著者

北梶 陽子 曽根 美幸 佐藤 浩輔 小林 翼 大沼 進

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.115-122, 2016-11-30 (Released:2016-11-30)

参考文献数

26

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This study investigated the effects of imagining others on cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. There are two ways to imagine others’ perspectives: “imagining the other” or considering how the other person feels, and “imagining the self” or projecting oneself onto the other person. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a) the imagining-other condition, b) the imagining-self condition, and c) the control condition (thinking about a landscape). Participants played a one-shot PD game and completed the social value orientation (SVO) scale, which measures one’s cooperative tendency. Results showed that the cooperation rate was higher in the imagining-other condition, and participants in the imagining-other condition expected that the partner would cooperate and that the partner thinks they would cooperate. In contrast, in the imagining-self condition, no significant differences were observed about these variables. Furthermore, the cooperation rate increased mediated by two-way expectations in the imagining-others condition, while it was not observed in imagining-self conditions. These results show the importance of imagining others not as a reflection of self, in increasing expectation of mutual cooperation and promoting cooperation.

著者

北梶 陽子 大沼 進

出版者

公益社団法人 日本心理学会

雑誌

心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.1, pp.9-19, 2014-04-25 (Released:2014-04-15)

参考文献数

29

被引用文献数

7

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This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that non-cooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players’ costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation.

著者

大沼 進 北梶 陽子

出版者

NPO法人 日本シミュレーション&ゲーミング学会

雑誌

シミュレーション&ゲーミング (ISSN:13451499)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.5-16, 2007

被引用文献数

1

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<p>社会的ジレンマ構造に,利得や情報の非対称性,フローの一方向性,信頼ゲームなどの要素を取り入れた「産業廃棄物不法投棄ゲーム」を開発した.このゲームは五つの異なる利得を持つプレーヤーからなり,利益と産業廃棄物を生み出す排出事業者,産業廃棄物の量を減らす中間処理業者,埋め立て処理をする最終処理業者,産業廃棄物を運搬する一次収集運搬業者および二次収集運搬業者が存在する.いずれの業者も,協カ(適正処理や処理委託)と非協力(不法投棄)を選択できる.8ゲームを実施し,次の結果が得られた.①フェイズを追うごとに不法投棄が減った.②処理フローの下流に行くほど不法役棄が多かった.③排出事業者は罰金やゲーム後の費用負担を恐れて委託金を低く抑える傾向があり,その結果,下流で適正処理費用が不足し不法投棄が増え,多くの費用を負担しなければならなくなった.④業者間の評価では,接触できないプレーヤーに対して信頼が低く,逆に,接触できるプレーヤーに対しては比較的信頼していた.</p>

著者

大沼 進 北梶 陽子

出版者

日本シミュレーション&ゲーミング学会

雑誌

シミュレーション&ゲーミング (ISSN:13451499)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.5-16, 2007-07

被引用文献数

1

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社会的ジレンマ構造に,利得や情報の非対称性,フローの一方向性,信頼ゲームなどの要素を取り入れた「産業廃棄物不法投棄ゲーム」を開発した.このゲームは五つの異なる利得を持つプレーヤーからなり,利益と産業廃棄物を生み出す排出事業者,産業廃棄物の量を減らす中間処理業者,埋め立て処理をする最終処理業者,産業廃棄物を運搬する一次収集運搬業者および二次収集運搬業者が存在する. いずれの業者も,協力(適正処理や処理委託)と非協力(不法投棄)を選択できる.8ゲームを実施し,次の結果が得られた.①フェイズを追うごとに不法投棄が減った.②処理フローの下流に行くほど不法投棄が多かった.③排出事業者は罰金やゲーム後の費用負担を恐れて委託金を低く抑える傾向があり,その結果,下流で適正処理費用が不足し不法投棄が増え,多くの費用を負担しなければならなくなった.④業者聞の評価では,接触できないプレーヤーに対して信頼が低く,逆に,接触できるプレーヤーに対しては比較的信頼していた.The"Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game" is based on a simulated social dilemma structure with aspects of asymmetry of incentive and information,one way flow of waste,and trust game. There are five different types of players in this game: the producing industries who produce money and waste; the mid-process industries who can reduce waste; the terminal industries who reclaim waste in landfill; the first and the second carriers who convey the waste. All players have to make decisions between cooperation (appropriate disposition and commission) and non-cooperation (illegal dumping). Eight games were conducted and the following are the results obtained: 1) Illegaldumping decreased over phases. 2) The players in downstream of the waste flow did more illegal dumping. 3) The Producing industry did not pay enough money to allow appropriate disposition,because they feared paying for potential fines and environmental restoration after all sessions are completed. Lack of initial spending money brought about more illegal dumping,causing later defrayment of greater costs. 4) Players who could not move were likely to be evaluated as less trustful,while those who could move were likely be evaluated as trustful.

著者

大沼 進 北梶 陽子

出版者

NPO法人 日本シミュレーション&ゲーミング学会

雑誌

シミュレーション&ゲーミング (ISSN:13451499)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.5-16, 2007-07-25 (Released:2020-10-01)

参考文献数

27

被引用文献数

2

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社会的ジレンマ構造に,利得や情報の非対称性,フローの一方向性,信頼ゲームなどの要素を取り入れた「産業廃棄物不法投棄ゲーム」を開発した.このゲームは五つの異なる利得を持つプレーヤーからなり,利益と産業廃棄物を生み出す排出事業者,産業廃棄物の量を減らす中間処理業者,埋め立て処理をする最終処理業者,産業廃棄物を運搬する一次収集運搬業者および二次収集運搬業者が存在する.いずれの業者も,協カ(適正処理や処理委託)と非協力(不法投棄)を選択できる.8ゲームを実施し,次の結果が得られた.①フェイズを追うごとに不法投棄が減った.②処理フローの下流に行くほど不法役棄が多かった.③排出事業者は罰金やゲーム後の費用負担を恐れて委託金を低く抑える傾向があり,その結果,下流で適正処理費用が不足し不法投棄が増え,多くの費用を負担しなければならなくなった.④業者間の評価では,接触できないプレーヤーに対して信頼が低く,逆に,接触できるプレーヤーに対しては比較的信頼していた.

著者

北梶 陽子 曽根 美幸 佐藤 浩輔 小林 翼 大沼 進

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.115-122, 2016

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<p>This study investigated the effects of imagining others on cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. There are two ways to imagine others' perspectives: "imagining the other" or considering how the other person feels, and "imagining the self" or projecting oneself onto the other person. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a) the imagining-other condition, b) the imagining-self condition, and c) the control condition (thinking about a landscape). Participants played a one-shot PD game and completed the social value orientation (SVO) scale, which measures one's cooperative tendency. Results showed that the cooperation rate was higher in the imagining-other condition, and participants in the imagining-other condition expected that the partner would cooperate and that the partner thinks they would cooperate. In contrast, in the imagining-self condition, no significant differences were observed about these variables. Furthermore, the cooperation rate increased mediated by two-way expectations in the imagining-others condition, while it was not observed in imagining-self conditions. These results show the importance of imagining others not as a reflection of self, in increasing expectation of mutual cooperation and promoting cooperation.</p>

著者

森永 康子 坂田 桐子 北梶 陽子 大池 真知子 福留 広大

出版者

公益社団法人 日本心理学会

雑誌

日本心理学会大会発表論文集

巻号頁・発行日

vol.82, pp.1AM-140-1AM-140, 2018

被引用文献数

1