著者

大串 敦 杉浦 史和 平田 武 渡邊 日日

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.1-33, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

堀江 典生

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.13-25, 2010 (Released:2012-06-20)

参考文献数

36

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This paper examines how Russia has addressed a series of migration issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To follow the history of Russia’s migration issues, we examine legislative and institutional changes, and the academic trends of Chinese migration issues in Russia, and analyze the labor market structure where Central Asian migrant workers are embedded. Finally we examine how to define the problems faced by foreign workers in the labor market in a migration study of Russia. The problems faced by the former Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union included how each country would manage the newly established borders and how they would control the human and commodity flows through them. In the early 1990s, Russia originally had to tackle how to receive ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet Union, how to resettle them, and how to control their increased flow. The revised law on forced migration in 1995 decreased the number of forced migrants from the former Soviet Union to Russia, and in turn a massive flow of Chinese migrants to Russia, especially to the Russian Far East, became the center of public attention. The Russian public and government considered the increasing numbers of Chinese migrant workers a threat to Russia and often dubbed such immigration the “yellow peril.” However, recent academic research on Chinese migration studies in Russia tends to draw a clear line against such alarmist discourse and to explore the realistic features of Chinese migrants living and working in Russia. Such research showed that most Chinese migrant workers are traders and businessmen temporarily staying in Russia and are actively exploring business opportunities and creating employment. Chinese migrant workers are indispensable for the Russian Far East where the labor shortage is critical. But in general, Chinese migrant workers find jobs, not due to the traditional demand of Russia’s labor market, but due to the demand created by Chinese businesses. The recent majority of foreign workers are from Central Asia. They are allowed to cross Russia’s border without visas and to look for jobs without visas or work permits. Central Asian workers living in Russia are embedded in the Russian labor market and occupy unqualified and low-paid jobs at the bottom of the market, filling jobs Russians do not want. Central Asian workers are employed with the traditional demand that Russia’s society always requires. Russia cannot maintain her economy and daily life without Central Asian workers. The Russian government, however, still fails to establish good governance to allow them to work legally, doesn’t protect their human and labor rights, and doesn’t ease the vulnerability they face as foreign workers. Migrant workers face much trouble in their daily lives and bureaucratic barriers to obtain legal status to stay and work in Russia. Without protecting their human and labor rights, the establishment of a common labor market in Eurasia, which is often mentioned in Russia, remains far from realization. Therefore we must scrutinize the real features of foreign workers in Russia’s labor market and tackle the problems faced by foreign workers in Russia.

著者

田中 良英

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.38, pp.72-88, 2009 (Released:2011-10-14)

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In order to understand concretely how the Russian Imperial government used the nobility in state service in the 18th century, it is necessary to investigate the actual conditions in the army, because many noblemen were firstly recruited into the army and trained there as state servants. Once temporarily established under the reign of Peter I only for the coronation ceremony of his Empress Catherine on 8 May, 1724, the Cavalry Guards (Kavalergardy) were reformed as a permanent military unit by Catherine I at the end of 1725. This corps has two noteworthy features. Firstly, unlike the other two existing guard regiments that included soldiers and officers who were recruited from the common people, it was composed exclusively of both Russian and foreign noblemen, most of whom started state service as common soldiers or dragoons and attained the status of company officers on the basis of their continuous work and abilities. Being appointed to the Cavalry Guards was rather beneficial for these military functionaries, because they were frequently and quickly promoted to a higher rank either while in office or at the transfer to different posts despite not being expected to actually fight on the battlefield. After leaving the Cavalry Guards, some of the members became core commanders of the two guard regiments newly founded under Anna Ioannovna in 1730, and others reached the top four ranks in the Russian army or the administrative system. Along with these high-ranking officials, many of the ex-cavalrymen were promoted to offices leading regiments, battalions, or local governments, acquiring grades equal to field officers. Judging from such social origins and career patterns of the staff, the Cavalry Guards can be seen one of the important resources for the Imperial government to gather and organize the talented and experienced noblemen distributed across the vast Empire, thereby utilizing their abilities not only in military but also in civil organs. Furthermore, this unit played a social role in absorbing and posting serviceable foreign families into Russia. The second important point is that the Cavalry Guards were mainly used in the Westernized court and state ceremonies, which were employed by the Russian rulers, especially after the Petrine reform, to propagate their unrivalled authority both in- and outside Russia. For example, at the coronation of Empress Catherine in the Moscow Kremlin, the cavalrymen in white wigs, hats with gold lace and white ribbons, green woollen coats, and red woollen vests guarded both the front and the rear end of the procession of the Empress and her husband when they paraded from the court to the ceremonial cathedral. Contributing greatly to the glorification of the rituals and monarchical power, such colourful costumes attracted considerable attention from contemporaries, above all, the foreign diplomats, one of whom noted their resemblance to the uniforms of the French musketeers (mousquetaire). Additionally, soon after Anna’s arrival at the outskirts of Moscow and at a relatively early stage of her coronation, the Cavalry Guards were granted a special audience with her, which symbolically suggested the respectful treatment of the rulers. Such favour could also have strengthened the connections between the imperial power and the elite, thereby supporting the rapid development of the 18th-century Russian Empire.

著者

工藤 仁子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.42-57, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper attempts to analyze politico-military relations in Russia, providing a perspective on the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate. Political leaders from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin had needed support from the military for governing the state. The military had expanded its influence on politics, based on this politico-military cooperation. The political leadership had placed its foremost priority on military policy, which had coincided with the military's interests. However, the political leadership is currently seeking to put more emphasis on economic development than military policy, for stabilizing Russia's domestic and external environment. This policy shift may provoke dissatisfaction from the military, which regards the national security as Russia's top concern. Therefore, the political leadership will strengthen its control over the military, for the purpose of keeping political superiority on military. Nevertheless, strengthening control over the military contains a dilemma in which strong objection from the military would lead to secession of the military from the political leadership, losing military support for politics. When the duumvirate collapses, a problem on which leader the military chooses will emerge. Therefore, unless the dilemma is settled, the politics will have to give way to, or pay the price for pacifying the military in case of confrontation with the military.

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no “clashes of civilizations” between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.

著者

袴田 茂樹

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.3-16, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most serious problems for today's Russia is how to establish stability and identity as a nation.There are two reasons this problem is especially serious in Russia. First, because of historical, social psychological and other reasons, Russian society has trouble creating autonomous public order. The present writer calls this aspect of Russian society a ‘sand-society’, which means a society where stable order and a market economy are difficult to establish without some measure of authoritarianism. The high rate of support for President Putin reflects, not stability, but a public fear of instability. Second, Russia, in spite of the social characteristics mentioned above, is trying to keep up the appearance of an advanced G8 nation with a civil society based on the rule of law and democratic values. It was in order to cope with this dilemma and to justify his government that Vladislav Surkov set forth his ‘Sovereign-Democracy’ theory of Neo-Slavophilism.There is a strong distrust towards the Western world behind this theory, which insists on Russian individuality and is inimical to interventions or ‘exportation of democracy’ by the West, as in the cases of the collapse of governments in Georgia and Ukraine. This theory above all justifies the great power of the Russian State, emphasizes Russian individuality or peculiarity and affirms people's demands for order, stability, and especially a strong leader.This theory is based on the ideas of Ivan Il'in, who was a Russianist religious thinker condemned for being a reactionary and deported from Soviet Union in 1922. Il'in describes Russian culture as synthetic, intuitive, and organic, while characterizing Western culture as analytic, materialistic, and logical. Surkov's theory retains the basic tenets of Slavophilism, which set Plato above Aristotle and was closely related to German Romanticism and mysticism, while making no deeper interpretation of its roots.Surkov points out three features of Russian political culture—‘centralization’, ‘idealization’, and‘personification’.‘Centralization’ means that strong centralized power guarantees stability.‘Idealization’ means that the Russians feel uncomfortable without an ideal or a mission such as ‘the Third Rome’ or ‘the Third International’. ‘Personification’ means that, in Russia, a person (leader) is considered more important than institutions.The problem of establishing identity in Russia is the problem of stabilizing a ‘sand-society’. Considering these three features in relation to this problem, there are two requirements for stabilizing the ‘sand-society’. One is a ‘mold’ or a ‘framework’ to give sand a form, and the other is ‘cement’ to fix it. Of the three features in Surkov's ‘sovereign-democracy’ theory, ‘centralization’, and ‘personification’ are the ‘mold’ or ‘framework’, while ‘idealization’, and ‘personification’ make up the ‘cement’. Against this Neo-Slavophilism or ‘sovereign-democracy’, so-called modern, Westernizers, democrats, reformists and social democrats-are criticizing Surkov. Curiously, therefore, the controversy between Slavophiles and Westernizers that occurred 150 years ago is now repeating itself. One Russian political scientist describes this phenomenon as a déjã vu and says it means that the problems dating back to the middle of the 19th century have not yet been solved.

著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.3-12, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In this essay, the present author researched the impact of the criticism of the‘Cult of Stalin, ’in the context of its implication on global socialist regimes. Above all, its impact over Asian socialist countries are analyzed. Special attention is paid on the Chinese communist party and DPRK. Emphasis is put on the fact that Hungarian and other East European revolution have un precedent impact over the fragile democratization in Asia. Kim IL Sung could perpetuate its ‘Cult of Chuch'e, ’because Moscow had to concentrate on Eastern socialism.

著者

横川 和穂

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.106-121, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the reforms of local public finance in Russia that have been carried out during the first term of the Putin administration from 2000 to 2003. The building processes for home rule and local pubic finance institutions in Russia started during the 1990s, although it was after 2000 that a comprehensive fiscal reforms focusing on municipalities ensued. Therefore, after a brief survey of the problems during the 1990s that caused reforms to be necessary, this work attempts to examine a“Program for the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation in the Period until 2005”that was introduced in 2001 and gave an orientation for reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relationship.The program tried to strengthen federal control over local public finances, by introducing uniform rule at federal level for the delegation of expenditure authority, revenue distribution, and intergovernmental transfers, that have to be applied to all levels of government. It also aimed at improving the efficiency of local public finances by strengthening the fiscal independence of the municipalities.As a result of the reforms, local government retained less taxable revenue source, causing them to depend more heavily on fiscal transfers from federal and regional government. This change imposed certain constraints on the expenditure patterns of local governments, and caused changes in the local public service systems; subsidies for housing and public utilities were reduced, while social assistance to residents was increased. However, the actual reform process did not necessarily embody the ideals of the program in the sense that did not strengthen the fiscal independence of the municipalities.It can be said that distinguishing feature of fiscal reforms under the Putin administration is an attempt to concentrate more fiscal resources within the federal budget while simultaneously strengthening political control over municipalities. And thus federal government tried to restructure the lax management of local public finances through reforms from above.

著者

藤原 克美

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.119-130, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

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Only few attempts have so far been made at gender approach to the transition economy in Russia. In contrast to the development of sociological gender studies, most of Russian economists simply neglect gender problems and some even deny the existence of the gender gap and inequality of opportunity. This paper critically examines the argument denying the gender gap in Russian labor market.First of all, the gender disparity in the labor market is reflected not in unemploy-ment rate but in the structure of labor market. Almost 70 percent of workers who had dropped out of employment were women. Many of them seem to have chosen to retire or to stay at home. It is hasty to assume the gender equality in the labor market without considering the reason why these women have left for economically nonactive.It is an undeniable fact that there exists gender segregation in Russian labor market. The main point of dispute lies how or why gender segregation is generated. Interindustry wage differentials are explained by the fact that average wages in‘feminized’ (women's) industries such as light industry, education or health care are relatively low. Under the condition of gender segregation, the widening of interindustry wage differentials are manifest in the widening of wage differentials by sex. On the other hand, the wage differential is caused by the fact that women take relatively low-wage and low-skilled jobs in the branch. Economists denying the existence of the gender gap explain this situation as a result of ‘normal’ function of market, that is, a result of free choices made by individuals. They argue that women are more tolerant of low-wage jobs because of their position as subsidiary earners in household. How-ever, this explanation already presupposes the dominance of patriarchal ideology, which is one of the typical form of gender discrimination.In reality, gender segregation is caused by inequalities of opportunity for recruitment and advancement within a company between men and women. Therefore, the differences in job evaluation of workers would not correspond to the differences in real skill level of them.Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that in Russian labor market in 90's there were apparent gender gap in both wage and employment. While withdrawal of women from the workplace was strongly affected by the severe depression resulting from the transition, the important factor that made women main victim of depression would be informal inequalities of opportunity for recruitment and advancement. Fe-male-worker's individual decision which concerns joining the workforce was made within the framework of this inequality.

著者

西村 厚

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.3-19, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

2

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Throughout these ten or twenty years, most communist countries have been trying economic transition to market economy. Now we can observe very different performances in their economic reforms. For instance, China as successful case and Russia as failed case. The way of Russian economic reform is understood to be shock therapy or big bang approach including political revolution. The Chinese approach is gradualism without political revolution.The purpose of this paper lies in analyzing the performance of transition economies through comparative study with Russia, Poland and China, aiming at finding the significant factor to influence the performance of transition economies. First, this paper focuses on the comparative study with Poland and Russia. Both countries adopted big bang approach after political revolution. However, both economies have revealed impressive contrasts in economic performance. Poland has succeeded to stabilize and develop her economy. On the other hand, Russia, going through the very long transformational recession, has not succeeded to develop her economy. Looking at macroeconomic factors, Russian current balance of payment has been sufficient, coming from oil export. On the other, Poland's one has been deficit. The contrasts in economic performance of both countries did not come from political or macroeconomic factor, but mainly came from the performance of financial reform. In the process of economic reform, Poland succeeded to build the reliable networks of commercial bank, but Russia did not succeed it. In Poland, most of national saving has been turning to investment in domestic industrial sectors through banking networks. On the other, huge saving of Russia has been running away to abroad without domestic money flow system. Even the Putin Regime, who has been trying to normalize the Russian system, has not been so eager to build the reliable banking network.China has dramatically succeeded to make economic reform under communist regime. The Chinese way of financial reform is interesting and paradoxical. Poland and Russia separated and privatized the former national banking system. The financial reform of Poland produced the nine national commercial banks, and has gradually privatized them. On the other hand, Russia separated and privatized the national banking system in the same time. The Russian financial reform produced more than two thousands small size banks that has not been trusted by Russian people. China has not been adopting such drastic separation and privatization, but sustaining the national banking system, under which China has been developing her economy. Even though the national commercial banks of China have been suffering the bad asset issue, Chinese people have been trusting the domestic banking system.

著者

大矢 温

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.57-72, 2002

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The main object of this paper is to analyze the prevalence of xenophobia (and Neo-nazism as its political expression) in Russian society today and to examine its persuadable causes. Here the action and the ideology of the People's National Party (Narodnaya national'naya partiya) and of its leader Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy are analyzed as an example of the violent fascist party in Russia because the PNP is considered to have a strong relation with the Skinhead movement among the younger generation today.<BR>Today xenophobia and racial antipathy is prevalent throughout European society and racist or fascist movement is gaining ground in many European countries. The question is, does Russian fascism have any relationship with this global movement? If so, does it advocate nationalism owing to the effect of globalism? Does fascism equal to a nationalism of Russia? (We must remember that more than 20 million Soviet people were killed in the war against the fascist Germany.) Is the Neo-nazi in today's Russia is really a Nazism? How does it differ from the classical one?<BR>The leader of the People's National Party, Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy, came to be known as a politician only after he became a candidate of the Parliament in 1995. He became widely known by his book &ldquo;My Faith is Rusism!&rdquo; (Moya vera - rusizm!) in 1997. In this book, Ivanov names his ideology as &ldquo;Russism&rdquo;. Although his &ldquo;Russism&rdquo; is composed of many ideological fragmentary elements of popular fascism, it can be formulated as a slogan of &ldquo;Russia for Russians&rdquo;, which also can be summed up as an appeal for Russians to emancipate Russia from &ldquo;non-aryans&rdquo;, &ldquo;communists&rdquo;, and &ldquo;Jews&rdquo; and to fight against them.<BR>Obviously, Ivanov's &ldquo;Russism&rdquo; is not so prominent one among other fascism ideologies. But what is the main reason of its success? Why does it so attract young dissatisfied Russians? What is the background of its prosperity?<BR>In this author's opinion, the main cause of Ivanov's prosperity does not seem to be &ldquo;a confusion&rdquo; of post-Soviet society. Rather, it must be found in &ldquo;a relative stability&rdquo; of Russian society today. In a word, Russian society today is not so confused as the post-Soviet society, say, up to 1995. A fairy tale of a post-Soviet millionaire is not plausible today for those whom live in misery. Because, according to Ivanov, &ldquo;Jews&rdquo; have already established &ldquo;Yid resume&rdquo; in Russia.<BR>Then, what is to be done? The answer is quite simple -- &ldquo;fight against them&rdquo;.<BR>By arguing so, Ivanov published one document which is named &ldquo;The ABC's of Russian skinheads&rdquo; (Azbuki rocciiskikh skinheaov) . In this document, Ivanov encourages the dissatisfied young to eliminate alien elements from Russia and to shave their own heads. In this way, Ivanov connects &ldquo;Russism&rdquo; as a political movement with skinheads, which was regarded as a sub-culture of the violent young.

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.i-xiii, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

長谷川 雄之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 : ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.43, pp.69-88, 2014

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.41-56, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

32

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Russia’s ideology concerning the invasion of Ukraine mainly comprises five components: the criticism of the “West,” historical unity of the East Slavs, self-portrait as a great multi-national/multi-religious nation, staging of the “Great Patriotic War” redux, and traditional gender and religious norms. Based on the three presidential speeches that officially explained the “special military operation” (February 21, February 24, and September 30), this study examines the origins and development of the five components of the Putinesque ideological construction, which is characterized by its haphazardness. The main body of the alleged motivation of the “operation” is the security threat posed by the “West.” In this context, Russia repeatedly criticized the double standard of the “West” as well as its neo-colonialism. More broadly, the September 30 speech expanded the accusation into a criticism of the so-called liberal international order, implying that Russia recognizes the cleavage between the “North” and the Global South and is attempting to use it as a wedge issue. The idea that the East Slavs were originally single “narod” long before the modern notion of “nation-state” emerged from Western Europe was popular in the imperial period and continues to affect parts of the contemporary Russian society. With Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as an intellectual reference point, it was revived in post-Soviet Russia and developed with the “Russkii mir” ideology. The present administration recycled it as a justification of Russia-Ukraine “historical unity.” Despite emphasizing its Slavic element, Russia still holds a multi-national nature. Its self-portrait as a huge multi-national/multi-religious state grew along with its Eurasian identity. In the 1990s, the newly born Russia rediscovered the legacy of classic Eurasianism. Since then, groups of diplomats and practitioners, as well as influential public intellectuals such as Aleksandr Panarin, have contributed to its spread in the political circle. Given the present situation of an increasing number of ethnic minorities being sent to the frontlines in Ukraine, it is essential for the Putin administration to emphasize its pride of the multi-national identity. On one hand, President Putin severely criticized the Soviet nationalities policy. On the other hand, the administration devoted much energy to choreographing the redux of the Second World War. The historical memory and family story of the “Great Patriotic War” is a valuable asset shared by the Russian society, which can unite the nation and create a patriotic atmosphere. Moreover, a considerable number of political elites maintain continuity with the Soviet period―it is no wonder the administration attempts to appeal to the Soviet nostalgia. The final ideological element comprises the traditional values of gender and religion. Since its third term, Putin administration has adopted it both as a tool to obtain support from the conservatives as well as the Orthodox Church and as an outreach strategy abroad. With anti-liberalism as the core based on strong antagonism toward the “West,” which behaves as “the winner of Cold War,” these ideological branches have been bound together in an eclectic manner. As a result, the current ideological production contains contradictions and seems complex at first glance.

著者

ベリャコワ・エレーナ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.57-75, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

29

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This paper seeks to explore the perception of learning, including the factors which contributed to the spread of self-learning and collaborative learning in the Association of Russian Interpreters in Japan. The research is based on the oral history interviews of three pioneer Russian language interpreters who have taken part in the activity of the Association of Russian Interpreters since the 1980s. The paper briefly outlines the background of pioneer Russian language interpreters in Post-World War II Japan. Tokunaga Harumi, who was one of the founders of the Association of Russian Interpreters in Japan, highlighted the importance of sharing knowledge and continuous learning, and his beliefs significantly influenced Russian language interpreters’ attitudes towards learning. Next follows a description on how the three interviewed interpreters acquired necessary competence through interpreting and translation work, and it focuses attention on the fact that all of them emphasized the role of background knowledge. The paper highlights the importance of extralinguistic knowledge, including worldly knowledge and the country-specific knowledge suggesting the future possibilities of interpreter training within area studies. By analyzing the narratives, this study also demonstrates how the socio-political situation, i.e., the ups and downs in demand for interpreters at that time, was one of the factors which led to the collaboration of the interpreters. Characteristics of interpreter demand, such as the need to work in different spheres, have influenced not only the contents of interpreters’ learning but also the style of learning. This in turn fostered the spread of collaborative learning in the community of practice which enabled the interpreters in this study to exchange their experiences.

著者

古宮 路子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.56-69, 2015

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<p>Yury Olesha completed <i>Envy</i>, his first novel, after repeated trial and error in terms of the form of narrative. The novel consists of two parts, with a change in the narrator from Nikolai Kavalerov, the hero, in the first part to the author in the second. However, it is not clear why Olesha changed the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of <i>Envy</i>. Upon inspection of the book's previous drafts, it becomes apparent that Olesha tried various forms of narrative in the process of writing. This study attempts to clarify the reason of change in the form of narrative in the published version, judging from the reason of change in the form of narrative in the drafts. </p><p>From multiple types of drafts, this study picked up three groups of drafts that were written in the three different stages of writing. The fragmental chapter "Useless Things" can be regarded as the first stage, in which the hero is not Kavalerov but Ivan Babichev, one of the main characters in the final draft. In "Useless Things," Olesha introduces Zvezdarov as a narrator and gradually gives him a personality as powerful as that of Ivan Babichev. As a result, the former becomes as important as the latter. </p><p>However, it seems that Olesha still wanted to present Ivan Babichev as the hero. Therefore, in the second stage, Olesha moves from Zvezdarov to Kavalerov as a neutral narrator to recount Ivan Babichev's story. Nevertheless, Kavalerov is also gradually given a powerful personality, becoming as important as Ivan Babichev. </p><p>This may account for Olesha making Kavalerov the hero in the third stage. Instead of Kavalerov, the author begins to use Kavalerov's neighbor as the narrator. The notable feature of this stage is the relationships of pairs: Kavalerov/Ivan and Kavalerov/his neighbor. Although Olesha ultimately shifted the focus from Ivan Babichev to Kavalerov as a hero in the novel, it appears that he continued to believe the former to be more suitable for the role. Thus, in this stage, Olesha adorns Kavalerov with many features characteristic of Ivan in the previous stage. At the same time, Olesha now found Kavalerov's personality suited to that of a narrator. Therefore, the author initially made the narrator, Kavalerov's neighbor, a literary mirror of Kavalerov, as a hero. However, in the end, the author presents Kavalerov with characteristics separate from Ivan, abandons the use of the neighbor as a narrator, and makes Kavalerov both the hero and the narrator. This decision was adopted in the final version as well. </p><p>The reason for change in the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of <i>Envy</i> is revealed in the relationship between the hero and the narrator in the earlier drafts. In the second part of the published version, Ivan Babichev's monologue is of great significance. In other words, Ivan Babichev becomes as important as the hero. As we saw above, Olesha knew that Kavalerov was not a suitable narrator for Ivan's story. Perhaps this is why Olesha abandoned the use of Kavalerov as the narrator in the second part of the novel. In <i>Envy</i>, the problem of who is the narrator of the story is as important as the problem of who is the hero of the story.</p>

著者

雲 和広

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.42-58, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

17

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This paper uses micro-data to show differences in normative attitudes towards the division of labor in households between former socialist countries and OECD countries. The results reveal a gap between the OECD countries and the former socialist countries in general. Among the latter, Russia tends to be more accepting traditional norms than the OECD countries, and the trend is stable.The phenomenon of the positive correlation between female labor participation rate and total fertility rate in developed countries has long attracted attention in demography from the viewpoint that "work-family harmony" can have a positive impact on fertility. In the data examined, we extract (1) a clear negative correlation between fertility and the attitude of "accepting" the traditional norms of division of labor between men and women in the household, and (2) an clear negative correlation between fertility and the weak division of labor between men and women in the household. In this respect, the widespread acceptance of the traditional domestic norms of division of labor in the former socialist countries, where the social division of labor was considered to be the most advanced under the socialist regime, is striking.Looking at Russia, the picture emerges that there is no clear correlation between age group and education level and the traditional division of labor. Note that comparing highly educated women's group across different time points is not an appropriate approach, since the data cover a period of about 20 years and the heterogeneity of respondents classified as the same group on the basis of educational level increases over time. However, it could be interpreted as casting a shadow on possible future prospects, such as whether the rise in educational attainment contributes to the achievement of gender equality.

著者

佐藤 圭史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.72-87, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

50

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Since the last month of 2016, after the assumption of the self-proclaimed presidency of Vadim Krasnoselsky, Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika (PMR, Transnistria) has implemented full-fledged “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its legal-administrative decisions concerned, in addition to pro-Kremlin patriotic policy. It is worthy to note that the political outcomes were abided on the 5-year State Program of Patriotic Education of Citizens of Russian Federation and have obvious similarities to patriotic educational programs which were introduced in Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, and other areas.The patriotic policy in PMR was officially launched at the establishment of self-proclaimed independence in September 1990 in the aim of promoting national solidarity among inhabitants as “Pridnestrovians,” which was essentially created along the Soviet national line. In contrast to the policy, however, the PMR Patriotic Program and subsequent related decisions after 2016 more focused on national awareness as “Russo-Pridnestrovians” which had inherited an indivisible historical legacy from Russian civilization. To recognize internal-external PMR policy and geopolitical relation between PMR and Russia, this paper deals with “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its related political decisions for the purpose of fostering patriotic awareness among “Pridnestrovian” youth. Eye-grabbing patriotism and patriotic movements followed Soviet nostalgia by retired veterans and elderly people are not main objects of this paper; rather, inconspicuous state-planned patriotic activities through school regular education, cultural festivals, academic-cultural exchange based on the state program are focal themes. The theory of “everyday patriotism,” which is penetrated in daily life without discomfort among subjects, leads to understanding this political phenomenon.From that perspective, Russian authority tends to control specific territory through cultural-social associations, NGOs, thinktanks or any other “non-political” organized bodies. In PMR, a patriotic youth organization “Unarimia” and a thinktank “Dnester-Prut Information Analytic Center”, a Pridnestrovian branch of RISI, had been activated under official support by the PMR state patriotic programs. This paper also focuses on the process and content of the state patriotic program and the effect and result of their patriotic activities toward “Pridnestrovian” children and youth by above mentioned organizations.

著者

⽮⼝ 啓朗

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.88-103, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

78

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Why did Russia abandon the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which was Russo-Turkish alliance, and accept the Straits Convention, which was signed by 5 powers on 13 July 1841? Previous studies have cited three reasons for this: (1) Russia’s weakened influence over the Ottoman Empire, (2) Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s orientation toward the Concert of Europe, and (3) France’s isolation. However, how did Russia evaluate the ability of its alliance partner? Using a commitment problem as an analytical framework, this study will clarify the security problems which Russia perceived in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and how it attempted to rectify them through the Straits Convention.In the first half of the 19th century, Russia, seeking to keep the Ottoman Empire vulnerable, gave military support to the Empire, which was reeling from the First Egyptian-Turkish War. After being approached by the Ottomans for an alliance, Russia signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi with the aim of expanding its influence over the Ottoman Empire and prohibiting the passage of foreign warships through the Dardanelles. However, this treaty not only caused a fierce opposition from Britain, which Russia had not expected, but also threatened the security of the Black Sea coastal region, which she had hoped.What did Russian policymakers think of these security threats? First, the Russian Military Officers questioned the Ottoman Empire’s military capabilities and believed that they would have to occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the event of a war with Britain, regardless of the intentions of their allied partner. Nesselrode also saw the Ottoman Empire as incapable of resisting British and French pressure and recognized that the conflict with Britain posed a serious threat to Russia’s security environment. And when the Second Egyptian-Turkish War broke out, Russia began to fear that it would be drawn into a war with Britain in the Straits region.In this situation, Russia tried to defuse the situation by participating in the conference of the five European powers. Russia approached Great Britain to abrogate the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and conclude a new agreement that would prohibit the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia believed that a new agreement, based on the Concert of Europe, would be more credible in its commitment to prohibit the passage of warships through both straits than the Russo—Turkish bilateral alliance. Although it was also Russia’s goal to isolate France at the London Conference, Russia believed that its commitment to the ban on passage through the Straits could be maintained with the agreement of the four powers, regardless of France’s consent. It can be said that the abrogation of Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was the result of seeking a more reliable guarantee to replace the Ottoman Empire, which was uncertain about its commitment to the Dardanelles blockade, besides easing tensions with Britain.

著者

堀⽥ 主

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.104-125, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

74

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This article explores the pivotal but largely unwatched 1985–1986 Soviet diplomacy over the Stockholm Conference, also known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in terms of its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains why and how the Soviet Union made concessions to Western proposals in the Stockholm negotiations after Gorbachev took office. Regarding the most contentious issue of the on-site inspection, the following three people — the new General Secretary, the Foreign Minister with no diplomatic experience, and the diplomat on the ground — collaborated to create the unprecedented Soviet decision. The long-held Soviet secrecy collapsed because the triangle stifled both the conservative KGB’s and military’s opposition. The Stockholm agreement, reached after two and a half years of negotiations, was the first multilateral East–West security accord since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the first arms control agreement involving the two superpowers since SALT II in 1979. It is also remarkable that its success was one of the first achievements for Soviet diplomacy in the ambitious Gorbachev period. However, the real significance of the conference lies in Soviet concessions in areas previously deemed unacceptable. The Kremlin, which had long adhered to secrecy, accepted the West’s proposal for on-site inspections. This paper is organised into four main parts. The first chapter deals with the end of the Gromyko era after Gorbachev’s advent. From the beginning, the new leader had a vision of improving international relations but no concrete plan. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned Foreign Minister, who had long dominated Soviet diplomacy, showed continuity in foreign policy from the pre-Gorbachev period. The second chapter analyses the period immediately following Eduard Shevardnadze’s appointment as Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze, who had no diplomatic experience, strengthened the bottom-up mechanism of actively incorporating his colleagues’ views. The increased discretion of negotiators on the ground significantly impacted the future of Stockholm. The third chapter focuses on the discordance between the words and deeds in Soviet diplomacy following Gorbachev’s spectacular declaration in January 1986. While the leader actively announced new initiatives, actual Soviet diplomacy did not profoundly change course. This chapter also stresses that the Chernobyl nuclear incident was not the decisive impetus for reaching the Stockholm agreement. Finally, the fourth chapter describes the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. The quiet war behind the Kremlin walls brought complex improvisation into the Soviet decision-making process and negotiation stance.