著者

韓 載香

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.27-57,96, 2006-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The entertainment industry of pachinko, Japanized pinball machines, is a unique business to Japan. Although its total market size exceeds that of such significant industries as iron and steel and chemicals, history research has long neglected this business. Partially it is because in the mind of ordinary people the industry still remains in the gray zone of legalized yet antisocial gambling that is characterized by tax evasion and connections to organized crime. It may also be because the industry historically developed thanks to the active contributions of ethnic minorities in Japanese society like Koreans and Chinese. Actually, pachinko business including both upstream machine-making to downstream service establishments stands as the only large industry in which the minority groups have played a predominant role in Japan.Although the pachinko entertainment originated on the busy street of temple and shrine festivals in pre-World War II Japan, the modern development resulted from the legalization of pachinko gambling after the war. The number of pachinko places thus skyrocketed to 43, 452 in 1953 from 4, 818 establishments in 1949, although the number then rapidly declined to 8, 487 in 1957. The turbulent 1950s symbolized the decade in which the basic organization of the industry got established thanks presumably to the emergence of innovative machines and the alterations of police regulations regarding high-risk gambling.The present article focuses on the entrepreneurial activities of Takeichi Masamura whose mechanical improvement called Masamura-gauge revolutionized the pachinko machine that became more technically sophisticated. While Masamura did not deliberately register for the patent of his invention for the sake of the overall development of the pachinko industry, his business combining the machine-making segment and the amusement establishments still flourished thanks to the strong sales of his machines and the technical know-how his company possessed as a manufacturer.In 1955, however, police regulation got altered in order to prevent the gambling craze of pachinko, which drastically changed the performance of the industry in general. Masamura's enterprise was also hit hard as the demand for new equipment suddenly declined. His downstream pachinko amusement segment, on the other hand, could improve the profitability, because the new regulation eventually lowered the business uncertainty that had been associated to the progressively risky equipment. Given the new regulatory environment and the stabilized structure of the industry the performance of pachinko business now depended upon accumulated managerial know-how and capabilities, rather simple luck or technical skills. Principles of scale economies kicked into the industry and the average size of amusement establishments would get larger in the 1960s. The new entry thus became difficult for both machine-making and amusement segment because of the requirements for financial resources and managerial know-how.

著者

中林 真幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.56-60, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

高橋 周

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.58-75,98, 2006-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper argues historical significance of the producers' attempts to improve fish manure in the early 20th century. In those years, there was a rapid increase of the import of manure that included not only bean oil cake and chemical fertilizer, but also fish manure. Therefore, it was considered as an issue of the industry to improve traditional fish oil cake which had been used popularly since the 18th century.Much of the imported fish manure was machine-made fish meal. There were two attempts to make and sell fish meal in the Japanese Empire. The one was the attempt to produce it by the Marine Products Experimental Station of Karafuto, and the other was the attempt to produce and sell it by Morosada who was one of the manure wholesalers in Nagoya.The former was started in 1909 and used American-made machines to process raw fish into fish meal. In comparison with traditional fish oil cake, it had more of components and also got better results from experiments. But this attempt ended in failure. Because the production process needed higher fixed cost, it did not suit the small-scale fishery management in Karafuto, in which the catch of fish was drastically varied year by year. It was difficult for the fishery management in Karafuto to use the machines.The latter was production of fish meal by breaking traditional fish oil cake into pieces. The fish meal produced with such a method was highly graded in the exhibition of manures in 1907. But Morosada had to make its price lower, facing the competition with traditional herring oil cake. The consumers of fish manure estimated the fish meal lower than Morosada had expected.To conclude, both these attempts indicate that fish meal was not suitable for the method of production and consumption habit of fish manure at this period.

著者

岩間 剛城

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.3, pp.3-27,104, 2006-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to consider what role was being played by a local trust company in the regional economy before the Trust Business Law was passed in 1923. The Yanagawa Trust Company was established in 1913 by Saheiji Nakamura who was a man of property in the town of Yanagawa, Date-Gun, Fukushima prefecture. Deposit money deposited with the Yanagawa Trust Company was the main source of funding, and lending money was the main capital operation. The principal customers of the Yanagawa Trust Company were the people involved in the silk industry who lived in Yanagawa, and Saheiji Nakamura. One report by the Bank of Japan Fukushima branch in 1913 stated that trust companies in Fukushima prefecture were small and rather unusual because their capital was only lent to one particular social group, the peasantry, from whom the credit obligation was then exacted. However, the Yanagawa Trust Company had the character of a small bank, and it differed in character from what was said in the report by the Bank of Japan. Furthermore, the Yanagawa Trust Company contributed to the regional economy by lending money to Saheiji Nakamura and the people involved in the silk industry who lived in Yanagawa.The Yanagawa Bank establishment plan after 1917 was drawn on the initiative of Saheiji Nakamura. Saheiji Nakamura wanted to convert the Yanagawa Trust Company to the Yanagawa Bank, and aimed to supply the necessary money for the people in the silk industry. However, Nakamura's plan was not achieved by enforcing the merger policy of the Ministry of Finance and the Trust Business Law. The Yanagawa Trust Company was merged with the 101 Bank in 1923, and the three reasons for this were as follows. First, the business of the Yanagawa Trust Company had been damaged by the recession after World War I. Second, some men of property who lived in the town of Yanagawa assumed the position of director in both the 101 Bank and the Yanagawa Trust Company. Third, Memos that promised the merger between the 101 Bank and the Yanagawa Trust Company had been exchanged in 1920.

著者

橋口 勝利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.3, pp.28-56,105, 2006-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between the chin'ori factories and the wholesale dealers in the interwar period by analyzing the development of business activities of the Fuki shokufu Co. Ltd. in the Chita region. The Chita region is located in the southwest part of Aichi Prefecture. Fuki shokufu was established in September, 1919and was a comparatively large-scale chin'ori factory with 120 power looms.Fuki Shokufu suffered from the long depression after the panic in 1920, as well as many merchants and factories in the Chita. As a result, Fuki shokufu was put in the disadvantageous condition with wholesale dealers. Traditionally, factories have been considered to be always disadvantageous against the wholesale dealers due to shortage of money. However, Fuki shokufu negotiated over terms and conditions with a wholesale dealer and got an advantageous condition. In addition, Fuki shokufu chose another wholesale dealer when negotiations did not reach agreement. So, Fuki shokufu won the benefits.Due to the recession since the financial panic in 1927, Fuki shokufu was driven into suspension of business because of the short-term business relationship with wholesale dealers. However, Fuki shokufu was able to continue the operation on the base of the fund through the stocks recruitment from the village and borrowing from the financial institution. Fuki shokufu maintained negotiations power to wholesale dealers in the basement of strong funds.

著者

久保 文克

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.62-66, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.66-67, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

平本 厚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.4, pp.3-27,98, 2006-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The aim of this paper is to analyze how a mass production and distribution system for radio sets was built up and developed in prewar Japan. The companies that succeeded in building up the system would become the giant consumer electrical appliance companies after the war.The building up of the system was not easy for the companies, because the radio industry was comprised of many small companies, whose behavior tended to be opportunistic. Especially, distribution was in a state of disorder.Hayakawa (later Sharp) and Matsushita, whose sets were very successful, invested heavily in plants and introduced scientific management into the plants. Hayakawa was the first to introduce a belt conveyor system and Matsushita, partly influenced by the introduction of Hayakawa, followed close behind. In order to keep product quality, they had to integrate parts production.Both companies also tried to regulate the distribution system by establishing agencies, hopefully exclusive ones, to which retail stores were assigned. In pursuing this, they interacted with each other.In the long run, Matsushita was the best in building up a mass production and distribution system. It is also clear, however, that this institutional innovation was not a product of a company's originality but that of interaction of the companies.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.4, pp.28-45,99, 2006-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper aims at making clear the importance and possibility of applied business history for understanding current economic and business issues. In order to solve the existing problems, it is necessary for an industry or a company to appreciate its own historical contexts. Even if a theory to explain the troubles is correct, it cannot be valid without the balanced appreciation of historical perspectives.The paper asserts the validity of applied business history. The tasks of applied business history are to comprehend the historical circumstances of the specific industry or company, and, based on that appreciation, to support the industry or company to conquer the present difficulties.In the paper, three telling cases are examined : The liberalization of the Japanese electric power industry; the reconstruction of the Japanese petroleum industry; and the community-based economic renaissance in Japan.One of the most important characteristics in the 124 year history of the Japanese electric power industry is private ownership and private management with the exception of the state management from 1939 to 1951. In the industry, the economies of scale have decreased, while the economies of vertical integration are still effective. Based on these historical contexts, it can be safely claimed that the goal of the liberalization of the Japanese electric power industry should be to abolish regional monopoly and to maintain vertically-integrated private companies.The Japanese petroleum industry possesses two weaknesses. The first is the disintegration of the upstream (exploration and production) part from the downstream (refinery and retail) segment. The other is that upstream companies are too numerous and two small. Moreover, under the regulation of the petroleum industry law from 1962 to 2002, the organizational capabilities of the downstream oil companies have undermined. Therefore, the downstream companies possess limited financial power for integrating into upstream businesses, though their corporate sizes are relatively large. Given these historical characteristics of the Japanese petroleum industry, the first step of the reconstruction of the industry should be to make the horizontal integration within the upstream segment.In the process of Japanese modernization, regional industrial accumulations have played important roles. The accumulations are the characteristics of specific areas, where many small and medium-sized enterprises gather in narrow spaces. Based on historical experiences, it is essential for the revitalization of local economies to realize the renaissance of industrial accumulations.

著者

加藤 健太

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.3-27,100, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

2

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The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of the mergers in the electric power industry during the inter-war period in Japan, based on the case of Tokyo Electric Light Co. (TELC). The foci of our analysis are the formation of a largearea electric supply network and the change in the company's performance.Through the 1920's, the aim of the mergers of the TELC changed. In the beginning of 1920's, the firm consolidated the electric power companies that supplied the industrial areas of Tokyo and its surrounding environments. The purpose of these mergers was to secure access to the electric power demand from which growth was expected. Afterwards, because TELC urgently needed to increase its electric power capacity to meet the greater demand, the firm acquired electric power companies with large-scale hydroelectric power plants one after another. Subsequently, in the latter half of 1920's, when an oversupply of the electric power became strong, TELC merged with three electric power companies that owned wide supply districts.Though the purpose of the mergers was different depending on time, the equipment and facilities obtained by TELC through the various mergers worked to expand the company's electric supply network. Toward this end, the company actively improved existing power lines and substations and built new ones in order to tie organically each power plant together. As a result, in the latter half of 1920's, achievements in cost reductions at each stage (transmission, transformation, delivery) of the supply of electric power were made possible due to progress made in the electric power ream system and through the possession of an advantageous supply district with a high customer-density.

著者

高田 茂臣

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.28-46,101, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The task of this article is to investigate the electrical business strategies of the Ganz Works in the era of the second industrial revolution.The Ganz Works established the electrical department in 1878. The main strategies of the Works were adoption of the alternating current technology by employing the talented young engineers, tie-up with the banks and foreign capitals that had been gradually strengthened through the business expansion, and reinforcement of the enterprise capability through the affiliation of the enterprise customers such as power plants and electric railways that had been realized by raising the outside funds.The Ganz Works had exhibited and demonstrated its own products in the international exhibitions, and also had collected the up-to-date technological knowledge there. They always tried to introduce and develop the new technology. As a result, the Works became one of the pioneers in the development of generator, transformer, motor, electric locomotive and others.The Ganz Works raised funds from various sources, such as several banks in the Dual Monarchy including the Hungarian general Credit-Bank, the German Loewe Concern and so on.The Ganz Works had depended on the foreign markets from the beginning because of the narrowness of the Hungarian domestic market. The Works had expanded its business into Austria and Italy, as for they seemed to have aimed at cutting the administration costs by investing in the countries that were close to their own country from the geographical and the political points of view.Though the electrical industry had achieved the dynamic development in the late 19th century, there were few enterprises that had succeeded in making a big spurt. The case of Ganz Works can be ranked among the rare successful cases in the world.

著者

尾高 煌之助

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.47-55, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

〓澤 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.26-50,100, 2005-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The aim of this paper is to see whether the Prussian (German) railroads in the 19th century evolved a system of internal labor markets and to investigate the influence of a traditional rule of employment in the Prussian bureaucracy on the employment relationships. It examines the promotion systems of the middle-ranked employees and assesses the existence of internal labor markets in the Prussian railroads from the 1850'S. This result indicates that the Prussian (private-and state owned-) railroads developed a modern employment system that was suitable for inducing available humane resources. The predominant employment of the retired officers and soldiers with the testimonial for maintenance in the civil service (Civilversorgungsschein) had a negative effect on the functions of these internal labor markets. The result of the introduction of traditional German-Prussian bureaucratic system in the railroads was ambivalent; on the one hand, the bureaucracy was a source of an internal labor market -some preferential treatment of the long-time employed in the employment relationship, but, on the other hand, it burdened the modern economic organizations with the risk and/or uncertainity of the supplied labor forces.

著者

川井 充

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.51-78,101, 2005-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Muto Sanji (武藤山治) (1867-1934) was one of the greatest Japanese business leaders in the early 20th century. He succeeded in managing the Kanegafuti Spinning Company (鐘淵紡績株式会社), which developed significantly under his prominent leadership. He was well-known for his paternalism in the company and distinguished for his dignified stance to the shareholders. This paper attempts to find how he could get the shareholders' support for his welfare works which cost much money.Muto knew that he must give the employees good working environments and conditions to induce them to work hard. He made all the possible improvements for the employees and he himself worked hard with them. On the other hand, he rejected any unreasonable request for dividend-increase and refused almost all the proposals from the shareholders to increase capital because they were often schemed just to get capital gain.The company grew better-off owing to his good management and came to able to pay a high dividend to the shareholders. Then Muto began to pay a higher dividend than those of other companies in return for the shareholders' cooperation for his policy to avoid unreasonable capital increase, and he could build the complete welfare facilities with their consents.This paper will give some hints to the Japanese managers struggling to create a new business model today.

著者

大石 直樹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.3-26,97, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The aim of this paper is to review the business expansion of early Mitsubishi from the viewpoint of funds. Mitsubishi went into businesses other than shipping and did the asset management from its early days. But the asset management of Mitsubishi was influenced by the establishment of Mitsubishi Exchange Office in 1880 and purchase of Takashima Colliery in 1881. A problem arose from the increase in the cost spent on the shipping business. Then the management didn't only cut the wages but also reexamined the accounting system, under which it had been impossible to calculate profits and losses precisely. In 1882, a new accounting system was set forth and the accounting of the shipping departments became isolated from the other departments.This process influenced the way of business expansion, too. Higher performance was required because the funds which had been used for a financial investment and had made a large profit until then were turned to the new business. Therefore, management used the new funds as lending, not as capital.I present the following hypothesis. Early Mitsubishi came to recognize business as the process of the flow of funds. In other words, Mitsubishi grasped business as the mechanism which is identical with a financial investment. It means that the business model of Mitsubishi worked as a management discipline of each office by the fund.

著者

桑原 哲也

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.44-52, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

著者

天野 雅敏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.59-62, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

辻 義浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.1-29, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

112

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The purpose of this article is to survey the development of the vegetable oil industry during the middle Meiji period, through the case of Settsu Seiyu.Settsu Seiyu, a vegetable oil company, was established in Osaka in 1889 as a limited company by famous oil and fertilizer merchants whose businesses dated from the Tokugawa period. This company, which pressed oil seed by machine, was the largest vegetable oil company in Japan.At the time of its foundation, Settsu Seiyu pressed only rapeseed. The company started to press other oil seeds (cotton seed, linseed, castor, and peanut) after 1984. It purchased materials from various places in order to set off possible risks of poor harvests and to maintain stable management. The circulating fund for the purchase materials was constantly insufficient, although the equipment fund was sufficiently raised from capital paid up by the company. The company therefore often borrowed funds from the banks, thus benefiting from the financial system.Initially, Settsu Seiyu sold most of its vegetable oil and oil cakes through special agents. But later it did not depend on special agents at all. It advertised its goods at Furitsu Osaka Shohin Chinretsusho, and its products were highly rated at not only domestic industrial expositions but also foreign expositions. The company expanded its market. Most of the vegetable oil and the refined oil were consumed not only as light oil but also as machine oil.

著者

小堀 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.30-55, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

75

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the Japanese government and private enterprises switched energy resources from domestic coal to imported crude oil during the late 1950s, in particular to focus on the electric power industry and its policies. Beginning in 1955, the government had prohibited the electric power industry from building boilers that exclusively burned heavy oil but abolished the prohibition in 1960. This paper examines when and why the electric power industry first requested the removal of the ban on exclusive heavy oil burning. Further, it also looks at how the government reacted to the industry's claims. As a result of the examination, many ideas became clear.First, in 1957, the electric power industry, especially the Committee of Modernizing Electrics, started to claim that they needed to burn heavy oil exclusively because it was becoming certain that the supply of domestic coal could not meet the rapidly increasing demand for electricity. This meant that the electric power industry would have to consume much more heavy oil, without regard to price. So it opted for the exclusive burning of heavy oil in order to consume the oil at the lowest cost.Second, the government, especially MITI and the Economic Planning Agency, took the initiative of adopting and establishing the electric power industry's claim as their energy policy. This enabled them to keep down the cost of power generation and to supply enough electricity for maximum growth. Therefore, the protection of the domestic coal industry was never in the mainstream of Japan's energy policy.

著者

金子 良事

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.56-80, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

40

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the wage system for male blue-collar workers at Fujigasu Spinning Company and their daily lives during the middle Taisho years.The conclusion is summarised as follows : 1. There were three types of wage forms : pay-for-person system, group-piece system, and individual-piece system. Bonuses were paid by individual rank, but this was abolished in 1920 and substituted by wage rates. In the former two wage forms, worker performance was evaluated when determining the wage rate, and in the last form, performance may have been evaluated.2. The evaluation principle of the entire company by the wage system was not established to control the workers' lives because their behavior was autonomous, and the manager did not know how to control the workers's family lives. The role of a worker in his family was not always that of the breadwinner and the workers' family lives varied. The worker could take a day off whenever heliked. The variety of workers' family lives and their behavior made it impossible for the manager to control their lives.3. The order of wage worked with the evaluation system, accepting the autonomy of workers' lives. The wage system was not organized by trade and was not the only the form of payment. In this wage system, the evaluation system was shaped as a principle of management but it was not a way of control of its workers.