著者
荒 哲
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.64, no.3, pp.33-59, 2018-07-31 (Released:2018-08-28)
参考文献数
84
被引用文献数
1

This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence? Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from “below.” Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives. This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in “periphery” in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well. Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in “periphery” of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time.
著者
荒 哲
出版者
独立行政法人 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所
雑誌
アジア経済 (ISSN:00022942)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.62, no.3, pp.32-62, 2021-09-15 (Released:2021-09-28)
参考文献数
58

本稿は,フィリピンの日本占領史研究において等閑視されてきた対日協力をめぐって住民間で頻発した暴力の状況と,それをめぐる戦後のフィリピン司法制度の恣意的運用について社会史的に考察する。ここでは,戦前より砂糖産業で隆盛を極めたネグロス島において,駐留日本軍を主体とする治安維持活動に関与したエリート住民と貧困層住民とが引き起こした暴力を事例として取り上げる。また,この暴力激化の過程において,戦前よりシュガーバロン(砂糖貴族)として社会的地位が高いエリートが駐留日本軍によって遂行された対ゲリラ戦の中で貧困層と共に対日協力を行いながらも,貧困層を利用しながら,戦後期において国家反逆罪の「汚名」から逃れているプロセスを明らかにする。そして,その結果もたらされた戦後のフィリピン社会分断の一側面を提示する。
著者
荒 哲
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.70-108, 2013

Most of the literatures on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in the local setting tend to focus on the "achievements" of anti-Japanese guerrilla movements. Meanwhile, except for some academic works conducted by the American historian, Alfred McCoy, other aspects of the Japanese occupation in rural areas of the country—such as political strife or factionalism among the local elites—have been avoided in discussions since it has been tabooed since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. Taking the academic gap into consideration, this article examines the memory of the war among local residents in certain area of the Philippines, Leyte. Interviews were conducted in the province of Leyte, focusing on political violence or atrocities in three towns—Ormoc, Abuyog, and La Paz. This article also clarifies that war atrocities in the province were attributed not only to the Japanese occupation policy but also to the political factionalism among the local elites, regardless of their political stance toward the Japanese occupying forces. Their political ambition became quite fierce during the Japanese occupation period, leading to bloody outcomes in each municipality. After the war, the elites' violence or atrocities were "absolved" by local residents so they could establish their political and economic hegemony over the province.
著者
荒 哲
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1999, no.120, pp.210-229,L19, 1999

General Artemio Ricarte, &ldquo;Vibora, &rdquo; is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.<br>Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the &ldquo;stubborness&rdquo; in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osme&ntilde;a. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called &ldquo;Sakdal Movement&rdquo; in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for &ldquo;immediate, absolute, and complete&rdquo; independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a &ldquo;Quzonista&rdquo; in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.<br>During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.<br>Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, &ldquo;pro-American&rdquo; cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the &ldquo;Peace Army&rdquo;, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.
著者
荒 哲
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.64, no.3, pp.33-59, 2018

<p>This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence? </p><p>Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from "below." Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives. </p><p>This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in "periphery" in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well. </p><p>Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in "periphery" of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time. </p>
著者
荒 哲
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1999, no.120, pp.210-229,L19, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
88

General Artemio Ricarte, “Vibora, ” is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the “stubborness” in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osmeña. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called “Sakdal Movement” in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for “immediate, absolute, and complete” independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a “Quzonista” in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, “pro-American” cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the “Peace Army”, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.