著者

内藤 浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.4, pp.58-75, 1995-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

平井 岳哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.1-27, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

This reseach is focused on the formative period from zaibatsu to enterprise grouping (it is not a vertical group but a horizontal group). After World War II, the zaibatsu dissolution was carried out by Occupation policy. In Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Iwasaki, owner family were removed from the firms, and Mitsubishi-honsha, which was a holding company, was broken up. Without owner family and a holding company, operating companies had been forming a new style of business grouping. The new grouping was consisted of autonomous companies. So it was necessary to have the function of maintaining a body of grouping. But then, it was not long before all of top managers were promoted in their companies. So almost of them did not have enough management skill and experience for interests coordination among a member of the group. Therefore senior managers, who used to be superior to top managers and obliged to retire after World War II, executed the function of interests coordination instead of them. In 1950's, it was senior managers rather than mutual stock holdings and top managers committee among a member of the group that fulfilled the function to band together in Mitsubishi group. And it depended upon human relationship among top managers and senior managers, which was built in the period of the zaibatsu.

著者

佐々木 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.28-54, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.55-65, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

上野 継義

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.1-30,140, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The South Works of the Illinois Steel Company, a U.S. Steel subsidiary, created the safety committee as a main program of the organized effort in accident prevention in 1908. The primary objective of this essay is to describe and document that the company's safety activities on the shop floor level resulted in the labor management reform, and that these activities were led by the chief safety inspectors, more commonly known as “safety men, ” who insisted that the “human factor” was a contributing element in accident occurrence.The safety men faced the same problems that employment managers would have to treat, and shortly realized that no safety devices without improving the employment system seemed to be available to diminish industrial accident rates. In January 1913, the company set up the new managerial position of the Supervisor of Labor and Safety, which integrated both functions of the safety department and the employment department. Arthur H. Young was given charge of this supervisory work. At the same time, the safety men had expanded the scope of the safety committees, so that they organized “combined” committees, a new experiment for improving the relationship between foremen and immigrant workers.From their experience the safety men realized that the safety problem was one of labor management, that no progress in safety could be given without considering the human relationship of employers and employees on the shop floor, and that immigrant workmen were not “backward, crude and ignorant” and could be efficient actors in safety work. Safety men's recognition of this was the most important factor of the successful management reform. In later years, A. H. Young concluded that “one of the by-products of the safety movement” had been the growth of personnel management.

著者

ジェフリー ジョーンズ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.31-55, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

著者

永江 眞夫 井奥 成彦 藤田 誠久 西川 浩司 鈴木 恒夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.56-78, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

小沢 勝之 後藤 伸 幸田 亮一 小澤 一男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.79-104, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.105-117, 1994-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

木元 富夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.1-30, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Werner Siemens (1816-92) not only built the greatest electric concern in Germany, he also concerned himself deeply with the enactment of the German Patent Law (1877). It is because he himself was an inventor-entrepreneur and recognized the significance of patents. He stated “the main reason of the rapid growth of our factories is that our products resulted mainly from our own inventions.” In his company, Siemens and Halske & Co., in 1873 an unprecedented controversy came about. That is, the upper engineer Hefner-Alteneck (1845-1904) who invented an epoch-making dynamo stated that he wanted to retire with the invention and set up his own company.At the time the whole German patent law had not been developed yet, and Prussian patent law was not complete, so the rights of employees concerning their inventions were not covered. How did Siemens cope with the situation? Siemens was opposed to Hefner's demand for his regisgnation because “even employeers' knowledge and skill is the property of the company, not to speak of employee-inventions.” However by only an old-fashioned patriarchic authoritarian approach he could not control his employees' loyality. In exchange for the concession of distributing profits, Siemens was able to prevent Hefner from starting his own business. After this trouble in Siemens & Co. every new employee had to sign the special agreement concerning employee inventions. This is an important case in history of business and technology because it was the earliest case of so-called employee-inventions.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.31-54, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The purpose of this paper is to make clear relationship between an international cartel and a domestic cartel in Japan through examining the case of the “Six Companies Agreement” on gasoline of 1932. The member companies of this agreement were the Rising Sun Petroleum, the Socony-Vacuum Corporation, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, the Mitsubishi Oil, and the Mitsui & Company. The Rising Sun belonged to Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell Group, and the Socony-Vacuum was an American company. In those days, the Royal Dutch Shell concluded the international cartel agreement with the Socony-Vacuum. Of the rest four companies, the Nippon Oil, the Ogura Oil, and the Mitsui & Company were genuine Japanese companies, and the Mitsubishi Oil was a joint concern of the Mitsubishi in Japan and the Associated Oil in the United States of America.The commonly accepted theory emphasizes the superiority of the international cartel between the Royal Dutch Shell and the Socony-Vacuum to the domestic cartel, that is the “Six Companies Agreement” of 1932 in Japan. The conclusion of this paper, however, denies the commonly accepted theory. It may safely be said that the control power in the gasoline market of the international cartel was restricted within narrow limits in a “medium advanced country” like Japan.

著者

森川 英正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.57-74, 1993-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

武井 章弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.1-29,i, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Was Ireland industrialized or de-industrialized in the first half of the nineteenth century? This is an acute question concerning Irish economic history. Under the Union in 1801 and the dissolution of any protective tarrifs in 1824 the major industrial cities of Ireland-Dublin, Cork and Belfast-were confronted with direct competition from the British Isles. Dublin, even de-industrialized, remained as the centre of administration and as a consumers' city, while Cork experienced a serious industrial decline.Belfast also seemed to decline with other cities. However, Belfast which developed the cotton industry had the alternative to survive in a different way. According to Geary's recent work, the Belfast entrepreneurs were competitive with Manchester under the free market in the limited sector. Moreover, as James Kay of Preston invented the wet-spinning process which produced the fine count linen yarn in 1825, fortunately the Belfast cotton spinners had an opportunity to challenge the new business which had more potential in Ireland.It is true that thanks to the linen industry Belfast survived and industrialized unlike Cork and Dublin. However the story was not so simple. In this essay, we examined who and when and in reality under what background did they launch into the linen business. The result of the examination is as follows; firstly, most of the Belfast entrepreneurs who started the linen business were the cotton spinners. Secondly, many of them changed their business in the mid-1830s, not immediately after 1825. Finally, they were prudent enough to wait and see the degree of the innovation and the situation of the linen market, and were also decisive enough to change to the new business. As a result, their business activity gave birth to the rise of the Irish linen industry in the world market and the industrialization in the north of Ireland.

著者

飯田 隆

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.30-54,ii, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

This paper deals with the new capital issue boom in the London capital market during the period of 1918-1920 and how large companies in those days committed themselves in the boom. Previously this boom has been characterized as essentially domestic and prominent with large issue by leading companies. However, it should also be pointed out that there were many speculative issues which were not connected with industrial development in the process of the boom.In order to clarify whether the boom played an important role in domestic capital formation or merely a speculative one, we have analyzed the amount of new capital raised by the issue, and the proportion of capital used for spending on equipment outlays in each issue, utilizing the prospectuses of companies and other documents.As a result of this investigation, we concluded that the boom had a great significance for the development of British industries, especially large companies belonging to the so-called heavy industrial sector. Though many large companies made considerable use of bonus issues during the period, they also expanded their assets substantially by new capital issues in the capital market.However, there were some instances of companies which had to face difficulties connected with the heavy burden of over-capitalization in the 1920's. These companies had to discover means for effective management of huge assets. For these reasons, the postwar capital issue boom had an important role in the rise of the corporate economy in Britain after the First World War.

著者

菅山 真次

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.4, pp.1-31,i, 1993-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The purpose of this papar is to investigate the careers of 158 white-collar workers employed by Yawata Steel in 1900, and to shed light on some aspects of the making of business white-collar employees particular to Japanese industrialization. As far as the white-collar employees studied here are concerned, one can hardly find any who had worked their way up from the ranks of artisans or skilled workers, or who had previously been employed in the traditional sector of commerce. For the most part, the careers of these personnel were limited to white-collar jobs in a broad sense, including various occupations such as business staff employees, government officials, teachers, policemen, and soldiers. A most striking fact is that a significant number of these people had experience in several different kinds of white-collar employment. This indicates that the demarcations between categories of white-collar employment were vague in early stages of Japanese industrialization. In other word, business staff personnal did not yet exist as an independent occupational group but rather fell within the broadly-defind category of white-collar workers. Based on the statistics regarding birthdate and social status, it appears that white-collar jobs were held almost exclusively by persons of samurai heritage at the beginning of the Meiji era, but that such post were becoming increasingly open to persons from all social backgrounds by 1880's. What made these changes in the make-up of white-collar workers possible was the spread of a wide variety of educational opportunities-except for regular secondary and higher schools-open to persons regardless of social status. These ranged from unsystematic education such as individual tutoring, shijuku, short training courses and correspondence schools, to the “irregular” miscellaneous schools called kakushu-gakko, and appecars to have played a critical role in satisfying a considerable demand for white-collar workers, especially in middle and lower levels that did arise in the course of Japanese industrialization.

著者

孫 一善

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.4, pp.32-63,iii, 1993-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

The objective of this paper is to examine changes in the vertical integration of distribution with regard to marketing policy during Japan's High Growth Period (1955-1973). Specifically, I deal with the senmon-hanbaigaishya (calling hansha) a system of selling companies created by the Kao Corporation, a major manufacturer, by the forward integration of wholesale distribution. With the shift in market demand during the High Growth Period from soaps to detergents, two characteristics of the traditional wholesalers became apprent : 1) inefficiency due to excessive fragmentation, and 2) a large discrepancy in size between the various wholesalers. On the other hand, a new force in distribution appeared with the advent in retail business of supermarkets, which used brand-name toiletary products in loss-leader selling. In October 1964, Kao responded to these developments by instituting a program of Resale Price Maintenance (R.P.M.) which reformed trade practices in an attempt to stabilize prices. However, it oved ineffective due to the shortcoming that it continued to use general wholesalers who also dealt with other toiletary products from competing manufacturers. This prompted Kao to take a further step of establishing a network of selling companies, the hansha, that handled only Kao products. Kao's hansha was a vertical integration of existing wholesalers undertaken in response to the fierce competition between toiletary manufacturers following the development of new detergent products as well as an out growth of the R.P.M. strategies that were implemented due to the appearance of supermark retailers. The hansha network of manufacturer's selling companies was established in three steps : initial selling companies, national selling companies, and broad-region selling companies. The initial selling companies were set up from specific whole salers from specific areas. Due to new trading practices implemented by Kao in 1968, national selling companies came into being when all primary and secondary wholesalers participated financially in the manufacturer's selling companies. After the hansha became a nationwide network, a series of mergers by selling companies brought about the broad-region selling companies. The implemetation of Kao's hansha system had a wide impact on the entire toiletary industry. For exemple, it prompted co-operation between small wholesalers as can be seen in the establishment of several jointpurchase institutions. It also caused the creation of broad-region selling companies from the merger of smaller selling companies, prompted one of Kao's competitors to adopt a multi-divisional structure of management, and brought about the establishment of a joint-purchase institution. With this modern system for managing the flow of both goods and information, Kao has been able to defend its position as top toiletary manufacturer in Japan since the oil embargo of 1973.

著者

米山 高生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.4, pp.64-75, 1993-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.1, pp.1-40, 1993-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

In this paper, the author describes the adoption of the “Taylor System” by the Pont-A-Mousson Company, a representative French manufacturer of iron tubes and other iron products.With the help of the Saint-Gobain Pont-A-Mousson Archives (25, rue de la Valée Maillard, 41000 Blois, France), it is possible to trace the efforts of this company to rationalize their production system.This paper is composed of three sections. The first section analyses the rationalization efforts of the company in the 1910s. Pont-A-Mousson asked the Morinni consulting company of Paris to suggest methods of rationalizing the production system. Morinni submitted a report concerning (a) worker's attitude and discipline, (b) the card system, (c) work time, labour and materials and (d) methods of bolt production.The second section examines the missions of company engineers sent to the United States in the 1920s in order to study the American “Taylor System”. Upon their return, these engineers improved the company's production system, and generated savings in production costs.The third section deals with the slowdown of the pace of rationalization in the 1930s. In this decade, the Bedeaux consulting company of Paris tried unsuccessfully to sell their system to Pont-A-Mousson.The Pont-A-Mousson company was very enthusiastic in adopting the American production system and we may conclude that their efforts produced significant results.

著者

上村 雅洋 川口 恵一 小早川 洋一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.1, pp.42-58, 1993-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

田中 俊宏 杉崎 京太 榎本 悟 〓沢 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.1, pp.59-85, 1993-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)