著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.3-29, 2007

著者

村上 はつ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.71-86, 1979

著者

島西 智輝 梅崎 修 南雲 智映

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.3-27, 2020-12

著者

長井 景太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.27-50, 2020-09

著者

宮﨑 忠恒

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 = Japan business history review (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.3-27, 2020-06

著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_3-2_27, 2011

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The main thrust of this study is to shed light on the management situation at the coastal industrial railway, which performed the function of linking factories of the coastal industrial area with the main trunk line, and also to shed light on its relationship with the companies in the coastal industrial area. This is a case study of the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway Co. that was built in the Keihin Industrial Area after the World War I.<br>What was epoch-making about the coastal industrial area was that it functioned as an 'industrial port' which allowed large ships to berth at private wharves. Many companies in the Keihin Industrial Area of the 1920s required overland transport for procurement of materials and resources, and to ship their goods to Tokyo and Yokohama in the hinterlands. Initially, the coastal industrial railway was a plan which petitioned for construction of a branch link from the main trunk line by the government railway. However, in 1924, this changed to a plan where a private railway called the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway would be built after it received investment from land reclamation companies and other companies.<br>The choice of a private railway helped to rapidly open up the Keihin Industrial Area rail system to traffic, but there were more than a few problems that arose from this. In particular, the high fares for straight-through transport with the government railway led to growing dissatisfaction from the recessionary companies along the railway line during the 1930s.<br>Many similar problems faced by the management of the private coastal industrial railway receded into the background for a period from the war boom in 1937. However, the protracted nature and worsening course of the war, particularly with respect to freight transportation, were a crushing burden on the Tsurumi Coastal Industrial Railway and was a factor in it being nationalized in 1943.

著者

小早川 洋一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.42-64, 1981

著者

山藤 竜太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2009

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The purpose of this article is to determine how and why Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system at its Shanghai branch. We investigated the case of Mitsui & Co. because it is the oldest and biggest general trading company (GTC), and it has increased its Chinese branches in the years straddling the 1900s. We focus on Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch because it was the first Chinese branch for Mitsui & Co., and it served as the headquarters for its Chinese branches. Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch abolished the comprador system in 1899. This was a precedent for the other Chinese branches of Mitsui & Co. and other companies, for example, other Japanese and German trading companies.<br>We illustrate three reasons for the abolishment of the comprador system at Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch. The first reason was Mitsui & Co.'s comprador himself. The comprador had a distinctive character. He drew salary as an employee, earned commission as an agent, and had a group of staffs. A typical comprador has the character of an employee and an agent and a group of staffs.<br>The second reason was the influence of the off-the-job training (off-JT) program. The overseas off-JT program was launched in April 1898 and January 1899. Preceding studies advocate that the off-JT program undermined Mitsui & Co.'s comprador system. However, Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system in July 1899 at its Shanghai branch; thus, the trainees employed thereafter were on training and not on the job.<br>The third reason was the human resource practices of Mitsui & Co. Employees that they cultivated during their professional practice in Mitsui & Co. and went on to become managers to deal with some goods in 1899.<br>Mitsui & Co. cut down costs on the salary and commissions provided to the comprador, increased its trading partners, and adopted a long-term marketing strategy because of the abolishment of the comprador system.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.50-82, 2018 (Released:2020-09-30)

著者

谷口 洋斗

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.3-28, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)

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This thesis examines the case of the Shimizu Port Lumber Industries Cooperative (SLC). This study looks at SLC's (1) background, (2) financing, and (3) activities of purchasing materials and merchandising, since 1952 (when the union was established) through to 1974 (when business declined after the first oil shock). The study relied on the analysis of historical documents held by SLC and a hearing survey.The management executives of the organizations in Shimizu before and during wartime established SLC in 1952. SLC comprised many small-sized firms with commonalities such as facilities and products.Small-sized firms found great benefits in strengthening their nexus with SLC and as such, increased their financial contributions toward the cooperative, significantly improving its capital adequacy ratio.Two noteworthy things occurred: First, SLC - members visited North America multiple times to inspect the forests and sawmills. Second, Tenryu Seizai Co., Ltd., one of the executive firms of the SLC, shared its sales channel with members.SLC played an important role in the import of lumber from North America to Japan. This provided a platform for small-sized firms to conduct business at the start of Japan's high economic growth period.However, at the end of Japan's period of high economic growth, the need for a cooperative for small-sized firms decreased due to their improved marketing capabilities. Further, the sustainability of cooperation was limited under the leadership of management executives.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.30-67, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.68-84, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

著者

青木 洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.3-21, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)

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Japanese computer firms evolved from the electronic and telecommunications equipment industries, while US firms such as IBM and Sperry Rand evolved from the business machines industry. From the late 1950s to early 1960s, the Japanese computer industry lacked computer peripherals and software technology. Therefore, it needed to acquire the technology from US firms.To do so, it needed to negotiate technological partnerships with IBM and Sperry Rand. This negotiation process greatly influenced the later competitive advantage of both the US and Japanese firms in the Japanese computer market. However, previous studies have not examined this influence in sufficient detail. Therefore, this paper focuses on the negotiation process between Sperry Rand and three Japanese parties (Nippon Remington Univac [NRU], Toshiba, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and uses Japanese archives to examine the negotiations' influence on Sperry Rand and Toshiba.This paper elucidates two points. First, Sperry Rand did not benefit from negotiations compared with IBM. Because it fell behind in patent applications and publication of computer principles and related technologies in Japan, it fell behind in the Japanese market. Second, Toshiba's role in founding NRU and negotiating with Sperry Rand delayed the commercialization of its computers. Toshiba expected an earlier technology transfer from Sperry Rand, and planned its computer business on the premise that NRU would order many computers and peripherals, but the partnership did not come to fruition.In the 1960s Japanese computer market, IBM gained a competitive advantage among foreign firms, while Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC did the same among Japanese firms. This situation was a consequence of Sperry Rand's and Toshiba's respective problems.

著者

ドンゼ ピエール=イヴ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.22-42, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)

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Although the German multinational enterprise Siemens dominated the global market of X-ray devices during the first half of the twentieth century, it was unable to maintain its advantage against Shimadzu in Japan, despite the technological superiority of its products. This article analyses hence the sources of Shimadzu's competitiveness.Shimadzu is a family-firm founded in Kyoto in 1875 and specialized in the production of scientific instruments, medical devices, and various parts. It engaged actively in the development of radiological equipment, making the first X-ray image in Japan (1896), and developing a first X-ray device for medical purpose in 1908. Then, during the 1920s, Shimadzu established as the largest producer of X-ray devices in Japan. This success relied on three major points: the internalization of technological capabilities (recruitment of university graduate engineers, subcontracting of R&D activities); the co-development of equipment and devices with medical doctors (joint R&D); and an original communication policy towards the medical world (participation to academic activities, organization of conferences, opening of a training center for X-ray technicians).Finally, this article demonstrates that Shimadzu was able to adapt foreign technology to the specificities of the Japanese medical market. Unlike Western countries, the Japanese hospital system consists in a large number of small private hospitals clustered in urban areas. Competition between them was a driving force for the diffusion of X-ray devices, but their limited budget, due to their small size, made it necessary to develop devices that were lighter, simpler, and cheaper than equipment manufactured by Siemens. Shimadzu understood this need and marketed X-ray devices suitable for the Japanese domestic market. However, it was difficult to export them to Western Europe and the US.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.43-82, 2018 (Released:2020-06-30)

著者

畠中 茂朗

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.3-26, 2018 (Released:2020-09-30)

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The purpose of this paper is to feature Chokichi Toyonaga, the Chofu clansman, as a local entrepreneur in the Meiji period who did entrepreneurial activities in a main stage then and started Nihon Seimi Seizou Kaisya (the Japan chemical medicine manufacturing company), which in the end became an enterprise in a foundational period of the chemical industry of our country, and to consider the process of growing as a local entrepreneur in the Kanmon area. I would like to make it clear that the local entrepreneurs industrialized through Toyonaga's business expansion in our country.Chokichi Toyonaga was born as a low-level clansman of Chofu, but was able to rise in rank as fast as possible because of his talent and also got deep trust from two seigneurs, Motokane Mori and Mototoshi Mori. It was in the establishment of Akamagaseki-Beisyoukaisyo (the Akamagaseki rice Exchange company) that Toyonaga developed independent entrepreneurial activities for the first time. After that, it was added to the establishment of Toyonaga-gumi of a financial institution and Moji-Chikkou-kaisya (the Moji harbor company) where they did maintenance of infrastructure, and he made progress as an entrepreneur and established Nihon Seimi Seizou Kaisya.They had developed the process of the industrial enterprise, because a local entrepreneur like Toyonaga existed, who also raised up a modern industry not only in an urban area but outside of an urban area in the Meiji period, and local entrepreneurs were playing an important role in our country as bearers, too.

著者

田中 光

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.3-28, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

被引用文献数

1

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In the Interwar period, especially the 1920s-30s, the Japanese economy faced a long recession. As heavy industry began to develop again in the late 1930s, urban areas headed to recovery. On the other hand, rural society was strongly tied with light industry (especially silk spinning), and faced continued recession.Worsening the situation, many natural disaster occurred in this period (Great Kanto Earthquake, huge frost damage in Central Japan area, Showa Sanriku Tsunami and so on). The Japanese economy and society were severely challenged. The Japanese central government even planned for emigration to Manchuria to reduce these domestic problems, a policy that would have disastrous consequences after the war.However, not all villages relied on the Manchuria emigration policy for their community's survival. Many rural villages maintained social order without a decrease in population. A major factor in the survival of these communities appears to have been the existence of a local cooperative. This paper shows how local cooperatives mitigated the economic crisis using a case study: Kano Credit Union, in Nagano prefecture.The economy of Kano village was severely damaged by declining silk prices, as well as natural disasters. Despite this, the cooperative maintained profitability. The Kano cooperative had been honored by the National cooperatives' central association in 1910 for its good management practices, so this cooperative provides an ideal model. I analyze the Kano cooperative's business during the interwar period, and show how local community cooperatives provide a source of stability during periods of economic crisis.

著者

鈴木 敦子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.29-53, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

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Naraya (the Sugimoto family), who were kimono fabrics dealers, purchased kimonos in Kyoto, and sold them in the Kanto region during the Edo period, while the major dealers purchased kimonos in Kyoto, and sold them in Edo city. This study examines the Naraya pricing process, using their settlement of accounts statement as well as the statements of Daikokuya (the Tomiyama family) and Echigoya (the Mitsui family).Two important aspects are discussed in this study: the markup pricing method of kimonos, and the convention of changing the price in price tags. Kimono retailers used two markup pricing methods in the Edo period: uchi-mashi and soto-mashi.[1] Uchi-mashi: Cost/(1 - Markup) = Selling price[2] Soto-mashi: Cost × (1 + Markup) = Selling priceThe main store of Naraya in Kyoto purchased kimonos (kudari-mono), priced them at the uchi-mashi, and then sent them to the Kanto branches. More specifically, they classified kimonos and applied a set percentage for each category. That is, using the markup pricing as a standard, Naraya priced each kimono according to aspects such as its quality and mode.However, the price on the tag was not the selling price. The main store priced the purchased kimonos by doubling the selling price, while the branches sold them at the selling price. For example, 200 monme on the tag in Kyoto was sold at 100 monme in the Kanto branches. Thus, the double pricing on the tag in Kyoto by the Naraya was the conventional pricing style, which the Echigoya had established earlier.This study is significant because it is the first in the literature on the economic history of Japan to discuss the above-mentioned aspects.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.54-83, 2017 (Released:2019-09-30)

著者

竹原 有吾

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.3, pp.3-25, 2017 (Released:2019-12-30)

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Jewish entrepreneurs made a great contribution to the development of the Prussian silk industry in the 18th century, and their contribution led to the possibility of building a secular “state community” in Prussia. The silk industry, which originated in Asia, was not seen in Prussia until the late 17th century. After the Thirty Years’ War, the government of Brandenburg-Prussia tried to promote various industries. The government, at first, used Huguenot immigrants from France to promote the silk industry, as they had been producing silk in France. Most of them, however, soon gave up silk manufacturing, because they lacked both money and knowledge of the Prussian market. On the other hand, David Hirsch, a Schutzjude (protected Jew), is the first merchant to have success in silk manufacturing in Prussia. Because Hirsch did not have any Christian business rivals in Prussia, he could begin producing silk there in 1730, using international markets and foreign artisans for his business.The number of Christian and Jewish merchants working in silk manufacturing increased during the reign of Frederick the Great. Jews were not excluded from the Prussian silk industry because they worked for both Jewish and Christian profits. In 1752 Jewish merchants were forced by the Prussian government to sell a fixed amount of silk produced in Christian factories. Furthermore, according to data found in the journal of Jewish silk manufacturer and eminent philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, he bought raw silk from abroad and sold it to both Christian and Jewish manufacturers.Because Jews generally could not join Zünften (associations of artisans) in medieval cities in Europe, it was very hard for Jews to work as artisans or manufacturers in late medieval times. By the 18th century, however, both Jews and Christians worked for the development of manufacturing, which led to the beginnings of a secular community in Prussia.