- 著者
-
足立 研幾
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_94-203_109, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)
- 参考文献数
- 61
The nuclear non-proliferation norm is one of the most important norms in international security to date. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was created to implement this norm and took effect in 1970. Since then, the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states has been curbed to a considerable extent. However, after the end of the Cold War, a couple of countries clearly violated the norm. Sanctions against such misconduct have not been strong enough to enforce compliance. The nuclear non-proliferation norm has been shaken from many angles and severely damaged. Will this lead to the degeneration and disappearance of the nuclear non-proliferation norm and the collapse of nuclear non-proliferation governance?One of the few existing studies on norm disappearance was conducted by Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn. They emphasize the importance of imposing appropriate sanctions on actors who violate an internalized norm. They say that when a lack of appropriate sanctions triggers a cascade of norm violation, the norm will degenerate and disappear or be replaced by another norm. They also argue that a norm will weaken rapidly if it is highly precise, if the environment changes rapidly, and if compliance is not enforced by others. Considering the preciseness of the nuclear non-proliferation norm, the rapidly changing international environment after the end of the Cold War, and the weak sanctions for enforcing compliance when the norm has been violated, will the nuclear non-proliferation norm degenerate?By examining the results of public polls, behaviors and discourses of states which violated the nuclear non-proliferation norm, and the reactions of other states to the norm violations, this paper demonstrates that the norm is still robust. One reason for its robustness is because there is no alternative norm that can supersede it. In addition, this paper shows that the nuclear non-proliferation norm’s high level of institutionalization as well as the high density of the web of norms related to it have increased the norm’s viscosity. This viscosity is the key to understanding why the nuclear non-proliferation norm has so far not regressed and hence why nuclear non-proliferation governance will not likely collapse in the near future despite all the challenges the norm has faced.