著者

桑原 哲也

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.44-52, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

著者

天野 雅敏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.59-62, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

辻 義浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.1-29, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

112

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The purpose of this article is to survey the development of the vegetable oil industry during the middle Meiji period, through the case of Settsu Seiyu.Settsu Seiyu, a vegetable oil company, was established in Osaka in 1889 as a limited company by famous oil and fertilizer merchants whose businesses dated from the Tokugawa period. This company, which pressed oil seed by machine, was the largest vegetable oil company in Japan.At the time of its foundation, Settsu Seiyu pressed only rapeseed. The company started to press other oil seeds (cotton seed, linseed, castor, and peanut) after 1984. It purchased materials from various places in order to set off possible risks of poor harvests and to maintain stable management. The circulating fund for the purchase materials was constantly insufficient, although the equipment fund was sufficiently raised from capital paid up by the company. The company therefore often borrowed funds from the banks, thus benefiting from the financial system.Initially, Settsu Seiyu sold most of its vegetable oil and oil cakes through special agents. But later it did not depend on special agents at all. It advertised its goods at Furitsu Osaka Shohin Chinretsusho, and its products were highly rated at not only domestic industrial expositions but also foreign expositions. The company expanded its market. Most of the vegetable oil and the refined oil were consumed not only as light oil but also as machine oil.

著者

小堀 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.30-55, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

75

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the Japanese government and private enterprises switched energy resources from domestic coal to imported crude oil during the late 1950s, in particular to focus on the electric power industry and its policies. Beginning in 1955, the government had prohibited the electric power industry from building boilers that exclusively burned heavy oil but abolished the prohibition in 1960. This paper examines when and why the electric power industry first requested the removal of the ban on exclusive heavy oil burning. Further, it also looks at how the government reacted to the industry's claims. As a result of the examination, many ideas became clear.First, in 1957, the electric power industry, especially the Committee of Modernizing Electrics, started to claim that they needed to burn heavy oil exclusively because it was becoming certain that the supply of domestic coal could not meet the rapidly increasing demand for electricity. This meant that the electric power industry would have to consume much more heavy oil, without regard to price. So it opted for the exclusive burning of heavy oil in order to consume the oil at the lowest cost.Second, the government, especially MITI and the Economic Planning Agency, took the initiative of adopting and establishing the electric power industry's claim as their energy policy. This enabled them to keep down the cost of power generation and to supply enough electricity for maximum growth. Therefore, the protection of the domestic coal industry was never in the mainstream of Japan's energy policy.

著者

金子 良事

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.56-80, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

40

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the wage system for male blue-collar workers at Fujigasu Spinning Company and their daily lives during the middle Taisho years.The conclusion is summarised as follows : 1. There were three types of wage forms : pay-for-person system, group-piece system, and individual-piece system. Bonuses were paid by individual rank, but this was abolished in 1920 and substituted by wage rates. In the former two wage forms, worker performance was evaluated when determining the wage rate, and in the last form, performance may have been evaluated.2. The evaluation principle of the entire company by the wage system was not established to control the workers' lives because their behavior was autonomous, and the manager did not know how to control the workers's family lives. The role of a worker in his family was not always that of the breadwinner and the workers' family lives varied. The worker could take a day off whenever heliked. The variety of workers' family lives and their behavior made it impossible for the manager to control their lives.3. The order of wage worked with the evaluation system, accepting the autonomy of workers' lives. The wage system was not organized by trade and was not the only the form of payment. In this wage system, the evaluation system was shaped as a principle of management but it was not a way of control of its workers.

著者

四宮 俊之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.4, pp.81-93, 2005-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

ロバート フィッツジェラルド

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.3-19,101, 2005-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Corporate case-studies constitute the greater part of the literature on British distribution and marketing. What is missing is a convincing interpretation, outlining the development stages of distribution and marketing in Britain. Nonetheless, some basic milestones and trends can be discerned. In Britain, the term 'marketing' was first introduced during the 1920s from the United States, replacing the previous use of the word 'sales'. It was concerned with the operational transfer of products from the factory gates to wholesalers and retailers. By the 1930s, 'marketing' at a few leading firms additionally encompassed an integrated system of production, product development, advertising, branding, sales, distribution, and management organisation. The inter-war period was, therefore, a turning point in the history of British marketing practice, but, as in the US, the top 100 companies did not adopt what became called the 'marketing orientation' until the post-war consumer boom. The period of the 'Great Victorian Boom', 1850-1870, is relatively under-researched, but we do know that some leading firms had a high appreciation of marketing. Yet it was the following decades that were critical in the emergence of marketing systems that were more identifiably modern. The new scale of production, marketing, branding and advertising and their importance to business objectives and organisation were noticeably transformed by 1900. Internationally-high levels of personal expenditure and well-developed product markets had encouraged in Britain a number of expanding consumer goods industries. Individual business histories reveal the importance of packaged, household goods in particular, and many of the firms that became leading advertisers at this time gained a long-lasting first mover advantage. There were, too, extensive developments in distribution and retailing : multiples expanded alongside city-centre department stores. Our knowledge and interpretation, however, are still guided by a seminal work, which appeared over fifty years ago, and there are few academic studies of businesses that were national retailers by 1914. British historians, with a few notable exceptions, have overlooked the advances of the 1920s and 1930s. Just as there was a shift towards high value, branded items in food and household goods, the growth in consumer durables expenditure suggests expanding wealth and a higher income elasticity of demand. The early development of British markets and manufacturing capabilities meant that the post-war decades did not demonstrate great marketing innovation, but did see, naturally, an enlargement in the scale of operations, and the further spread of 'best-practice' management techniques. On the other hand, the growing oligopoly of the retailing multiples and especially supermarkets shifted the balance of marketing power towards their competitive advantages in logistics, bulk purchase and price, and away from the manufacturers' emphasis on brand, cachet and image. It is a pity, therefore, that no systematic survey of Britain in the 1950s and 1960s exists to track general trends in market structure, consumer attitudes, and business strategy. Our knowledge of British marketing and distribution remains is largely dominated by a small group of consumer goods manufacturers, and to an even smaller set of retailers, despite some insights into insurance firms and railways. Too few British business histories, whatever their other virtues, pay attention to the topic. In addition, systematic surveys would deepen our understanding of 'modern' marketing, its origins, and causes, and contribute to our appreciation of its many dimensions, wide-ranging impact, and patterns of development.

著者

三浦 壮

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.20-45,103, 2005-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper aims to describe a corporate system in the coal mining industry called Ube-style anonymous association. This trust system has been supported by and developed in accordance with the customs in Ube areas from Meiji to Showa period. Coal mine companies used to have equal equity structure accruing equivalent right to each equity owner. However, since the shift from short-term to long-term management, equity structure had evolved to allow absorption of small capital with equity holdings. This relatively increased the equity holdings of functional capitalists resulted in larger share of profits and greater executive power. Resolutions in the general meeting of stakeholders previously done on human rule, a quorum defined by voting rights, was changed to a material rule which does not require an existence of a quorum. Despite the shift to long-term management, some companies still provide 400% dividend to its stakeholders and do not account for retained earnings. But, with the expansion of and constraints of partnership structure, the ratio of dividend payout decreased. Companies then recognized the importance of complementing financial policies with corporate management. This paper concludes that although Ube-style anonymous association retains its peculiar corporate system, it advances to establish itself as a corporate system with differentiating equity structure and is responsive to organizational and management constraints.

著者

下谷 政弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.46-63,104, 2005-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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After much contested debates, the 1997 revision of the Anti-monopoly Law finally lifted the ban on the creation of holding companies for the first time in half of a century. The reason why it took as long as 50 years seems to lie in the Japan-specific historical backgrounds. They are the critical influences of prewar zaibatsu over the postwar economy and the unique understanding about the so-called Konzern (corporate agglomeration). Theoretically speaking, holding companies have two major functions. Holding companies in Japan, however, have long been regarded as just means of concentrating economic powers. They have been easily associated with prewar gigantic zaibatsu structures, and that is why they had been prohibited such a long time. But nowadays it is important to recognize they have another significant function, that is, the reorganization of corporate internal structures. This paper intends to survey the prewar debates on holding companies and Konzern as well, pursuing after how the Japan-specific historical backgrounds emerged since the 1930s. This article will also examine how much the second function of holding companies was ignored in the prewar debates.

著者

加藤 健太

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.1-27, 2004-09-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

71

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of corporate acquisitions during the inter-war period in Japan, using the case of Oita Cement Co., Ltd. The focus of our analysis is the behavior and performance of the acquired company.In the first half of the 1920s, most of Oita Cement's directors were from among the firm's large shareholders, who at the same time held management positions in firms in other industries, for example banking, manufacturing, and commerce, and businessmen of local fame. Foremost among these was advisor Toyoji Wada, who was a leading magnate in financial circles and had significant influence over the firm's operating policy and decision-making.In the 1920s, Oita Cement pursued an aggressive growth strategy, including merging with two other cement companies, Asahi Cement Co. and Sakura Cement Co. At the time, Oita Cement had a burden of debt service and tried to reduce profitability through the issuance of debt bonds to finance an extensive capital expenditure program. The amount of debt increased from 1, 588, 000 yen to 7, 724, 000 yen through the 1920s.Onoda Cement acquired Oita Cement's stocks in 1930. Two directors, Shinzo Kasai and Shuzo Karim, who also held posts as Onoda directors, together with technical experts they dispatched to the firm, played an important role in formulating and implementing the recovery plan for Oita Cement through research of the firm's manufacturing capabilities, equipment, and factory management. With this acquisition as a turning point, by the end of 1934 Oita Cement paid back its borrowings from the Industrial Bank of Japan and other banks because the firm was able to borrow fixed-rate funds by issuing bonds. Onoda Cement's technological assistance made it possible for the firm to reduce manufacturing costs. Furthermore, in 1930 the firm adopted the accounting principle of listing incurred depreciation charges as expenses and also wrote off fixed assets. As a result, in first half of the 1930s Oita Cement saw a remarkable increase in net incomes both before and after depreciation.In conclusion, the acquiring company, Onoda Cement, promoted change in Oita Cement's behavior and contributed to its ability to regain profitability.

著者

豊田 太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.28-58, 2004-09-24 (Released:2010-05-07)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this paper is to examine oil field management in the oil regions of Pennsylvania in the latter nineteenth century, especially taking the economic interests of landownership into consideration. Much research has been done on the history of the American petroleum industry, mainly on Standard Oil Company. The research has, however, not sufficiently analyzed the crude-producing sector, which had for a long time been independent of Standard Oil's control. In this paper, we focus on the management of the United States Petroleum Company, which first developed the Pithole oil field, the site famous for the “oil rush.” What sources we depend on are the original materials preserved in the Drake Well Museum.U.S. Petroleum was not an oil-producing company but was essentially in real estate. Although the company developed the Pithole oil field and completed the United States Well as a discovery well, all these efforts were made to cause the oil rush; creating high land prices (through the oil rush) was the ultimate purpose of the Company. In fact, after the completion of U.S. Well, the company no longer continued in petroleum development but rather divided Thomas Holmden farm (the center of petroleum development) into small lots to sub-lease to oilmen at exorbitant prices. The severe terms of lease and the “rule of capture” stimulated many oilmen to overdrill, and, as the result, crude production increased rapidly. This situation was favorable to both U.S. Petroleum, as the receiver of royalties, and the downstream sector, which demanded a large supply of cheap crude oil.The economic interests of landownership in oil fields continued to stimulate the crude-producing business and soon came to guarantee (excessive) crude supply to the downstream sector, Standard Oil. The combination of the interest in monopolistic capital and that of landownership in the development of the American petroleum industry lasted until the New Deal era.

著者

宮地 英敏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.59-80, 2004-09-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

81

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This paper examines one aspect of porcelain production in modern Japan. In contrast to the neighboring Tono area, which mainly increased the number of its small-scale businesses, Seto area businesses increased their factory sizes. Seto also differed from its other neighboring area, Nagoya, which was mechanized thanks to large quantities of merchant capital.At the beginning of the Meiji era, the Seto area attained rapid growth owing to the export of porcelain to the United States and China. But businesses were deprived of a home market by the Tono area because of its higher wages. In addition, Seto porcelain gradually seemed to reach its peak for export production because of its decreasing popularity and defeat in competition with products from other areas. The Seto area subsequently specialized in the middle process, not the final process : Seto became a subcontractor for Nagoya.In order to cope with the difficult situation, Seto businesses used a new means of production : plaster molds. The use of plaster molds adapted relatively well to mass and homogeneous production, and businesses had to expand their factory sizes. But the domestic means of production, the potter's wheel, was still maintained. In other words, the technological innovation was a reversible change.The expansion of factory sizes influenced Seto in other ways. There was, for example, specialization of labor, the local money market, and adjustment to new technology. To conclude, Seto's businesses unexpectedly expanded their factories' sizes, and they were able to adapt to changes in the economy and prepare for future growth.

著者

石井 晋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.3, pp.1-29, 2004-12-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the change in the relationship between suppliers and retailers in the Japanese apparel industry from the 1970 to 1980s. In the 1970s, the Japanese apparel market entered a new phase. With each season, the price of apparel products began to fall more sharply than ever before. Both the suppliers and retailers tried to cope with the new market conditions, and in the process their relationship changed, with the large apparel suppliers integrating retail functions into their business.Some new apparel suppliers, who had wholesaled their products mainly to specialty shops, tried to maintain the value of their products by controlling the way they were sold to consumers. World Co. Ltd. established its own sales network from the late 1960s because most big specialty shops controlled their shop floors and were reluctant to sell World's new sets of products under World's instructions. Then a number of medium-sized specialty stores were organized and managed under the guidance of World. Some smaller apparel suppliers, called Designer's and Character (DC) brand-makers, produced fashionably designed products and made a big hit in the early 1980s. Their products were sold mainly at shops under the direct management of DC brand-makers. These new apparel suppliers established their brand value and rapidly expanded in the 1970s-80s.The large and established apparel suppliers had wholesaled their products mainly to big department stores. In the 1970s-80s, many big department stores left the management of each division and selection of products for sale in the hands of large apparel suppliers. But even these established apparel suppliers had little choice but to integrate retail functions in order to keep their transactions with department stores. They soon adopted the same strategies as the new suppliers had, and they integrated retail functions on their own initiative to enhance their production and sales systems.In this way, the relationship between suppliers and retailers changed, and quite a few suppliers acquired retail functions, and the Japanese apparel industry continued its transformation until the early 1990s.

著者

岡部 桂史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.3, pp.30-57, 2004-12-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Studies on entrepreneurs in the machine/metal processing industry have emphasized their technical contributions-as technicians and inventors-to business development, and most of these studies have focused on entrepreneurs in urban industries. We investigated Genzo Matsuyama, the founder of a small agricultural implements factory in Nagano Prefecture in 1902, which was an impetus for growth of the local economy.The factors that contributed to the establishment of Genzo's factory were his passion for agricultural reform, financial backing from Shintaro Tanaka, and the assistance of local iron factories. After Genzo overcame his start-up troubles, which lasted from 1902 to 1906, and with Shintaro's aid, sales channels of plows began to significantly expand in 1907, resulting in a much more stable business.The main sales channels expanded as a result of the diligent effort made by Genzo and peoples who worked to improve farming techniques and also due to the support of certain influential traditional retailers. The money required to expand operations was raised from local asset holders and banks. Local suppliers initially provided the parts that were used in production. In order to ensure quality and increase production, in-house manufacturing of parts was started along with the procurement of parts from suppliers in Tokyo. For the minimization of labor costs, a production control system that utilized surplus labor during the lean months was developed. This system took advantage of the seasonal demand for plows and the setting of factory in the rural district.Genzo successfully expanded sales channels, fund raising, and production facilities. The most remarkable point is that local entrepreneurs such as Genzo played an important role in coordinating various business resources embedded in the local economy.

著者

本村 希代

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.3, pp.58-77, 2004-12-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The Hino Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd is headquartered today in Hino-Cho, Gamo-Gun, Shiga Prefecture, Japan. The medicine Shono Manbyo Kannohgan, produced by this company, originally derives from Shinnoh Kannohgan, a traditional medicine that was manufactured for generations by the Shono Genzo family. This family had been engaged in the business of drug manufacture (called awasegusuri in Japanese in those days) since the Genroku era (1688-1704). During the Edo period (1603-1868), distribution of awasegusuri was strictly controlled by as well as dependent on the policies of Shogunate regime. Thus, after the Shogunate collapsed, many pharmaceutical companies could not maintain their businesses. Despite the collapse of the economic system under the Shogunate, however, some of them, such as the Shono family, survived and continued their traditional trade until this day as a company, During the Edo period, the awasegusuri sales network of the Shono family consisted of special agencies that were each assigned a specific sales territory. Ohmi merchants were dominant among these agencies. The Shono family's success is due to its feature of modernity, which is a distinct characteristic of the Ohmi merchants' management style.The reason why the awasegusuri business was accepted by many Ohmi merchants was because the Shono family was a family of high repute. The fact that the Shono promoted the pharmaceutical industry in the Hino area contributed to this family's fame.

著者

脇村 春夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.4, pp.1-29, 2004-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Large independent cotton textile weavers used to be located in the cotton weaving textile industrial areas in the western part of Japan. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the various factors contributing to the successes or failures of large cotton weavers; while some large cotton weavers succeeded and survive to this day, many more were forced to discontinue their business activities. The methods of analysis are based on case studies of each company through interviews, or oral history. The definition of “large” cotton weaver in this paper is 1) ownership of 1, 000 rooms, either before or after the Second World War or 2) a turnover that had once exceeded 8 billion yen. Out of 23 cotton weavers that fall under these conditions, 7 companies still survive, while 16 have disbanded. Concerning the origins of various cotton weaving industrial areas located in Sennan, Senboku, Chita, Banshu, Enshu, Chugoku, etc., 15 companies out of 23 were situated in Sennan, Senboku, and Chita. Most of the large weavers were originally form these three areas because of contracts from large textile mills and trading firms for mass production of grey fabrics for export. From the middle-1980s, however, export of such mass production fabrics as poplin, broad and lawn for started to wane because of yen appreciation production of these fabrics consequently lost in the competition for exports, and a big increase in imported fabrics and apparels followed. Those large weavers who succeeded in converting to either heavy gauge fabrics, like twill or denim, or high value-added thin gauge fabrics for domestic usage, which China could not produce, were able to survive. Those who relied on large textile mills for mass production products for export failed to survive. Finally, this paper concludes that the main factor determining the ability or failure to survive, was the speed at which company management was capable of switching its products from the exports to domestic market.

著者

庄 紅娟

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.4, pp.30-55, 2004-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This article examines entrepreneurial activities in Chinese domestic cotton spinning industry (minzokubo) in the 1930s. Contrary to previous studies that have described “declining” tendency of minzokubo, this article gives attention to its “rising” tendency. The entrepreneurial activities based on the development of minzokubo are analyzed. First, the adoption, by Chinese entrepreneurs, of experts in textile manufacturing technology as middle-managers is pointed out. In the following section, changes in interfirm relationships, administrative management, capital accumulation, and market strategy for producing high-quality cotton goods are described. Further, the author pays special attention to such business activities as raw cotton cultivation, manufacturing of textile machinery, and supply of technicians. Along with the reform of administrative management, the profits gained were well reserved in the firms. In order to secure the domestic market, the entrepreneurs aggressively introduced the vertical integration strategy from spinning to weaving, finishing, and even to raw cotton cultivation and textile machinery production. All this was lead by the major minzokubo. The entrepreneurs and their families in China kept firm control of the top management even in the 1930s. They tried to found such business associations as the Greater Japan Cotton Spinners' Association, which did not function satisfactorily. However, the intimate link among entrepreneurs played an important role in the development of minzokubo, which was based on Chinese tradition. Chinese entrepreneurs learned many lessons from the foreign firms, but denied their rule of China.

著者

王 淑珍

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.4, pp.56-85, 2004-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

36

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The purpose of this article is to introduce how the Taiwanese government formulated semiconductor industry technology between 1974 and 1983. It includes the process, the mechanism of formulation, and the key factors that lead to success. In 1974, most of the private enterprises' productions were assembling operations and the scale of the private enterprises was too small to transfer semiconductor technology from abroad. In this situation, the Taiwanese government built its first semiconductor factory as part of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) to decide whether to adapt semiconductor industry or not. Under this policy, ITRI took three years to transfer 7.0μm CMOS technology from RCA (Radio Corporation of America) and another three years to transfer the technology to a newly established private enterprise, UMC (United Microelectronics Corp.). This was the start of Taiwan's semiconductor industry. As it expanded, it was able to rank fourth in the world in 1994 in semiconductor production. This success was obviously brought by the technology transfer program between 1974 and 1983. There are however, some questions concerning this technology transfer program. The first question is, if RCA did not have the most advanced technology, why did the Taiwanese government choose it to be the technology supplier? Second, after ITRI transferred the technology from RCA, the major American and Japanese semiconductor companies have improved their technology to 1.5μm CMOS. This means, even though ITRI smoothly transferred technology from RCA, UMC was incapable of competing with those companies. How then did they overcome the huge gap that was formed? Third, engineers played a key role during the technology transfer. The question to consider is what were the factors that made their excellent performance possible during the technology transfer? Previous research on Taiwan's semiconductor industry focused on the government's industry policy. However, it is important to note that this period of nine years from 1974 to 1983 occupied one-forth of Taiwan's semiconductor industry history. And furthermore, if the technology transfer program was not a success, Taiwan would have been incapacitated from developing its industry smoothly. This article focuses on the three points mentioned above. At the same time, it examines the early stage of the formulation of Taiwan semiconductor industry technology and explain it thoroughly in a clear way.

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.1-27, 2004-06-24 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This article aims at analyzing the business activities of OGUMA Koichiro, one of the famous wealthy men of Hakodate, Hokkaido, from the late Meiji to the World War I era.Oguma attained a resounding success by investing in fishing grounds during the Russo-Japanese War. With his fishing and other business successes, he became one of the most prosperous men in Hokkaido. Thereafter, his main business activities lay in the fishing business.During World War I, he again enjoyed great success in speculating in the shipping business, and used profits from that speculation to contribute to the welfare of his beloved Hakodate. He donated part of his profits to the Hakodate association for Education and built warehouses, an unprofitable business in the region, which Hakodate needed.After the 1920 Crisis, Oguma invested in unprofitable regional enterprises and became the president of a regional bank in Hakodate to contribute to the restoration of Hakodate local economy. However, in terms of business, he gradually departed from Hakodate. And in the middle of the 1920s, his contribution to the welfare of Hakodate began to merge with his non-business activities.

著者

桜井 信哉

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.28-49, 2004-06-24 (Released:2010-02-19)

被引用文献数

1

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The fluctuation of the rate between gold and silver has been considered as favorable for merchants in the Edo period because they could take advantage of the fluctuation, speculate, and make much money. But actually, the official parity rate between gold and silver was declared in 1700 because dealers who purchased kimono in Kyoto and sold them in Edo pleaded with the Tokugawa Bakufu to establish an official rate.Using materials written by Mitsui Echigoya or Mitsui Hondana from 1818 to 1820, this article explains why the official parity rate was in favor of the dealers. In this period, the value of silver, which was used mainly in western Japan, rose, causing the price of products bought in Kyoto to rise in Edo. But the competition between dealers in kimono was so harsh that they could not raise the price of kimono high enough to make up for the rise of silver. And the sale of kimono bought in Kyoto decreased in comparison to those of kimono bought in the Kanto area.To hedge these risks in 1720, dealers in kimono in Edo asked their counterparts in Osaka to conclude an agreement to fix the value of gold privately, because the official parity rate was not followed by most people.And also dealers in kimono could not make much money by speculating in gold and silver, because they could not speculate as they wished, though they obtained much accurate information on the fluctuation before ordinary people did. They instead purchased a lot of kimono by paying in gold instead of buying silver.