著者
今井 真士
出版者
文教大学
雑誌
文教大学国際学部紀要 (ISSN:09173072)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.26, no.1, pp.17-32, 2015-07

Historical Institutionalist explanations / Comparative Historical Analysis approaches are inferences about the causes of specific outcomes in particular cases. They are intended to explain outcomes that have already happened, either in the distant past or in the recent past. The goal of the analysis is precisely to explain the specific past occurrences (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009: 116). In Historical Institutionalist explanations, political institutions are seen as the developing products of struggle among unequal actors, and are mainly focused on the long-term processes of institutional building, change and thus divergence. In Comparative Historical Analysis approaches, this view is expanded into the one focused on various events including political institutions. While these approaches are developing in comparative politics after the middle of 1990s based on the qualitative methodology, some scholars emphasized on the methodological differences between the qualitative one and the quantitative one, and thus pursued their ontological foundations of philosophy of science (especially biology and complexity science); especially, without proposing empirical and useful methods, they have seen these differences of methodologies as ones of paradigms and scientific views. Recently, however, other scholars have avoided these pedantic arguments of the philosophy of science and thus attempted to propose the logical (but not biological) foundations based on the set theory. In this article, I argue the ontological development of the literature of Historical Institutionalism / Comparative Historical Analysis and focus on the conceptual and terminological change of "contexts". Especially, I compare the usage of "contexts" in the five approaches; critical junctures, institutional evolutions, multiple contexts, critical antecedents, and permissive / productive conditions.
著者
今井 真士
出版者
日本比較政治学会
雑誌
比較政治研究 (ISSN:21890552)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.57-82, 2021 (Released:2021-09-10)
参考文献数
37

執政制度の形式的側面(執政府・立法府関係)は民主主義体制だけでなく権威主義体制においても重要である。しかし、これまで権威主義体制を分類するときには実態的側面(支配エリートの組織的基盤)のみが重視される傾向にあった。本稿では、体制横断的に形式的側面を捉えるためのデータセットとして「憲法の明示的規定に基づく執政府・立法府関係」(CELR)を提示する。まず、各データの趣旨として、政治制度の設計と運用に基づく政治体制、実効性の有無と執政府の二元性に基づく執政府・立法府関係の分類枠組み、権限行使の経路の違いに基づく各アクターの憲法的権限を順次説明する。次に、CELRの応用方法を主に3つ提案する。すなわち、複数の類型の統合に伴う事例群の拡大、特定の権限の追加に伴う事例群の絞り込み、CELRの憲法的権限とV-Demの慣例的権力のデータの併用に伴う権限行使の形式と実態の乖離の識別、である。最後に、CELRの対象範囲の拡張可能性を指摘して議論を締め括る。
著者
今井 真士
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_44-172_57, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)
参考文献数
28

It is often assumed that, even if opposition parties can participate in electoral politics, they are fragmented, insufficient and insignificant under authoritarian regimes in which the ruling elites have maintained their political power for the long term. Recently, however, there have been not a few pre-electoral coalitions in various countries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Post-Communist World and the Middle East that opposition parties have formed with each other during the parliamentary elections. Under what conditions do opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty authoritarian regimes? There are still a few studies on pre-electoral coalitions under authoritarian regimes, though even such arguments have not consider a possibility that opposition parties could form them not only in competitive context but also in hegemonic one: In other words, these studies have treated a degree of party competitiveness as a given condition and dismissed a question of how it affects coalition formation among opposition parties. Therefore, this article focuses on party competition and electoral institutions, and attempts to testify their effects on the pre-electoral coalitions formed by the leading opposition parties by using an original data of the parliamentary elections from 1961 to 2008 in multiparty authoritarian regimes in which ruling elites have maintained their political power for more than a decade. The first section outlines it as a background of pre-electoral coalition formation of opposition parties that the number of authoritarian regimes which adopted a multiparty system has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Although compelling to adopt a multiparty system as a part of political liberalization, ruling parties have still tended to maintain their economic, social and political dominance and the opposition parties have tended to be in a disadvantageous position: It is authoritarian single-party dominance. The second section provides four hypotheses of pre-electoral coalitions focused on the party competition and the electoral institutions on the basis of two contrasting logics derived from the analyses of authoritarian regimes:One is that multiparty elections can facilitate their political liberalization, and another is that they can foster their political stability. The third section testifies several models with a large-N logistic regression with a sample of 248 parliamentary elections in 54 countries in the period 1961-2008. These models show that the leading opposition party is more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties when (1) the opposition parties as a whole have more seat share and when (2) the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (ENOP) increase, but that it is less likely to do it when (3) the numbers of the interaction term of seat share and ENOP increase and when (4) the plurality voting system is adopted. Finally, this article concludes by emphasizing that political institutions matter in authoritarian regimes.
著者
今井 真士
出版者
文教大学
雑誌
文教大学国際学部紀要 = Journal of the Faculty of International Studies (ISSN:09173072)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.26, no.1, pp.17-32, 2015-07-01

Historical Institutionalist explanations / Comparative Historical Analysis approaches are inferences about the causes of specific outcomes in particular cases. They are intended to explain outcomes that have already happened, either in the distant past or in the recent past. The goal of the analysis is precisely to explain the specific past occurrences (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009: 116). In Historical Institutionalist explanations, political institutions are seen as the developing products of struggle among unequal actors, and are mainly focused on the long-term processes of institutional building, change and thus divergence. In Comparative Historical Analysis approaches, this view is expanded into the one focused on various events including political institutions. While these approaches are developing in comparative politics after the middle of 1990s based on the qualitative methodology, some scholars emphasized on the methodological differences between the qualitative one and the quantitative one, and thus pursued their ontological foundations of philosophy of science (especially biology and complexity science); especially, without proposing empirical and useful methods, they have seen these differences of methodologies as ones of paradigms and scientific views. Recently, however, other scholars have avoided these pedantic arguments of the philosophy of science and thus attempted to propose the logical (but not biological) foundations based on the set theory. In this article, I argue the ontological development of the literature of Historical Institutionalism / Comparative Historical Analysis and focus on the conceptual and terminological change of “contexts”. Especially, I compare the usage of “contexts” in the five approaches; critical junctures, institutional evolutions, multiple contexts, critical antecedents, and permissive / productive conditions.
著者
今井 真士
出版者
慶應義塾大学
雑誌
特別研究員奨励費
巻号頁・発行日
2008

(1)理論的枠組みに関して,主に中東地域の権威主義体制を論じた先行研究を題材に,「比較権威主義体制論」と呼びうる研究分野が比較政治学に形成されつつあることを明らかにした.とりわけ,(1)民主化に言及することなく権威主義体制それ自体の内部力学を分析対象と見なす,(2)権威主義体制下においても「制度」が重要である,という問題意識を共有しながらも,分類論,寿命論,分岐論という複数の研究戦略が乱立・共存していることを明らかにした.これに関連して,分岐論の根底にある考え方を体系的に表したものとして『ポリティクス・イン・タイム』の翻訳を手がけた.(2)具体的な議論に関して,権威主義体制の違いを説明するために2つの問いに注目した,(1)複数政党制を認める権威主義体制において,与党が野党と連立政権を形成して権力を維持しようとする場合がある一方,名目的な協定を締結するだけで権力を維持しようとする場合があるのはなぜか?(2)野党がイデオロギー横断的な連合(特にイスラーム主義者と左派の連合)を形成する場合がある一方,イデオロギー別に連合を結成する場合があるのはなぜか?という問いである,これを検討するために,与党による野党の「排除率」と,イデオロギーの異なる野党間の「議席占有率の差」に着目して,2つの仮説を提示した,与野党の関係について,排除率が低ければ,与党は取り込みの手段として連立政権を構築しうる一方,排除率が高ければ,与党は排除しなかった野党との間で形式的な対話を進めると想定した.野党間の関係について,イデオロギーの異なる野党間の議席占有率の差が大きければ,連合を構築するよりも個別に行動し,拮抗していれば,イデオロギー横断的な連合を構築すると想定した,この議論によって,権威主義体制における取り込みに関する仮説を精緻化するとともに,中東地域のイスラーム主義政党の行動の多様性を説明することが可能になると思われる.
著者
今井 真士
出版者
日本中東学会
雑誌
日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.1, pp.1-27, 2020-08-31 (Released:2021-09-30)

To appropriately understand and operationalize the concept of “personalist rule,” this article separates the institutional arrangements of the (de)centralization of executive power into three components: the organizational foundation of the ruling elites, executive-legislative relations, and constitutional authority and partisan power. This article is divided into four sections. First, it indicates that previous studies on “personalist rule” have focused on its two primary features: the long-standing rule and centralization of executive power. Second, based on the above three aspects of the (de)centralization of executive power, it explores the institutional arrangements of the Egyptian third republic, which was established in the 2014 constitution and reformed in 2019 to coexist with the second chamber, the vice presidency, and presidential term limits under semi-presidentialism. Third, it discusses the institutional implications of extensive constitutional reform and suggests that the introduction of the vice presidency and second chamber, with the simultaneous relaxation of presidential term limits, can give an impression of strengthening the decentralization of executive power when in fact weakening it. Finally, it concludes that such an argument contributes to broadening the institutionalist perspective on authoritarian regimes and constructing a measurable and reproducible indicator of “personalist rule.”
著者
今井 真士
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_129-188_138, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
16