著者
竹花 洋祐
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, pp.45-59, 2020 (Released:2022-03-11)

Tanabe Hajime is famous as the second philosopher to develop a philosophy based on the idea of “absolute nothingness” in modern Japanese philosophy. In a sense, he deserves to be called the philosopher of “absolute nothingness” more than Nishida Kitaro as it remains a core concept until his death while the term “absolute nothingness” gradually becomes inconspicuous in the late philosophy of Nishida. As is well known, however, Tanabe decidedly refused to acknowledge the philosophical value of this idea in the beginning. Why does he accept the concept of “absolute nothingness” in spite of his criticism towards Nishida? How could he continue to find his fundamental standpoint in this idea while disapproving Nishida’s philosophy of “absolute nothingness”? The key to responding to these complicated questions lies in the problem of time, and more specifically, in Nishida’s idea of “the eternal now” and Tanabe’s interpretation of this concept. Therefore, in this paper, I will examine Tanabe’s understanding of “absolute nothingness” by focusing on his attitude towards the central notion in Nishida’s theory of time, namely “the eternal now.”
著者
猪ノ原 次郎
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, pp.77-90, 2020 (Released:2022-03-11)

It is said that the concept of body was hugely important for the later Nishida. While I do not disagree with this assessment, I believe it is important to recognize that, although it was concatenated with many other key concepts in his philosophy, Nishida did not explicitly indicate what the significance of the concept of the body actually was. Moreover, I believe that this question of why the body was so significant to Nishida’s work has still yet to be answered. Thus, the aim of this paper is to make the significance of Nishida’s concept of the body explicit by pursuing some conceptual connections that can be found within his thought. First, we need to specify what kind of issues concerning the body were taken up by Nishida. I will consider this question by comparing his description of the historical aspect of bodily activities with the biological, and thus find his central interest to be the semiotic functions of ‘historical body’. Second, I will examine the concept of expression, which Nishida used to deal with the semiotic and mental domains, and thus try to figure out the relation between expression and ‘form’: the relation which determines the normative characteristics of expressions. These examinations will help us understand why such acts of expression should, primarily, belong to the body rather than the mind or subjectivity. Finally, from these conceptions of expression and Nishida’s arguments over acquisition, I will conclude that the significance of the body consists in its semiotic acquisition, especially language acquisition, which radically constitutes the historical dimension of human individuals in the historical world.
著者
佐野 之人
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, pp.106-121, 2020 (Released:2022-03-11)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the climax of pure experience as normality, as interpreted by Nishitani Keiji. According to Nishitani, pure experience as described by Nishida Kitaro is a standpoint which, while breaking through ordinary experience, does not go beyond it and is nothing more than normality as “pure” experience. Nishitani provides no further explanation of pure experience. Based on An Inquiry into the Good this paper aims to demonstrate in detail what Nishitani does not explain; specifically, how “normality” as a climactic aspect of “pure experience” is formed from the standpoint of “everydayness”, and also a clarification of the concept of “normality”. This paper reaches the following conclusions. Everyday life is indeed pure experience but that is not evident when it is being experienced. In order for pure experience to become evident it needs to be brought into reflection. However, pure experience brought into reflection is only pure experience for reflection, and it is not genuine pure experience. Breaking through this reflective standpoint makes pure experience evident as normality. However, this has an essential inverse correspondence (gyakutaiō, 逆対応) because it appears as a single expression when the reflective standpoint is broken.
著者
高谷 掌子
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, pp.122-136, 2020 (Released:2022-03-11)

This paper explores the meaning of neighborly love in the temporality as the “eternal now”, found in The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness by Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro. Through the development of this work, Nishida shows considerable empathy toward the concepts of love and time by Augustine. However, whether these concepts can support neighborly love has been debated. Augustine limits love for neighbors by adding the condition “only in God”. However, God and neighbors exist in different temporalities; God is eternal, while neighbors are to be lost with time. Nishida develops this point by attempting to define time as “eternal now”. Inspired by Eckhart and Augustine, Nishida develops the concept of time as “eternal now” and “continuity of discontinuity” to depict the exact moment when continuous time emerges from eternity. In such a moment, the continuity of “I” as well as “you” is questioned. His “dialectic of self-love and other-love” leads to the conclusion that “I” can be myself and “you” can be yourself only by loving each other in the “eternal now”—the nexus where history and the creation of God begin.
著者
名和 達宣
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.12, pp.96-115, 2015

In recent years there have been many studies that look at the relationship between the philosophies of Nishida Kitaro and Shinran, however, only a very small number explore this relationship from the perspective of Shinran's Doctrinal Studies. One can see in Nishida a deep affinity with Shinran from an early age, expressed for example in his 1911 essay Gutoku Shinran. Also, in his Zen no kenkyū("An Inquiry into the Good"), released in the same year, one can see in the fourth section, which deals with religion, a possible influence from contemporary modern Shinran's Doctrinal Studies pioneer Kiyozawa Manshi (1863―1903). After that, Nishida very rarely directly mentions Shinran, right up until his later years. However, I believe that even if Shinran is not visible on the surface one can perceive a note in Nishida's underlying philosophy that resonates with Shinran's doctrine. And, I believe that note takes full form in one of his last works, 1945's Basho-teki ronri to shūkyō-teki sekai-kan("The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview"). The study I present here will center itself around the philosophical concept of "Inverse Correspondence" and argue the Shinran's Doctrine is revealed in Nishida's discussion of the relationship between the infinite other and the finite individual self.
著者
築山 修道
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.81-96, 2008

The whole subject of the symposium is "Philosophy and Religion in Nishida,"and it is the task imposed on me to approach the subject and bring up what problems there are about it in terms of Shin Buddhism. For that purpose, I tried to think about the theme from three following points : (1) The Fundamental Understanding of Philosophy and Religion in Nishida, (2) The Definition of Religion, Religious Awareness and the Whereabouts of Religious Problems in Nishida, and (3) The Characteristic of Nishida's View of Shinran or Shin Buddhism and its Meaning. The points of(1) and (2) are what we should know by all means in order to discuss the problem of philosophy and religion in Nishida, therefore I dealt with them to confirm that. As for the point (3), I examined how Nishida grasped the religious essence of Shinran or Shin Buddhism, focusing on Shinran's words of "Ōchō", "Jinenhōni", "Ginaki-o-gitosu"and "Myōgō"which express the core of Shin Buddhism, and are the fundamental words. As a result, it turned out that Nishida considered the essence of Shin Buddhism as teachings of salvation by faith in Amidabha's absolute power (Other Power) with great compassion, (Zettai-higan-no-tariki-shu). Through the examination, we could simultaneously not only explicate the characteristic and significance of Nishida's view of Shinran or Shin Buddhism but also present some meaningful matters on philosophy and religion in Nishida. Going right to the point, real teachings of absolute Other Power can be grasped and explained only by "fact of spiritual self-awareness"and "place-logic", and never by abstract subject and objective logic. In such a way, therefore, philosophy and religion can deepen and develop themselves more through the mediacy of the other, and in this sense both would be able to be complementary to each other. We here find a great possibility and meaning of Nishida Philosophy as philosophy of religion.
著者
石井 砂母亜
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.22-41, 2020 (Released:2020-08-10)

Kitaro Nishida declared, “The emotion which drives us to philosophical thinking must be not ‘surprise’ but profound sorrow for our life.” He had regarded “the self-awareness of death” as the most important subject of philosophy consistently. The death was not other people’s affairs but “the most concrete and individual event” for him. Whenever the past is recalled with regret in “the self-awareness of death”, the meaning of our life must become questionable. Since 1930, Nishida had searched after the meaning of our life by using the expression “the self-determination of eternal now”. According to Nishida, the self-awareness which must be thought ultimately as the self-awareness of absolute nothingness contains a contradiction. It means that present passes away as it stands still. Therefore, the self-awareness should be interpreted as “the self-determination of eternal now”. In my article, I would like to clarify the structure of “the self-awareness of death” from the viewpoint of Nishida’s theory of time.
著者
松本 直樹
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.58-77, 2020 (Released:2020-08-10)

Im vorliegenden Aufsatz vergleiche ich, unter Berufung auf die Gedanken Martin Heideggers, die Überlegungen von Nishida Kitarō und Kuki Shūzō zum Wesen des ewigen Jetzt. Kuki bezeichnet die phänomenologische, von Heidegger als Zeitlichkeit explizierte Struktur der gewöhnlichen Zeit als horizontale Ekstase. Davon unterscheidet er die vertikale Ekstase, auf deren Grundlage seine eigene metaphysische Idee der kreisförmigen, wiederkehrenden Zeit erst denkbar wird und die es uns ermöglicht, unser eigenes, zufälliges und einmaliges Leben in seiner ewigen Bedeutsamkeit ernsthaft zu erfassen. Diese Auffassung hat offensichtliche Parallelen zu Nishidas Idee der Selbstbestimmung des ewigen Jetzt als absolutes Nichts: Dort meint dieser Begriff nämlich, dass nur in einer “vertikalen” Selbstbestimmung das zufällige und einmalige Einzelne erkannt werde, das über jegliches Allgemeine hinausgehe. Dieses vertikale Moment der Zeitlichkeit ist aber auch für Heideggers Zeitlehre wesentlich, der zufolge das Dasein erst dann im eigentlichen Sinne, nämlich als eigentlich vereinzeltes, existiert, wenn es seinem eigenen Nichts, d. h. seinem Tod, gegenübersteht. Nishida und Heidegger erkennen in der vertikalen Richtung der Ekstase das Phänomen des Nichts, in dem die horizontale Ekstase der Zeitlichkeit insgesamt verschwindet und aus dem heraus sie erneut entsteht. In diesem Prozess erweist sich ihre Unumkehrbarkeit. Dagegen hält Kuki die vertikale Ekstase gerade für den Grund der Umkehrbarkeit der Zeit. In der folgenden Diskussion versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Kukis divergierende Deutung darin begründet ist, dass seine metaphysische Zeitlehre zum ästhetischen Genuss und zur “Ideation” der Zufälligkeit und Einmaligkeit des eigentlichen Einzelnen tendiert.
著者
浦井 聡
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.78-97, 2020 (Released:2020-08-10)

Tanabe Hajime (1885‒1962) started developing his philosophy of religion which he dubbed ‘philosophy as metanoetics’ since the autumn of 1944. In December of the same year, Nishida Kitaro (1870‒1945) criticized his understanding of the philosophy of religion, pointing out that its core concept of ‘repentance’ (zange) reduces to a mere ethical notion. Is this criticism justified? This paper aims to answer this question by indicating that Tanabe’s philosophy of religion is synthesis of ethics and religion, rather than a reduction of the latter to the prior. That is, I will clarify the relation between Tanabe’s notions of salvation (to which he referred to with the term ‘resurrection’) and existential communion (a term pertaining to social ontology that stands for the community of people who have been resurrected). For Tanabe, resurrection occurs when our practical reason is faced with an antinomy of duties and fails to find a solution; we are thus ‘resurrected’ by the Absolute. Resurrection leads naturally to new antinomies, which bring about higher demands for salvation. In this continuous process, we can gradually come to mediate the antinomies between oneself, others and entire communities. On the one hand, we can only realize existential communion by continuing ethical practices in our community. On the other, our salvation is attested only by existential communion. In this way, ethics and religion are inseparable in Tanabe’s philosophy of religion.
著者
Steve G. Lofts
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.98-124, 2020 (Released:2020-08-10)

本論文は、エルンスト・カッシーラーと西田幾多郎の二つの哲学が共有し両者 の対話がそこにおいて生じるような場所を確立するために、これら二つの哲学を 比較する哲学的試みである。本稿で論じられるのは、カッシーラーと西田の企図 に共通する哲学的な意図が、西洋の形而上学的伝統の凝り固まった二元論の超克 にあること、またこのことは超越論哲学と生の哲学という、相反する二つの哲学 的見地を逆説的に統合することで成し遂げられるということである。本論はまず 彼らの哲学的な企てが持つこの逆説的な性格を、それぞれのベルクソン批判を検 討することによって明らかにする。そのうえで、カッシーラーと西田が、形而上 学的な二元論を生じさせてきた根本要因を捜して古代ギリシャ哲学全般に、また 特にアリストテレスの実体概念にまで立ち戻ることを見る。さらに両者それぞれ のヘーゲル哲学への関わり方を検討することで、両者の哲学的企図を構成する本 質的な諸要素の比較を行う。最後に、現実性と可能性(エネルゲイアとポテンチ ア)の存在論的カテゴリーの逆転という観点から、カッシーラーの「全き可能性」 の概念と西田の「絶対無」の概念を比較する。