著者
猪木 正道
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学四季報 (ISSN:24338583)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1951, no.7-8, pp.265-290, 1951-02-05 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
57
著者
井上 達夫
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, pp.58-70,198, 2006-10-30 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
14

The present paper reconstructs the idea of rule of law as a response to the persistence of human conflicts and defends it against the criticism that it hides and speciously rationalizes the rule of men. It is pointed out that Hobbes, who correctly rejected Coke's perception of rule of law as a groundless defense of social tyranny of feudal powers including religious forces, provided a deep insight into the problem of human conflicts which even the Hobbesian social contract cannot overcome. This insight is developed by arguing that the establishment of the state as a collective decision making system and enforcement mechanism cannot prevent the persistent human con-flicts from degenerating into the violent clashes in the state of nature unless the state's power structure is subjected to the governance of the principles which enables the losers of the strife in political decision making process to accept its outcomes as something beyond the victor's justice and pay deference to the winners. The rule of law is reinterpreted and defended as constituting the governance of such principles. This implies that the rule of law constitutes the conditions of the legitimacy of law as distinguished form its rightness. A further elaboration of this point is given by showing that Jeremy Waldron's normative-positivist defense of the dignity of democratic legislation as a response to “the circumstances of politics” helps to clarify the distinction between the legitimacy and rightness of law although it fails to solve the question of what constitutes the conditions of legitimacy. It is concluded that an adequate answer to this question is provided by the “strong structural interpretation” of rule of law. The rule of law on this interpretation protects the proto-right to justice-review of the outcomes of constitutional as well as legislative strife and subjects them to the test of the universalizable and reversible justification which underlies competing conceptions of justice as their common conceptual core.
著者
足立 英彦
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, pp.157-166,229, 2004-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
17

Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) presented his famous formula under the direct influence of 12 years of National Socialism. It reads: “Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely ‘false law’; it completely lacks the very nature of law.” Many scholars claim that this proposition differs from the legal philosophy expressed in his earlier works. I will argue that his legal philosophy has commonly been misinterpreted in such a way that it is apparently inconsistent with this proposition, and that when correctly interpreted, it supports the proposition. The reinterpretation presented in this paper is based on two arguments. The first concerns Radbruch's concept of law. Many scholars believe that Radbruch developed his concept of law with reference to Heinrich Rickert's “value-reference”, according to which any false statute is acknowledged as “law”. However, I will argue that Radbruch developed this concept under the guidance of Emil Lask's teleological principle. The second argument concerns Radbruch's theory about the purposes of law, and his closely interrelated notion of relativism. I will present a manuscript that Radbruch wrote for his lecture at the University of Kiel in 1919 (Gustav Radbruch. Rechtsphilosophische Tagesfragen [Current Questions of Legal Philosophy]. Ed. Hidehiko Adachi and Nils Teifke. Nomos-Verlag: Baden-Baden 2004). In this manuscript, Radbruch gave preference to what he called the “transpersonal view”, in which personality values and collective values (i. e., the values of nations) are subservient to work values. However, he added to this the argument that personalities and nations are at the same time the precondition of any true community of work. In addition, relativism, from which standpoint he developed his theory before 1919, is critically described in this paper. Pursuant to this, I will maintain that his legal philosophy after 1919 should be reinterpreted as non-relativistic and that, as argued in his proposition, any statute that completely denies one of three given values is non-law.