著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.3, pp.1-29, 1991-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this essay is to make clear the roles of company groups, trade associations, and the government for the competitive power or growth of Japanese companies. It takes up the case of the petrochemical industry, which presents the most suitable data on the point at issue.The first half of this paper examines the historical outline of Japan's petrochemical industry, which has gone through the following three periods : 1. The period of the beginning of home production (1957-1964);2. The period of the large-sized investment in plant and equipment (1965-1973);3. The period of the reorganization of the industry after the first and second Oil Shock (1974-).The latter half investigates the functions of company groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo), trade association (Sekiyu Kagaku Kogyo Kyokai, the Petrochemical Industry Association), and the government (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry). After due criticism against the commonly accepted theories, I draw two conclusions as follows : 1. Company groups, trade associations, and the government made many-sided contributions to the competitive power or growth of Japanese companies;2. Nevertheless, the functions of company groups, trade associations, and the government was within the limit of supplementing organizational capability of Japanese companies.

著者

渡辺 喜七

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.4, pp.1-28, 1991-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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In this paper, I attempt to define “business ideology” as a decisive element in management and entrepreneurship. Then I go on to examine comparatively the role it played in 18th century Japan and the United States. At first I define the concept of business ideology as the fundamental principle, goal or spirit of business which entrepreneurs regard as the soundest basis for the foundation, maintenance and development of the enterprise, greatly affecting strategic and managerial decision-making. Secondly, I describe the business ideology and/or the spirit of the modern capitalism of Benjamin Franklin as the origin of modern entrepreneurship in the United States. Franklin's business values and ideology did not only emphasize the virtues of temperance, industry, frugality and rational techniques for making money; but also strongly affirm freedom, individualism and social responsibility in modern industrial society. It is worth emphasizing that Franklin's ideas and example contributed to the formation of modern work ethics and business ideology which promoted American industrialization. Thirdly, I touch upon the social values and business ideology of the Tokugawa era of Japan in the 18th century. In order to understand the business ideology of the era, two examples, the business philosophy, Shingaku, by Baigan Ishida and House Rule formed by the Mitsui have been examined. They both approved the traditional values of diligence, frugality, obedience, loyalty and patience based on Confucianism, affirming “profit making” without guilty feeling. Among the many aspects of management of the House Rule of the Mitsui in 1722, we observe the strongly conservative and firm policy that prohibited new ventures in favor of maintaning the ancestral business and the House. Finally, comparing the business values and ideology of America and Japan in the same century, we consider “what were the real factors” of promoting industrialization in the modern society by re-examination of Weber's theory of the spirit of the modern capitalism. We observe that the spirit or ethics in the business values of the Tokugawa era, Baigan's thought, and the business ideology of the merchant's House is similar to what we find in Weber's theory of modernization. They all emphasize the virtues of diligence, frugality, honesty, patience and confidence of profitmaking, “the spirit of capitalism”. If we compare American values with Japanese values in the 18th century, or the business ideology of Franklin with the Merchant's House Rule, clear similarities as well as differences will be found. Diligence, frugality and profit-making are the same values for both sides. However, the big difference is the fact that America produced progressive, innovative minds, the spirit of freedom, criticism and individualism, but Japan failed to evolve those ideals in the Tokugawa era. My final point is that these American spirits or ideas were vital factors in bringing about spontaneous industrialization and modern capitalism. Therefore, we observe something missing in Weber's theory of modernization. Especially Weber failed to appreciate the role of individualism, freedom, and innovation in driving entrepreneurship and industrialization.

著者

作道 潤

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.4, pp.29-58, 1991-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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French entrepreneurship has been hotly debated in earlier business history. Perhaps the reason is that the poor performance of French industrialists has been considered as one of major retardative factors of French economic growth. But recent studies on French economic and business growth challenged these conventional views. The performance of modern French economy is far more satisfactory than has generally been allowed. This article aims to reexamine the French entrepreneurship in the nineteenth century, mainly from two points of view. Firstly, investigating several cases of most successful firms, the positive role of family firm in French economic growth will be pointed out. The other major problems such as business ideology, paternalism and religion will be argued in this context. Secondly, regional differences in French entrepreneurship will be examined, based on the cases of five industrial centers (Alsace, Lorraine, Nord, Normandie, Lyon). In conclusion, the emphasis will be placed on the active role that dynamic entrepreneurs and enterprises had played in the evolution of French modern economy.

著者

福森 徹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.4, pp.59-87, 1991-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

四宮 俊之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.4, pp.88-103, 1991-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

大津寄 勝典

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.1-35, 1991-04-30 (Released:2010-02-19)

参考文献数

63

被引用文献数

1

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The name Magosaburo Ohara (1880-1943) conjures up in the mind of many people the image of a great cultural figure of rare farseeing intelligence. This is due to his position as the founder of Ohara Art. Museum and many other large cultural facilities. People will also remember Ohara as a philanthropist-a generous benefactor who devoted his life to pursuing more desirable conditions for humanity and an ideal form of society.These images alone, however, would not do justice to the totality of Ohara the man. For they fail to capture his greatness as a prominent entrepreneur and a theorist of unique labor management policies.Ohara served his presidency at Kurashiki Cotton Spinning, now known as Kurabo Industries, in the years between 1906 and 1939. At the firm, he committed himself to the expansion of spinning projects. Under the leadership of Ohara, KCS had continuously made remarkable progress through the years, eventually establishing itself as one of Japan's six big spinning enterprises in 1920. KCS originally commenced its operations in 1888 as a small factory in the rural village of Kurashiki.Ohara founded eight research institutes in his lifetime. Of these, Ohara Institute of Social Problems and Kurashiki Institute of Labor Science were of particular importance to the founder. For it was at these two institutions that Ohara developed his own theories of labor management policies through studies on the relationships between industry and laboratories.This paper, from the perspective of business history, will shed fresh light upon Magosaburo Ohara, focusing on his activities as a great entrepreneur. It will also examine many of his unique concepts on labor management policies. These policies, widely practiced at KCS during his presidency, seem to reflect Ohara's entrepreneurial spirit. The paper will be concluded with the author's rationales for considering Ohara's management ideas to be theoretically sound. Chief among those is his business ideology of collaborative workshop, which is neither a form of paternalism nor of collusive harmony between labor and capital.

著者

両角 成広

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.36-55, 1991-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

55

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.77-87, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 2

著者

間 宏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.2, pp.1-32, 1990-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The study of management creeds must be one of the most advanced field of business history in Japan, and perhaps compared with that in other highly industrialized countries. Since the era of the feudal big merchant families, many large companies have drawn up management creeds and philosophies and regard them as important. Today, at a time when businessmen and scholars show great interest in them, we should promote the comparative study of management creeds. The establishment of an analytical framework or conceptual scheme which is essential for deeper insight.This paper seeks to form a conceptual framework for the comparative study of management creeds in the East and the West.The basic value system of the East and the West are characterized by collectivism (groupism) and individualism respectively. However, the concept of collectivism (groupism) and that of individualism are vague as scientific terms. For this reason, these two terms are made clear by using crossing two axes. The vertical axis shows the purpose or goal of social action, and the horizontal axis shows the means of social action to attain the purpose or goal. The former axis has two poles representing collectivity-centeredness and self-centeredness, and the latter axis has two poles representing self-help and mutual-help.According to the four quadrants formed by the two axes, management creeds are separated into four types. Management creeds in the early stage of industrialization in Japan are illustrated using this framework.

著者

黄 明水

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.2, pp.33-51, 1990-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper is an attempt to clarify the business ideology in Korea through an historical approach. The establishment of modern business enterprises in Korea began in 1890. However, it was in the year 1876 during the late years of the Yi dynasty, that Korea adopted its open-door policy. The stages of business development are divided into three periods : The first period was the last decade of the 19th century. The second was the 1920s while under colonial rule, and the third period was the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. During the first period, almost all modern native enterprises went bankrupt. However, in the second period they began to develop, and the number of native enterprises increased greatly following the “Sam-il Independence Movement” on March 1, 1919. In the third period, enterprise groups, so-called zaibatsu, were formed. In each period, the direction of business management was decided by a business motive and business ideology of enterprisers based on a strong nationalism rooted in traditional Confucian thought.In this paper, the business motive and business ideology in Korea will be clarified on the basis of case studies of three businessmen : Rhee, Byung-chul, the founder of Samsung group; Kim, Sung-kon, the founder of Ssangyong group; and Rhyu, Il-han, the founder of Yuhan Corporation.In the first period, the native business enterprises were established to protest against foreign control of Korean industries and to respond to the introduction of modern civilization. The business motive and business behavior of the enterprisers at that time worked for “the protection of the country.” In the second period of the business boom after the Sam-il Independence Movement, the business motive was “the recovery of national rights.” In the third period, the business motive was “escape from poverty through economic growth, ” in other words, industrial contribution to the nation.The strong nationalism in the business ideology of enterprisers before and after the liberation in 1945 was in evidence in the attitude of enterprisers toward national crises. This nationalism traces itself back to the royalty, to parents, and to rulers and is based on Confucian tradition. For instance, Ryee, Byung-chul and Kim, Sung-kon were influenced by Confucian philosophy throughout their lives. Rhyu, Il-han was also influenced by Confucian thought from his early childhood. Their business ideology was based on strong patriotism, priority on national interests, and belief in business's contribution to the nation.The ethics of honesty, industry, prudence and frugality in business management in Korea is based on the Confucian thought of “self-control before governing the people, patience, and self-sacrifice.” The higher economic growth in Korea since 1960 likewise is based on self-control, endurance, industry and self-sacrifice.These are similar to the thought of self-denial (asceticism) in Protestant ethics and that of Benjamin Franklin, as pointed out by Max Weber.

著者

沢井 実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.2, pp.52-61, 1990-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

中村 清司

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.2, pp.61-69, 1990-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

谷口 明丈

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.3, pp.1-39, 1990-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

113

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We can find that 47 of the 63 largest manufacturing firms in 1909 were formed by consolidation from 1882 to 1904. Consolidation played a decisive role in the process of the emergence of modern large corporations.In this article I divide these cases of consolidation into four types according to three criteria : (1) pattern of strategic evolution ; (2) percentage effect of the standard firm on the market or economy of scale and speed ; and (3) incentive to diversification. To type A-1 belong the cases where first horizontal consolidation of single-unit-firms took place because the high percentage effect brought about severe competition and then vertical integration evolved, and no incentive to diversification existed. In type A-2 the percentage effect was low and other conditions were similar to those in type A-1. In type B-1 one firm began vertical integration and a few firms followed it, and then the severe competition between them led to horizontal consolidation. There, the percentage effect was high because vertically integrated firms became standard, and incentive to diversification was little. In type B-2 incentive to diversification was an important factor that led to consolidation, and other conditions were similar to those in type B-1.These four types express the dynamism of American industry in this period. The cases in type A-1 were in the main stream where the progress in technology itself gave birth to overproduction. In type B-1 where the technological condition was similar to type A-1, innovations made pioneers develop new strategies (vertical integration). The cases in type A-2 show the move to consolidation in the low-technology industries. The cases in type B-2, though only a few, imply the emergence of new type of industries where product-innovation is of significance.After consolidation most of the large corporations in every type began to pursue the strategy of growth through diversification which was still of narrow range in most cases.

著者

藤井 信幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.3, pp.40-57, 1990-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.3, pp.58-73, 1990-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

三輪 宗弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.3, pp.58-76, 1989-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.4, pp.1-35, 1990-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this essay is to make clear the activities of the Japan Branch of Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (SVOC) and its predecessors, Standard Oil Company of New York (SOCONY), Vacuum Oil Company, and Socony-Vacuum Corporation, before World War II. In this essay I examine the following seven points at issue.1. Why did SOCONY and Vacuum establish the Japan Branch in the early 1890s?2. Why did SOCONY and Vacuum succeed in penetrating into the Japan's petroleum market?3. Why did SOCONY start producing and refining Japan's domestic crude oil in 1900 and stop them in 1911?4. Why did SOCONY's sales share in the Japan's petroleum market decrease during the 1910s and 1920s?5. How did the establishment of Socony-Vacuum in 1931 influence the Japan Branch?6. How did the establishment of SVOC in 1933 influence the Japan Branch?7. How did SVOC move against the Japan's Petroleum Industry Law of 1934, which persecuted foreign petroleum companies?These examinations show one general conclusion : In case of analyzing activities of foreign companies in Japan, we must take notice of their world-wide (at least Asia-wide) strategy as well as the peculiarity of the Japan's market.

著者

粕谷 誠

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.4, pp.36-72, 1990-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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It has been commonly accepted that the Zaibatsu holding companies held control over its subsidiary companies by giving permission to appoint managers, to make a huge long-term investment, to establish branches, and so on. But we have few studies about Zaibatsu control over banking companies. The purpose of this paper is to make clear how Zaibatsu holding company (Mitsui Gomei) controlled its subsidiary bank (Mitsui Bank) in the 1910s.Without agreement of the directors board of Mitsui Bank, Managing Directors could not (a) make or revise rules or regulations of the bank, (b) establish branches and appoint managers of branches, (c) change the tacit cartel treatment on deposit interest rate among main banks, (d) change maximum amount of loans of each branch, (e) underwrote public and corporate bonds, (f) closed contracts with foreign banks, while they could change the preferred interest rate of deposits for special customers and make loans (except asked politically). The board of the bank needed the permission of Mitsui Gomei when it (a) made or revised important rules, (b) established branches and appointed managers of branches, (c) underwrote bonds.In 1917, the board meetings were held 57 times, of which 25 meetings could not make decisions because the number of those present didn't reach a quorum. The quorum is five of six members of the Board, into which Mitsui families sent two members. From this fact we can infer that the board meetings didn't play an important role in decision making.In 1919, Mitsui Bank issued new stock partly by public subscription, the Board added two members in it. The two were the new stock owners, and they had not been working for the companies controlled exclusively by Mitsui Gomei. It was the first time for the Board to accept the outsiders. After 1919 the Board could make any decisions without agreement of Mitsui Gomei formally. At this time the Board made some codes which empowered Managing Directors to make decisions in particular matters without agreement of the Board, but the codes consisted mainly of the customs which had prevailed in the Board.

著者

安岡 重明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.1-18,i, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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By the end of the War, in 1945, a substantial part of the Japanese economy was controlled by many zaibatsu. When the war became serious, zaibatsu were compelled to change their character : the Mitsui and the Yasuda which had developed on the bases of banking and trade business entered such new fields as the heavy and the chemical industries, which were the main businesses of the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo zaibatsu; the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo had become more powerful just before the bombing by the U.S. Air Force. At the termination of the war, 35.2% of the total domestic paid-up capital was occupied by that of the companies of the ten biggest zaibatsu. The employed managers of the Mitsui and the Yasuda zaibatsu endeavored to adapt their business to the new environment in the 1930-40s, by shifting the main field of their businesses and by reforming the organizational structure of their firms. The headquarters of zaibatsu, which had been unlimited (Mitsui and Yasuda) or limited partnerships (Mitsubishi and Sumitomo), were obliged to be reorganized as joint-stock companies (corporations) in order to raise neccesary funds for new investments. By adopting the form of joint-stock company, the headquarters could offer their stocks for public subscription and could issue debentures. In the cases of the Mitsui and the Yasuda, however, zaibatsu owners were reluctant to invest in heavy industries because the center of their interest was in the preservation of their business entities. Therefore, the top-managers of the two zaibatsu made every effort to awake the owners, only to cause friction with the owners. On the other hand, the owners in the Mitsubishi usually held real power in the management. In the Sumitomo, it was an established practice that the owners delegate authority over management to the top-managers. On account of this practice, no severe conflict was ever seen between the owners and the managers in the two zaibatsu. After the war, main zaibatsu were dissolved according to the order of the GHQ; the headquarters of zaibatsu was broken up; the owners and managers of zaibatsu were purged; and the stocks of zaibatsu-affiliated companies were offered to the general public, and these companies became firms independent of each other. After the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, however, the former zaibatsu subsidiaries began to regather together and to reorganize their own financial groups respectively. These financial groups are called “Kigyo-shudan” instead of “zaibatsu.” Among Kigyo-shudan, the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo groups grew up most remarkably. On the other hand, the solidarity of the Mitsui and the Yasuda groups was weak because of the top-managers' reluctance to renew zaibatsu. Moreover, the top-managers opposed the former owners' comeback and involvement in the former subsidiaries. It may be argued from the above that the prewar pattern of owner-manager relations that developed in respective zaibatsu had a great influence upon the solidarity and potentiality of each Kigyo-shudan in the postwar period.

著者

上月 直人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.19-37, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)