著者

塩見 治人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.1-26,i, 1984-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The modern business enterprise resulted from the integration of mass production with mass distribution within a single business firm. The American meat-packing industry created the typical type of enterprise exemplified by the “Big Five” at the beginning of the 20th century. However, the dominant status of the “Big Five” has ceased today. The industry clearly represents the category of slight to negligible barriers to entry, and might be labeled as “low moderate” concentration. This paper focuses on the resolution process of “Big Five” business structure under long-term technological trends. Section II and III argue that differences in entrepreneurial response to the refrigeration age brought forth three types of business structure. Section IV raises and attempts to answer the question of the decline of the “Big Five.”

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.27-44,ii, 1984-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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From the viewpoint of accounting history, it is one of the great issues when and how systematic depreciation began. At the present time, an influential understanding on this matter might be that of A.C. Littleton, a renowned accounting historian. He maintained that systematic depreciation did not originate until the mid-nineteenth century when railway came up. By contrast, there is a different view that during the Industrial Revolution systematic depreciation already started. In this controversy, it is noteworthy that depreciation must be systematic and regular, not haphazard is assumed. Accordingly, depreciation by the inventory method is excluded from the discussion because it is not planned depreciation.The author tries to give some evidence to this problem by dint of looking into the accounts of the Cyfarthfa Ironworks which was the largest ironworks in Britain during the early nineteenth century. As a result of analysing these accounts, the following facts were found.In the Cyfarthfa ironworks, broadly speaking, the straight line method was adopted as a means of writing off “Premises”, from 1819 on. Although the way to write off “Premises” was rather complicated, it is obvious that they used the system so as to recover their invested fixed capital just when the lease contract regarding raw materials would expire. For that purpose, they set the length of 45 years to write off “Premises” in 1819. The process to discover this mechanism was kind of mysterious. In the long run, this fact-finding gives weight to the view that systematic depreciation started before the railway age by offering a fresh exemplification.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.45-67, 1984-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

由井 常彦 マーク フルーエン

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.1, pp.29-57,ii, 1983-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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The lists presented here are the data showing the financial records of the 200 largest enterprises in the development of Japanese business. These lists rank large industrial enterprises in the order of the size of the firm and also provide information on the amount of assets, paid-up capital and revenue of each of the enterprises.As the main purpose of this survey is a comparative study among industrialized countries, the lists are devised to the extent possible to be adaptable to international standards. (1) The enterprises listed are the 200 largest industrial enterprises, in accordance with the list of the United States and United Kingdom. (2) The authors researched the year 1918, 1930 and 1954. Although the data for the U.S. and the U.K. includes a list for 1949, marking the beginning of the post World War II period, the authors analyzing Japanese enterprises listed the 200 industrial firms of 1954 instead of 1949, because in 1949 Japanese large enterprises had not yet recovered from the war damage. (3) The standard for ranking enterprises in the lists is the sum of assets in real terms, mainly because most of the Japanese companies before World War II had not published their sales figures. (4) The definition and classification of “industry” is based on the SIC (Standard Classification of Industry) in the U.S.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.1, pp.58-68, 1983-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

レイ ウィリアム D

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.2, pp.1-22,i, 1983-07-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

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This paper deals with the plans for a merger between the N.Y.K. and the O.S.K. and the effects that the failure of the negotiations had on N.Y.K. management. Japan's large shipping companies were relatively independent of the zaibatsu to which they belonged. However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s several forces prompted Mitsubishi to take a more ieterventionist policy toward the N.Y.K. These forces included N.Y.K. managerial dissension and the financial problems of the depression. In particular Mitsubishi favored N.Y.K.-O.S.K. cooperation because it had developed close financial ties with the O.S.K., which had become a major market for its ships. Kagami Kenkichi, the leading financial executive within the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, tried to implement cooperation and merger with the O.S.K. during the early years of his tenure as N.Y.K. president. The principal focus of this paper is Kagami's attempt to negotiate this merger and the opposition that arose against it from “mainstream” N.Y.K. executives, that is, managers who had spent their whole careers with the company. These managers were more concerned with obtaining government subsidies and preserving the identity of their firm than with negotiations for the merger. Their successful opposition strengthened the forces of company autonomy.

著者

山中 雅夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.2, pp.66-72, 1983-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

柴 孝夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.3, pp.1-28,i, 1983-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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After World War I, Japanese shipbuilding industry was visited by severe depression. At that time, most of shipbuilding firms in Japan were hard hit in their management by this depression. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding company and Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Ltd. were biggest ones in this industry at that time. But managements of these firms changed for the worse with the advance of the depression. Especially the condition of Kawasaki was severe. This company collapsed as early as the middle of this depression, 1927. On the other hand Mitsubishi was not so severe. Because, it was superior to Kawasaki in building of merchant vesseles. And it selected moderated policy for the depression.This company cut off unprofitable depertments and endeavored to accumulate internal funds. As a result, it could hold huge funds at the end of Taisho era. Policy of Kawasaki was very extreme compared of Mitsubishi's. This company tried to find a way out by extending to new fields one after another. But such policy imposed a big burden on the finance of this company.

著者

米山 高生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.1, pp.1-28,i, 1983-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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When we study the history of British insurance offices, especially in terms of comparative business history, it is paramount to consider 'composite' offices which handle various types of insurance -life, fire, marine and accident. There are no such insurance offices in the US, Germany, Japan and most other countries, but in Britain all major insurance offices, except a few, are large-scale composite offices.Composite offices, in the strict sense of the word, did not emerge until the turn of the century. During the years of 1904-14, some major insurance offices expanded their business by handling 'new-type' of insurance-personal accident, employers, liability, and so on-in addition to tranditional insurance. In other words, it was at this time that the British insurance offices undertook diversification of business.The purpose of this article is twofold. One is showing the process of the emergence of composite offices, and two, more importantly, presenting a picture of the historical character of British insurance business against the background of the maturity of the British economy. References used were the Board of Trade Returns and some insurance journals and yearbooks.The following are the conclusions of this article. Firstly, large-scale composite offices did not derive from life offices (e.g. Equitable, Standard Life), but from fire-life offices (e.g. Royal, North British and Mercantile) or fire-life-marine offices (e.g. Royal Exchange, Liverpool and London and Globe). Secondly, diversification, strictly speaking diversification to 'related business' according to R.P. Rumelt, was the result of amalgamations rather than internal growth. Furthermore, it was around this time that the post, of 'General Manager' emerged, bringing an 'Age of General Managers' to the British insurance business. Thirdly, traditional London based offices (e.g. London Assurance) and specialist life offices (e.g. Scottish Widows' Fund) continued to lose their shares in the insurance market. To the contrary, some active non-London insurance offices, which had a comparatively short history, gradually became of increasing importance.

著者

田付 茉莉子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.3, pp.1-21,i, 1982-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In the Meiji period, Japan began to manufacture various products of modern industries such as cotton yarn, paper, or refined suger which had formerly been imported from abroad. In the fields of trade and shipping as well, Japanese enterprises started to replace foreign companies. We may call the phenomena the replacement by Japanese national enterprises.The case was different with the field of life insurance, where foreign companies entered into the Japanese market already cultivated by Japanese companies. The first Japanese life insurence company was established in 1871, followed by many others until about 1890. The foreign companies of those days had agents in Japan and did business mainly for foreign residents. Two American and two Canadian companies, authorized to enter the Japanese market about 1900, expanded their amount of insurance in force rapidly by selling insurance with tontine allottment. Since tontine offered high-rate allottment at maturity instead of annual allottment, it became popular among wealthy people. Foreign companies occupied for more than 10% of the Japanese market in 1904-06. They gradually reduced their activities thereafter, because American companies were prohibited from allotting tontine by the Insurance Law of New York State. On the other hand, some Japanese companies adopted the method as it was not prohibited by the Japanese Insurance Law, causing a considerable damage to American companies. In the 1910's an American company withdrew from the field and the share of other foreign companies decreased yearly.We intended here to find out the foreign companies which had agents in Japan since 1870, the exact date when five companies started their business for the Japanese, the reason for their success and their eventual withdrawal from Japan.

著者

中瀬 寿一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.3, pp.22-52,ii, 1982-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to trace the historical formation process of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu around 1837 and 1845 with the objective of discovering how the reform of not only the house precepts, shop rules and miner's rules etc. but also the house system were done by Genbee Takawara, the head-clerk of the Izumiya-Sumitomo and how characteristics the reform of these feudalistic house system had as compared with the reform of Mitsui and Konoike in the Tokugawa Period (1600-1868).The 1830's brought Tokugawa Japan to the edge of another period of crisis compounded of financial insolvency at the top and reaction to conditions of poverty at the bottom. The country was seething with displaced peasants and the cities choked with peasants and wanderers. The poor were in a desperate mood. Outbreaks of violence and rice warehouse smashings became frequent.In 1837 there was a uprising led by Heihachiro Oshio (17921837), a scholar and a leading O-Yomei philosopher, who had already sold his books to help the hungry poor. The rebels attacked Osaka, and tried to kill the heartless Bakufu's officials and to set fire to the city centre where luxury-living merchants and usury capitalists had been living and to release its wealth to the poor. But they were put down in a day by the Bakufu's troops and Oshio took his own life.His revolt, while quickly put down, shocked greatly the Bakufu, the country and luxury-living merchants who profited while the poor starved.Thus, G. Takawara who became the leader of the Sumitomo Tempo reform, had repeatedly memorialized Tomohiro Sumitomo, the family head, on the need for reform in 1837-1844, following the Oshio rebellion. In this paper I will focus on the role of G. Takawara, the head-clerk of the Sumitomo, the most representative big business, mine-manufacturer and usury of Edo period and analyze the characteristics of the reform for the “modernization” and “rationalization” of the Sumitomo house.

著者

藤村 大時郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.1-30,i, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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One of the results acquired through investigation of the Rules of the Schneider and Co., which were instituted in 1913 to establish principles of its management organization, is a discovery of the fact that, in France before the First World War, there was another type of business organization different from what Professor Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. explained eloquently in his book, “The Visible Hand”. The difference is found in the function performed by the middle management of the Schneider and Co., which are divided into five Divisions according to its products, such as coal and steel, various engines and electric motors, artillery and armour plates, ships, and bridges. As well as almost all of its products are order-made, each Division is organized to perform efficiently functions necessary for order production. According to the Rules of 1913, each Division is composed of Sales, Technical, Production, Test and Accounting Departments, and main functions are fulfilled by the first three Departments; respectively negociation with clients, design for contract and production management (of job shop type). The most remarkable thing is that, in there Rules, heavy emphasis is placed on co-ordination among these functions, not only between negotiation and design but also negotiation and production management, so as to acquire orders profitably and quickly. It would appear that this co-ordination is not the “Administrative Co-ordination” which replace the “Invisible Hand”, though very suitable for the big business of order production type. These Rules also prescribe centralization of the functions of these Departments in Paris headquators in order to realize its better relationship, although this principle is not fully applied to all Divisions owing to its industrial characters.In this article, I have examined such middle management organization and the business strategy of the Schneider and Co., which form clear contrast to what Professor Chandler, Jr. elucidated; those of mass production, so that we can find out another aspect of the French entrepreneurship and big business.

著者

猿渡 啓子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.31-54,ii, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This paper analyzes the growth of a British-owned trading company, Guthrie Corporation, with emphasis on its strategic and structural responses to changing business environment.During the 19th century, Guthrie's major activity was general trading between Singapore and the United Kingdom, although the company gradually expanded its businesses into such related areas as finance for provincial ventures and local agencies of British firms. Reflecting the simplicity of operations, Guthrie's organization remained primitive. The general office in Singapore and its branch and agent in London carried their duties without clear functional divisions and close coordination.Facing the depression in trading in the late 19th century, Guthrie's strategic interest turned to then rising rubber production. By utilizing its financial and personal ties in trading, Guthrie played an intermediary role between the British capital market and Malayan agriculture. While the company acted as a London promoter of newly-established and converted public companies for rubbergrowing, Guthrie took the charge of managing rubber estates in Malaya and marketing products overseas. Responding to this integration, Guthrie's organization became functional. For instance, the London office now had the companies department which concentrated on promotional and secretarial functions of the rubber companies.Changes in world markets for agricultural products and Malaya's independence in the 1950's forced Guthrie to adopt another strategy of integration and diversification into manufacturing in Malaysia and industrialized countries. Following the forward integration into such rubber-consuming industries as carpet-weaving, Guthrie's management agressively took over manufacturing enterprises in related and unrelated fields in Western Europe, Canada, and the U.S. In the 1970's, Guthrie thus became a multinational company with multi-divisional structure organized by region and product.This strategy of multinationalization and the relative retreat from Malaysian interests, however, inevitably resulted in consecutive conflicts with Malaysia's economic policy which sought indigenous ownership and control of foreign firms. In 1981, the Malaysian government took the final move of publicly taking over Guthrie at the London stock market and easily succeeded by overcoming desperate defense by Guthrie's management, by which a long history of this trading company was eventually terminated.

著者

楊 天溢

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.4, pp.55-65, 1983-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

米山 高生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.50-68, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

鳥羽 欽一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.1-21,i, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It was believed for long years that distribution system in Japan was traditional and far retarded from that of the western societies. However, Japanese manufacturers and retailers has made efforts in modernizing themselves by learning and introducing modern marketing theory and know-how mainly from the United States. And now they are actively engaging in selling Japanese products to Europe and the United States for which economic frictions arise. This article try to make clear how distribution system and marketing technique has been modernized from the Meiji period to present. In this connection, two aspects which is believed to characterize the modernization process of distribution system and marketing in Japan are pointed out. In considering the market for manufacturers and distributors in pre-war Japan, two completely different type of markets had been developed : they were 'international market' and 'domestic market'. The former was newly opened market for Japan and was mainly carried out by such big zaibatsu enterprises as Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji. The latter was traditional one and was dealt by traditional distributers in traditional way. Modernization had occured in both markets. In international market, it was sogo-shosha which led the modernization and, in domestic market, they were such retailors as Mitsukoshi and Takashimaya and also such manufacturers as Shiseido, Morinaga, Ajinomoto and Matsushita which started the production of new products. In both cases, influence of western knowledge and technique was very strong. However, as a whole, traditional character of the distribution system was remained. It was only after the War that retailing revolution and modern marketing by manufacturers gave big influence on the whole system of distribution in Japan. But such dual charachter of market still exists even today and it is the reason why European and American claim Japan's domestic market as of non-tariff barrior. This article makes clear this dual character of Japan's distribution system in its historical perspectives.

著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.22-46,iii, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In the international maritime history, the International Mercantile Marine (IMM) Co., established as an American concern in 1902, had an unique beginning as follows : firstly, J.P. Morgan & Co., a famous investment banking, played an important role in forming the IMM; secondly, Morgan & Co. combined several important liner companies engaged in a single operating route, the North Atlantic; and lastly, the IMM was composed of shipping firms whose nationalities were different, but mainly American and British. So far, many books and articles have treated of the IMM, usually, from a viewpoint of regarding the IMM as Morgan's Trust in the shipping industry. They analyse the financial aspects of the IMM, with pointing out failure as Trust because of poor financial performance. They are, however, little explanation of 'Americanization' policy that the IMM disposed of its foreign subsidaries and became an American shipping enterprise after the First World War. In order to inquire into the reason for and meaning of adopting Americanization policy, it should be required to analyse the IMM's strategy and structure rather than financial results up to the period of pre-War, and that is my task of the article. In conclusion, it is the reason for adopting Americanization policy that the IMM failed to formulate definite corporate strategy because of differences in managerial environment between constituent companies in the U.S.A. and U.K., and to create administrative control as a whole because of different approaches to organizational design between the top management in the U.S.A. and U.K. While, thus, Americanization policy taken by the IMM after the war was seen as a result of managerial failure of an earlier transnational enterprise in the maritime history, its policy was valid in the sense that it aimed to reconstruct effective organization for control and operation of fleets through unification of strategy by disposing of foreign flags under nominal control.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.47, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

田村 祐一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.1-22,i, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Mutually organized enterprise have had a long and snccessful history in American life insurance business. In theory, mutuals, without capital item in its balance-sheet, are owned by and operated for the benefit of the policyowners, and their boards of directors or “trustees” are elected by them, typically exemplified by the original Charter and By-Laws of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, the first mutual in the United States. But in practice, officers and directors of mutuals, although claiming democracy of their companies, have completely ignored the sovereignty of policyowners, who have consequently been silent majority for nearly one and a half century.The third president of the Mutual Life usurped the control through proxy contests and established his autocracy, so-called “Winston regime”. He and his vice-president held so many proxies, compared to “Children of Israel, ” that no one succeded in defeating his rule. Management control were dramatically disclosed by the Armstrong Committee of the New York Legislature in 1905, saying “Notwithstanding their theoretical rights, policyholders have had little or no voice in the management. Entrenched behind proxies, easily collected by subservient agents and running for long periods, unless expressly revoked, the officers of these companies have occupied unassailable positions and have been able to exercise despotic power”. With all the drastic revision of the New York Insurance laws, nothing happened in the elections of mutuals except temporary excitement, and management control continued at no stands for more than thirty years later the Temporary National Economic Committee disclosed the fact. “Life Insurance executives and directors constitute a small group that is self-appointing and self-perpetuating”. Another thirty years-plus have passed since TNEC, and the situation remains the same. All the while mutual managements have been criticized and refuted in the courts, legislatures of the stastes and journals, it has been desparately impossible to find out an effective means to bring indifferent policyowners to annual elections.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.23-46,ii, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The purpose of this paper is to compare the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Tokyo Electric Light Co. with the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Toho Electric Power Co..In the 1920's and the 1930's the Mitsui Bank had been positively financing both of the two electric power companies. Nevertheless, the Mitsui Bank intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. alone. On the other hand Toho Electric Power Co. was its own master.This contrast was due to the difference in point of administrative ability of managers of the two electric power companies. Owing to loose-spending management by Shohachi Wakao, the president from 1926 to 1930, Tokyo Electric Light Co. was in financial difficulties. Therefore Tokyo Electric Light Co. could not pay back debts from the Mitsui Bank sufficiently during the latter half of 1920's. Shigeaki Ikeda, the head of the managing directors of the Mitsui Bank interfered in human affairs concerning directors of Tokyo Electric Light Co.. Firstly he dispatched Seinosuke Go and Ichizo Kobayashi in 1927. Secondly he changed the president from Wakao to Go in 1930. Under capable management by Go and Kobayashi Tokyo Electric Light Co. recovered itself in the 1930's. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. directly after 1930.The intervening in Tokyo Electric Light Co. by the Mitsui Bank was a temporary phenomenon in order to preserve credits. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Toho Electric Power Co. which could pay back debts sufficiently under excellent management by the president Yasuzaemon Matsunaga. Therefore the commonly accepted theory is not adequate, which asserts that electric power capital was put under the control of Zaibatsu.