitive states of mind with regard to their corresponding natural properties. The reason is that it seems follow from the shapelessness of thick terms that the two components of their concepts, i.e. descriptive and evaluative components, are ‘entangling’, but noncognitivists, including Simon Blackburn as their representative, try to disentangle them. My aim in this essay is twofold. First, I organize and reconstruct McDowell’s ‘anti-disentangling argument’ and Blackburn’s response to it for simplicity’s sake. I then argue that McDowell fails in refuting noncognitivism in general because his argument restricts it unduly, while Blackburn’s pragmatic or semantics- free explanation of the shapelessness is also insufficient because it cannot ensure the default evaluative component of thick terms. Second, I argue that the feature of shapelessness can be explained as a semantic phenomenon in term of the nonindexical context-sensitivity of thick terms, in virtue of which such evaluative terms have the same content in any contexts, while their extensions are sensitive with regard to moral standards from ethical sensibilities of the context. By the use of this interpretation of shapelessness, noncognitivists can successfully disentangle the components of thick concepts into two entirely separate ones fulfilling different semantic roles. Thus the nonindexical contextualism I advocate not only makes clear the nature of thick terms and concepts but also offers a new and different semantic ground for noncognitivism from the traditional model.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

南山大学社会倫理研究所

雑誌

社会と倫理 = Society and Ethics (ISSN:13440616)

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.[121]-140, 2021-11-15

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.119-138, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

20

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In this paper, I will present a way to reorganize constitutionalism,one of the major metaphysical positions on cases of spatially coincident things such as a bronze statue and the lump of bronze from which it is formed. After an overview of constitutionalism and its problems, I will construct a hylomorphist theory to revise the relation of constitution from two independent perspective of the metaphysical grounding concerning forms and matters and the mutual parthood of coincidents. It is only a sketch of basic ideas, but it would contribute to a new basis not only for a full explanation of the mechanism of constitution and but also for an ontology of bodies and persons.

著者

横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020

---

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In his "Demonstratives", David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.</p>

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1-2, pp.35-50, 2018 (Released:2018-05-07)

参考文献数

56

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The aim of this paper is to give appropriate rejoinders to some typical objections to Epistemic Sortalism (ES) and thus to vindicate ES from them. ES argues that in epistemically individuating an object, a subject of perception needs to grasp under which sortal concept the object falls. ES has been, however, questioned lately in terms of both the possibility of misconceptions or ignorance of sortal concepts and the conflict with some current psychological research. I shall show that these objections pose no threat to ES, by examining the notion of ‘individuation' and thereby reorganizing ES as a specific epistemological theory concerning discriminating and identifying knowledge. Based on the relevant ontology, i.e., the constitution view, newly reconstructed ES requires an individuator to grasp the sortal concept of an object as an epistemic evidence.