著者

平本 厚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.22-45, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the process by which Matsushita Electric branched out into radio manufacturing in the first half of 1930s and the organizational reform the company undertook as a result. The originality of Matsushita's divisional restructuring of 1933 is well known, and it was the earliest one to take place in Japan.In 1930, Matsushita, which had succeeded in the electrical appliance industry, decided to expand into radio manufacturing. Its founder Kohnosuke Matsushita wished to produce trouble-free radio sets, which seemed a promising idea as the radio market at that time was flooded with inferior products.It was, however, not easy to make Matsushita's dream a reality. The resulting radios were too idealistic and consequently too expensive, and Matsushita's radio business showed a considerable deficit. It forced the company to reorganize its radio business on July 1933 by integrating the manufacturing and the sales sections.Following the reorganization, Matsushita was able to develop new models that were suitable to market needs, and its radio business expanded rapidly. Leaning from this success, Matsushita introduced its multidivisional structure on March 1934. It is clear that Matsushita's creation of a multidivisional structure was based on the same logic as that of Du Pont and GM in 1920-21 which were analyzed by A.D. Chandler.

著者

太田原 準

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.1-28, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

2

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The Japanese motorcycle industry produces more than 70 percent of the world's motorcycles and enjoys the position of one of the most competitive industries in Japan. This case history aims to single out the distinctive characteristics of the industry and presents an economic analysis of its evolution from 1945 to 1965.After World War II, the market for motorcycles rapidly expanded when merchants employed them as a tool for lightweight transportation. New entry firms numbered over 200, which were mostly small- and medium-sized firms. The nature of motorcycle production then resembled bicycle making rather than automobile assembly. The entire process was basically a network of component suppliers and motorcycle manufacturers specializing in the final assembly. But Honda Motors first introduced mass production through an integrated system in its Saitama and Hamamatsu plants. This rapid expansion pushed Honda close to bankruptcy, owing to financial crises in 1954. By contrast, Tohatsu, a conservative but efficient firm, increased its market share to 20.2 percent in 1955 and became leader of the industry.While obtaining emergency financing from Mitsubishi Bank, Honda rationalized its management and plant system. Furthermore, Honda invested 7 billion -yen to build a new plant in Suzuka in 1960 in order to manufacture Super-Cub, which became a dominant model in emerging the moped market. This plant, which aimed to achieve the maximum production economy, was designed to produce only Super-Cubs and adopted a highly automated mass production system. This strategic decision by Honda resulted in increasing its market share from 18.9 percent in 1957 to 63.5 percent in 1963. Other small- and medium-sized firms were outclassed by the operation of Suzuka plant and were wiped out from the motorcycle market. This was the formation of oligo-polistic competition among the so-called Big Four and of the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese motorcycle industry, which is far larger in production size relative to all other nations and which brought the advantages of the scale economy.

著者

清水 剛

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.1-21, 1999-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

39

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This paper explores the “longevity” of firms, particularly of big businesses in postwar Japan, and investigates some features of Japanese firms from this aspect.Organizational growth and decline process have been studied in organization theory and business history, though the quantitative aspect of this process has not been examined. I therefore studied this aspect by investigating the longevity of firms, based on studies of organizational ecology and related research. Consideration of longevity presents a new perspective from which to study the activities and organization of firms.From an analysis of the average number of years in which firms are ranked by total capital, and an event history analysis of the duration of listing in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, I will show that big businesses in the postwar period have especially long lifetimes, and there is no “liability of newness” or “liability of aging” about them; that is, there is no relation between the duration of listing and the rate of elimination from the first section of TSE. Therefore, these big businesses can be regarded as stable entities. It seems reasonable to believe that this stability is related to the Japanese longterm employment system.I will also show that their longevity increased gradually in the postwar period, but not without fluctuation; it decreased in the first half of the 1960s. This seems to reflect the magnitude of economic change during this period, sometimes referred to as the “transformation period.”

著者

植村 正治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.3, pp.1-22, 1999-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It is from 1900 onward that modern cane sugar manufacturing companies were founded in Japan, when Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing Corporation was established in Taiwan, then a Japanese colony. As early as 1865, the Satsuma clan introduced modern cane sugar manufacturing technology from Britain and Holland. Since the Meiji Restoration, though the Meiji government also transferred various kinds of modern sugar technologies from the West, and to some extent acquired mechanical engineering technology for beet sugar at Monbetsu Seitosho (beet sugar manufacturing company) in Hokkaido, cane sugar technology transfer was unsuccessful because sugar-cane cultivation was not very suitable for the Japanese climate. As a consequence of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, however, China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan's climate was very suitable for sugar-cane cultivation.Since around 1899, the Government General of Taiwan and Mitsui Bussan formed a project to establish a modern cane sugar manufacturing company. They spent a mere two or three years to accomplish this project. This paper investigates the reasons for such a short time span between the project's inception and its accomplishment.

著者

吉次 啓二 寺地 孝之 種田 明 中島 俊克 柳町 功

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.50-96, 1998-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.3, pp.1-37, 1985-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Established by Chikuhei Nakajima in 1917, Nakajima Aircraft Company grew into a huge munitions company during World War II. Together with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the Company was ranked as one of the two largest aircraft manufacturers in Japan. At the time of the so-called “dissolution of Zaibatsu”, the Company was named among the significant targets of such measures together with the Four Largest Zaibatsu and divided drastically into pieces. Thus, though important, no study has been made about the Company because of extreme lack of available materials.The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of the Nakajima Aircraft Group by digging out materials so far unknown, the results of which are as follows:1) The capital of the Company was usually small and the stocks were possessed actually by the Nakajima brothers alone. The Company was, therefore, able to make decisions promptly, meeting the severe requirements from the military authorities, which led it to realize a great progress.2) Devoting itself to working only for the army and navy, the Company had been structured not to make any profit except for that necessary to make dividends of 7% p.a.(3) Because of its small capital and small accumulation of profit, the Company was forced to rely extremely on borrowings, and in the stage of its rapid growth during the War, it depended solely on The Industrial Bank of Japan.(4) Although the Company had possessed stocks of many companies or made loans to them, these relationships did not constitute a Zaibatsu, but one of the general cases often seen, where a parent company controls many subcontract companies.

著者

赤坂 義浩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.3, pp.69-92, 1995-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

長谷部 宏一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.4, pp.31-51, 1988-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

福應 健

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.1, pp.37-66, 1971-10-20 (Released:2009-10-14)

著者

ユルゲン コッカ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, no.2, pp.70-74, 1976-10-15 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

北村 次一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.2, pp.47-70, 1971-11-10 (Released:2009-10-14)

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The main purpose of the article is to analize the last stage of developments in the modern entrepreneurship in Germany. After the foundation of the Reich, crisis in 1873 marked the gradual transformation of the lasses-faire economy of free competition into the monopolistic capitalism. Concentration movement was the main feature of the age. The writer describes the two instances. The one is Vereinigte Maschinenfabrik Augsburg und Maschinenbaugesellschaft Nürnberg A.G., a case of a<offene Fusion>of two mashine companies in Bavaria in 1898. The another case of merger between Hegenscheidt and Caro was more complicated. The two groups which had been highly competitive, were, through a trasitional form agreed in 1887, finally fused into Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie A.G. für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb in 1889. A typical metamorphosing entrepreneur was Einil Kirdorf, who was at the same time general manager of Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk-A. G., succeeded in joing the greatest coal cartel, Rheinisch-westfälisches Kohlensyndikat in 1893 and took up his post as chairman.The writer concludes that in the eighteen-nineties, with the advance of concentration into large scale enterprise (cartelisation, trustification), a new type of entrepreneurs began to be originated. A leading personalily, seating on the Pupervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) or becoming a top (or a member) of Managing Board (Vorstand), fulfiled his entrepreneural tasks through cartel, trust or “Konzern”.

著者

福應 健

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.3, pp.53-77,iii, 1982-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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As widely recognized, one of the characteristics of german company law since 1870 is shown in the provisions of the Aufsichtsrat as a compulsory organ. This legal institution was established simultaneously with the marked development of big business. Therefore, interaction between company law and large business organization raises an important issue of german business history. But we have still few empirical study of Aufsichtsrat in its historical reality. Moreover, decisive points of the problem; its meanings and functions in the dynamics of entrepreneurial activties have been remained a tabula rasa. Only the relation to amalgamation, relations between banking and industry, or interlockings have been roughly outlined in some eptomizing works. The real situations of Aufsichtsrat in the course of making integrated, multi-functioned big business seems to be most rich soil of german business history that is not yet ploughed.In this essay a preparatory approach is tried to analyze concretely the institutional and functional dimensions of Aufsichtsrat during the turn of the century through cases of three famous companies, namely : Mannesmann-Röhren, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG and Harpener Bergbau-AG.As a result, it would hot be allowed to induce any solid and general conclusion from these few cases. But it is fairly sure that a combination of top figures of Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand (executives) had been appeared as the top management de facto, which had acted as entrepreneur in decision making of big business. In fact, they also inclined to become the same social status group in the Kaiserreich. Effective analysis of the process and character of emergence of so-called managerial capitalism in Germany cannot be expected without further empirical as well as theoretical research on this group.

著者

北村 次一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.2, pp.52-65, 1983-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

塩見 治人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.22-49,ii, 1985-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In order to evaluate the impact of the inside contract system in the process on the evolution of factory management, this paper adopts the technology-organization approach. The type of organization developed by the early textile mills remainded satisfactory in the mechanical industries (textile, meat-packing, flouer-milling) and the refining and distilling (cottonseed oil, petroleum, beer, whisky). In the case of these industries, the adoption of the new continuous-process machinery and improved plant design had a profound effect on increasing output. They had much less impact on the modern factory organization. On the other hand, the metal-making and metal-working industries were faced with many managerial difficulties toward mass-production. Gang-work and separated plant lay-out impeded the coordination of flow through several processes of production. The inside contract system was the first organizational response to attain the high-volume throughput in these factories.

著者

壽永 欣三郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.34-63,iii, 1981-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Mass production system is the predominant production method of the _present age. The Core of mass production system is the interchangeable parts system. The interchangeable parts system made by the specialized machines have been known as American System of Manufactures since the latter half of the 19th century. In my paper, I inquiry into the trace of development of American System, comparing with Anglo-American machine tool industry. The main points are as follows. First, I follow the trace of the development of the interchangeable parts system in U.S.A. Second, with making clear the reason why that system had diffused in many durable consumer-goods industries during the 19th century, I investigate the peculiarity in transfer of technology in U.S.A. Third, I make clear the British response to American System. In Britain, the systematic production method of machine-initiative type was not introduced during the 19th century, although American-made machine was introduced. And I pursue the reason why the interchangeable parts system did not develop in U.K. that was the most industrialized country in the 19th century. Last, I make clear the acceptance condition. The Important factors are the simultaneous growth of several industries, market factor, propensity of manufactures, labor practice, etc.

著者

三島 康雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.1-27,i, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Syozo Kawasaki, the founder of Kawasaki Shipyard, died in 1912. Kawasaki Sohonten (limited partnership), the holding company of Kawasaki family, was founded by his daughter and grandsons in 1920. While Kojiro Matsukata, the president of Kawasaki Shipyard since 1896, founded Matsushokai in 1920, his own holding company. And Matsushokai held increasingly more stocks of Kawasaki Shipyard than Kawasaki Sohonten. Matsukata brothers operated many companies of shipbuilding, iron manufacturing, sugar refining and machine manufacturing. These companies borrowed much funds from Jugo-Ginko, whose president was Iwao Matsukata, their eldest brother.Both of Kawasaki and Matsukata family came from Kagoshima prefecture, so this group of businesses was called Sasshu (old name of Kagoshima) Zaibatsu. All of these companies overborrowed and overinvested at the period of financial panic in 1927, so they were on the brink of ruin. The family of Kawasaki and Matsukata retired from their companies and thus Sasshu Zaibatsu collapsed at that time.

著者

村上 はつ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.71-86, 1980-02-29 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

小林 正彬

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.1, pp.69-90, 1971-10-20 (Released:2009-10-14)

著者

石坂 昭雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.2, pp.61-91, 1969-10-25 (Released:2009-11-11)

参考文献数

37

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The huge Seraing iron and machine works, founded by the Cockerills in 1817, was in the first half of the 19th century one of the largest heavy industry establishments on the Continent, and not only a most formidable rival for the British machine industry, but also something like a model factory and training center for young engineers and skilled workers in Germany and other nations. In this article we attempt to throw some light on the role which the Cockerills played in the course of the industrial revolution on the Continent.The Cockerill family, English mechanics in origin, started their business in 1799, when William Cockerill with his sons at the request of Simonis, Biolly & Co., the biggest clothier in the Verviers woollen industry district, constructed a set of machines for the woollen industry. Afterwards the Cockerills transferred their workshop to Liège, the iron industry center of Belgium, to take advantage of the entrepreneurial opportunities for machine-makers which the prosperous woollen industries, under the Napoleonic Empire, guaranteed them.After 1815, when Belgium was cut off from France, the Cockerills were obliged to contend with the economic crisis caused by the fall of the Napoleonic system, and tried to seek compensation in German markets. They founded actually several branch-mills for machine construction and model woollen spinneries in Berlin and other eastern German towns under the auspices of the Prussian Government, besides some similar ones in Russian Poland.However, John Cockerill, the successor of this family enterprise, dissatisfied with this limitation of his business, ventured into the difficult undertaking of being a steam engine constructor. He converted the Seraing castle, disposed of by the King William I of the Netherlands at a favourable price, into a huge machine factory in 1817.Moreover, to secure materials suitable for machine-building, John Cockerill was obliged not only to expand his business to iron works and collieries under the auspice of the Netherlands government, but also to form a joint enterprise with the State.Through several years of hardships and experiments, his business was established in a complete vertical combination, and after 1830, Cockerill was able to take full advantages of the excellent capacities of his factories in the face of new railway age.It was duly these legacies of John Cockerill that allowed made the Seraing factory to survive to become the best in European heavy industries, after his bankruptcy in 1839 and his death in 1842 followed by a reorganization of the business into a joint stock company.

著者

上林 貞治郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.1-29,i, 1967-09-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

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Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks in Deutschland besteht aus zwei verschiedenen Abschnitte. Der erste Abschnitt von 1916 bis 1945 ist die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein grosses Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals, und der zweite von 1945 bis heute ist die Geschichte als ein volkseigener Betrieb der DDR. Dieses Referat spricht hauptsachlich uber den ersten Abschnitt.Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein kapitalistisches Werk des I G-Konzerns ist in zwei Bestandteile zu teilen, also, erstens die Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung des I G-Monopolkapitals, zweitens die der Grundung und Entwicklung des Leuna-Werks selbst. Die Entstehung des I G-Trusts in 1925 war ein Erfolg des langen Entwicklungsprozesses der acht groBen Chemiegesellschaften, die in 1904 zwei Interessengemeinschaften und dann in 1916 ein groBe Interessengemeinschaft bildeten. In 1925 wurden diese acht Gesellschaften in einem Trust, “I G Farbenindustrie AG”, fusioniert. Das Leuna-Werk selbst wurde in 1916 als ein Werk von “Die Badische Anilin-und Sodafabik” begrundet, dann in 1920 als ihre Tochtergesellschaft, “Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, ” reorganisiert, und nach 1925 als das grosste Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals entwickelt. Aber die Niederlage des deutschen Imperiolismus in dem zweiten Weltkrieg war zugleich die Ende des Leuna-Werks als Werk des Monopolkapitals. Heute ist es “VEB Leuna-Werke Walter Ulbricht” in der DDR.