著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.24-45, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper seeks to shed new light on the process by which the modern cane sugar industry in Taiwan came into being and how it became established under Japanese colonial rule. While doing so, the study focusses on the issues involved in shipping raw sugarcane.Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which had developed as a colonial enterprise, planned to become self-sufficient in sugarcane through the use of an extensive company-held plantation. However, in actuality, it continued to rely on purchases from local farmers. Sugarcane is bulky and requires great effort to transport, and the ability to rapidly transport large volumes of sugarcane is critical because the sugar content drops over time after it has been harvested. Hauling sugarcane from farmers in carts pulled by water buffalo to the factory posed a bottleneck for large-scale, continuous production—a characteristic feature of the modern sugar industry.The use of a private steam-powered railway that began operating at the end of 1907 was a goal of TSMC, which, since its founding, had made efforts to gradually improve its sugarcane logistics. These proprietary rail lines integrated the sugarcane production process from harvesting to milling and also contributed to greater profits by improving sugar yields.After the Russo-Japanese War, TSMC continued building its own proprietary rail lines so that it would be able to continue dealing with the problem of rapidly transporting sugarcane from the fields to the factories. The company also successfully undertook the building of an inter-linking transport network among its factories, thus becoming able to adjust sugarcane supply and demand beyond the limitations of the raw-material acquisition zones. TSMC's construction and enhancement of its ground-breaking raw material transport system became a business model for the modern cane sugar industry in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, thus stimulating growth in the industry overall as other sugar manufacturers copied them.

著者

工藤 章

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.3, pp.1-26, 1989-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Generally, the international transfer of technology occurs from a country posessing a high level of technology to one of a lower level. Prior to the Second World War many German technologies were introduced into Japan. There was, however, at least one case where they tried to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. It was the case of Ostasiatische Lurgi-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung located in Berlin.The company, Ost Lurgi, was established in March 1926 as a joint venture of Mitsubishi Goshi, Metallgesellschaft and Degussa. The initiator of the establishing Ost Lurgi was Fritz Haber, inventer of the Haber Bosch process, who visited Japan in 1924, thought highly of the standard of Japanese technology and originated a number of proposals for technico-industrial cooperation between Germany and Japan. One of his idealistic proposals gave rise to the establishment contract of Ost Lurgi.The purpose of Ost Lurgi was to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. The Shimazdu process for manufacturing battery cells and ship hull paint owned by Shimazdu Works was the only actual proposal as to Japanese technology. Degussa showed an initial interest, but reached a negative conclusion on this. Metallgesellschaft's dissatisfaction with the contract also deepened. As a result, Ost Lurgi was liquidated in December 1931, when the contract was invalidated. Ironically, in June 1932, the patent right for the Shimazdu process was established in the United States, followed by its transfer in France and Great Britain as well as in the United States, but not in Germany. In the light of the present context of booming Japanese direct investment in West Germany, this failed attempt, however, can be seen as a pioneering technico-industrial endevour, from which there is much still to learn.

著者

幸田 亮一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.2, pp.31-62,ii, 1992-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This study intends to analyze the initiation of mass production technology and its influence on the machine tool industry in Germany at the end of the 19th century.It is still believed, that at the end of the 19th century, mechanical engineering industry in Germany was technologically far behind as compared with the standard of the USA. The “American system of manufacturing” was often used to emphasize the above notion to prejudge the German machine tool industry. However, it is a question to assess whether the development of the German machine tool industry was far behind than that of America.Even in the USA, the sewing machine, one of the typical product of the “American system, ” was made as a hand-made one at the beginning. Sewing machine builders in the USA introduced its mass production upon interchangeable parts in 1870s, after few years of this change, German also began to intoroduce this system. This pattern was also true for industries like bicycle, fire arm and typewriter.In order to make parts for the above machines, it was inevitable to use new kind of machine tools like milling machine or turret lathe. Although these machines were developed by American engineers in the middle of the 19th century, their commercial production commenced even in the USA in the middle of 1860s. After few years later German machine tool builders also started to copy and improve them.In the stage of developing process of the mass production, the machine tool industry played a “convergent” roll not only in the USA but also in Germany. At the beginning of the 20th century, the German machine tool technologies had been developed significantly in order to compete with the American builders in the world market.

著者

幸田 亮一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.4, pp.1-24_1, 1999-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Factory systems changed drastically around the turn of the 19th to 20th century in the Western countries. In the United States many researchers have analyzed the rise of the new factory system, but in Europe on the contrary there are many issues still unsolved. Not a few researchers still believe that the German factory system at that time was far behind that of America. Actually, however, many contemporary scientists and engineers devoted themselves to solving problems related to machinery, industrial psychology, management and so on. In this paper the historical change of the classic factory system to the new one will be examined in the German machine building industry.The first section deals with the new factory system from the view points of architecture, machinery and administration focusing on the great rolls of engineers. Through their activities traditional workshop management was substituted by a kind of “scientific management”. The second section describes the reduction tendency of working hours from the middle of the 19th century to WW1 and then points out the importance of new time management through introducing the American time-recorder. The third section analyzes the relations between the mass production system and the reduction of working hours by using two survey reports of the German metal workers union in 1911 and 1912. Results of these surveys suggest that there were intimate relations between the two.Factory science was well developed in Germany at that time, and it is reasonable enough to consider those engineers who led efforts before WW1 as forerunners of the German rationalization movement of the 1920s.

著者

岡室 博之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.59-83, 2003-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the development of the manufacturer-supplier relationship in the German automotive industry from the 1920s to the 1960s and to examine the continuity (or discontinuity) between the prewar and postwar periods. There has been no detailed historical research on this topic, though the German experience forms an interesting contrast to the American and the Japanese cases.Using original documents mainly from the DaimlerChrysler Archive and focusing on Daimler-Benz, I found that the postwar manufacturer-supplier relationship is quite different from that of the prewar period. While an arm's-length relationship was dominant in the prewar period, with frequent replacement of suppliers and little cooperation on the part of manufacturers, though often concentrating a whole order for a part on a sole supplier, the postwar relationship is more stable and characterized by intensive mutual commitment, with a clear trend to the two-vendor policy.An important turning point in the evolution of the manufacturer-supplier relationship can be found in the wartime economy. Under serious pressures of economic regulation and military production, Daimler-Benz provided suppliers with continuous support and instruction and introduced cooperative product design with selected suppliers. There are reasons to believe that these wartime experiences are related to the postwar development.However, a more direct reason for the postwar changes lies in the new economic environment and experiences in the postwar period, especially the serious shortage of production materials as well as delivery and quality problems of suppliers, combined with the drastic increase in demand for cars. Carmakers had to secure a sufficient parts supply and required the suppliers to keep a large production capacity with enormous capital investment for a longer term, which led necessarily to a stable manufacturer-supplier relationship with mutual commitment.

著者

石崎 亜美

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.3-25, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This paper aims to examine the brand marks of the soy sauce shipped to Edo city by the Takanashi family (now known as Kikkoman Corporation) in Noda town, and clarify aspects of the Takanashi family's soy sauce brands.The Yamasa Corporation had basically two brand marks during the Edo, Meiji, and Taisho eras. It seems other soy sauce breweries also had few brand marks. Therefore, there has been no study that focuses on brand marks. Meanwhile, the investigation into the Takanashi family clarified they shipped more than ten brand marks for a year during the late Edo era, and shipped 66 brand marks for a year during the Tenpou era. Few soy sauce breweries had as many brand marks as the Takanashi and Mogi families (the Mogi family is related to the Takanashi family). It seems the large number of brand marks is one of their characteristics. Therefore, we identify the differences in their brand marks and explain the reasons for the many brand marks.The prices of the Takanashi family's brands were classified into between three and five categories; the differences in price denoted the quality of raw materials, mixture proportion and quality of unrefined soy sauce. Particularly, they blended unrefined soy sauces that had different ripeness characteristics. This led to the Takanashi family having many brands. Moreover, there were brand marks called tezirushi (hand marks). Tezirushi were sold individually to wholesalers; they were wholesalers' possessive marks. Tezirushi were made by request for wholesalers, and there were instances where different tezirushi contained the same contents. The reason the wholesalers requested tezirushi was that they wanted to differentiate their sauce from other wholesalers. In conclusion, the many brands of the Takanashi family were an expression of their business policy they tried to meet customer needs, which was one of the factors they had maintained, and increase sales in Edo city market.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.1, pp.50-82, 2015 (Released:2018-01-23)

著者

二階堂 行宣

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_3-4_24, 2015 (Released:2017-11-10)

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This paper aims to grasp the Japanese government railways' freight operations during the interwar period as an integrated ‘transportation system’, and clarify how it was formed and developed. The ‘transportation system’ here means an integration of policies and measures adopted for freight operations. The analysis covers even the role of individual managers who contributed to freight business reforms, corresponding appropriately to different circumstances at each stage of business procedure.The government railways' freight organization was composed of traditionally separated‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors, and the former was divided into two: the ‘transportation’ division in charge of train operations, and the ‘wagon distribution’ division in charge of distributing empty wagons and collecting loaded ones. After the 1907 railway nationalization, the new government railways badly needed a nation-wide unified freight system. Moreover, rapid growth of demand due to the boom during the WWI urgently required efficient use of transport capacity. However, the ‘line’ sector hardly coped with the changing circumstances in the 1910s, despite some improvements in ‘staff’ sector. In particular, wagon distribution was controlled by old managers of former private railways, continuing decentralized operations.The 1919 transportation disruption revealed the defects of the old system, and establishing a truly centralized system became the most urgent challenge. Finally, the new Wagon Distribution Division was founded under the Transportation Department of the Ministry of Railways, and skilled experts were called to Tokyo to serve the new headquarters. Frequent adjustments and clear transportation planning were made possible by this reform. Ryukichi Nakayama, an eminent bureaucrat of the Railway Ministry, led the entire reform process and served as the first chief of the new division.Through this reform, a centralized wagon distribution system was established, leading to clear separation of ‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors, and from this time onward, the rail freight‘transportation system’ at each period was shaped through cooperation and occasional confrontation between the newly established ‘line’ and ‘staff’ sectors.

著者

久保 文克

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_4-1_22, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.3-29, 2007-09-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

110

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.27-57, 2007-06-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

132

被引用文献数

1

著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.3-25,98, 2005-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to study the process and features of the so-called 'military transition' of the Japanese automobile firms during the wartime. 'Small vehicle' manufacturing sector and automobile sales sector were then repressed by the military government, for they were thought to be unfitted to military use. Therefore, these sectors were compelled to change their product item, otherwise to be closed and to supply their labor forces to the military sector. In the meanwhile, the vast amount of capital for constructing and enlarging the factories was required by firms in order to transit the product item. The main focus of this article lies in the analysis of financing the capital for restructuring by the firms concerned.Nihonnainenki established in 1932, was the 3rd manufacture of small vehicles for civil use. In the initial phase, the management of this firm possessed to the Nihonjidosha. But, in 1936, it was transferred to Terada Zinkichi who was the top management of Terada Zaibatsu. Because he was the active manager for the military production, Nihonnainenki rapidly enlarged the production capacity. Since 1938, on which wartime economy began, up until 1942, production focused to small vehicle for military use. However, since 1943, it shifted to airplane parts under the financial support by the Nihon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan).Nihonjidosha established in 1909, was the largest automobile sales firm in the inter-war Japan. It was originated as a division of the Okura Zaibatsu, but Okura's influence to this firm became weaker and weaker. Initially, Nihonjidosha was reluctant for transiting the business and enlarging the capacity, although automobile sales sector was repressed. However since late 1943, the firm also started to produce tornado parts for navy, under the financial support by the Senji Kinyu Kinko (Wartime Finance Fund).In conclusion, the transition of Japanese automobile companies during the wartime from civil to military production could be performed only under the financial aegis of the public banking institutions. And, nothing explains better than the firm's managerial strategy that makes a distinction between Nihonnainenki and Nihojidosha.

著者

近藤 智子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.27-43,98, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1902, two girls were employed by Mitsukoshi department store. Since then, the number of salesgirls increased. The girls were called department store girl. Before the WW I, most of the salesgirls were true meaning girls, about 12-15 years old. They had started working right after graduating only primary school. They worked long long time every day. So they were considered very miserable.In the 1920's, department stores had changed their customer target. Since then, customers of middle classes increased. Many of them were families. At the same time, the salesgirls with decent images grew an important factor at department stores. They were thought to be well-educated and beautiful girls, so sometimes they were heroin of modern city. Many of salesgirls were from middle classes, and retired from their job by marriage. But they came back to department stores again with their family (her husband and children) as customers. It is so called reproduction of clients. The salesgirls were not only representative of modern culture, but also assisted with development of Japanese department stores. So department stores had become modern consumer's culture, and they also became women's workplace.

著者

青地 正史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.49-75, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the corporate governance structure of non-zaibatu companies in 1920s Japan. Takahashi Kamekichi, Kabushikigaisha Boukoku Ron (1930), Tohou Denryoku Shi (Tohou Electric Power History, 1962) and so on, are very instructive. They observed that Japanese companies in those days operated on short-range planning and showed unusually high pay-out ratios, up to nearly 70%, neglecting sufficient internal reserves, depreciation, and investment for plants and equipment.This paper takes the so-called institutional approach, focusing especially on the accounting system and laws at that time and places special emphasis on the following two issues.First, surprisingly old Japanese companies used the market price accounting system from 1893 to 1949, as do today's Japanese companies since 2001. But the new market price accounting system is confined to only financial instruments, and valuation profits cannot be paid out as dividends. On the contrary, the old market price accounting covered all assets and valuation profits were appropriated as dividends. According to Takahashi (1930), Japanese companies in the 1920s gained valuation profits from fixed assets and clearance assets as well as stocks, and they paid almost all of them out as dividends. Consequently, they lacked in long-term planning and suffered from ineffective management. It is difficult to say that they were mature going concerns.Second, between 1893 and 1938, an accordance of ownership and control was commonly found within Japanese companies under the Commercial Law system, which stipulated that a director and auditor must be a stockholder. Moreover, there were both a few large block large shareholders and many small shareholders. On the one hand, the block shareholders occupied executive posts of the within the companies. According to Tohou Denryoku Shi, they enjoyed controlling the company profits. On the other hand, many small shareholders were silent or weak, and shareholders' meetings were meaningless, as today's are. Consequently, both could not work as monitors for their companies. It is evident that this sort of image of Japanese companies was quite different from Berle & Means's separation of ownership and control.In conclusion, the 1920s Japanese companies were not mature going concerns, and their shareholders did not function as monitors at all. Thus they cannot be classified as the Anglo-Saxon corporate types.

著者

松下 元則

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.76-101, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to show the reason why Suntory was able to innovate on a distribution channel in the Shanghai Beer industry. Suntory has had strong marketing skills and high technology in beer production in Japan. From 1984, Suntory's Chinese Business began in earnest. China Jiangsu Suntory Foods became the number one beer maker of Jiangsu Province, and Suntory developed skills in the management of a Chinese beer company. These Chinese business skill work as the core competence of Suntory's business in China. In 1996, Suntory established Shanghai Suntory Brewing and started a beer business in Shanghai. Though the Chinese business skills worked well, they were not good enough to make Suntory Shanghai's top beer maker. The marketing skills and knowledge of the beer market's competence, which were obtained in Japan, were needed. From 1997, Chinese business skills combined with marketing skills helped the rapid increase in Suntory beer sales. Suntory has been the number one beer maker in Shanghai since 1999. Suntory's technology and management skills have been adjusted to the Chinese market and work well in China. The adjustment process distinguishes Suntory from others and contributed to Suntory's to success in distribution innovation.

著者

齊藤 毅憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.86-96, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

長廣 利崇

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.30-55, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In most previous studies of the Japanese coal industrial history, it is assumed that small-scale coal mines were undeveloped. Large-scale coal mines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were thought to have monopolized the market during the interwar period. However, there is almost no empirical study that analyzes small-scale coal mines. Therefore, this paper examines the case of Arate coal mine, under small-scale management in the coalfields of Chikuhou during the interwar period.The coal market share of Arate was greatly extended under the oligopoly of large-scale coal mines from 1930 to 1935. In this study, this factor is analyzed from three angles: a market, production, and finances.What should be emphasized is that Arate produced high-quality coal that was equal to that of large-scale coal mines. Arate operated under a labor-intensive system, using low wage earnings, and was became able to compete at the same production cost as large-scale coal mines.That is, Arate competed on an equal footing with large-scale coal mines, in both the market and production cost, and grew in management scale. This paper thus presents a critique of the historical image of small-scale coal mines as undeveloped.

著者

松本 純

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.48-70, 2001-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The main purpose of this article is to clarify the British pattern of the introduction of technical instruction, analyzing the economic influence of the activity of the City and Guilds of London Institute for the Advancement of Technical Education at the end of the 19th century. This paper also focuses upon the fact that the City and Guilds attached importance to the opinion of small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers in Britain.As a first industrial nation, Britain had preserved entrenched institutional structures since the Industrial Revolution and as regards technical instruction, the state was reluctant to create the polytechnics and the scientific facilities like Germany. In Britain, on the whole, some voluntary societies, one of which was City and Guilds, endeavored to promote technical instruction throughout the 19th century.The conclusion of this paper can be summarized as follows. City and Guilds, which consisted of members of the Corporation of London and sixteen Livery Companies, conducted a nationwide technological exam for the various types of merchants and manufacturers and built the first technical college, Finsbury Technical College, in London. This college particularly attracted small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers who worked around London and coped with industrialization by relying upon their manual technologies. City and Guilds satisfied their needs concerning higher knowledge or information to catch up with the technical standards of their rivals. Moreover, they provided an opportunity to centralize the technical instruction system in Britain.

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.84-103, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

木山 実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.1-26, 2000-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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From its inception period, Mitsui Bussan (MB) actively recruited graduates of Shoho Koshujo (a business school, Hitotsubashi University) and other schools, and the posts of chiefs at overseas MB branches were occupied by the graduates around the 1890s. In fact, MB had already established branches in Shanghai, Hong-Kong, Paris, New York, London, Lyon, and Milan between 1877 and 1880. This paper aims to clarify who had taken charge of each branch and what career they had had before those posts were occupied by the graduates of such higher educational institutions as Shoho Koshujo.MB established the above seven offices mainly at the request of the Japanese government, which encouraged trade through Japanese trading merchants rather than through foreign trading houses. While the higher educational system was being established in Japan, MB struggled due to the shortage of Japanese staff who were able to cope with work in overseas offices. MB, however, did not entrust its overseas work to local merchants at its overseas branches. Instead, MB sought out capable Japanese nationals who had gone abroad to study, worked as overseas consular officials, or worked at international exhibitions as civil servants or private citizens. MB dispatched them to overseas branches as chief, and the graduates of the higher schools worked under them. Until those graduates were trained and promoted as branch chief, the staff recruited overseas played a temporary, yet important role in establishing the MB's overseas offices.