著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.28-44, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

20

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It is commonplace to distinguish two different approaches to the history of philosophy. According to the first approach, the point of studying a text from philosophy’s past is to learn something philosophically important for us today from it. In contrast, the second, more history-oriented approach refuses to read the past philosophical text for the sake of one’s own philosophical interest. For proponents of this approach, the text can be understood only if it is situated in its context in a broad sense. In this discussion, it is sometimes suggested (by Richard Rorty, for instance) that the two approaches do not constitute a dilemma; we can and must do both independently of each other. This suggestion of coexistence, however, would cause a problem for the second approach. Preferring to be exempted from the question of truth in discussing a past philosopher, proponents of this approach would be forced into a distorted understanding of philosophy’s past. In order to avoid this consequence, the present paper proposes a third approach to the history of philosophy, in which we can deal with philosophy’s past historically and philosophically at the same time.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04-01 (Released:2017-06-10)

参考文献数

1

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In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of anti-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a deliberative sense; in its primal form, “pure” logic concerns descriptive laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the Prolegomena is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl’s criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl’s so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015

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<p></p><p>In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the <i>Prolegomena</i> of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of <i>anti</i>-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a <i>deliberative</i> sense; in its primal form, "pure" logic concerns <i>descriptive</i> laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the <i>Prolegomena</i> is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl's criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl's so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.</p>

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

情況出版

雑誌

情況. 第四期 : 変革のための総合誌

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.6, pp.127-139, 2015-08

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本ホワイトヘッド・プロセス学会

雑誌

プロセス思想 (ISSN:21853207)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, pp.49-63, 2022 (Released:2023-04-09)

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本ディルタイ協会

雑誌

ディルタイ研究 = Dilthey-forschung (ISSN:09142983)

巻号頁・発行日

no.32, pp.29-46, 2022

著者

Chrudzimski Arkadiusz 植村 玄輝

出版者

青土社

雑誌

現代思想

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.16, pp.66-88, 2009-12

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本現象学会

雑誌

現象学年報 (ISSN:0289825X)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.63-71, 2011

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

東北大学倫理学研究会

雑誌

モラリア (ISSN:13434802)

巻号頁・発行日

no.20, pp.189-210, 2014

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本現象学会

雑誌

現象学年報 (ISSN:0289825X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.23, pp.109-117, 2007

著者

植村 玄輝 吉川 孝 八重樫 徹 竹島 あゆみ 鈴木 崇志

出版者

岡山大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2020-04-01

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本研究は、現象学の創始者エトムント・フッサール(Edmund Husserl)が1922年から1923年にかけて日本の雑誌『改造』に寄稿した5編の論文(うち2編は当時未刊)、通称「『改造』論文」について、フッサールの思想の発展・同時代の現象学的な社会哲学の系譜・より広範な社会哲学史の系譜という三つの文脈に位置づけ、現象学的な社会哲学の可能性についてひとつの見通しを与えることを目指すものである。