著者
松本 直樹
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.85-103, 2013 (Released:2020-03-22)

In seinem frühen, allgemein bekannten Hauptwerk Studie über das Gute (善の研究(Zen no kenkyū)charakterisiert Nishida Kitarō(西田幾多郎)die reine Erfahrung als “Gegenwartsbewusstsein des Tatsächlichen als solchen”. Die Verbindung zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit beeinträchtigt in diesem Sinne die Reinheit und Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung. Aber so, wie sich die reine Erfahrung Nishida zufolge, z. B. in Form des Willensaktes, darstellt, spielt die Vergangenheit eine bedeutende Rolle. Teils scheint sie sogar eine Art Vorrang vor der Gegenwart zu haben. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird versucht, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zusammenhangs zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart jene Sicht der Zeit deutlich zu machen, die Nishida in der Studie über das Gute zwar implizit voraussetzt, aber nicht ausdrücklich entwickelt. Nishida behauptet, die Gegenwart sei nicht ein bloßer Zeitpunkt ohne jegliche Dauer, sondern enthalte immer eine bestimmte Zeitspanne. Diese sich aufspannende, jeweils veränderliche Weite der Gegenwart ermöglicht, indem sie die Vergangenheit subsumiert, die Einheit von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, die selbst wiederum als eine gegenwärtige charakterisiert wird. Diese Einheit soll aber nicht interpretiert werden als äußerliche Verbindung zweier(oder mehrerer)abgetrennter Bewusstseinselemente, hier des Vergangenheits- und Gegenwartsbewusstseins. Vielmehr gilt sie als Identität, die, wenn sie im Eigentlichen, z. B. im unbewussten triebhaften Handeln, entsteht, sich überhaupt nicht des Unterschieds ihrer zwei konstitutiven Elemente bewusst ist. Aber diese Identität darf auch nicht verstanden werden als chaotische Undifferenziertheit. In ihrer Subsumierung unter die Gegenwart verliert sich die Vergangenheit nicht darin, sondern wirkt in ihr erst eigentlich als “die Kraft vergangener Erfahrungen”. Das besagt: die Gegenwart hat eine Ursprünglichkeit inne, die auch den Vorrang der Vergangenheit selbst ermöglicht. Nishida zufolge kann es im Bewusstsein zwar kein Nebeneinander(“juxtaposition”)der Elemente geben, aber der Erfahrung eignet immer irgendeine Unterschiedenheit. Es wird eine Metapher vorgeschlagen, um diesen Zusammenhang zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart fassbar zu machen: sie schichten sich übereinander und sind doch füreinander durchlässig, so wie eine Vielheit von Tönen eine harmonische Melodie zu konstituieren imstande ist.
著者
三宅 浩史
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.104-117, 2013 (Released:2020-03-22)

The book The Contemporary Dictionary of Philosophy(1936), which was mainly edited by Kiyoshi Miki, seems to have fallen into obscurity. One rarely hears it mentioned these days. As made clear in a paper by Prof. Miyajima(2011), the book was revised and edited by Kiyoshi Miki, and republished in 1941 as The New Edition of the Contemporary Dictionary of Philosophy. At that time, Japan was under a state of emergency because of war time hostilities. Five years later, the revised edition of the text was also out of print. Miyajima tells of the necessity of the transition from the old edition to the new one, and of the circumstances under which the revisions were made, as well as the crucial efforts made by Miki as the sole editor. Following the end of the Pacific War, rather than republish the newer edition, the older 1936 edition was going to be republished. But when articles written for the new edition were reviewed, it was found that some descriptions in the new edition were superior in comparison with their older versions. However, other articles in the new edition seemed to have suffered wartime censorship, which slanted their meaning. Therefore, some articles in the new edition can give the modern reader of the text a taste of the cultural circumstances at that time. In comparing the headings of both editions, one can see these distinctions. In this paper, a comparative study between both texts is made. For that purpose, several headings are selected to compare both texts with each other. In his introduction to the 1941 edition, Miki claims that the new text is the definitive edition. He suggests to us that the contents of each heading in this dictionary is not only to be looked up, but is to be read in detail. Through this research, we may have a clearer view to understand the period and circumstances of Japan during war time.
著者
上原 麻有子
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.118-134, 2013 (Released:2020-03-22)

Chez Nishida, la vision du corps se manifesta dès les deux premiers écrits, Ėtudes sur le Bien ainsi que Intuition et réflexion dans l’éveil à soi. Dans les années 1930, elle se développa comme une véritable théorie du corps, dont un des concepts centraux est l’« intuition d’acte ». Certes, le visage fait partie du corps, mais Nishida n’aborda pas ce problème à la différence de Watsuji Tetsurô qui s’y intéressa dans le contexte de la « communion des sensations corporelles ». Le concept d’« intuition d’acte » suggère la possibilité de saisir, dans les rapports entre le corps et la chose, l’apparition des visages tout à la fois exprimant et exprimé, créant et créé. Pourtant, elle semble incomplète si nous tenons à éclaircir le rapport entre l’intériorité et le visage comme extériorisation. Ce rapport se présente comme extrêmement complexe car l’expression faciale ne se forme pas toujours par un acte volontaire, mais parfois involontaire. Le présent essai consiste à expliquer la théorie du corps nishidien en la mettant en ordre, à relever ensuite les problèmes de l’expression faciale du point de vue de l’« intuition d’acte ». En outre, notre réflexion présente la nouvelle direction de l’étude de la théorie du corps nishidien, en mettant au point des sens culturel et social du visage de la femme.
著者
石崎 恵子
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.135-151, 2013 (Released:2020-03-22)

This paper summarizes the essence of “Creation” in the philosophy of NISHIDA. The first part of the paper specifies the characteristics of the theory of “Creation” by NISHIDA. He emphasized the notion of “Negation” in “Creation.” This idea provides room for Creation in every case. The second part of this paper locates uniqueness of “Creation”. NISHIDA indicates that it is the “now” and the “reality” that are “Creative.”History is creative because it is always the one and only now. History is the self-determination of the eternal now. NISHIDA warns one against being unaware of persistence in an object, which is only an opportunity for self-determination, or else “Creativity” is lost. However, lost creativity is also an opportunity for new creativity, according to the logic of place. The third part of this paper investigates concrete ways. We can understand NISHIDA’s creative terms, “Action–Intuition,” “Historical- Body,” “Self-Awareness,” and “The Identity of the Contradictory,” as methods of actual “Creation”. These methods embody “Creation” at the juncture of contrary direction. “Representation” and “Reflection” of the world radiate individual creative perspectives in the contrary direction. Thus the “Creation” in NISHIDA can be also our “Creation”, because it is universal, unique and concrete.
著者
コクリン メラニー
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.110-118, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

While confirming Nishitani Keiji’s ultimately existential treatment of religion which emphasizes ‘realization,’ this paper aims to elucidate the particular character of this realization through Nishitani’s interpretation of Shinran. There grasping the ‘originary awareness of evil’ as a negative and qualitative overturning of sociological or psychological ethics, I argue that Nishitani’s existential religious attitude does not limit itself to Zen Buddhism, but also realizes the existential standpoint of Kamakura Shin Buddhism, and thereby conclude that Nishitani’s approach to religion has meaning beyond any one particular religious sect.
著者
西塚 俊太
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.119-134, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Nishida Kitaro expresses his understanding of the integration between human beings and the world by the notion “the creative element of the creative world.” It is certain that he worked out his philosophical system in considering the close and immediate connection between the individual and the world. However, it is not always so easy to find out the specific connection between our ordinary actions in daily life and creations of the world. Scholars have so far mentioned that Nishida had shifted the emphasis of his thinking to the theme of history after his representative treatise “I - thou;” but, they have seldom grasped squarely the meaning of Nishida’s peculiar theory about history. So, we can say that it is necessary to investigate the left problem of unclear connection between them by reexamining Nishida Kitaro’s own theory about history. In this paper, to substantiate this view, I attempt to grasp the consistent theme and logic of history in Nishida’s thought through an examination of his representative writings dating around 1930s in first and second sections. In the third and final sections, I will examine the reason why Nishida depicted human beings as “the creative element of the creative world.” And finally, from this study, I will elucidate Nishida’s view on death and life.
著者
ハシント・サヴァラ アグステイン
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.154-173, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Except for occasional quotations from the posthumously published text of the Fragments concerning Pure Experience, this series of reflections which continued for about eight years has been overlooked by most commentators and interpreters of Nishida philosophy. One of the main difficulties in the study of the Fragments is the articulation of the many-sided views Nishida takes into consideration. This is a task that should be undertaken by researchers of Nishida philosophy in the future. In this paper I present the results reached after several attempts at finding one of the several possible ways of presenting a coherent view of the contents of the Fragments. From this overview of the contents, we can see that Nishida entered into great detail in his reflection on pure experience, and we can perceive that there were other ways, alternative to the Zen no kenkyû, in which Nishida could have worked out his interpretation of pure experience.

1 0 0 0 OA The Giotto’s O

著者
フォンガロ エンリコ
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.174-186, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Despite the large diffusion beyond boundaries of the academic world, the 2007 Italian translation of Zen no kenkyū hasn’t yet had a wide impact among Italian researchers of philosophy. Besides an ongoing ignorance of non-Western cultures, one of the principal reasons seems to be a kind of recalcitrance to a real intercultural dialog, which Nishida’s texts constrain. Zen no kenkyū appears in fact as the fulfillment of a creative encounter of different cultures, where the limit between East and West is exceeded in favour of something that forces the readers to bring themselves into question. Therefore the reading of Zen no kenkyū seems to be often confusing, especially when, under the appearance of something very familiar, an alterity is suddenly discovered, that becomes a constitutive element of something new and unexpected. An example of it can be found in the interpretation of the famous episode of “Giotto’s O” in the Lives of Vasari, that Nishida inserts in the third part of Zen no kenkyū. This interpretation departs notably from the usual Italian one, focused on some features typical of the Renaissance thought and aesthetics. Nishida’s ≪Giotto’s circle≫, although it calls to mind Zen paintings such as ensō or full moons, is something different, so that it is impossible to put it merely aside as “Oriental thought”. Giotto’s quotation in Zen no kenkyū, on the contrary, familiar and alien at the same time, goes deep hitting the sensibility of the Italian readers, compelling the question of interculture, that is recently beginning to be considered in Italy as a necessity or a destiny.
著者
ジロー ヴァンサン
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.187-200, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

To what extent can pure experience be considered to be “devoid of meaning”(An Inquiry into the Good, trans. M. Abe, p. 8)? It is well known that Nishida elaborated his own concept of “pure experience” in reference to the way it appears in the philosophy of William James. He thus aimed at founding philosophical speculation on a solid ground in a radically new way. It is by putting aside any kind of “meaning”(意味 , imi), that Nishida reaches the realm of pure experience conceived as a strict unity of consciousness: “a truly pure experience has no meaning whatsoever”(Ibid., p. 4). Almost at the same period, in his seminal work, Logical Investigations, and moreover in his Ideas, Husserl attempted a similar move towards the authentic nature of consciousness. However, his phenomenological method of “bracketing (Einklammerung)”, by which the objective world is neutralized, has not conduced him to a suspension of meaning(Sinn)as such. On the contrary, this methodological procedure unveiled the intentionality of consciousness as a pure structure of meaning. If pure experience has to be considered as philosophy’s terra firma, a comparison with Husserlian reduction— or epochè—proves itself to be necessary. It should indeed provide us with a critical insight into what Nishida understands as being the true “content” of pure experience.
著者
ステリン ローラン
出版者
Nishida Philosophy Association
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.187-172, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

The notion of the individual(個物 kobutu)is well known to be a key element of the later Nishidian philosophy. There, it plays a necessary role in the dialectical logic of the historical world, so much as to give rise to what Nishida calls a “dialectical monadology”. However, it did not always enjoy such an importance and served essentially to sustain a philosophy of unification based on the idea of the concrete or self-determining universal. In this paper, we will take a closer look at the place assigned to the individual in the formation of Nishida’s philosophy, especially his first usage of Leibniz’ monadology in The problem of Consciousness. The subsequent developments, meanwhile they are accurately explained from the perspective of the concept of nothingness, can also be presented from the correlative idea of the individual. From this position, we will interpret the role of the hypokeimenon and the later transformations of the subsomptive logic into a dialectical logic. The progressive emancipation of the concept of the individual can thus be seen as one of the important developments leading to Nishida’s late thought.
著者
片柳 榮一
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.36-56, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

One of the causes of the difficulty of understanding Nishida’s essay “I and thou” is the ambiguity of his use of the word“thou”. This word means not only a human other to whom I can call, but also means the I of the past, because the I of yesterday, for example, is qualitatively different from the I of now, this moment. The “thou” of Nishida’s philosophical construct extends to the full expanse of the universe. It is not easy to clearly decipher his definition of the term “thou,” used as it is in various contexts, but in the aggregate, it is possible to infer that Nishida intends the term “thou” to refer to the being whose presence gives an individual his true existence, despite that individual’s independence. Nishida emphasizes the fact that all things have their existence only in a transient instant and that in the next moment all things transmute. The thing that is now should not, indeed cannot, be considered as the same thing that it just was. What bridges the thing that was and thing that is? Nishida asserts that what bridges each independent thing is true love which he terms Absolute-nothingness. This love finds new life through its own death.
著者
水野 友晴
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.96-109, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Nishida Kitaro argued in Inquiry into the Good that only through contemplation of the eternal could a person lead a life of meaning. This view on life and morality was not unique to Nishida, but widely shared by other Japanese intellectuals of this period. In order to highlight this point, in this paper I wish to compare the religious philosophy of Nishida Kitaro with that of two other thinkers of the Meiji period, Tsunashima Ryosen and Uchimura Kanzo, who both made profound contributions to the development of Christian thought in Japan. Through this comparison I hope to shed light on the basic substratum of the Japanese religious mind and determine the relationship found therein between mortality and eternity. My hope is that this paper will assist in the establishment of a new standpoint which treats both God and Buddha as unlimited Absolutes, fostering a religious attitude that may provide a greater opportunity for dialogue between members of different religions.