文献一覧: 21882266 (ISSN) - Ceek.jp Altmetrics

1 0 0 0 OA 心と記憶力 ─知的創造のベルクソンモデル─

著者: 平井靖史
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.33, no.4, pp.508-514, 2018-07-01 (Released:2020-09-29)

2023-12-13 02:49:19
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1 0 0 0 OA 特集「汎用人工知能(AGI)への招待」にあたって

著者: 山川宏市瀬龍太郎
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.29, no.3, pp.226-227, 2014-05-01 (Released:2020-09-29)

2023-12-10 08:34:49
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1 0 0 0 OA 情報の部分性とフレーム問題の解決不能性

著者: 松原仁橋田浩一
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.4, no.6, pp.695-703, 1989-11-20 (Released:2020-09-29)

The frame problem is very important in the context of knowledge representation of both humans and computers. The present paper discusses the frame problem for humans from a viewpoint of artificial intelligence. A major claim here is that the frame problem is unsolvable for humans as well. This claim is supported by several examples. Another major claim is that from a viewpoint of partiality of information, the frame problem must be discussed generally in a wide sense of the term, instead of being subdivided into the problem of description and the problem of processing. The unsolvability of the frame problem for humans should not be regarded as a limitation of human intelligence. Contrariwise, the flexibility of human intelligence is possible thanks to the fact that they cannot solve the frame problem; i. e., the fact that they make mistakes from time to time.

2023-12-02 21:14:18
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1 0 0 0 OA 現代記号論の構想 : 若干の問題とその構図(レクチャーシリーズ : 「哲学とAIにおける対象世界モデリング」〔第5回〕)

著者: 菅野盾樹
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.17, no.6, pp.760-770, 2002-11-01 (Released:2020-09-29)

2023-11-29 15:55:52
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1 0 0 0 OA アバターによる仮想化実世界の倫理問題

著者: 石黒浩
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.36, no.5, pp.558-563, 2021-09-01 (Released:2021-09-01)
被引用文献数: 5

2023-11-27 03:02:10
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1 0 0 0 OA 取引履歴公開下での最適取引戦略 : 自律的エージェント社会の行動規範

著者: 伊藤昭矢野博之
出版者: 一般社団法人人工知能学会
雑誌: 人工知能 (ISSN:21882266)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.10, no.2, pp.271-278, 1995-03-01 (Released:2020-09-29)

The social sanction mechanism against unfair deals is investigated in a society of autonomous agents. The mechanism is realized by disclosing the contract histories of all the agents. To simulate the situation, each agent is made to engage in the deal equivalent to the "Prisoner's dilemma" problem repetitively, each time changing the other party of the deal. Optimal deal strategies are searched under the condition that the contract records will be disclosed and open to all the agents. Several deal algorithms are taken up, and their behaviors are investigated by matching them under various conditions. Based on the results, the condition for optimal deal strategies of the agents are discussed.