著者
作道 潤
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.2, pp.1-32, 1989-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

This article aims to examine two principal aspects of France's organic chemical industry from the second half of the 19th century to World War I ; the first is the declining process of France's tar dye industry, and the second is the formation of French pharmaceutical industry during this period.As for the first point, two cases will be investigated. Firstly, the Saint-Denis Company had to abandon the fabrication of synthetic alizarins in the 1880s, mainly because of stiff competition with German companies. Secondly, the Usines du Rhône Company discovered a new synthetic process of indigos at the turn of the century, and succeeded in licencing its patents to Hœchst Co.. But the adventure of the Usines du Rhône was doomed to fail, mainly because of the poor performance of this company's top management.The case of the Usines du Rhône will also be useful for clarifying the second point. In spite of the failure in the field of tar dye industry, this company had successfully commercialized the synthetic pharmaceutical products such as salicylates, antipyrine and synthetic anesthic, as well as the synthetic perfume and the cellulose acetate just before World War I. In talking about the factors contributed to this development, emphasis will be placed on two points ; the renovation of the managerial system by the Société Générale Bank and this company's traditional eagerness to establish and maintain R & D laboratories, which were commonly held to has been little developed in France before World War I.
著者
伊藤 孝
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.2, pp.33-67, 1989-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of business activities of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) -the present name is Exxon Corp.-in the United Kingdom from right after World War II through the late 1950's.The main characteristics were as follows : (1) The Company was able to make most products with its new refinery in the U.K.. At the first the Company hesitated to build and operate the refinery because of some problems, especially uncertainty as to use of fereign exchange for remitting profits to the U.S.A. and other payments. But it had no choice but to do that in order to keep its position in the British market.(2) The Company strenghened control over the retail market of gasoline, a main item among petroleum products, chiefly by extending network of exclusive outlets. But the primary motive to bring the network into its marketing channel did not directly come from marketing itself, but from refining. The Company needed enough and reliable outlets which helped to make operation of the refinery high level.(3) The Company's local rifining depended on its operations (producing and purchasing crude petroleum) in the Middle East. But on the other hand the operation in the U.K. influenced them in the Middle East. Under the dollar shortage in the U.K., the Company could hardly use crude petroleum produced by Aramco for the refining because of its so-called dollar oil. The Aramco crude development program had already been reduced in the late 1940's.
著者
島田 昌和
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.3, pp.27-57, 1989-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

There have been few studies concerning the fact that the Industrial Club of Japan (ICJ) played a prominent role in the process of establishing the “Kyochokai”. A report by the ICJ formed the basic foundation of the “Kyochokai”. The business leaders in the ICJ assumed a vital role in collecting funds and making up its policies, and were elected as the main members in the “Kyochokai”. It is very important to analyze the role that the ICJ played in the establishment of the “Kyochokai” and to examine the business leaders' views of labor management relations which were founded upon the ethics of “Kyocho-shugi (the principle of harmony and conciliation)”.In 1919, the Hara government consulted the ICJ about the “Shin-ai-Kyokai” plan which the government itself had drafted. This plan reflected the paternalistic relationship between labor and management. Business leaders in the ICJ felt that they should deal with the increasing labor disputes after World War I in a way different from the paternalistic one. So, they adopted a strategy based on the “kyocho-sugi” including arbitration of labor disputes and various social policy programs.However, the social policy programs of the neutral foundation “The Kyochokai”, were not governmental programs. Actually they were industry-based voluntary programs which did facilitate labor management relations.Seijiro Miyajima is one of the persons who most heatedly argued the necessity of “Kyocho-shugi”. He recognized the gap between the classes of labor and management and the opposing nature of their interests, and he contributed to moving the views of the ICJ members closer to the spirit of “Kyocho-shugi”.
著者
千本 暁子
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.4, pp.1-23,i, 1989-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)
被引用文献数
1

The traditional years from the preindustrial Edo era in Japan to the Meiji era saw changes in employment relationship While not a few of the current practices can be traced back to the apprentice system of Edo merchant houses as, we recognize prototypes of our long-term employment in their live-out system and branch family system applied to executive employees.The apprenticeship system was essentially educational system whereby apprenticed children were disciplined until becoming full-fledged, independent merchants. Then, we have to ask why and how the merchant houses in the Edo era encouraged further long-term service from their fully qualified personnel long after their term of education. By the late Edo era, on the other hand, the word “apprentice” was often applied to petty servants and day laborers. What effect did this disintegration of the apprentice system have on the long-term service of highly skilled and potentially independent personnel? This article offers answers to these problems as it proceeds with the analysis of the sequential changes in the series of tactics the Mitsui House employed as it tried to secure long-term service of its high-ranking personnel.The Mitsui House apparently deliberated on and did deploy a succession of flexible stratagems in the face of changes within the House as well as in society. When the House underwent aggrandizement in the Edo era, the utmost effort went into securing the stable service of able personnel. Apprenticeship in any merchant house was a highly selective process and quite a few failed to fulfill their term of service and this competitiveness among the peers was quite a stimulus in the training of skilled personnel.As a result of Meiji restoration, the practice of having personnel changed in such way that the role of employees became stratified and they received their salary in cash according to the newly-introduced graded salary system. This new system worked as a good incentive to secure long-term service because loyalty and ability promised successive promotions with steady raise in salary.
著者
藤村 大時郎
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.4, pp.24-54,ii, 1989-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

After reviewing administrative structures of multi-unit enterprises in the mid-nineteenth century France, I examined that of Schneider et Cie which had been defined by its 1913 organizational rules. Like most advanced structures of contemporary american firms, it had a central office comprised of heads of functional departments-operating, financial, industrial accounting, personnel and legal departments. Into the first operating department, however, were integrated manufacturing, sales and engineering offices, and the line of authority between the major manufacturing and the other two units, and also between the operating and the other departments was defined on a line-and-staff basis. This contrast to the american integrated industrial enterprises can be explained by the similarity in the object of organization building, that is coordination of production and marketing activities, as well as the difference, lack of its own sales network in the french enterprise.Another and more important difference is found out in behavior at organization building. In contrast to american organization builders, Schneider's executives used data only for controling activities, so not for evaluating the performance of managers, and their range of authority and responsibility remained obscure in consequence. This discovery of another way of organization buildng suggests that creation of the general officers which constitute a major innovation in developing the decentralized, divisional structure was a result of the american way of organization building, because strictness in the delegation of authority to the division managers is assured by clearness of individual responsibility confined by objective figures. The schema of strategy and structure of A.D. Chandler, Jr., therefore, should be reconsidered.
著者
長沢 康昭
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, no.1, pp.1-31, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

After 1902, Mitsubishi Goshi opened branches in Hankou, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Peking, Vladivostok, and Singapore in order to export coal extracted from the company's mines. As these branches began in the 1910s to deal in commodities made by other companies, the character of the trading department of Mitsubishi Goshi changed from that of a sales department to that of a Sogo-shosha (general trading company). In this paper, I will try to outline reasons for the change by analyzing the business activities of the branches. In the 1910s, coal exports to China were unstable because of the severe fluctuations of the foreign exchange rate. As a result, the branches were unable to show stable profits. On the other hand, they had adopted an independent profit system. Thus, in order to obtain a profit, the manager and salesmen of each branch attempted to deal in goods produced by other companies. They sold the goods made by Mitsubishi-related companies, including beer, carbonated water, paper, and glassware, and traded commodities of unrelated companies, including raw cotton, cotton thread and fabrics, cement, paulownia oil, sesame, and so on. They succeeded only in dealing in paulownia oil and sesame-export goods of Chinese origin to Europe and America. This indicates that only those goods which do not suffer the instability of major goods (coal) are suitable for trade. From the above analysis, we can form a hypothesis that the Sogo-shosha is a mechanism for stabilizing foreign trade and that a sales department must transform its character to that of a Sogo-shosha in order to stay in operation when its main business becomes unstable.
著者
大塩 武
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.1, pp.67-76, 1988-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)
著者
片岡 豊
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.2, pp.33-58,ii, 1988-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

Many of the modern companies in Japan have developed as jointstock companies.In respect that those jointstock companies raised funds mainly by issuing stocks, the role of stockholders was important. And it is stockholders' meetings that ensure the rights of those stockholders who invested in the companies. It is, however, debated that stockholders' meetings in these days are nothing but are held as a matter of form.The purpose of this paper is to survey the function of the stockholders' meetings in the Meiji Era when the modern companies had just come into existence.The object of my study in this paper is the stockholders' meetings for the mergers of railroad companies. It is because the merger was, and of course is, one of the most important affairs for the companies, and also for the stockholders concerned. Moreover stocks of a railroad company had relatively wide distribution in those days.In this paper mergers are divided into three kinds of cases. The first is the case where the estimated value of the company which was merged was lower than the stock price of the company. In the second the former was equal to the latter, and the third is of an opposite kind to the first.