著者

木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸 木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸 木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.1-16, 1986

著者

木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸 木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸 木村 彰一 岩井 憲幸

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.191-215, 1985

著者

沢田 和彦

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.79-100, 1998

著者

沢田 和彦

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.79-100, 1998-03-31

著者

藤原 潤子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.355-371, 2004

著者

光吉 淑江

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.277-285, 1999

著者

天野 尚樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.203-227, 2003

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Since the era of Peter the Great the history of modern Russian thought is one characterized by cultural contact with European thought. The purpose of this paper is to examine the thought of a representative pre-revolutionary scholar of international law, Fedor Fedorovich Martens, from the angle of cultural contact with European thought. The main themes of Martens' thought were affected by Western thought. His, however, was bound to undergo modification in accordance with traditional Russian legal thinking. Let us consider this way of thinking from three interrelated points. The first point concerns the concept of "pravo." Martens defines the key concept of international relations as "the idea of law [pravo]." International law manages the international social and cultural exchange between "civilized nations." Martens refers to this international activity as "international life," that is, the role of international law is to govern "international life." He calls this role "international administration." Martens' thought reflects the influence of Lorenz von Stein. The concept of "law [pravo]" in Martens' context, however, differs from that of "law [Recht]" in Stein's work. The second point is connected with the Russian concept of social community and its characteristics. Martens views international relations as taking place within the "international community." He regards the essence of international law to be an "international community" in which "civilized nations" have an "international life." The "international community" is the voluntary association of "civilized nations." "Civilization," in other words, means the prerequisite for membership in the "international community" which does not have any authority over states. According to Martens' theory, international conferences function as administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the "international community." This idea is inspired by the Russian understanding of social community. The third point concerns the Russian concept of natural law. Martens' key concept of international relations, "the idea of law," is relevant to structural change in the "international community." This change refers to the expansion of "international life" on a global scale. The turning point of this change was the Crimean War, which resulted in Turkey's entering the "international community." Before the war, the members of this "international community" were restricted to "civilized nations," that is, only Christian-European nations. This restriction, however, became invalid with the entry of Turkey into the "international community," thus extending the "international community" beyond Europe. Martens applied the following condition to meet this situation: the idea of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law." Martens argues that this idea is an outgrowth of the Grotian tradition of international law. Martens defines non-European nations as "uncivilized nations," meaning that positive law cannot be applied to them. Instead Martens applies natural law in these situations. This usage, however, differs from the Western legal tradition, because Martens recognizes natural law in Russian way. According to Russian legal traditions, pravo is not distinguished from the orders of specific political authorities, such as an ukaz from the tsar. The Russian masses do not try to exercise their subjective rights, which is the essence of Recht. On this point, the Russian legal traditon differs from that of the West. The attitude of the Russian masses allows the exercise of unlimited power by political authorities. This is due to the nature of traditional Russian social communities that lack autonomous bodies to exercise their subjective rights. This attitude stems from the Russian concept of natural law. Whereas Western people recognize natural law metaphysically, the Russians grasp it empirically. I call the Russian concept the "realistic natural law." The validity of the "realistic natural law" ultimately rests on political power. The Russian legal consciousness is reflected in Martens' recognition of the "international community." As stated above, Martens applies natural law to "uncivilized nations." According to his theory, "uncivilized nations" are not allowed to exercise their subjective rights. Therefore, it is possible for "civilized" Russia to exercise her power over "uncivilized nations" without any restrictions. Martens' concept of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law" is deeply influenced by Russia's "realistic natural law."

著者

長谷川 毅

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.p27-55, 1987

著者

大石 雅彦

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.21-45, 1989

著者

光吉 淑江

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.277-285, 1999

著者

三谷 惠子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.75-96, 1993

著者

秋月 孝子 秋月 俊幸

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.54-72, 1985

著者

栗生沢 猛夫

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.21-50, 1979-07

著者

秋草 俊一郎

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.91-121, 2008

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Перевод и комментарии к роману «Евгений Онегин» (1964) представляют собой самое объемное произведение в творчестве Владимира Владимировича Набокова (1899-1977), работа над которым заняла восемь лет. Хотя сам Набоков относил комментарии к «Евгению Онегину» к числу своих важнейших произведений, они до сих пор изучены мало, так как им не уделяли должного внимания ни исследователи Пушкина, ни исследователи Набокова. Самым странным среди многочисленных комментариев является комментарий к XIX строфе четвертой главы. В нем Набоков выдвигает гипотезу о том, что непосредственно перед ссылкой Пушкин дрался на дуэли с Кондратием Рылеевым. Согласно Набокову, дуэль произошла между 6 и 9 мая 1820 года в окрестностях Петербурга, в имении матери Рылеева Батове. При этом Набоков сообщает, что его предок приобрел Батово и Рождествено, и в окруженном красивой природой Батове Набоков играл в потешные дуэли с кузеном. Набоков также знакомит читателей с «туманным семейным преданием», согласно которому Пушкин дрался на дуэли с Рылеевым на главной аллее Батова -- «Chemin du Pendu» (тропинка повешенного). Набоков потратил девять страниц для доказательства дуэли, но не представил убедительных доводов в пользу своей гипотезы. Однако мы можем относиться к содержанию этого комментария не как к историческому факту, а как к лирическому отступлению. Сам «Евгений Онегин» включает много лирических отступлений, в которых повествователь Пушкин высказывает свое мнение и делится воспоминаниями. Таким же образом, Набоков часто отступает от роли беспристрастного комментатора и говорит о себе. Из этого следует, что героем комментариев является Набоков, аналогично тому, как героем «Евгения Онегина» является Пушкин. В двух автобиографиях -- «Conclusive Evidence: A Memoir» (Убедительное доказательство, 1951) и «Другие берега» (1954), -- которые Набоков написал до создания комментариев, писатель вспоминал, что его дядя Василий Рукавишников оставил ему в наследство Рождествено, и мальчик Набоков играл на главной аллее Батова с кузеном Юрием Раушем фон Траубенбергом, который погиб в борьбе с Красной Армией. В комментариях Набоков вносит свои воспоминания и великую русскую литературу, чтобы навсегда запечатлеть свои воспоминания и название своей земли в классике. В комментариях Набоков обращает внимание на трехдневную разницу между днем, когда Пушкин в действительности отправился из Петербурга, и днем, который Пушкин указал в дневнике спустя год. Набоков дает истолкование этой временной разницы. Однако сам Набоков пользовался такой же разницей во времени в своем самом известном произведении -- «Lolita» (1955). В этом романе подобно тому, как Онегин убил поэта Ленского, Гумберт Гумберт убил драматурга Клэра Куильти. В своей статье один из самых известных исследователей Набокова Александр Долинин пишет, что Набоков управляет временем, и выражает сомнение относительно дуэли между Гумбертом и Куильти. По нашему мнению, в своих комментариях Набоков, как писатель, управляет временем и заставляет Пушкина и Рылеева стреляться. В одном интервью Набоков сказал, что он не верит во время. В развязке романа «Lolita» Гумберт говорит, что его исповедь -- «спасение в искусстве». Таким образом, для Набокова эти комментарии -- «спасение в искусстве» вне времени. В 1966 году Набоков сам перевел «Другие берега» на английский язык. В автобиографии «Speak, Memory: Autography Revisited» (Память, говори 1966) он начертил карту своего поместья и поместил указатель. На карте, сделанной от руки, изображена извилистая тропинка -- «Chemin du Pendu». При этом он упомянул «Chemin du Pendu» в указателе. Еще более интересный факт обнаруживает сравнение старых и нового издания автобиографии. В указателе Набоков переменил детали, чтобы осуществить «туманное семейное предание», потому что в старых изданиях не было никаких описаний ни Рылеева, ни предания, ни «Chemin du Pendu». На основании этого мы убеждаемся в том, что Набоков создавал не только литературную историю, но и свои воспоминания, чтобы вернуть утраченную землю.

著者

矢田 俊隆

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.16, pp.251-270, 1972-03

著者

勝田 吉太郎

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.7-65, 1959

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The leitmotif of this article is to compare Bakuninism with Marxism in terms of their philosophical and sociological foundations as well as of their revolutionary programmes and tactics. In a word, the basic pathos of Marxism is Equality, and it starts with the society, whereas Bakunin's is Liberty and he starts with the individual. Indeed, his social and political theory begins, and almost ends, with liberty. That is why Bakunin's criticism of "the dictatorship of proletariat" is so severe and uncompromising. It may be said that his "apolitism" and the rejection of legal political action lead to the syndicalist ideas. Marx introduced into the revolutionary theory and practice the order, method, and authority, and thereby laid the foundation of the disciplined revolutionary State, Bakunin was a visionary and a romantic. His concern was not with the mass but with the individual, not with institutions but with morality. On the other hand, the combination between the Russian reality and his unrealism is peculiar enough. The paradox of history shows us that Lenin owes more to that rebel of the eastern backward country rather than to his official teacher, Karl Marx in formulating his own revolutionary tactics.(Particulary in his theory of "smychka" between workers and peasants and also his concept of the revolutionary party organization.) At all events, Bakunin's ideas, with his all fantasies and Narodnik biases, are deep-rooted in the Russian soil.

著者

東田 範子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.46, pp.1-32, 1999

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Since the time of the Russian Empire, Kazak(Qazaq) music had been described as "folk music" by scholars and musicians, and under Soviet rule, it was to be developed to create a part of the Kazak national culture. The author describes the process of the formation of Kazak national music and its systematization in the first half of the Soviet period. To understand the changes in Kazak musical culture in the Soviet period, it is important to survey the course of Russian nationalism in the 19th century; which served as a model for the formation of Kazak national music. In Russia, Iike in other countries on the periphery of Europe, there had been interest in folk culture since the middle of the 18th century; and folk songs and music were transcribed in musical notation and arranged by composers and scholars. So-called Russian nationalist school w as established in the history of European music, and composers did not simply quote Russian folk music in their works with European harmonization. At that time, it became a common practice for composers to publish "collected folk songs" -- a term which was applied to their own arrangements of songs with piano accompaniment. The worth of folk songs was appreciated only when they were given arrangements or harmonization, thus transformed by composers into works of art. Folk music was always subsidiary to "art music" or "universal music" -- i.e., European Classical Music. Another source of material to be transformed into works of art in Russia was the musical traditions of foreign peoples. Their motifs were inlaid in many works by Russian composers, and they evoked not only exotic but also imperialistic and patriotic feelings for Russia. The music of foreign peoples was also considered as "folk music," whether it be their ritual music or court music. On the other hand, Russian folk music was transformed in the process of staging it. In the 1880s, V. V. Andreev "improved" Russian folk musical instruments, giving them frets and adding strings to permit the playing of more "complicated" European works. He made instruments of different sizes and registers, and these were organized into the orchestra of Russian folk musical instruments. This orchestra became instantly popular, and stimulated formation of similar ensembles. The collection of folk music and its publication was of interest not only to musicians but to Russian ethnographers. Ethnographic research institutions formed special commissions for folk music research, which included composers, musicologists, and music critics, as well as ethnographers. They undertook the systematic collection and study of Russian and foreign music, and published the results. Kazak music was also transcribed in this tradition. Beginning in the first half of the 19th century; it was recorded in linear notation. Many of the transcribers of Kazak music were professional or semi-professional musicians or ethnographers well-grounded in music, and some of them did arrangements in the manner of the Russian composers. Meanwhile, Kazaks did not write their own music into notation until 1931. Since they had transmitted tr mheiusical heritage in an entirely oral-aural w ay, the idea of visual recording of music was unfamiliar for them. It is natural that they might have come into contact with Russian music and with European music through the Russians, as a result of their long history as neighbors. A few Kazaks at that time actually read and wrote European notation. But most people simply received the music by ear, not by a European notation system, and they never attempted transcription of Kazak music. Unlike Kazak literature, which was transformed eclectically to meet the demands of the coming new age, such transformation of Kazak music was not possible without transcription. In early Soviet ideology, the culture of the Kazaks was seen not as "national culture," but as "folk culture." Folk culture was to be collected and recorded to educate and enlighten the people. They were expected to gradually adopt "universal culture," supplemented with their own folk elements. In 1920, when the Kirgiz [Kazak] ASSR was established, the government decided to undertake the collection of Kazak folk music as a state project. As the key person responsible for this task, the government appointed A. V. Zataevich, who had come from Russia. Since he once wished to be a professional composer, Zataevich had been interested in Kazak music before his offircial appointment, and he had himself already begun transcription and arrangements of the music. His personal purpose was to create new art music by using the motifs and melodies of Kazak music in his works as was done by the Russian composers whom he admired. Thus the aims of the government and those of Zataevich diverged, but they were basically in agreement on the ultimate purpose of contributing to "universal art music" -- one by educating Kazak people, and the other by trying to bring new possibilities to art music. Another program pursued by the government and Zataevich was the "improvement" of Kazak musical instruments and the organization of ensembles according to the Russian model. Improvement meant increasing the volume of the sound of instruments for performance on stage, increasing the number of frets and strings, and so on. This program was initiated after 1928, and took shape in the 1930s. After the concept of the socialistic realism was formulated in the 1930s, folk culture was required to be "national in the form and socialistic in the content" through "development" in a Soviet socialistic way. In Kazak music, this development was to be realized through professionalization and popularization. Now Kazak musicians had to become "professional" by being educated in public institutions which were opened in rapid succession, and by playing the improved Kazak instruments in orchestras using notation. Education in institutions was conducted only by these "professional" musicians, and the traditional form of Kazak musical culture was designated as amateurism. It was only "professional folk music" that could become "Soviet-Kazak national music." The first institution of higher musical education in Kazak SSR was the Musical-Dramatic Training College, founded in 1932. The government appointed A. Jŭbanov to direct this College. Jŭbanov was the first Kazak that learned European music in Russia (Leningrad), and he was an expert in Kazak musical culture, as well. In the College, he played a leading role in the transcription and arrangement of Kazak music, in the reconstruction of Kazak musical instruments, and in musical education. He and colleagues transcribed a large number of Kazak songs and melodies into staff notation. They were arranged to create "art music", and to provide a repertoire for the Orchestra of Kazak Folk Musical Instruments which was established in 1934. Kazak instruments were "improved" by Russian masters who had previously worked with orchestras and ensembles of Russian folk musical instruments. The Orchestra of Kazak Folk Musical Instruments began to use a notation system for performing arranged European Classical pieces, but there were great difficulties for Kazak musicians both in the polyphonic performance style of the orchestra and in using the linear notation system. In this way, the professionalism of Kazak folk music was developed despite various difficulties. Furthermore, this professionalism was supported by musicological research. Jŭbanov began to write the biographies of past Kazak musicians, and formulated the concept of "the history of Kazak music." The first comprehensive work on the history of Kazak music was written by Jŭbanov, entitled "The Lives and Works of Kazak Composers." This book apparently follows the history of masters of European music in its manner of historical and biographical writing. We see that Jtibanov attempted to show the autonomous and independent worth of Kazak music -- by both denying and allowing the application of European terms to Kazak music. Simultaneously, though, this autonomy of Kazak musical culture was considered as a thing of the past, and in this regard was unlike Soviet-Kazak professional folk music. In this way, Kazak folk music was "developed" into Soviet national music through systematization and institutionalization. As national music was seen to have these indispensable characteristics, traditional forms of Kazak music were relegated to the realm of folk music, which was associated with "simplicity" and "amateurism".

著者

石 和静

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.33-55, 1999

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This paper elucidates the plans for Korea's neutralization by Russia between 1900-1903 and evaluates its connection with Count Witte's Manchurian policy It deals with a series of three attempts to realize Korea's neutrality under the auspices of a "joint guarantee by the Powers," which was invented by the Russian government. In most of the literature reviewed, discussions about Russia's Korean neutralization plans have failed to view them as policies initiated by the government as a whole, and tended to interpret them only as impromptu, unauthoritative proposals by Russian Ministers on the spot. Witte, as the Russian Minister of Finance who had the greatest influence in Russian East Asian affairs, sought to strike separate under-the-table deals with Japan concerning Korea's neutrality. Japan in fact wanted a free hand for itself in the Korean peninsula, however, which seemed to Russia absolutely unacceptable in view of Korea's paramount strategic significance. This study shows that Korea's neutralization was Russia's ultimate goal, and this goal conflicted with lapan's stance on the Korean and Manchurian issues. In the end, these tensions contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Korean neutralization policy was originated and conducted by Witte. This was due to Witte and his ministry's involvement in all aspects of Russian foreign affairs. Witte's solution to the Korean problem was always connected with the situation in Manchuria, where the Russians wanted to exercise their extraterritorial rights. He brought up the Korean neutralization policy as a temporary means to defend against the lapanese from "getting into Korea" while Russian troops were actively engaged against the Boxer Rebellion in Manchuria. Witte argued that Japan would be handicapped by the expenditures it was making in Korea and that it would be much more susceptible to Russian pressure, especially once the Transsiberian Railroad was completed. All of which would make it easier for Russia to take possession of Korea later, if circumstances required. In other words, Witte was simply searching for a modus vivendi until Russian preparations were complete. Henceforth Russian troops occupied Manchuria on 7 January 1901, Izvolskii, the Russian Minister to Japan, proposed Korea's neutralization under international guarantees, that is, by Japan and Russia, which in substance would divide the Korean peninsula according to each side's sphere of influence. The Japanese government, however, replied that they would not discuss Korea's neutrality until the Russians took steps to move their armies out of Manchuria. By replying through Chinda, the Japanese Minister to St. Petersburg, Japan by- passed lzvolskii who had been entrusted by the Czar with the authority to negotiate the neutralization issue. The two countries' relations continued to be very strained. The "war crisis" of Spring 1901, caused by the conflict and mutual distrust between Russia and lapan on the Manchurian and Korean questions, had a number of consequences. First, it tended to unite Japanese statesmen who had previously been undecided with the proponents of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Second, for Witte, Russia's primary concern was to avoid war with Japan, and the best means for solving the Manchurian problem was to renounce any political intentions in Manchuria and limit Russian interests there to the protection the Chinese Eastern Railway's interest as a private company With regards to Korea, he felt that if lapan demanded the country's annexation, the proper course would be to open the issue to international discussion. Even if Japan seized Korea, Russia should not consider it a casus belli. Following the "war crisis," a second neutrality scheme was attempted by Witte himself. In July 1901, when his ideas were accepted as the basis for a plan for the three-stepped e vacuation of Manchuria with some reservations, he approached the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg and suggested, unofficially, a conditional arrangement regarding the crucial Korean problem. Russia, he said, would agree to a settlement making Korea a neutral area, but allow Japan the right to supply the Korean government with administrative and fmancial advisers as well as with a chief of police. In return, Iapan would officially recognize Russia's preponderance in Manchuria. Witte's practical proposals would have conceded Japan's demands in Korea with some reservations and normalized relations with China. The main concern of Wiitte's counterpart, however, was Korea, and for Japan it was seen as matter of life and death for Japan to keep Russia out of Korea. Japan could not question the actions of Russia in Manchuria merely on the basis of the London Times revelations of reported Russo-Chinese secret ne gotiations to consolidate Russia's occupation of Manchuria. By tying in the Manchurian question with Korea they hoped to ascertain Russia's intentions. The Russian proposal ended in failure because lapan would not enter into an agreement concerning Korea until the fate of Manchuria was decisively settled. Russia did not take this to mean a breakdown in negotiations. In Decernber 1901, while the question of a military retreat from Manchuria was a heated subject of discussion between Russia and China, Witte suggested more specific neutrality terms in St. Petersburg, in talks with Ito, Iapan's former Premier. It is evident that the Russians accepted the Japanese demands with respect to Korea only with the following qualifications: guarantees to maintain Korea's independence, not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes, and not to hinder Russia's free passage through the Korea Strait. In return, Russia was to be left with a free hand in Manchuria. On the other hand, Ito brought with him an itemized plan setting forth Japan's desire for a free hand in Korea commercially, industrially, militarily and politically, as well as offering a guarantee that the country would not be used for military purposes against Russia. In the end, Russia's final plan was refused by the Japanese government. Japan felt compelled to conclude an alliance with England which would provide it with the guarantees it needed for primacy over Korea rather than negotiate an agreement with Russia which would have hindered it in attaining this goal. The last secret attempt by Russia to achieve Korea's neutrality was the proposal for the "Neutralization of Korea under the joint guarantee of the Three Powers, Russia, Japan, and America." This plan was aborted almost as soon as Russia had begun proposing it, mainly because America had already made a decision not to interfere in a matter being pursued by the Japanese government. At the time lapan questioned Russia's approaches to America. It is evident that with the first scheduled evacuation in Manchuria coming soon, Witte probably considered the plan as a way of placating America and to encouraging them to develop a new understanding regarding Korea. To restrict Russia's activities in Manchuria and in support of the Anglo-Iapanese Alliance, the United States demanded the 'Open Door' policy in China. It should be also noted that the fmal neutralization scheme proposed in September 1902 was a more concrete version of the plan "under the joint guarantee of the Powers" which had been formally proposed in January 1901. The main feature of the negotiations on Korea's neutralization between Russia and Japan was that the Russian proposals were repeatedly rejected by the Japanese, who were always one step ahead of Russia. The pattern of Russia's abortive schemes for Korean neutrality did not change in official discussions on the Manchurian and Korean questions after August 1903, the period of so-called "w ar diplomacy." From the Japanese point of view," the neutralization of Korea" meant the sacrifice of its position on the peninsula. In fact, Japan, not yet viewing itself as a fully independent actor, had the support of England and America behind it. Agreeing to anti-Russian common interests, the Western powers did not stint in their promises of diplomatic support to Japan. It can be surmised that the failure of Russia's schemes to neutralize Korea, aimed at putting lapan's imperialistic ambitions to rest, was a by-product of general trends in power politics in East Asia since the last decades of the nineteenth century.

著者

猪木 正道

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.1-17, 1960

著者

鳥山 成人 鳥山 成人 鳥山 成人

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.25-70, 1957