- 著者
-
宮園 健吾
- 出版者
- 日本科学哲学会
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.44, no.2, pp.2_83-2_98, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)
- 参考文献数
- 17
This article explores “Inner Speech Account of Introspection”, according to which inner speech is the source of our introspective self-knowledge. The view hypothesizes that we come to know that we are thinking that p by being aware of the sentence of inner speech “p” accompanying the thought. I argue for Inner Speech Account by showing that it explains six explananda imposed for the philosophical theories of introspection; peculiar access, privileged access, detection condition, the lack of phenomenology, occurent/dispositional distinction, and content/attitude distinction.