著者
千葉 恵
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
一般研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
1992

アリストテレスの哲学的思索の宝庫である生物学をめぐる近年の争点は目的因の存在論的身分である。或る人々は有機体の存在は質料因と始動因だけでは十分に説明できないと考え、他の人々はその本質の定義は目的因なしには不可能であるが、この両因による有機体の存在の十分な説明は可能であるとする。因果性(実在)と説明(言語)の関係をめぐるこの因難な問題接近の一基地を見定めたい。自然は複雑な構造を有し規則的で美しく無駄のない秩序を示す。人が人を生む複製機構の絶妙さこそ「最も自然なこと」であり、この自律的に形態発生する生物の秩序性の帰一的第一根拠が「実現さるべきもの」なる目的因である。目的は反省概念ではなく、理(設計図)の次元で資料に比と限界を与へ条件的に必然な質料を規定し(「理にも必然性はある」200b4)、時空特定可能な物理的次元で質料の自然的運動を引き起こす自然的原因である。熱冷等物理的必然運動なる自然学者の「自然的にある」は、理により形相づけられた質料の必然運動として、行為モデルに比され、解し直される。それ故質料の端的必然性は条件的必然性に「還元され」も「包摂され」(J.Cooper等)もせず、理上指定された質料が時空次元で一質料として独立した「自然的にある」必然運動を為すので、両者は同一事物の二次元の必然性である。(Phii8,9,PAil,De Anii4,GAiil,v8)生物の複製機構を範例とする「何故かくも自然は秩序正しいのか」という何故疑問に対する解が四原因論である。原因は実体の力の能動的・受動的発現と解される。始動因は場所上連続的な力の変動を生む物理的原因である。他方理にある善なる目的因は生成の完成状態なる形相因でもあり、受動的質料とそれに合着した始動因に秩序と方向性を賦与するその第一能動因、本質である。かくして目的因は質料・始動因と存在論的次元を異にしにそれらに還元されない。かく自然の帰一構造は原因論のそれとなる。(Phii3,7,Metv4)
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
慶應義塾大学
雑誌
哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.75, pp.19-45, 1982

In the first book of Physics, which is said to belong to his early Academia period, Aristotle investigates the principles of change in general - matter, privation and form. The most important of his discoveries in that book is, it seems, the concept of matter analysed in terms of the underlying thing (substratum) of change; the thing underlying is the terminus a quo and the thing constituted is the terminus ad quem of change. The relation of both termini consists in the fact that matter is the proximate cause of the thing constituted, such as bronze becoming a statue and wood becoming a bed, so that an analogy is found in the relation between the matter qua terminus a quo and the thing constituted qua terminus ad quem as between bronze and statue, wood and bed, and so on. It follows that Aristotle devised at first the concept of matter in relation to the thing constituted, not in relation to the formal cause as seen in later writings, for matter is consistently. in Physics, A the proximate cause of the thing constituted, and not in such a way that prime matter is claimed to be the ultimate cause of all things as many commentators interpret the text.
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, pp.47-56, 1994-03-28

I offer an interpretation, mainly on the basis of Physics II 9, of Aristotle's claim in his biological writings that explanation by necessity involving only material and efficient causes is consistent with an explanation of the same phenomena by purpose. My argument is directed towards the further question of whether Aristotle also believes that while the essences of certain biological phenomena are partly determined by their role in a teleological system, there is a complete account in terms of material and efficient causation of the conditions under which they exist. Physics II 9 presupposes his argument for the final cause as the nature in the primary sense in II 8, and is similar in theme to Parts of Animals 1 1 where Aristotle criticises the physiologoi on the ground that when they claimed that biological phenomena come into being by necessity, they fail to distinguish what kind of necessity is involved. At the beginning of II 9, Aristotle considers two alternative ways of understanding the necessity involved in generation ; either hypothetical necessity(HN) or HN plus simple necessity(SN). HN depends on a goal. If the goal is to be, it is necessary that certain other things come to be. SN, by contrast, depends on the nature of simple bodies and their movements. Aristotle locates the SN which the physiologoi take as the main cause of generation as a "necessary nature" (200a8) and regards this as explanatory of the goal, only insofar as the latter is purely materially specified as the matter of the goal(ω&b.sigmav; δι υλην). The goal taken as its matter is simply necessitated by its material components in the sense that the material components yield a specified condition for the existence of the goal. Thus Aristotle expresses two modes of necessity involved in generation as follows ; "The necessity, then, is on a hypothesis, but isn't necessary as the same way the goal(ω&b.sigmav; τελο&b.sigmav;) is necessary. For in the latter case the necessity lies in the matter, but in the former case the purpose lies in the λογο&b.sigmav; (account as design)." (200a13ff) Aristotle confirms the two modes of necessity in comparison with a mathematical reasoning. He compares both (1) "things which come to be based on nature(κατα <φυσιν)"(200a16) and (2) "things which come to be for something" (al9) with the necessity involved in a specific mathematical proof : given that the straight is thus and so, necessarily the triangle has angles whose sum is two right angles. While (1) is wider than (2) in terms of their extensions, they differ from each other in that the necessity involved in (1) is determined by the nature of underlying(υποκειμενομ), but the necessity involved in (2) is determined by goal. Aristotle defines nature in "κατα φυσιν" in (1) as a certain underlying based on simple bodies which have "natural tendency for change" (ορμη 192b18 cf. 95 al, 276a26) for both "substances" which "have a nature"(192b33) as formal or final cause and "their per se components" (cf. 73a34ff)which "do not have a nature" (193 a1) specified above as moving upwards belongs to fire. In that mathematical reasoning, the premises or components of the conclusion determine the necessity of the conclusion. This is said to be "in a parallel fashion" (200a16) with the case in (1). On the other hand, it is said to be "in a reversed fashion"(a19) with case in (2) in the sense that the goal which is achieved at the end of generation determines the necessity of the antecedent which comes no doubt earlier than the end. In this way, these two modes of necessity in generation are indirectly compared with each other via an example of mathematics. I conclude that while the purpose as design at the level of Adyoc determines what kind of matter should be employed in generation "as matter of λογο&b.sigmav; (200b8) , matter at the level of generation necessarily generates the matter of a goal by its own power, according to the program which is laid as design at the level of λογο&b.sigmav;. This allows us to say eg. eyeball and optic nerve etc. are an eye by themselves for the sake of seeing(cf. 1041a26). By distinguishing the level of λογο&b.sigmav; in which the purpose lies from the level of generation in which material necessity lies, Aristotle sets up the compatibility between teleological explanation of biological phenomena and explanation by material necessity in which both HN and SN lie.
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
慶應義塾大学
雑誌
哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.80, pp.25-55, 1985-05

We take issue with Shorey's thesis that the closest analogy to the Aristotelian syllogistic can be found in the causal reasoning of the Phaedo 100ff and that his "first idea" comes from this doctrine of Idea's causality. In our assesment, Shorey ignores the basic difference in the problem situation which lies between the causality discussed in AP_0 and the logical necessity in APr. We argue that the origin of the "first idea" should be traced back to Aristotle's practical interest in winning the argument, which in turn has led Aristotle to a theory of valid inference. First, he develops it as the Topos theory in Top II-VII 2. The aim of this theory is to offer the lists of argument-forms or rules concerning the validity of propositions. This prefigures some moments of his syllogistic, such as rules of logical necessity or propositional implications, the theory of the square of oppositions. Based on this Topos theory, the dialectical syllogism is theorized to a certain extent in Top I, VII 3-VIII, SE. Finally, Aristotle moves from the dialectical syllogism to the formal system of the syllogistic theory in APr by utilizing some aspects of the proportional theory of Pythagorean mathematics especially Book V of Euclid's Elementa by Eudoxos. Eudoxos supplies Aristotle with most of terminologies and technical procedures. Thus, Logic told the dawn.
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
慶應義塾大学
雑誌
哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.79, pp.21-48, 1984

There are four ideas about the origin .of the syllogistic. Our aim is to trace the making of Aristotle's Logic, critically examining these ideas. We assume that APr presupposes Top SE and that Top II-VII 2 comes earlier than Top I, VII 3-VIII, SE. In the latter, "συλλογισμοs" (=syllogism) comes: to be used technically and theorized as dialectical syllogism. We examine first Plato's theory of division. Le Blond and others derive the ground of their idea about the origin of the Syllogistic,entirely from the sentence that the division is a weak syllogism. They interpret that Aristotle has established his syllogistic by his critical consideration of this weak syllogism. APr I 31 and APo II 5 where he criticizes Plato's division theory are different from one another in the aspect 'of argument. In APr I 31, he simply takes issue with all those who insist that the division has a power of the demonstration, and shows by trying, to syllogize the division that it cannot demonstrate anything. So he has no hesitation to say that the division is a syllogism. In APo II 5, while evaluating highly division's peculiar function, he clearly says that the division is not a syllogism. So "a weak syllogism" is mere irony. The syllogistic is not dans le prolongement of the division. But the division might be able to be arranged in the theory of the origin only in the sense of affecting the making of the dialectical syllogism in Top and SE.
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
無教会全国集会さっぽろ準備委員会
巻号頁・発行日
2007

無教会全国集会2006さっぽろ:無教会の源流を求めて―札幌バンドの信仰とその系譜―,pp.29-37
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
慶應義塾大学
雑誌
哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.73, pp.1-24, 1981-12

In Post. Anal. A4, Aristotle enumerates four Kinds of "Per Se" which designate four kinds of necessity between subject and predicate. Many commentators exclude the last two "Per Se" from their concern as irrelevant to Aristotle's inquiry of the demonstrative theory. I think, however, that, as far as a necessary S-P relation, all four kinds of "Per Se" are, for Aristotle, indispensable to his theory of demonstration. In this paper, I try to investigate his true thought when he manifests four "Per Se" and to show the principal role of each of the last "neglected" two as follows. 1. implies tautological necessity which we acquire from the linguistical point of view. This must be relevant for positing a genus which each science has as its domain. 2. implies causal necessity such as is valid, in fields of nonmathematical sciences.
著者
新田 孝彦 坂井 昭宏 千葉 恵 石原 孝二 中川 大 中澤 務 柏葉 武秀 山田 友幸
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2002

本研究プロジェクトは、認知と行為の総合理論の基礎を据えることを目的として発足し、行為の合理性の分析を軸として、隣接諸学との関連をも視野に入れた研究を行ってきた。認知と行為の関連は、古くは「知と徳」の問題として、あるいはカントにおいて「理論理性と実践理性」の問題として問われ続けてきたように、哲学の中心的な問いの一つである。本研究プロジェクトでは、研究成果報告書第I部に見られるように、プラトンの対話篇を素材としたシンポジウム及びその背景となった研究において、生全体の認知と、そのもとに営まれる行為との関連のありさまを、哲学的思索の根源的な形態において理解しようとした。また、「プラグマティズムと人間学的哲学」シンポジウムにおいては、外国人研究者の協力も得て、日本及び東アジアの思想とヨーロッパにおける合理性概念の検討を行った。ともすれば、近代ヨーロッパに起源をもつ合理性概念にのみ着目してきた従来の哲学研究を、このような形でいったん相対化することは、合理性概念そのものの深化にとって不可欠である。さらに、シャーバー氏のセミナー及びシンポジウムでは、道徳的実在論に焦点を当て、より直接的に行為の合理性理解の可能性を問題にした。また、研究成果報告書第II部では、行為の合理性の分析と並んで、本研究プロジェクトのもう一つの柱である、哲学的な合理性概念と隣接諸学との関連にかかわる諸問題が論じられている。それらは社会生物学やフレーゲの論理思想、キリスト教信仰、認知科学、メレオトポロジー、技術者倫理と、一見バラバラな素材を取り扱っているように見えるが、それらはいずれも価値と人間の行為の合理性を軸とした認知と行為の問題の解明に他ならない。認知と行為の関連の問題は、さまざまなヴァリエーションをもって問われ続けてきた哲学の根本的な問題群であり、さらにその根底には人間とは何か、あるいは何であるべきかという問いが潜んでいる。これについてはさらに別のプロジェクトによって研究の継続を期することにしたい。
著者
千葉 恵
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
1995

本研究はアリストテレスの「分析論後書」の翻訳と註解からなる。この書物の詳しい説明は『序文』に譲るが、J.バーンズの印象的な表現を借りるなら、「この書物は、いかなる理由にせよ、哲学の歴史のなかで最も優れた、独創的で影響力のある作品のうちのひとつである。それは科学哲学のコースを--また或る程度科学そのもののコースを--千年間にわたり決定した」と形容されるものである。(J.Barnes,Aristotle Posterior Analytics,xiv,Clarendon Press Oxford 1994)今日は科学技術の時代であると言ってよく、生活のすみずみにいたるまで、その恩恵と制約のもとにある。科学そして科学的知識というものが、その起源において、いかなるものとして理解されたかを知ることは、今日の状況を作り上げているものをその源泉から理解し、省察することを促うように思われる。本研究においては「分析論後書」の全翻訳を提示し、註解としては私の「分析論後書」について研究である"Aristotle on Explanation ; Demonstrative Science and Scientific Inquiry Part I,II"(北海道大学文学部紀要 72号、pp.1-110、73号、pp.1-95)の関連箇所を指示する。詳細な註解の執筆は今後の課題としたい。