著者
岡田 有功
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.1, pp.1-27, 2002-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the development of Kosaka Silver Mine in the 1880s in terms of the relationship between the running of the mine and regional environment.In 1861, the operation of Kosaka Silver Mine started in earnest. Moreover, it was placed under the government management in 1869. Some changes in silver refining were effected by the introduction of various technologies and brought about improvement in mining. Since Ziervogel's process, which Curt A. Netto adopted in 1877, resulted in large charcoal consumption, trees were cut down for the use in the mine. As a result, only a few trees were left in the surroundings of the mine.Kosaka Mine operated on a loss. The change in refining technologies from Ziervogel's process to Augustine's process in 1881 lowered the costs and brought profits and success to the management. The conversion of the refining process was initiated by Ohshima Takatou. In 1884, the government disposed of Kosaka Silver Mine by selling it to Fujita Gumi & Co., under which business management policy changed and cut expenditures in the mine.Kosaka Silver Mine became the principal silver mine in Japan. Development of the mine returned profits to Kosaka's society by creating employment opportunities. In the 1880s, the development of the mine resulted in a population explosion in Kosaka village and improvements in the regional infrastructure, such as the building of an elementary school, post office, police substation, and many stores. The mine thus donated to the village and contributed to the community.The mine was able to produce a large volume of silver and changed the regional environment as the living spaces of the inhabitants into those that depended on the mine. The sustainable management in turn required the continuation of the regional environment.
著者
沢井 実
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.3, pp.3-25, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

Before Japan became a major exporter of home appliances and automobiles, there was an age of light-machine production in the 1950s and 1960s that included items such as cameras, home sewing machines, binoculars, etc. There were three types of home sewing machine manufacturers in the 1950s: the integration type that manufactured arms, beds, and other parts of the sewing machines entirely in the plant; the assembling type that assembled outsourced parts into finished products; and the mixed type that both manufactured and assembled parts.Large companies such as Janome Sewing Machine, Riccar, and Brother Industries formed the integration type, while small- and medium-sized companies that were largely located in Osaka formed the assembling type. Large home sewing machine companies went through an era of rapid growth in the domestic market. The export of home sewing machines was led by the small businesses, i.e., the assembling manufacturers.However, the competition to dominate the U.S. market—led mainly by assembling manufacturers—was so harsh that the export prices decreased due to market forces. The MITI introduced the minimum export price system (the supposed check price) to respond to this situation. Japanese sewing machines manufactured by the assembling manufacturers were often called Karasu (crow) machines, because they were completely black and did have no brand labels. In 1954, in the wake of the depression after the Korean War, integration manufacturers started making an effort to export products. By the 1960s, the distinction between the large manufacturers of Tokyo and Nagoya in the domestic market and the small business of Osaka in the export market had collapsed. The situation was symbolized by Janome’s acquisition of Sanko Sewing Machine Co., a medium-sized manufacturer that began as an assembler in Osaka in October 1959.One advantage that large integration manufacturers possessed over assembling manufacturers was that they could establish their own sales networks in the U.S. market. For assembling manufacturers of Karasu home sewing machines, the sales network behind the U.S. distributors was a black box, while the large integration manufacturers tried to establish their own sales networks in the U.S. market.
著者
山崎 広明
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.2, pp.3-26,95, 2006-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the development of entrepreneurial activities of the Youemon Sasaki family at Shin'ichi in Bingo region which is located in the eastern part of Hiroshima Prefecture during the period after the Showa panic (1930-31) until the wartime (July, 1937-August, 1945). The author utilized such various materials as the oral history, the printed matters and the Sasaki archives to accomplish the above purpose.Youemon Sasaki, successful local wholesale merchant, were seriously hit by the Showa panic, and thereafter, the restructuring by the young leader, Gi'ichi Sasaki, became unavoidable. Gi'ichi closed the weaving factories established in 1915, began sewing business, came to sell new commodities such as wide cloths and garments to the local areas and continued seeking such gains as dividends and rents of land and houses.At the wartime Gi'ichi greatly committed himself to sewing business and kept the wealthy local businessman by becoming a salaried manager in Bingo Tokumen Kasuri Moto Haikyu Kabusiki Kaisha (Bingo Kasuri Distribution Company) and Huhaku Seihin Chuo Seizo Haikyu Tosei Kabushiki Kaisha (Cloth Goods Central Manufacturing Distribution Company). He also earned lots of money through dividends of shares during wartime.In recent years many economic and business historians in Japan are making great efforts to describe the local entrepreneurial activities in the prewar years, and this article is also included in such an academic trend.
著者
藤井 信幸
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.2, pp.1-29, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

In Japan after World War I, the population of the big cities increased with the growth of the heavy and chemical industries in urban areas, resulting in a widening of gaps in regional development. During the 1930s, the government urged factories to relocate from the cities in order to narrow the gaps. Moreover, the government assisted in the evacuation of munitions factories, above all the strategically important machine shops, to avoid air strikes during the Pacific War.Although not as many machine shops dispersed geographically as the government had anticipated, the agglomeration of small-to-medium-sized machine shops did accelerate, and the experience of learning by making various types of machines was acquired by many local cities as a result. Machine production increased remarkably in these local cities after World War II, enabling regional small-to-medium-sized shops to contribute substantially to the Era of the High-Speed Growth in the 1960s.
著者
恩田 睦
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2010

The aim of this paper is to present the entrepreneurial activities of local enterprises during the pre-war period by analyzing the fund raising approach of Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. between the early 1900s and mid 1920s. The funds raised were instrumental in the railway company's success in large-scale capital investments like the electrification and electric actuation of their train carriages in a short period of time. In conclusion, it was evident that the 2nd generation manager, Sadakichi Kakihara was not only able to expand business activities in the local areas, but also actively do so in Tokyo and raised funds with highly favorable standings.<br>For the funds raised between 1900 and 1907, it was necessary to have collaterals for small sums of money borrowed at high interest rates for a short period from small-scale local banks situated along the railway lines that were concurrently run by the board of directors. The board of directors had to use their own securities or the company's stocks as collaterals. However, by relying solely on the local banks, it was unable to provide sufficient funds for the railway construction. It was during 1907, when Kakihara became the manager that he took the initiative to approach Tokyo's Eiichi Shibusawa for loan financing and the two entered into an agreement. The debt financing terms of Shibusawa, who had connections with banks in Tokyo, were such that there was sufficient funding with low-interest rate for the construction of the railways. In addition, the loan was for the long term.<br>Subsequently, with regards to financing for the electrification works of the railway, Kakihara then raised funds from Bushu Bank which had been inaugurated as an external board. Although Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. was able to increase profits, retained earnings for the company were reduced because of the increase in corporate dividend ratio. Due to Kakihara's business activities making inroads into Tokyo, success in large-scale capital investment with the funds raised was made possible.
著者
脇村 義太郎
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.3, pp.1-27,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)
参考文献数
46

The Sumitomo Zaibatsu, one of the biggest business groups in Japan, has frown uninterruptedly since the Meiji Restoration. The key factor of its growth may be found in its unique leaders-recruitment policy.This paper introduces many of its leaders and analyzes the recruitment and personnel policy of the Zaibatsu.
著者
宝利 ひとみ
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.4, pp.3-29, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

This paper attempts to contribute to find the key of firm growth by analyzing business of a specific firm, using a management dataset from the business report of the long-lived firm that was in Fukui prefecture in the first half of the twentieth century.The name of the firm that examined in this paper was Katsuyama Kigyo Kaytey Goshi Gaisya (Katsuyama Textile Brother's Joint-stock Company). In the mid-1920s, Kaytey was on the verge of bankruptcy due to a halt in financing from Katsuyama Bank. Katsuyama Bank was the main financing bank of Kaytey. That event triggered a change in the way of funding. After that, Kaytey increased the rate of raising money from company members instead of borrowings from a bank. By raising capital adequacy ratio, Kaytey could lower the rate of bankruptcy.Furthermore, it is found that Kaytey worked together with an iron factory in Kanazawa prefecture to development new products. In 1930s, Kaytey could sell many rayon and silk crepe. It was the fruit of product development by crossover cooperation in 1920s. This finding indicates how important the continuous product development was. Management stability also supported this continuous product development and made successful result in 1930s.
著者
桂 芳男
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, no.1, pp.34-65, 1973-08-25 (Released:2009-10-14)
参考文献数
6
著者
矢作 正
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.3, pp.1-24, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

1. The first point at issue is whether Chisso considered Minamata Disease as well as economic factors when it decided to expand into petrochemicals.The only period during which Minamata Disease could have possibly influenced Chisso's petrochemical plan was from July 1959 to December 1959. During this period, Chisso's executives would not admit that Minamata factory was the cause of Minamata Disease, so they did not take any appropriate measures. There was no scheme to scrap the acetaldehyde plant in Minamata at that time.Chisso continued to operate the old plant although the petrochemical plants were completed.To conclude, Chisso's changeover to petrochemicals was promoted independent of Minamata Disease and only based on economic considerations.2. The second point at issue is whether Chisso increased its acetaldehyde production by obtaining a license.In Japan's second petrochemical plan, the main product was polypropylene and acetaldehyde was secondary. In January 1961, four companys' plans were presented to the government authorities, and all four plans were approved. Chisso was the top company in the acetaldehyde industry, which justified approval of its plan.
著者
吉田 幸司 岡室 博之
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.4, pp.3-26, 2016 (Released:2018-03-30)

Using longitudinal micro data for Mitsubishi Shipbuilding employees from 1918 to 1946, this paper quantitatively analyzes the promotion and selection process for white-collar workers during the prewar period. Previous studies on the postwar period have mostly examined this career pattern quantitatively, while historical studies focusing on the prewar period are mostly qualitative. Moreover, even the few quantitative studies on the prewar period do not employ such methods as career trees and event history analysis, which are generally used in the studies focusing on the postwar period. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the career pattern of white-collar employees in prewar Japan in a quantitative way comparable with studies focusing on postwar Japan.We target two cohorts of white-collar workers—those who joined Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in 1918 and 1921—and track their careers (section and position) until 1946 by matching three internal data sources, including lists of personnel. We first draw up the career trees of new white-collar employees in both cohorts to illustrate the characteristics of their career patterns. Next, we employ event history analysis to test the differences in the career patterns between sub-groups, such as clerks and engineers. Finally, we estimate a logit model to determine the factors of their “survival” until 1939. We find that (1) the speed of promotion differs considerably across white-collar workers in the same cohort, (2) “return match” is observed not only in promotion to section manager positions but also in promotion to division manager positions, (3) despite a high ratio of resignation, most remaining white-collar workers are promoted to division managers, and (4) engineers are more likely than clerks to stay with the company for more than 20 years. Findings (1) to (3) are common to the career patterns of white-collar workers in the prewar core banks of Zaibatsu groups but contrast with those of large postwar firms.
著者
大久保 いづみ
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.4, pp.4_25-4_51, 2015

<p>This paper examines the influence of foreign alliances on competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry prior to World War Ⅱ. In pre-war Japan, the main industry competitors were Nihon Chikuonki Shokai (NCS), Nihon Victor Chikuonki (NVC), Nihon Polidor Chikuonki (NPC), King Record (King), Teikoku Chikuonki (Teikoku), and Dainihon Chikuonki (Dainihon). NCS and NVC had alliances with companies in the United Kingdom and the United States, while NPC and King partnered with German record companies. In contrast, Teikoku and Dainihon remained purely Japanese companies, without foreign affiliations.</p><p>What benefits did the record companies receive from their foreign partnerships? And, how did the alliances influence the strategies of their counterparts?</p><p>As concerns Western music recordings, the companies with foreign alliances maintained a formidable competitive advantage throughout the pre-war period. On the other hand, for recordings of Japanese music, technological disparity between firms with foreign alliances and solely Japanese firms were essntially erased, and the latter rose to competiveness with the former, especially in the so-called "ryukoka" (Japanese popular songs) market. Thus, the foreign-allied-companies were forced to focus on Japanese music more than ever, this in turn accelerated the expansion of the Japanese music records market. In this context, foreign-partnered companies, such as NCS and NVC, made important contributions to "the golden age of ryukoka".</p><p>Until the beginning of the 1930s, the keys to competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry involved the introduction of new technologies and the sale of Western music records, based on alliances with foreign companies. After the mid-1930s, however, the capability to produce and sell records of Japanese music played a larger role in determining competitive advantage within the industry.</p>

2 0 0 0 OA 書評

出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.3, pp.3_58-3_89, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)
著者
鈴木 良隆
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, no.2, pp.23-45,ii, 1971-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

This thesis deals with two aspects of labour management of the Lancashire cotton industry during the first half of the 1830's; 1) organization within workshops and 2) the efficient use of labour. The main difficulties of these two aspects as faced by mill-owners during the Industrial Revolution Era has been repeatedly pointed out by Andrew Ure.1) As regards organization within workshops: as a conclusion of the author's study of that “Indirect Employment by the Master”, the intervention by the mill-owner in the matter of the management is clearly seen in several points. On the other hand, under “Direct Employment by the Masters”, the centralized management by mill-owners can be seen but even in that case there was no completed organization of management from the first. The work of the overseer was differenciated because of the division of processes, due to the expansion of the mills, and the regulation of the organization of operation.2) As regards the efficient use of labour: though attention was paid to the appropriate placement of the labour and the skill, the maintenance of factory discipline was the most significant. For the maintaining of discipline the use of fines and threat importance was attached to educating for the purpose of moral improvement.

2 0 0 0 OA 書評

出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.3, pp.46-75, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)
著者
永江 眞夫
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, no.4, pp.36-65,ii, 1985-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

The purpose of this paper is a examination of the correlation between a local spinning company and Zaibatsu (financial group) during the period of capitalism establishment by utilizing the data about Kyushu Spinning Company and Mitsui.Kyushu Spinning Company was established by consolidation of three companies, or Miike, Kurume and Kumamoto spinning company, in 1899. This company had about 50, 000 spindles and was a big company at that time as a local one. But its business results was aggravated by an effect of the post Sino-Japanese war depression. Futhermore, the speculation that Matazo Moriyama, the manager of Osaka branch of Kyushu Spinning Company, put into operation to cover above aggravation resulted into failure. Then, managers of this company tried to reform the business by calling up un-paid capital, but this plan did not be realized because a capacity in raising capital of local stockholders was very limited.Consequently, reformation of this company was left to Mitsui accompanied by stockholders' loss from capital reduction. Mitsui obtained the managerial rights of this company, on the other hand it improved a financial position of this company with its large ability in raising capital. And it made efforts to increase the profit through a reduction in interest payment and a utilization of sales ability that Mitsui-bussan (trading company) had.Thus, supported by the recovery of business conditions, Mitsui accomplished managerial reformation of Kyushu Spinning Company with its synthetic ability as a Zaibatsu. And then, Kyushu Spinning Company was absorbed by Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, a company that was a member of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, in 1902.