著者

朝妻 恵里子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.197-213, 2009

著者

森 美矢子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.217-248, 2000

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This paper looks at the attempts made between 1987 and 1988 to reform and revive Komsomol under the pressure of political and social change, and their consequences that paradoxically led to the collapse of Komsomol. When we explore the process of Perestroika and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, we tend to perceive Perestroika simply as the prologue to the collapse of the Union and interpret all factors and phenomena during Perestroika from the perspective of how they contributed to the demise of the Soviet system. While it is true that Perestroika ultimately brought about the collapse of the old regime, ten years have elapsed since the beginning of Perestroika. I believe that a more critical and historical examination of the complicated and contradicted process of Perestroika is necessary. Upon reconsidering the historical meaning of Perestroika, it is puzzling to realize how the measures were first initiated to make the system work better, and then transformed intentionally or unintentionally under given circumstances, thus deviating from their original aims and reaching completely different results. Komsomol, as I will examine later, is a good example of this process. Komsomol was one of the major 'social organizations' with enormous membership and a very high saturation rate among the Soviet young. It had been an indispensable part of the Soviet political system, functioning as a mobilization and indoctrination machine since the early years of nation construction. Therefore, even though it had little actual importance and autonomy in political decision making, it did have the potential to exercise great influence on the potential of Perestroika as a driving force of political and social change. As a matter of fact, Komsomol played an important role in determining the direction of Perestroika. It came to be an avant-garde of economic change and secure a position as a leading actor in the emerging market economy and consumerism. In the chapters of this paper, I will investigate the transformation process of Komsomol, which resulted in its eventual fragmentation and collapse, in close connection with the destination of Perestroika. This paper is composed as follows. First of all, I will survey the critical situation of Komsomol just prior to Perestroika and the measures of the Party to make Komsomol more effective as a doctrination machine. Several months after the introduction of Perestroika, the glasnost' uncovered the pathological reality of Komsomol, triggering harsh attacks on it from the society. Holding serious concerns for the future of Komsomol, the Party and Komsomol officials at last proclaimed to start genuene reform. In the second chapter, I will examine the consequence of his reform and discuss the problems, especially the draft of the new "ustav" which was presented at the 20th Komsomol Congress. This marked the actual starting point for making the new Komsomol. In the following section, the two principal directions of Komsomol reform will be elucidated separately in detail. The first is the giving of greater autonomy to the local organizations. The second is the representation of youth interests as an interest association. Komsomol's post-reform direction will then be discussed in the conclusion. Up to the end of 1986, Komsomol seemed to be very reluctant to do anything special even amidst the criticism that was being leveled against it. It rather belatedly declared to hold the 20th Congress in April 1987 to revise the "ustav" (rules) of the organization. Complains and opinions about Komsomol were concentrated on the widening gap between Komsomol and ordinary young people. In the course of active discussions in preparation for the Congress, a general consent was formed that Komsomol should be more responsive to young people's interests through the establishment of local organizations, especially primary organizations. It was believed that Komsomol should grant these organizations rights to decide policies, and allocate budgets for staffing and activities such as local recruitment. The aim was to reform Komsomol from a youth mobiliser to a youth representative. At the 20th Congress, the directions referred to above were officially confirmed and the "ustav" revised accordingly. Therefore it was in the 20th Congress that Komsomol took the first step to remake itself to survive under the unique circumstances brought about by Perestroika, showing not only the members but also the other organizations which Komsomol was working with Komsomol's two new directions of giving local organizations more autonomy and becoming an initiator of the youth interests not a mobiliser of the youth force. Despite this, real change inside Komsomol had not begun yet. An exploration of the practical changes that emerged after the Congress and their effects on the future of Komsomol is necessary. The ideal image of the new Komsomol formulated by the 20th Congress was one that would be activated by the initiatives from the below. Empowerment of local organizations, especially the primary organizations, thus was essential for real change. The authorization of primary organizations to make final decisions on recruitment and the abolishment of membership targets was welcomed by the local organizations that had in the past been prevented from other substantial activities. The effectiveness of local organization largely depended, however, on the quantity of funds and the quality of staff. Thus from 1987 to 1988, local organizations were only gradually given autonomy form the central committee not only on the jurisdiction of the activities, but also on the budget and the personnel administration. The measures mentioned above gave the local organizations the incentive to earn funds because they had to survive on their own at the time the membership began to decline. This meant that through local organizations getting autonomy more and more, Komsomol was becoming more and more centrifugal instead of a united active political force supported from below. This contradicted development can also be seen in the another direction Komsomol took to transform itself under Perestroika. For a long time, Komsomol had been functioning as the main mobilization machine to provide human resources for economic purposes. It had been in charge of students construction brigates (SSOs) and Komsomol storming units (KUOs), sending labor fources to destinated sites or factories that had high economic priority. But this had largely been against their will and interests according to rank and file members. So when it confronted the difficult situation around 1987, in order to restore authority among the members, it was natural that Komsomol turned to the very members who were accusing it of being indifferent to the welfare of the nation's youth through a failure to resist hindrance by governmental or economic organizations. The members appealed to its status as the only representative of the youth, arguing that it should be a reliable promoter of their interests through acquiring the right to determine how much labor forces to supply, where to send brigades and so on. Moreover, through 1987 and 1988, local organizations began to mobilize labor to create profit-making enterprises under Komsomol auspices. The professed aim of the measure was to increase the income of the participants of SSOs or KSUs by giving them the chance to make profits at their own discretion. It should not be overlooked that Komsomol's interest in the measure was to utilize these enterprises to make money because it had to maintain the organization and support the staff in spite of the declining membership and income from membership fees. SSOs, KSUs and other forms like youth housing complexes (MZhKs) which were originally made to provide young workers opportunities to acquire dwelling through social competition got to be the foundation for Komsomol to develop profit-making enterprises which would be leading to genuine Komsomol businesses in the near future. In other words, the Komsomol transformation into be the representative of youth interests entailed the shift from political activities to profit making ones. As a consequence, we can consider Komsomol to have been one of the leading pioneers in making of the market economy in the Soviet Union. As was already mentioned, Komsomol's underlying rationale for reform was to survive the radical political and social change around 1987. Thus it took fundamental actions to be responsive to the demands of youth and to the circumstances under Perestroika. Its breakdown was not due to the obstinate resistance of the stubborn conservative careerists in Komsomol. It was also not the result of any students' revolts or social uprisings. At the present stage, it is necessary to further illuminate the process by which Komsomol reformed itself and should refrain from assertive conclusions. However, it can be assumed that the collapse of Komsomol was an unexpected outcome inadvertently brought about by actions aimed at creating a new Komsomol, but that these actions deviated gradually from their original purpose and drove Komsomol into fragmentation and finally collapse. This paper attempts to analyse this process and serves as a preliminary step to further investigation.

著者

出 かず子

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.53-85, 1979

著者

森 美矢子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.143-175, 2003

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This paper focuses on the relationship between Komsomol and informal organizations under Perestroika. Perestroika brought immense social change to Soviet society. Komsomol had to face, for the first time in its long history, rival informal youth organizations not subordinate to, but independent of its power. An investigation of this new situation and analysis of the transformation of formal organizations like Komsomol sheds light on the transition and social change experienced during the final days of the Soviet system. First, this paper will examine the appearance of various informal youth organizations under Perestroika, ranging from amateur hobby clubs to political groups. Simultaneously it will explore the tactics used by Komsomol to compete with them for support among young people and to survive in the new situation. This discussion will include an examination of the roles played by Komsomol and the informal youth organizations during Perestroika. This paper focuses on the period from the 20th Komsomol Congress held in April, 1987 until June, 1988, when there were heated demands for democratization at the 19th Party Conference. It was in this period that the informal organizations not only played the most important role in promoting social change, but Komsomol also devised strategies to revive its role as a youth organization. As background, we will trace the history of the relations between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations. At first, Komsomol had to take young people from traditional youth organizations in order to become the only formal youth organization in the Soviet system. Although Komsomol acquired this status in the late 1920s, there was an ongoing struggle to retain this monopoly in the face of continual attempts to create informal youth organizations. In the 1970s, informal organizations of youth, mostly hobby clubs like rock music clubs became an essential part of life for ordinary young people. They enjoyed their leisure time in a subculture beyond the influence of Komsomol. These organizations were not directly anti-Soviet nor even politically oriented. Nevertheless, they were threatening to the authorities as potential enemies because they were making Soviet ideology less influential among the youth, the future-builders of Soviet society. The renewed Cold War that broke out at the beginning of the 1980s made Komsomol confront a hard situation: how to protect Soviet youth from the evil subculture of the West. Under these circumstances, Komsomol adopted a new policy for informal organizations. That is, instead of suppressing all of them, Komsomol began to select "better" organizations both to promote and to keep under control the leisure activities of Soviet youth. Second, this paper will examine this new Komsomol policy toward informal youth organizations. After Perestroika began, as society became more and more active, ideological restrictions rapidly weakened. Komsomol decided to "register" the informal youth hobby clubs and permit them to operate freely under its supervision. This new approach greatly increased the possibility both for cooperation and friction between Komsomol and the informal organizations. In addition, new organizations appeared such as those protecting cultural assets or others promoting ecological awareness. Further, youth groups involved in political discussions gradually emerged. These new organizations were considered the pioneers of Perestroika and were starting to rival Komsomol. The 20th Komsomol Congress was the first opportunity to discuss the relationship between Komsomol and the emerging informal youth organizations. At this Congress, Komsomol declared that they could not become an alternative to Komsomol. It also tried to transform itself into a political organization to represent youth interests. Third, this paper analyzes the politicization of the informal youth organizations in the spring just before the 19th Party Conference. At last, Komsomol recognized that it could not avoid talking on equal terms with the informal political organizations concerning the future of all youth organizations, including Komsomol itself. The informal organizations and Komsomol delegates met several times to discuss political problems in general and to make a joint appeal to the 19th Conference. The 19th Conference was a very important venue for Komsomol to insure its role and status in the emerging system. After the discussions with the informal organizations, Komsomol devised a new strategy: It would become one of many youth organizations and it would cooperate with the others to advance Perestroika. Komsomol abandoned its earlier strategy of maintaining a monopoly over youth organizations. It realized that it could survive only if it became reconciled with the informal organizations that were more popular and more influential among the youth. To improve its image and survive, Komsomol would have to work in partnership with the other groups. After the 20th Congress, a partnership was gradually established between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations in the area of leisure and cultural activities because such cooperation would serve to make Komsomol more popular. Ironically however, Komsomol was losing its organizational unity and identity as a youth organization due to its success in constructing a cooperative relationship with the informal organizations. In addition, after the 19th Conference, the search for a political partnership between Komsomol and the informal organizations became more difficult. Under Perestroika, Komsomol had to transform itself in order to compete with the informal organizations. This transformation process and the evolving relationship between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations are ongoing. They are a topic for future research on the role of Komsomol under Perestroika.

著者

佐藤 圭史

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.313-332, 2006

著者

望月 恒子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.93-124, 2006

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В результате политических и общественных потрясений, произошедших в современной России за последние 20 лет, культурная ситуация в стране заметно изменилась. Одним из самых ярких явлений в области литературы стала активная деятельность женщинписателей. Огромный интерес вызывают у читателей ставшие необыкновенно популярными такие нелохожие друг на друга писательницы, как Татьяна Толстая, Людмила Петрушевская, Виктория Токарева, а также авторы детективной литературы Александра Маринина, Дарья Донцова и др., произведения которых активно издаются. Таким образом, одной из самых характерных особенностей современной русской литературы можно считать расцвет женской прозы. Литературная деятельность Людмилы Улицкой (род. в 1943 г.) началась сравнительно поздно. Ее первый рассказ появился в журнале «Огонек» в 1989 г., а первый сборник рассказов вышел в 1994 г., то есть ее профессиональная творческая жизнь составляет всего 15 лет, за которые писательница успела сделать очень много: на август 2005 г. ею было опубликовано 5 крупных произведений (3 романа и 2 повести) и 36 рассказов. В 2001 г. Улицкой была присуждена самая престижная литературная премия в современной России - Букер-Smirnoff, а в 2004 г. она была названа лучшей писательницей года. Вне всякого сомнения, Улицкая является одним из крупных представителей русской литературы постоветского времени. В настоящей статье мы проанализировали все произведения Улицкой и постарались выяснить специфические особенности ее творчества. В своих произведениях Улицкая всегда описывает личную жизнь людей и семью советской эпохи; политика и события государственной важности остаются вне поля ее зрения. Ее герои, как правило, «маленькие люди» - старики, больные, бедные, отверженные обществом, - словом, те, кого сейчас принято называть маргиналами. Однако при этом важно отметить, что этих самых маргиналов Улицкой никак не назовешь ни униженными, ни безгласными. Они не боятся что-либо потерять, поскольку не имеют ни имущества, ни высокого общественного положения, и поэтому живут свободно, подчиняясь только своим собственным представлениям. Семейная жизнь или хроника семейной жизни героев советской эпохи, которым чужд весь советский социум, - типичная тема произведений Улицкой. Отметим следующие характерные черты стиля писательницы: 1) Наличие физиологических описаний человеческого тела и ощущений героев. Улицкая прямо и подробно описывает женское тело и все проявления физиологии: болезни, секс, физиологические отправления, плач и т.д. Такие описания можно найти не только у Улицкой, но и у многих современных писателей, особенно постмодернистского направления. Однако, в отличие от постмодернистов, Улицкая не доходит до гротеска и всегда избегает просторечий и вульгаризмов, которые являются ведущими элементами стратегии постмодернистов. 2) Мастерство бытописания. Как уже было сказано выше, главные темы Улицкой - частная жизнь героев и семейные истории. Для усиления реалистического впечатления писателю нужно наполнить мир произведения бытовыми деталями, Критики часто называют Улицкую мастером бытописания, и действительно, у нее всегда подробно описываются жилище, одежда, еда, учебные заведения, рабочие места героев, - все то, что позволяет читателю безошибочно определить время действия. Кроме того, она всегда называет конкретные улицы, переулки, площади, станции и остановки в Москве, которая большей частью и являстся сценой ее произведений. Благодаря такому мастерскому бытописанию, изобилующему деталями, творчество Улицкой вызывает ностальгию по советскому времени, несмотря на то, что в ее произведениях явно ощущается антисоветский настрой и у персонажей, и у самого автора. В связи с этим стоит отметить, что в советской литературе мастерство бытописания не всегда ценилось высоко, а, напротив, считалось признаком отсутствия определенной идеологии. Женщин-бытописателей, охотно изображавших частную и семейную жизнь, называли бытописателями с некоторым пренебрежительным оттенком даже в конце 70-х гг. Возможно, Улицкая продолжает писать только личные и семейные истории, полные бытовых подробностей, имея в виду именно эту традиционную точку зрения. Ведь в советской культуре, в том числе и в литературе, всегда придавалось наибольшее значение именно идеологии и общественной жизни человека, а к частной жизни личности отношение было пренебрежительное. Поэтому произведения Улицкой можно считать своеобразным протестом против этой традиционной идеологии. Далее мы обращаемся к анализу образов героев. В произведениях Улицкой, так же, как и у других женщин-писателей, большое внимание уделяется проблеме безотцовщины. У Улицкой почти не встретишь героя-отца, зато всегда много матерей. И, если семья состоит из нескольких поколсний, то среди старших также не встретишь мужчины, - в ней, как правило, бабушка, мать и дети (среди которых, конечно, есть сыновья и внуки). В своей статье мы подробно останавливаемся на образе матери у Улицкой. Среди всего многообразия героинь можно выделить 2 типа, которые особенно заметны: 1) Мать-святая дура, из-за психической травмы или горя лишившаяся рассудка. Она проявляет сверхъестественную проницательность по отношению к любимым людям. 2) Мудрая мать, защищающая свою семью всеми силами, своим умом и мужеством. У таких женшин, как правило, сочетаются происхождение из традиционной семьи и дореволюционное высшее образование. В творчестве Улицкой нам открываются глубокие народные и семейные традиции, не заслуживавшие внимания, однако стойко сохранившиеся в советское время. Творчество Улицкой в некотором смыслс прсдставляет постсоветскую эпоху. Ее произведения, в которых свободной и независимой жизнью живут маргиналы, отверженные обществом, но сохранившие активную позицию и человеческую уникальность, и в дальнейшем булут волновать читателей.

著者

三浦 清美

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.37-64, 1997

著者

外川 継男 外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.149-165, 1980

著者

外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.105-144, 1963

著者

望月 哲男

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.131-152, 1992

著者

藤本 透子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.1-28, 2008

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The purpose of this research is to examine how Kazakhs in a northern Kazakhstan village have revitalized memorial services in the post-Soviet period. Although death is a biological phenomenon, it is accompanied by culturally and socially diverse practices such as funeral and memorial services, which often show dynamism with regard to societal changes. It is noted that religious practices often play an important role in the post-Soviet cultural revitalization. In Kazakhstan, memorial services for the deceased have become one of the focal points of this revitalization. Previous studies of these services have followed two distinct approaches. Kazakh ethnographers such as Arghїnbaev and Toleubaev have argued that memorial services contain the remnants of pre-Islamic beliefs, such as animism and shamanism, while Privratsky, an American anthropologist, claimed that they are in fact part of modern Kazakh Islamic practices. However, both approaches have neglected the social context of the vitalization of memorial services in post-Soviet period. Privratsky merely reported that memorial feasts are held in honor of "the collective memory of Muslim ancestors," and concluded that Kazakh genealogy is not an important aspect of these practices. This paper explores several characteristics of memorial services in the post-Soviet period by focusing on not only religious but also social aspects, based on field research conducted over 26 months between 2003 and 2007 in a northern Kazakh village of approximately 700 inhabitants. First, the historical background of Kazakh memorial services is surveyed. Russian literature of the 19th century describes Kazakh nomads reciting the Quran and serving special meals to the deceased. In the Soviet period, however, religious practices were strictly controlled by the government. Villagers remembered their elders secretly reciting the daily prayers, and that memorial services continued to be held, but only on a small scale. However, from perestroika onward, there was a revitalization of Islam in Kazakhstan; mosques were founded all over the country, and an Islamic university was established in the large city of Almaty. Thus, the villagers of northern Kazakhstan began to openly commemorate the deceased in various rituals. Villagers consistently observe the Islamic funeral and memorial services on the seventh and 40th days after death, and on the one-year anniversary. Moreover, they often recite the Quran to their ancestors both seasonally and on other occasions, including the 'Qŭrban ayt' (Feast of Sacrifice) or 'Ramazan' (the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, the month of fasting), as well as during less formal celebrations such as a son's graduation from university or the first horse milk of the year. In principle, the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice is celebrated by all Muslims to commemorate the prophet Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to prove his devotion to God. While Kazakh villagers are familiar with the story, they also consider the Feast of Sacrifice an important occasion in which they recite Quranic verses for the deceased, especially their ancestors. The performance of a memorial service at the Feast of Sacrifice by a Kazakh family in 2005 was analyzed based on participatory observation. The service involved the slaughter of a sheep by a village family, and then an elderly female neighbor prayed that spirits of their ancestors would be satisfied by the sacrifice. The family then prepared a meal of mutton and a special fried bread, to which they invited many kinsmen and neighbors. After the meal, the Quran was recited by the 'molda' (mullah) for the dead of the family. In order to elucidate the reason for this frequent commemoration of ancestors, the concept of memorial services was examined based on interviews with villagers. The dead are believed to become spirits, which are called 'aruaqtar', that then influence people's lives. Villagers explained the reason for the memorial services using a Kazakh proverb: "If the dead are not satisfied, the living will not get rich." A special fried bread called 'shelpek' is always prepared for memorial services, because Kazakhs believe that the spirits of the deceased are pleased by the aroma of oil. While there is no mention of memorial services in the Quran, villagers insisted that memorial services are practiced as a type of Islamic almsgiving, or 'sadaqa'. They also considered that the Quranic recital by a descendant is the equivalent of a good deed by the deceased himself; thus, the dead person will be able to go to Heaven due to the actions of his descendants. It was then attempted to confirm the identity of the deceased family members to whom these particular memorial activities were devoted. In the prayers, or 'bata,' after the Quranic recital, the purpose of the recital was explained, and three 'jŭrt' kinship categories were collectively mentioned. In addition, the personal names of the householder's patrilineal ancestors, the most of whom belonged to the same patrilineal clan, or 'ru,' were named and recited back to about the third generation. The spirits of householder's patrilineal ancestors are considered the most important; however, the wife's patrilineal ancestors are also mentioned, especially at the Feast of Sacrifice and during 'Ramazan', because the Quran recital is considered to be more acceptable to God during these periods. Several important characteristics of post-Soviet Kazakh memorial services are noted in the final section of this paper. As a result of the revitalization of Islam, Kazakh villagers began to hold the Feast of Sacrifice more openly and on a larger scale than during the Soviet period. However, it is important to note that the memorial services were vitalized along with the Feast of Sacrifice. It was observed that villagers tried to explain the significance of the memorial services by both Islamic contextualization and by emphasizing belief in the ancestor spirits. Kazakh villagers do not commemorate collective "Muslim ancestors," but concretely trace and commemorate the deceased's genealogy by repeated recitation of the Quran to their ancestors. It is concluded that these villagers vitalize the Feast of Sacrifice as memorial services in the post-Soviet period due to a persistent belief in the spirits of the deceased through Islamic contextualization and a strong genealogical awareness.

著者

菅野 開史朗

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.139-166, 2001

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В современном латышском литературном языке употребляется «пересказывате-льное наклонение» (латыш. atstāstījuma izteiksme), формы глагола, которые указывают на то, что говорящий только пересказывает информацию, которую он слышал от другого человека и не отвечает за ее достоверность. В статье мы рассматриваем употребление этого наклонения, анализируя примеры, взятые преимущественно из литературных произведений и их переводов с латышского на русский, с русского на латышский и с японского на латышский языки. В сопоставлении с латышским языком, пересматривается и косвенная речь русского языка, в котором нет такого наклонения, а также японского языка, в котором существуют несколько различных способов выражения пересказывания. Пересказывательное наклонение латышского языка представляет собой своео-бразное явление в группе индоевропейских языков. Говоря о происхождении пересказывательного наклонения, отмечается, что это языковое явление обусловлено контактом с балто-финскими языками. Пересказывательное наклонение имеет в латышском языке три времени: настоящее, будущее (I), прошедшее. Еще есть и перифрастическая форма будущего времению (II), которая весьма редко употребляется (в случае, когда некоторое действие следует за действием, выраженным глаголом в простом будущем времени). Вместо нее обычно употребляется простое будущее. Форма прошедшего времени тоже перифрастическая. Форма настоящего времени пересказывательного наклонения восходит к форме деепричастия настоящего времени, которое семантически соответствует деепричастию несовершенного вида, заканчивающемуся на -я в русском языке. Форма настоящего времени пересказывательного наклонения, как и форма деепричастия, образуется путем прибавления к основе настоящего времени изъявительного наклонения морфемы -ot. Форма будущего времени пересказывательного наклонения образуется от основы будущего времени, которая, как правило, совпадает с основой инфинитива, путем прибавления -šot. Форма на -šot не употребляется как деепричастие в современном языке, а только как форма пересказывательного наклонения. Формы настоящего и будущего времени пересказывательного наклонения не спрягаются. Перифрастическая форма прошедшего времени пересказывательного наклонения образуется путем присоединения к esot (наст. вр. пересказ. накл. глагола-связки būt) действительного причастия прошедшего времени спрягаемого глагола. Так же, как и формы настоящего и будущего времени, esot не склоняется, а действительное причастие прошедшего времени склоняется по родам и числам. В некоторых работах модальность, которую выражает пересказывательное наклонение, определяется как «предположение». Однако этого определения недостаточно, поскольку говорящий формой пересказывательного наклонения выражает, что у него нет свидетельства достоверности сообщаемой информации. Иначе говоря, пересказывательное наклонение выражает то, что говорящий находится вне сферы, где можно подтвердить достоверность или недостоверность содержания высказывания. Модальность пересказывательного наклонения наиболее ярко проявляется в сопоставлении форм настоящего времени пересказывательного наклонения с формами настоящего времени изъявительного наклонения. Когда в настоящем времени пересказывают речь постороннего (третьего лица), появляется основное объективное значение пересказывательного наклонения, т.е. «скепсис». В будущем времени различие между изъявительным и пересказывательным наклонениями более туманно. В сравнении с настоящим временем будущее время пересказывательного наклонения чаще употребляется вместе с формами изъявительного наклонения (во многих случаях можно заменить одно на другое). Употребление пересказывательного наклонения наиболее типично в придаточных предложениях, поскольку по модальности пересказывательное наклонение чаще всего соответствует косвенной речи. Здесь нужно напомнить, что в основе форм пересказывательного наклонения лежит деепричастие, что также в некотором роде обусловливает синтаксические свойства рассматриваемых форм. Так, подлежащее придаточного предложения может часто отсутствовать, если оно идентично подлежащему главного предложения. В грамматиках латышского языка обычно не приводится определенного списка глаголов, способных подчинять пересказывательное наклонение. Хотя, разумеется, пересказывательное наклонение преимущественно подчиняется «глаголам речи», встречаются и случаи подчинения исследуемых форм глаголами, выражающими (а) способы передачи устной речи (напр., teikt «сказать»); (б) восприятия устной речи (dzirdēt «слышать»); (в) передачи письменной речи (напр., rakstīt «писать, написать»); (г) восприятия письменной речи (напр., lasīt «читать»). Некоторые ученые подчеркивают, что и глаголы мысли подчиняют пересказывательное наклонение, однако, это бывает в относительно редких случаях: когда говорящий высказывает свою мысль на самом деле, а в литературных произведениях, когда автор «пересказывает» читателю речь действущих лиц. В русском языке, в котором нет пересказывательного наклонения, в аналогичных случаях употребляется изъявительное наклонение в косвенной речи. Исходя из этого, можно сделать вывод, что по модальности изъявительное и пересказывательное наклонение очень близки. В лингвистических исследованиях, посвященных латышскому языку, одной из центральных тем является разъяснение схемы противопоставления изъявительного и пересказывательного наклонений. Кроме типического придаточного предложения с союзом ka («что»), пересказывательное наклонение может употребляться и в придаточных предложениях с другими союзами, например, в вопросительном предложении - с союзом vai («ли») или с вопросительными союзами. Наиболее сложным случаем является предложение с lai («чтобы»): после lai может стоять и изъявительное, и пересказывательное, и сослагательное наклонения. Если глаголы речи имеют форму, которая не обозначает выполнения речевого акта (напр., повелительное наклонение, сослагательное наклонение, выражение долженствования, будущее время), употребляется не пересказывательное, а изъявительное наклонение. Употребление пересказывательного наклонения распространяется и на простые предложения. Есть два случая такого употребления. 1) Главное предложение опущено, а кто и при каких обстоятельствах совершил речевой акт уже известно по контексту. 2) Полностью независимым предложением пользуются для пересказывания «слухов». В русскоязычных грамматиках латышского языка объясняют, что такое предложение на русский язык переводится как сложное предложение «говорят, что…» или как простое предложение с вводными словами «мол», «де», «дескать», «якобы» и т.п. Например, в русском переводе Блауманиса даже употребляется вводное слово «говорят». Интересно, что переводчик так перевел, чтобы не изменять структуру. В японском языке одна из конструкций для выражения пересказывания - конструкция на [-то иу] («говорят, что»), в которой глагол [иу] в следствие грамматикализации уже не спрягается. Модальность пересказывательного наклонения может расширяться в зависимости от степени нейтральности отношения к достоверности. Так, например, когда содержание пересказываемого относится к самому говорящему или к слушающему, к объективному скепсису прибавляются различные оттенки: уверенность, сомнение, недоверие и т.п. Это означает, что расширенная модальность пересказывательного наклонения может приближаться или соприкасаться и с сослагательным наклонением. Прошедшее время пересказывательного наклонения соответствует сложному настоящему, простому прошедшему и сложному прошедшему временам изъявительного наклонения. Поскольку в латышском языке нет согласования времен, прошедшее время пересказывательного наклонения означает действие, которое уже произошло к моменту пересказываемой речи. В сравнении с настоящим и будущим временами для прошедшего времени пересказывательного наклонения характерно то, что иногда опускается связка esot, т.е. употребляется только действительное причастие прошедшего времени («нарративное прошедшее»). В этом случае различие между изъявительным и пересказательным наклонениями по форме может исчезать. Действительное причастие прошедшего времени первоначально носило такую же модальность, что и теперь пересказывательное наклонение. В общем, эта модальность сохранилась у рассматриваемой формы действительного причастия, однако имеет уже народнопоэтический оттенок. Форма пересказывательного наклонения на -ot, будучи сравнительно новым явлением, еще не замещает самостоятельную форму действительного причастия прошедшего времени в чистом виде. Таким образом, грамматикализация пересказывательного наклонения в настоящем и будущем временах уже завершилась, а в прошедшем времени еще идет. Хотя пересказывательное наклонение на -ot и не объясняется «развитием модального значения у перфекта (Серебренников)», относительно характера действительного причастия здесь можно увидеть некоторую параллель между латышским и русским (балто-славянскими, а возможно и индоевропейскими) языками. В этих языках наблдается тенденция ношения определенной модальности. Интересно, что в болгарском языке пересказывательное наклонение образуется с помощью -л, а в русском языке с формой на -л образуется форма сослагательного наклонения. Так или иначе, говоря о прошедшем времени, можно сказать, что отсутствие согласования времен можно объясняться формальным происхождением, а именно бывшим причастием на -л, сохранившим придаточный характер. Несмотря на то, что грамматикализация пересказывательного наклонения в прошедшем времени еще не завершилась, мы признаем эти формы самостоятельным наклонением, поскольку синхронически они имеют собственную форму будущего, и требуют структуры, отличной от структуры предложения с деепричастием на -ot. Говоря о косвеюннюой речи, нам бы также хотелось упомянуть и так называемую «несобственно-прямую речь». Точка зрения, что явление смешения прямой и косвенной речи в русском языке основывается на отсутствии особой формы косвенной речи, как нам кажется, не очень убедительна, поскольку даже в латышском языке, в котором есть специальная форма косвенной речи, наблюдается то явление.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.301-325, 2000

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Ukraine draws attention from the international community because it is positioned between NATO and Russia. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were allowed to join NATO. Ukraine welcomed this accession as it would "strengthen security and stability in the European Continent." It seems that Ukraine has consistently moved closer to West European organizations and Ukraine took advantage of this opportunity to significantly improve its relationship with the West. However, the fact is not as simple as described above. Ukraine once proposed its original security plan and denounced NATO's PfP. Furthermore, Ukraine's economy relies heavily on the Russian market and energy supplies. When Ukraine's economy fails, there will be real danger that Ukraine involuntarily drifts eastward. In this paper, attention will be given to Ukraine's unique security policy regarding NATO-Russian relations. In the first chapter, economic problem under which Ukraine has existed will be discussed. In the second chapter, attention will be given to Ukraine's bridge diplomacy. Taking into account Ukraine's economic constraint and neutral policy, the last chapter will discuss Ukraine's policy towards NATO's expansion. 1. Economic factor plays an important role in Ukraine's security policy since its economy depends on Russia. After Russia launched its price liberalization in January 1992, Ukraine chose to leave the Ruble zone in order to establish its own national economic policy. This policy, called the "New economic plan" ended in failure and brought about hyperinflation, decline of GDP and huge energy debts. Kiev realized that Ukraine could not run its economy without Russia's cheap energy and market. A year later, Ukraine switched its orientation to Russia, but claimed that this integration was limited to the economic area. This economic integration with Russia, or the CIS Economic Union, generated great disputes among the citizens. In the presidential election in 1994, Ukrainian opinion was divided into two: Eastern Ukraine voted for former prime minister and pro-Economic integrationist Kuchma, Western Ukraine voted for then President Kravchuk who acted as a guarantor of Ukrainian statehood. Kuchma won, but after the elections, he launched an economic reform with the IMF and did not choose the integration line with Russia. The reason is straightforward. The IMF provided credit to cover the energy debts. After this decision was made, Ukraine's interest for the CIS Economic Union diminished. Ukraine realized that Russia had no intention of selling its energy at a cheap price. As IMF gives credit, Ukraine's interest in Russia is only to secure market for its products. Even with the economic reform launch in 1994, Ukraine's economy still records minus growth and its dependency on Russia has not been resolved. 2. As in the case of Euro-neutrals, their positive image in international arena comes not from their economic or military power, but from their neutral diplomacy, that is, bridge-diplomacy. Ukraine also tries to carry out this diplomacy. In 1993, Ukraine proposed to create a collective security zone for Central and Eastern Europe. This proposal aimed to create a bridge between Western Europe and Russia that would develop a broad transatlantic security system covering the entire CSCE (now OSCE) region. This proposal has found little support in Central and Eastern states as well as U.S. and Russia because it seemed like an anti-Russian alliance. Furthermore, it could be said that unstable Ukraine lacked its positive international image. This proposal was finally eroded by the PfP, since the PfP aimed to create a bridge between NATO and non-NATO countries. In 1996, Ukraine had the opportunity to propose a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central and Eastern Europe which also aimed for a bridge between NATO and Russia. Ukraine connected this proposal with the fact that Ukraine has carried out her commitments to transfer nuclear warheads. However, it appears that Ukraine did not have an intention to institutionalize this proposal. Generally, negative security assurance from nuclear powers is one of the necessary factors to materialize the nuclear-weapon-free-zone. However, there was no security assurance discussion in this proposal. As a matter of fact, this proposal aimed to find a common language with Russia who strongly opposed to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member states rather than creating a bridge between NATO and Russia. 3. Ukraine has shifted its view of NATO and its security policy. Eastern European countries which wanted to join NATO regarded PfP as the first step to NATO membership. Ukraine also did not oppose NATO's expansion, but claimed this process must be evolutionary, and it was necessary to harmonize with neighboring countries such as Russia and Ukraine. From Ukraine's viewpoint, Ukraine would develop her security through the PfP framework. At this point, Ukraine advocated building pan-European security institutions, especially the OSCE, the main pillar of the new European security architecture. This was similar to the Russian vision. Ukraine saw that NATO would be a promotive but secondary factor for this institution. However, soon Ukraine realized that NATO would expand in the near future. Ukraine changed its view of NATO from a passive to a positive one. Russian Duma and politicians have on several occasions called into question Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol. Furthermore, some Russian government officials implied using economic pressure to boost its integration policy within the CIS. In these circumstances, Ukraine must place NATO as the center of its security policy. Ukraine noticed that NATO was changing from a defense organization to a political-military institute, as well as the guardian of democracy and human rights. This could be the reason why NATO would not harm any other states. Furthermore, idealism regarding the OSCE was replaced by a realistic approach to NATO. At this moment, it was vital for Ukraine to conclude a special relationship with NATO. NATO-Russian document seemed likely to be signed, so if Ukraine could not conclude a document with NATO, Ukraine's future would be determined by this NATO-Russian document. In the negotiation process, Ukraine strongly asked NATO to give security assurance or "associate status." Finally, in the document called "NATO-Ukraine Charter," NATO gave vague security assurance to Ukraine. NATO knows that Russia is strongly against the former Soviet Republics joining NATO. NATO had given Ukraine this document to "keep Ukraine quiet" regarding this problem. This Ukrainian government's pro-NATO orientation could not be explained by domestic factors, such as parliament and regional opinions. 4. Conclusion. Since independence, Ukraine has been caught and limited by economic dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, Ukraine pursued its intention of playing an intermediary role in European security issues. In the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine again showed its intention to intermediate between NATO and Serbia, but this initiative had found little support by both sides and as a result, ended in failure. Under the current international environment, there is little room for Ukraine to implement its bridge-diplomacy. Concerning the above mentioned objective and subjective factors, Ukraine gradually shifted its policy toward NATO. However, NATO's expansion continued regardless Ukraine's concerns. Ukraine demanded more security assurances from NATO, but its proposals were rejected. Every Ukrainian leader has to consider this situation. Ukraine's economic slump continues and Russia does not provide energy by cheap price. On the other hand, keeping a distance from NATO and pursuing its neutral policy have little prospect in the short and medium term. If the above-mentioned international condition continues, then there is no alternative for Ukraine but to maintain the current policy, IMF-oriented, pro-NATO but neutral status.

著者

志田 恭子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.49, pp.245-268, 2002

著者

城野 充

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, pp.167-180, 1996

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.63-89[含 英語文要旨], 2009

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In this paper, I examine the meaning of the concepts of "person" and "thing" in M. M. Bakhtin's theory of dialogue. Through this examination, I aim to clarify the similarities and differences between Bakhtin's and C. L. Frank's philosophy based on an ontological concept unique to traditional Russian philosophy, namely, "pan-unity" (всеединство). I begin by presenting a conceptual contrast between dialogue and reification, which play an important role in Bakhtin's seminal work Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. I demonstrate that this contrast between dialogue and reification derives from the contrast between person and thing. Dialogue, to Bakhtin, is the relationship between "I" and "Thou." We need to consider the other as "Thou" because he/she is not a thing but a person who has his/her "independence," "inner freedom," and "unfinalizability." Bakhtin says that only through dialogue can we properly deal with such characteristics of the other. If we have contact with the other without a dialogical attitude, he/she is reified as a thing that does not speak. He affirms that the main aim of his work is to elucidate the meaning of the artistic form of Dostoevsky's literary works, namely, "polyphony." According to Bakhtin, polyphony emancipates the person from such reification through a dialogical attitude. In this sense, we can infer that Bakhtin's theory of dialogue is based on the contrast between dialogue and reification, which derives from the fundamental contrast between person and thing. In addition, by comparing Bakhtin's concept of reification with A. F. Losev's, I demonstrate that Bakhtin utilized the word "reification" not in the manner of Russian Platonism, wherein it was considered as the incarnation of an "idea," but in the manner of Kantian argument, which ethically differentiated person from thing and criticized the idea of treating a person as a means. Next, I examine S. L. Frank's concepts of person and thing to compare them with Bakhtin's. Frank also developed the idea of "I" and "Thou." Moreover, like Bakhtin, he criticized the idea of treating a person as a thing. In this sense, I think that his philosophy is suitable for a comparison with Bakhtin's theory. However, there is a third category in Frank's argument, which he refers to as "We." This makes his idea of "I" and "Thou" distinct from others' idea. "We" is characterized as a primary state from which "I" and "Thou" are derived through differentiation, namely, as pan-unity. Frank ultimately places these categories in ontological unity under God. I show that in Frank's philosophy, encounter and association with the other as "Thou" is grounded in this ontological concept. On the basis of these theories, we can point out the similarities between Bakhtin's and Frank's philosophy. Both developed the idea of "I" and "Thou" on the basis of the contrast between person and thing. Moreover, it seems that Frank's definition of "We" as a "polycentric system" is similar to Bakhtin's idea of "polyphony." However, there is a decisive difference between them, namely, the ontological premise of the relationship between "I" and "Thou." As stated above, the relationship between "I" and "Thou" is ensured by the ontological concept of "We" as pan-unity in Frank's philosophy. On the other hand, the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogue is the idea of "outsideness" (вненаходимость). I conclude that this idea is incompatible with the idea of pan-unity. However, there seems to be a disagreement concerning the interpretation of Bakhtin's idea of outsideness. Some scholars, including me, think that there are some differences between the idea of outsideness and the idea of pan-unity. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be distinct from traditional Russian philosophy. Others think that there are some similarities or connections between them. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be influenced by traditional Russian philosophy. By considering the differentiation between "monological outsideness" and "polyphonic (dialogical) outsideness," which was proposed by Bakhtin, I intend to provide a solution for this seeming disagreement. Finally, on the basis of these arguments, I consider not only how Bakhtin's idea of person and thing can be appreciated in comparison with Frank's idea, but also how the idea of outsideness as the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogism can be appreciated in comparison with the ontological idea of pan-unity, unique to Russian philosophy.

著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.p81-104, 1981

著者

相沢 直樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.1-33, 1998-03-31

著者

伊東 孝之

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.117-166, 1973

著者

森下 嘉之

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.93-114, 2012-06-15

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Right after WWII, Eastern European countries stood at a crossroads, witnessing, to name but a couple, communization of the state and transfer of millions of ethnic minorities, most notably Germans. Postwar Czechoslovakia was no exception. Czechoslovakia had had three republican periods: the first republic from its independence in 1918 to the collapse in 1938, the second from 1938 to the Nazi occupation in 1939, and the third from 1945 to the beginning of Communist Party rule in 1948. The third republic in particular embraced many alternatives for future social policies, neither capitalistic nor communistic. Focusing on the housing policy from 1945 to 1948, this article aims to elucidate postwar Czechoslovakia's search for the optimum social policies, addressing the difference between the prewar and the postwar period. I also examine the policy of the transfer of the German population and the settlement of Czechs in the Czech border area, as it was against this backdrop that the new housing policy took form. While the last president of the first republic, Eduard Beneš, returned as president of the new Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party was dominant in the government. On the one hand, the new republic resembled its prewar predecessors in terms of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, undertaking the nationalization of large enterprises, land reform, and a planned economy, the postwar government attempted to differentiate itself from the prewar regime that had resulted in the Nazi's invasion and the collapse of the state. The Communists as the largest group in the government could propose their own postwar reforms disposed not toward Soviet-type socialism, but toward "the Czechoslovakian way" or "the bridge between the East and the West." The highest on the agenda for postwar reconstruction was the housing policy. The postwar government launched a "two-year plan," the first planned economy for the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. Notably, the government planned to build and supply 125,000 houses from 1947 to 1948. The government and architects worked in tandem to upgrade the poor prewar housing conditions by revising prewar housing laws. On the one hand, socialist parties and architects criticized the prewar liberalist housing market, exhorting the introduction of state control of the market. Some architects were enthusiastic about grand apartment buildings containing small houses as the socialist type of housing of the future. On the other hand, based on the housing law of 1921, the government decided to provide subsidies for family houses with 80 m2 of floor space, instead of 34 m2 as had been stipulated in 1937, with a view toward improving the housing environment. Moreover, the new government adhering to the Czechoslovakian way, neither liberalist nor socialist, even allowed private properties, while some architects influenced by Soviet architecture insisted on the entire socialization of houses and land. It is definitely necessary to contextualize the postwar Czechoslovakian housing policy in the removal of more than 2,000,000 Germans and the settlement of Czech people in the borderland (pohraniči). There, the "settlement office (Osidlovací úřad)" led by the Communist Party played a particularly essential role. The settlement office as well as the national board, which was also ruled by Communists, fulfilled the task of furnishing new Czech settlers with houses that had been expropriated from Germans and Hungarians as well as managing the housing market. The Communist Party had a good reason to expect support from those new settlers who could obtain huge properties, such as houses, thanks to the Communist policy. Despite the abundance of confiscated empty houses, this period did not see the solution to the housing problem, as the condition of these houses remained atrocious. Although the postwar housing policy held an opportunity to realize ideal plans for the future Czechoslovakia, it did not thrive due to the tough reality in the borderland. The policy and the ideal were consigned to oblivion after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1948.