著者

韓 載香

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.3-27, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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This paper discusses the pachinko industry's tremendous market expansion and development in the 1980s through an examination of factors related to the transformation of pachinko parlor management during this period.The first factor in this development is related to increasing stability of the profit structure of parlors that occurred as sales fluctuations became smaller, a trend spurred by the sudden rise in sales brought about by greater enthusiasm for gambling. At the same time, management became increasingly independent as it no longer needed to readjust the individual pins on game boards, a process that required a great deal of technical skill.The second factor is related to the supply system of the ‘Fever’ machine, which occurred in response to the pachinko boom. Since there is high fluctuation in demand, machinery manufacturers generally do not have sufficient production facilities to fill orders in a short period of time when popular models appear. However, in response to the sudden popularity of the ‘Fever’ machine, other makers, in addition to the original manufacturer, started to produce and supply imitations, making it possible to meet expanded demand throughout Japan.On the other hand, competition became more fierce as many new parlors entered the market, enticed by the industry's growth potential. Parlor management, which had previously relied on, among other things, technical expertise related to pachinko board pin adjustment, now found itself confronted with limitations. The industry thus sought new management approaches as it attempted to come to terms with the new situation.

著者

西尾 典子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.28-53, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the medium-sized munitions companies which grew rapidly in the interwar period, focusing on Watanabe Tekkojo (Watanabe Engineering Corporation).In 1886, Watanabe Tekkojo was established as the supporting section of a wholesale merchant of metal products in Fukuoka. It had expanded into munitions in 1902, when Fukuo Watanabe became one of the executives in the company. He had experience of working in the military section of Ishikawajima Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., Ltd. Watanabe Tekkojo made advances to the Imperial Japanese Navy in WW I, and received orders for parts of torpedoes and torpedo tubes from the navy. The orders increased after the Washington Naval Treaty. In the 1930s the navy built up military aircrafts because of the London Naval Treaty, so Watanabe Tekkojo began to manufacture parts of aircrafts.In the past studies about the Japanese munitions companies, the military sections of the Zaibatsu Konzerns had attracted attention as the center of the private military companies. Accordingly, it has been defined that the military influence in the Japanese economy was reduced in the disarmament period before WW II. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy also made advance to the medium-sized companies. As a result, the range of the munitions industry was expanded in Japan. The Imperial Japanese Navy gave technical guidance to the medium-sized munitions companies, dispatched able engineers to them, helped the procurement of their capital and materials and so on.The change in the interwar period led the Japanese military production system to the wartime economic controls in WW II. Aircrafts and the others munitions were made by not only arsenals and the Zaibatsu Konzerns but also many medium-sized munitions companies.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.54-83, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.52-77, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_52-4_63, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_64-4_89, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

真保 晶子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.3-26, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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The history of retailing in the early modern England has found new evidence of the advanced nature of retailing during the period, challenging the conventional view of James Jefferys (1954) that regards the mid-nineteenth century onwards as the starting point for modernisation of retailing systems and the development of stores. Instead of showing a development of shopping space and advertising, this article focuses on the role of showrooms as a space for discussing a long-term use of products and London furniture-makers' pursuit of quality and durability in the 1840s and 1850s, using showroom account books and advertisements.Recent studies of luxury shops in eighteenth-century London emphasise the separation of production space and retailing space to explain the existence of ‘modern’ spaces for retailing. However, as some furniture-makers' trade cards emphasised, having workshops and showrooms in the same premises or in close proximity was furniture-makers' strategy to support the originality and quality of their products and to attract visitors.Furniture-makers provided a wide range of services, partly because they were aware that the services formed lasting relationships with customers. This is proved by the existence of regular customers shown in the use of the customer number system introduced in Gillow's London showroom account books. Records of house-letting also suggest the role of the London showroom as an information centre.Heal and Son made the best use of advertisements, which offered convenience for customers and brought about more standardised taste. Nevertheless, the words ‘large workshops’ came together with ‘showrooms’ in their circulars, and ‘quality’ and ‘workmanship’ sometimes appeared in circulars and price lists to prove the genuineness of the products. Thus, behind sophisticated showrooms and growing advertisements of ready-made items for middle-class markets, both furniture-makers and consumers continued to care about the expected longevity of domestic goods and houses.

著者

竹原 有吾

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.27-49, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

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Historical changes in the social relationship between Jews and Christians are an important factor behind the formation of large-scale businesses by religious minority entrepreneurs. Jews in Berlin were politically emancipated in 1869. But they were opposed by anti-Semitic campaigns after the end of the 1870s, and strived to assimilate culturally.Emil Rathenau, a Jewish entrepreneur in Berlin, was able to found the first telephone office in Berlin in 1881, and the forerunner of AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft), Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft für angewandte Elektricität in 1883, thanks to political emancipation. These businesses received most of their capital and executives from Jewish private banks. They were, therefore, managed by Jewish interests. The Jewish bankers on their own, however, could not afford to cover the expanding financial risks which were necessary to make Deutsche Edison Gesellschaft für angewandte Elektricität into a company large enough to accommodate the growing demand for electricity in the latter part of the 1880s. They had to find banks which could afford to share their company's financial risk.AEG was established in 1887 as a company managed by civil interests. The Jewish executives decided to get funds from the credit banks in Berlin, which required that they appoint executives of those banks as executives of AEG. The credit banks which invested in AEG were, in particular, found at the initiative of Ältesten der Kaufmannschaft von Berlin and were funded by both Jewish and Christian capital. These banks were, therefore, managed by civil interests.This paper shows that large-scale business-building was the primary factor behind Jewish acceptance of the representation of civil interests. This expanding of business was part of the process of Jewish assimilation.

著者

平沢 照雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.2_28-2_50, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

被引用文献数

1

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This study examines the philosophy upon which Tamagawa Seiki Co., Ltd. is based, and analyzes the management reforms implemented by the company since the 1990s.In 1938, Hiroichi Hagimoto established Tamagawa Seiki for the main purpose of stimulating regional revitalization in the south of Nagano Prefecture, which had suffered heavily in the 1930s because of the effects of the Great Depression. Since then, the basic philosophy of this company has been to focus on its regional community; this philosophy has contributed to regional industrial development.After World WarⅡ, Tamagawa Seiki focused extensively on the design of products and on research and development. Further, it actively promoted and organized cooperative factories to contribute to regional development. However, the company faced two management crises between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. During the management reforms that were implemented in the aftermath of these crises, the top management resolved not to move its factories overseas and, instead, to continue domestic development and production.The reforms comprised the following measures. (1) The company adopted an original strategy called Tanzakuka that involves identifying core competencies and concentrating on these competencies. (2) The production engineering department was instrumental in enabling the company to produce selected “Tanzaku” products in-house through a mass production system. (3) Upon further expansion of production in the 2000s, Tamagawa Seiki acquired some bankrupt cooperative factories as wholly owned subsidiaries, and established new factories in those areas from which leading companies had withdrawn. Because of these reforms, Tamagawa Seiki realized fresh corporate growth and contributed to the revitalization of the regional economy.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.2_51-2_94, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

稲葉 和也

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_28-3_49, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

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Many Japanese chemical companies have been re-evaluating the importance of research and development (R&D) since the low-growth era began during the first oil crisis. New businesses cannot succeed without the cooperation of their R&D departments. Their R&D sections were merged with their Business sections to connect research with product development more closely. As a result, the Central Research Institute became disorganized, and the volume of corporate research declined. This paper examines the history of R&D at Tokuyama Corp. I describe both the company's polysilicon production and the laboratory reform that occurred at the beginning of the 1980s.Tokuyama's polysilicon production was a planning initiative project. Such a project required a leader who can maximize the company's investment. Yuuji Fujii, director of Tokuyama's Planning Division, headed the company's polysilicon business. He was both an engineer and a manager, which proved an effective combination. This project grew into the company's core business; they are now the world's second-largest polysilicon producer for semiconductors, after the Hemlock Semiconductor Corporation.Laboratory reform is now considered necessary for Japan's chemical corporations. During reforms at Tokuyama Corp.'s new Fujisawa Laboratory, the old linear model was retired, and at least two of the lab's functions were changed to stimulate market creation. Takashi Yoshioka, the new R&D head, announced the “Five Management Ideas in the Laboratory” concept. Instead of a bottom-up management style, he imposed a top-down style, which is how the R&D and Business sections had worked together in the beginning.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_50-3_84, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

宇田 理

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_51-1_67, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_68-1_99, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

塩谷 昌史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_50-4_74, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

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The purpose of this article is to examine the cotton industry in Vladimir Province before Emancipation of serfs in Russia (1860), from the viewpoint of print and distribution. In order to accomplish this purpose, I utilize the Vladimir Province newspaper as a main material, which was published from 1838 to 1917, but confine the perusal of the material to the period from 1838 to 1860.Europe imported various commodities from Asia through East India Companies after 17th century. At that time, a cotton fabric (chintz) was one of important commodities from Asia. As the amount of European import of Asian chintz increased, Europe suffered from trade deficit and banned the import of chintz to reduce the deficit. After that, Europe realized the production of chintz by industrialization. From the viewpoint of a long term, we consider that the industrialization of European countries enabled import substitution of Asian commodities. This hypothesis would apply for the history of trade between Russia and Central Asia.Vladimir Province imported chintz from Central Asia after 16th century and first produced chintz in 18th century, based on the printing skills from Central Asia. After England exported cotton products to Russia at the end of 18th century, Vladimir Province introduced technology from Europe and developed modern cotton industry in 19th century. When we see the process of development in a middle term (100 years), we recognize that because Vladimir province learned European experiences, she accomplished the industrialization. But, we can also conclude that the industrialization of Vladimir Province was the process of import substitution of chintz from Central Asia, from the viewpoint of a long term (300 years). This is similar to the experiences of Europe.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4_75-4_94, 2013 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

前田 廉孝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_49-2_75, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

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This paper aims to determine the factors that led to the improvement of soy sauce brewery management during the Meiji and Taisho Eras. In particular, we focus on how the Takanashi family, now Kikkoman Corporation, procured raw materials from 1887 to 1917.The food manufacturing industry accounted for more than 20 percent of the production volume of all industries in pre-war Japan. Until the 1900s, the soy sauce brewing industry was the third largest producer from among all types of food manufacturing industries. Two factors shaped the brewing industry. First, over 50 percent of the production cost went toward the procurement of raw materials. Second, after the late 1890s, a crucial condition for the expansion of the soy sauce industry was securing stable supply of raw materials not only from domestic regions but also from foreign countries and Japanese colonies. Therefore, we analyze the decision-making process of brewery companies with regard to the raw materials they used.Takanashi produced high quality soy sauce and low quality one. However, the price of the high quality sauce increased considerably after the 1890s. Therefore, Takanashi began to increase the production of the high quality sauce. They also began to procure imported raw materials mainly for the low quality sauce to reduce its cost. For the high quality sauce, they chose good quality raw materials. These raw materials procurement strategies played an important role in improving the competitive position of Takanashi's soy sauce in the market. Nonetheless, because the ratio of the quantity of high quality to low quality sauce increased, Takanashi was no longer able to strike a balance between cost reduction of the low quality sauce and quality maintenance of high quality one. This indicates a limitation of these strategies, and it was one of the causes of the emergence of the Noda Shoyu Company, Kikkoman's predecessor, that was established through a merger of individual proprietorships in 1917.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.2_76-2_94, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

中西 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.3_3-3_31, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

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This paper seeks to elucidate the process through which a kimono cloth store transformed into a modern department store. Additionally, I will analyze the influence of the popularization that occurred as part of that transformation on department store management, and consider the relation between the formation of a mass-consumption society and department-store management. I shall assess the transformation from three viewpoints: (1) expansion of stores, (2) diversification of merchandise sold, and (3) the development of various functions of the department system.Matsuzakaya's transformation from kimono dealer to department store occurred during the 1910s. At that time another Japanese department store, Mitsukoshi, had already been established. In order to compete with Mitsukoshi, Matsuzakaya assembled a line of highgrade products, pioneered modern equipment and fixtures, and thus contributed to the formation of the “department store culture.” However, due to price surges during the final stage of World War I, as well as the economic downturn, which followed the war, there arose a desire among consumers for discount sales which outpaced the anticipation of Matsuzakaya.In response to that desire, Matsuzakaya advanced lines completely corresponding to the bargain sale expectation of consumers during the 1920s. Because of the intense competition among department stores during that period, Matsuzakaya adopted a completely different business strategy in which they purchased merchandise directly from the places of production, and advertised merchandise in cooperation with the places of production. As a result, from the second half of the 1920s, Matsuzakaya expanded their stores rapidly, and began to carry not only high-grade products, but also everyday items. Moreover, Matsuzakaya diversified and increased the kinds of products sold. As a result, not only the highgrade articles but also these everyday articles gradually proved to be an important profit source for Matsuzakaya.Finally, as a result of Matsuzakaya's pursuit of efficiencies based on cost consciousness during the Showa Depression at the beginning of the 1930s, the functioning of the merchandise department system helped Matsuzakaya to undertake an all-inclusive transformation into a department store. In light of that, I argue that the transformation into a department store and the popularization of Matsuzakaya's product line progressed in a parallel fashion, in which the two functioned in a reciprocal relationship.

著者

竹内 竜介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.3_32-3_57, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

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management with a special reference to the FDI (i.e. foreign direct investment) from a historical perspective, especially from postwar period. The previous studies regarding the FDI for Japanese market has not fully captured in what ways the multinational enterprises strengthened the ties with Japanese market. It is also unclear how the enterprises have utilized the Social Capital in Japan.In pharmaceutical industry, for example, examining the relationship with Japanese medical practitioners is an extremely interesting question, especially if we view this under the management systems. The multinational pharmaceutical enterprises was urged to build up relation with Japanese medical practitioners and therefore made a good use of their network in order for the growth of their own business. Taking the above problems into consideration, the paper sheds a light on Schering AG of Germany as a case study and clarifies its management method in Japan between the 1950s and 1990s.Schering has strengthened the ties with Japanese subsidiary company since the late 1970s. The corporation tried to strengthen the functional capability of Japanese subsidiary by building up its R&D division as well as educating their employee. The Japanese subsidiary built up good relations with Japanese medical doctors who are supposed to contribute to acting as opinion leaders among Japanese medical circles. The subsidiary, in return, provides cutting edge scientific information to them.By utilizing Social Capital in contrast medium area, Schering had successfully expanded its Japanese market from 1980s. Then, it entered therapeutic medicine area in order to increase the profit. However, this was unsuccessful. This is because there had existed many related network of medical doctors in therapeutic medicine area already. It is also because that Schering has heavily relied on contrast medium business, which made it hard to make use of Social Capital and not succeed in this area.