著者

今井 真士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_146-204_149, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

半澤 朝彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_149-204_152, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

編集委員会

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_153, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

荒井 誉史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_126-203_141, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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This paper explores why the Sato Eisaku administration (from 1964 to 1972) feared the development of nuclear weapons by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The existing literature argues that the Sato administration worried about the possibility of a nuclear attack by the PRC because this administration considered the political leaders of PRC as very aggressive and irrational. In contrast, by using newly declassified documents, this paper shows that the Sato administration feared the possibility of a political disturbance in Japan resulting from a nuclear blackmail by the PRC.During this period, the Japanese government recognized that it was not likely for the PRC and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to invade Japanese soil, including by a nuclear attack, because they realized that the US had military supremacy in Asia in terms of naval, air, and nuclear force. On the other hand, the Japanese government feared nuclear blackmail by the PRC or the USSR because it could lead to a large political movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty. In this period, the Japanese political leaders felt uneasiness about the duration of the US-Japan Security Treaty because this treaty would expire in 1970, and the number of supporters of this treaty was as much as that of the non-alignment policy. Therefore, the Japanese government suspected that if the PRC or the USSR inflamed public anxiety for Japanese security by nuclear blackmail, Japanese people would be attracted by a non-alignment policy in order to inhibit nuclear attacks. To avoid such a situation, the Japanese government asked the US to assure their defense commitment to Japan to eradicate public anxiety that the US government would not fulfill the commitment to defend Japan when the PRC or the USSR attacked Japanese soil by nuclear weapons. Therefore, this paper concludes that the Sato administration feared political disturbance against the US-Japan Security Treaty caused by nuclear blackmail of the PRC or the USSR.This paper may contribute to a rethinking of the role of extended nuclear deterrence. Generally, nuclear weapons are known to be deterrent to a nuclear attack by other states, and few researchers have paid attention to nuclear blackmail and domestic politics. However, this paper illustrates that extended deterrence has also played an important role in preventing domestic disturbance caused by nuclear blackmail. This paper discovers new aspects of extended nuclear deterrence.

著者

太田 昌克

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_142-203_158, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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Since the Crimea crisis in 2014, the international nuclear order bed-rocked on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has become severely distressed due to lack of cooperation among nuclear stakeholders. Especially, stalling disarmament dialogue between the United States and Russia amplifies such a negative atmosphere. To be worse, the competitive nuclear-weapon powers have been beefing up their nuclear capability and sharpening their nuclear doctrines in recent years.The demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 and the expiration of the Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 have undermined the “strategic stability” which was established and maintained by the US and the Soviet Union, later Russia, through a series of nuclear arms-control negotiations during the Cold War.Behind these destabilizing scenes played by the former super-powers, China, another nuclear rising power, has steadily increased her strategic capability through deployment of new nuclear missiles and hypersonic weapons for the past decade. North Korea is another big nuclear challenge against regional stakeholders like Japan, South Korea and the U.S. that promises to provide strategic deterrence in East Asia.Giving a rough overview of the recent nuclear landscape shaped by these strategic trends, this paper mainly analyzes evolutions of the U.S.-Japan alliance influenced by U.S. nuclear policy, especially represented by each administrations’ Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and deteriorating security situation in East Asia.For example, the Trump administration announced its own NPR in 2018 and broadened nuclear retaliation option against “non-nuclear strategic attack” which may include adversary’s cyber-attack on the U.S. nuclear command and control system. At almost the same timing of an announcement of Trump NPR, the Japanese Abe administration expressed a high evaluation of the NPR, because Japan strongly desired to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against the backdrop of on-going military crisis provoked by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests.Based on exclusive interviews with current and former officials of the U.S. and Japan, the paper focuses on diplomatic process of the two allies for solidifying the nature of “nuclear alliance” through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue that started under the Obama administration in 2010. Differently from NATO, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not ever formalized any mechanism to share and operate U.S. nuclear weapons at the time of contingency. However, the paper sheds a light on how the U.S. and Japan have evolved their nuclear bond particularly for the past decade.

著者

鳥潟 優子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_159-203_162, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

浜中 新吾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_163-203_166, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

植木(川勝) 千可子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_167, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_1-204_16, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

55

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How do alliance partners treat the problem of credibility of extended deterrence when they understand seriousness of security threats differently? Do they continue negotiations on the measures to confirm credibility? If so, why? To study this problem, this paper examines US policies toward nuclear sharing when France challenged NATO and shook US-European relations since World War II.France withdrew from the military organization of NATO when nuclear sharing and the stationing costs of the US/British troops on the European continent also troubled the alliance. The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson treated them as parts of a large problem. Washington also tried to solve these related problems through closer cooperation of the United States, the British, and the West Germans. This tripartitism (or trilateralism) was the basic framework through which the Johnson administration considered the ways to deal with individual problems in NATO.Nuclear sharing was not only a part of tripartitism but also a means to promote it. At least by the end of 1964, the respective US governments regarded nuclear sharing as the major way to secure credibility of extended deterrence and, as a result, to hold the alliance together. This attitude changed, however, by the beginning of 1966 when the Johnson administration seriously studied the France-NATO problem and the troop stationing costs. By constructing a nuclear consultation mechanism based on US-UK-FRG cooperation, Washington expected to introduce tripartitism into NATO.The problem of the US/British troop stationing costs grew tense in the middle of the same year. The Johnson administration tried to persuade Bonn to bear more costs of these costs, and this burden-sharing was expected to be a part of tripartitism. Washington tried to introduce a burden-sharing mechanism into NATO in face of the French challenge. President Johnson particularly considered a deal with Bonn over nuclear sharing and the troop costs problem, and this became clear in unofficial US-Soviet talks over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Johnson insisted on sustaining the possibility of a common strategic nuclear force despite Soviet rejection of any common strategic nuclear force with FRG participation. Here Johnson expected to open this option of a common nuclear force to encourage Bonn’s acceptance of larger burden to support US/British forces.This paper shows that a nuclear sharing measure played a role in inter-allies’ negotiations even though its prime purpose, securing credibility of US extended deterrence, grew less relevant. This perspective could enhance our understanding of nuclear issues under a less tense international situation.

著者

小島 真智子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_17-204_32, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

85

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This paper deals with the continuities and changes in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy by asking the following question: has the basic notion of French strategy switched to the so-called “deterrence by denial” as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”? Some raised such question, by observing that France no longer insists on her nuclear weapons’ retaliatory capabilities, but underlines its arms’ precision as if they were to be used in counter-force operations. Such critiques do not make sense to others, because all deterrence capabilities should be or should at least look operational in order to be effective. And in a world where many countries are increasing their military invulnerabilities, the search for operational capabilities is a condition sine qua non to strengthen the deterrence.In order to answer the above question, this article first traces the French nuclear strategy thinking from 1945 on, with a focus on the strategic quarrels, in 1960s, between Pierre Gallois and Raymond Aron. Aron was against Gallois’ nuclear weapons’ “equalizer” concept which made French nuclear deterrence oriented not only against Russians but also against Americans. These quarrels were more political than strategic. In fact, the Vth republic under De Gaulle promoted the notion of national independence based on Gallois’ concept on nuclear deterrence and rejected Aron’s preferences on France-US cooperative relations. The article then analyses how France’s independent nuclear policy found its righteousness as US-USSR condominium emerged during the Cold war. France was against US coexistence with the Soviets which would undermine its Ally’s national interest. The US-USSR condominium was sacred through Arms Control measures. Even Aron criticized the condominium by calling the SALT I agreement a US-USSR “Alliance”.The second part of the article is devoted to the revision of France’s nuclear deterrence strategy in the post-Cold war era. It was especially under Jacques Chirac’s administration that France’s nuclear doctrine went through an important revision. The article uses presidential discourses, parliamentary discussions as well as ministerial internal documents such as “Horizon stratégique” in order to analyze how and why France had to review its nuclear deterrence strategy. The focus here is put on the notion of “counter-deterrence”. This notion is based on France’s recognition that France can no longer be on the side to deter but will be deterred by an emerging country in the post Cold war era. And it happens that these emerging countries are non-democratic countries marking the decline of the Occident.This article concludes that continuities in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy remains essential whereas the changes are only apparent. The changes are nonetheless important because they confirm that today’s nuclear world order as two-folds (or disconnected between): global order between Russians and Americans; regional order among emerging nuclear countries including nuclear-capable Iran.

著者

シナン レヴェント

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_33-204_48, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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This manuscript analyzes the nationalism seen in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy after the World War II, focusing on Takeyo Nakatani, the president of Japan Arab Society. Nakatani’s activities, thoughts about the Middle East, and his network with Japanese politicians will be investigated. Specifically, it examines Nakatani’s relationship with conservative politicians such as Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Takeo Miki etc. in his approach to the Arabian countries, as well as how Nakatani’s Pan-Asiatic notion left over from the pre-war period effected his ‘public diplomacy’ to the Middle East.Concretely, the manuscript first examines Nakatani’s role in Japan’s involvement of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam construction project. Then, it inquires the process of establishing the Japan Arab Society in Tokyo and Nakatani’s ‘public diplomacy’ with Egypt and other Arab countries. Finally, Nakatani’s postwar Asianism is discussed in the example of the Middle East issues, especially the Palestinian Question.Consequently, Nakatani was a Japanese nationalist, keenly advocating that the Japanese Imperial regime and so the institution of Tennō should be preserved in post-war time. Tennō, Japanese Emperor was a holy existence which took his roots from a two-thousand year history and was placed at the center of Japanese nation and people. His ideological background deeply related to the Greater Asianism, Pan-Asianism in other word, did not leave him in post-war period either.Since Japan’s technological and economical superiority to other Asian countries, he consistently advocated that Japan was still the leader nation of all Asia even in post-war time. He believed that most of Arabian countries in the Middle East obtained their independence via Japanese defeat in the World War II, that Nakatani explained it as ‘Japanese sacrifice for Asian nations’ in the war.‘Asia’, which was Tōyō in Nakatani’s word, was centered on Japan and Japanese Emperor was the core of this concept. Nakatani’s way of thinking is none other than ‘the post-war Asianism’. He thought that Japan’s diplomacy towards the Middle East as a demilitarized country should be based on peaceful system, and the economic and technical aspects should be mainstream of the politics to countries in the region.Briefly, Nakatani as a non-state actor played crucial roles in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy in post-war period. And Asianism, nationalist ideology in Japan before and during the war was still effective in his actions, remarks on the Middle East issues and even network in the relations with both Japanese politicians and leaders of Arab countries.

著者

藤田 将史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_49-204_65, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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Since the liberalization of capital accounts, huge international financial crises have resulted repeatedly and caused serious damage. This experience clearly demonstrates that the international lender of last resort is essential for the stable development of the global economy.Intriguingly, the U.S. that bore the responsibility of the international lender of last resort after World War II ceased bilateral balance of payment (BOP) support recently and commenced its delegation to the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Prior to the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. gave huge amounts of bilateral BOP support to economically or politically important countries because it is easier to reflect U.S. national interests in bilateral support than multilateral ones. However, since the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. has provided limited bilateral support however important a crisis country is, and increased contribution to the IMF instead. Why has the U.S. ceased to provide support by itself and delegated the role of the international lender of last resort to the IMF?Previous studies explained the U.S. utilization of the IMF mainly by two international factors: change in the nature of BOP support from economic stabilization to structural adjustment and a decline in the U.S. financial capacity. However, these international factors dissipated post the second half of the 1990s with no precise explanations for the U.S. delegation to the IMF during that period.Therefore, this paper focuses on the U.S. domestic decision-making process that previous studies almost ignored and presents a hypothesis that the Congress has delegated the BOP support to the IMF for the purpose of blame avoidance. That is, while integration of the U.S. economy into the global financial system increased the necessity of BOP support for the American political elites, enlarging inequality also increased discontent in the U.S. voters with the support. Consequently, members of Congress that faced a serious dilemma have delegated the support to the IMF for reconciliation between implementation of necessary BOP support and maintenance of political support from voters. This paper verifies that hypothesis both by statistical analysis and by supplementary case analysis.This paper has three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it demonstrates that the IMF has a politically important function to the U.S. that enables implementation of large BOP support through domestic blame avoidance. Second, it confirms the significant role and preferences of the Congress in deciding the means of the U.S. BOP support. Third, it hints at the general theory of international institutions that multilateral organizations can be utilized for blame avoidance because they can lower the visibility of operations controversial in domestic politics.

著者

山口 航

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_105-202_108, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

一政 祐行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_17-203_32, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

77

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It has been a long time since the international security dealing with nuclear weapons started to be called the “second nuclear age.” The second nuclear age has lasted more than 30 years since the end of the Cold War. There is considerable diversity in established studies on this era, which need to be assessed and analyzed. Based on those studies, this paper examines how international security related to nuclear weapons in the second nuclear age have changed since the “first nuclear age.” It also discusses whether the international community in the second nuclear age is safer or more in danger than it was in the first nuclear age.The international environment of nuclear weapons has changed dramatically during the second nuclear age, and the horizontal nuclear proliferation has resulted in the birth of three regional substantial nuclear powers. There are other concerns about proliferation, especially among Asian countries. India and Pakistan, which have possessed nuclear weapons during the second nuclear age, have yet to dispel the risk of nuclear warfare. Although two countries are working to establish hotlines and implement measures to improve their relations, India has set a nuclear triad to improve its second-strike ability, and Pakistan is rushing to develop tactical nuclear forces to realize an immediate reactive nuclear posture. As for the “third nuclear crisis of the Korean Peninsula,” North Korea has repeatedly done provocative acts, which have been increasingly alarming its neighboring countries and the United States and destabilizing the region’s security. The blitz summit meetings between the U.S. and North Korea seemed to open the way to denuclearization talks. Still, no concrete results have yet been achieved. While the number of nuclear weapons in the world is reducing, nuclear-weapon states and substantial nuclear powers strive to modernize their nuclear forces. Among nuclear weapon states, the number of countries adopting the no first use (NFU) policy does not increase. The norm of “the sole purpose of nuclear weapons” has not been adopted, and counties seek more advanced transporting means of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts still significantly influence international security and its strategic stability.In conclusion, security policies related to nuclear weapons has been changing, depending on whether the object of safety is a state or the entire human race. Therefore, multilateral nuclear non-proliferation will be more required in international politics in the future.

著者

秋山 信将

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_33-203_46, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

46

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Arms control policy is aimed at achieving objectives such as (1) disarmament, (2) stability, and (3) the pursuit of superiority. These objectives can be understood as three aspects of arms control policy that are simultaneously in place, rather than mutually exclusive. Under stability, there was at the same time a technological and political competition between the great powers for superiority within a framework set by the arms control regime. Which of these aspects is emphasized in the negotiation and policy pursuits of arms control and which of these aspects comes into play in reaching an agreement between the parties will depend on (1) the international political environment, particularly the distribution of power, (2) domestic political dynamics, and (3) innovations in weapons technology.This paper discusses how the multi-polarization of the international political structure due to the rise of China and changes in military strategy due to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic gliding and precision warheads, missile defense, and cyber offense will affect the designing of deterrence architecture and the modality of nuclear arms control regime that defines the framework for strategic competition between the major powers.The nuclear arms control regime encompasses the conflicting objectives of ensuring stability and pursuing superiority. As the United States, Russia, and China have different strategic visions and different prospects for power distribution in the future, which increase uncertainty in the prospect nature and modality of mutual relationships among them, as emerging technologies assign a strategic role to conventional and cyber technologies, and as non-strategic uses of nuclear weapons are incorporated into national nuclear policies, a concept of strategic stability will require extensive work to re-define. Institutionalizing nuclear deterrence at the strategic level based on mutual vulnerability is not enough to ensure stability among states, and the potential for intense security competition to unfold across the borders of nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional domains is increasing. As a result, different nuclear weapons employment policies make it difficult to find a point of equilibrium in the institutional design of an arms control regime that ensures the establishment of stability among the three countries, including the United States, Russia and China. In addition, as a result of the convergence of competition at the global level of the great powers and regional security that includes non-nuclear allies, a new challenge has also arisen: how can arms control bridge the stability at the strategic level between the great powers and security at the regional level?

著者

戸﨑 洋史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_47-203_62, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

40

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The basic structure of nuclear arms control during and after the Cold War was shaped mainly by the structure of the international system and its balance of power. Particularly for the great powers, nuclear arms control was one of the key tools for maintaining the international order they led.Since the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in 2010, nuclear arms control has been at a standstill for a decade. This can be mainly seen as a consequence of power transition in the international system, which has affected the trend of nuclear weapons issues at the unit level as well. The narrowing of the power/nuclear disparity in the post post-Cold War era has brought about dual multipolarity of nuclear arms control among the great powers and between the great and other major countries, suggesting a possibility that the framework as well as regime of nuclear arms control would also be transformed considerably. Especially in multilateral nuclear arms control, difficulties of achieving agreements—through coordination of national and security interests and convergence of objectives among countries involved—increase exponentially.In addition, the implications for nuclear arms control of the modernization of nuclear forces, and the technological development and proliferation of both nuclear and conventional forces have also being becoming apparent. On the one hand, the development of highly capable conventional forces which could compliment nuclear forces could reduce the role of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a country facing a threat of its adversary’s advanced conventional weapons would increase its reliance on nuclear weapons in order to offset its inferiority, and thus increase its reluctance to engage in nuclear arms control by which its nuclear activities are bound. Besides that, since conventional weapons do not have equivalent psychological and strategic impact as nuclear weapons, the incentives for promoting conventional arms control are not as high as those for nuclear arms control, which would also impede a progress of nuclear arms control.The possible transformation of nuclear arms control is complicated due to the dual multiporality of countries involved and diversification of nuclear and conventional forces, making it difficult to predict the future of nuclear arms control. Furthermore, as great power/geopolitical competitions have intensified, countries involved are re-emphasizing the importance of nuclear deterrents in their security policies. However, this is also the moment when nuclear arms control is most needed. It is necessary to renovate framework and discourse on nuclear arms control that takes into account the complexities surrounding nuclear weapons issues.

著者

向 和歌奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_63-203_79, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

43

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There seems to be a tendency that nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence have been treated as contradictory concepts. Those who have advocated nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons, have claimed that the idea of nuclear deterrence has long been an obstacle for the further progress of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, promoters of nuclear deterrence consider the concept itself as an important mechanism to enhance international peace and security, and thus tend to neglect the idea of nuclear disarmament. In other words, the two concepts are on the opposite ends of the spectrum.At the same time, it is also possible to point out that the concept of deterrence and disarmament have long been inseparable, and that the two have progressed in parallel with each other. In other words, the promotion of nuclear disarmament has, in some cases, reinforced the concept of nuclear deterrence.In the early ages of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced a period in which the two countries were contemplating the idea of a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) with specific proposals for a treaty to initiate the concept. Both the United States and the Soviet Union craved for international support to let the world know that they were seriously thinking of how to ultimately avoid war. On the other hand, the two countries recognized from an early stage that it was nearly impossible to reach an agreement on GCD, and the two moved in the direction of a search for multilateral arms control agreements, resulting in the creation of the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).Both the PTBT and the NPT contributed in securing the nuclear status of the already-nuclear possessing states at that time. The two treaties were attempts by the already-nuclear possessing states to dominate nuclear weapons, which were considered as signs that nuclear deterrence does matter in international politics. This prompted discontent among the nuclear threshold states, which eventually led them to acquire their own nuclear weapons.The indefinite extension of the NPT, the creation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) were cases in which the importance of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were more explicitly and implicitly advocated by countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. The TPNW which stigmatizes nuclear weapons made the gap between the so-called “deterrers” and “disarmers” even more solid. Moreover, it reminded the international community that not only countries that possess nuclear weapons but also countries that are under the nuclear umbrella regard nuclear deterrence too important to let go, even being accused of not being faithful to the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

著者

足立 研幾

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_94-203_109, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

61

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The nuclear non-proliferation norm is one of the most important norms in international security to date. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was created to implement this norm and took effect in 1970. Since then, the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states has been curbed to a considerable extent. However, after the end of the Cold War, a couple of countries clearly violated the norm. Sanctions against such misconduct have not been strong enough to enforce compliance. The nuclear non-proliferation norm has been shaken from many angles and severely damaged. Will this lead to the degeneration and disappearance of the nuclear non-proliferation norm and the collapse of nuclear non-proliferation governance?One of the few existing studies on norm disappearance was conducted by Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn. They emphasize the importance of imposing appropriate sanctions on actors who violate an internalized norm. They say that when a lack of appropriate sanctions triggers a cascade of norm violation, the norm will degenerate and disappear or be replaced by another norm. They also argue that a norm will weaken rapidly if it is highly precise, if the environment changes rapidly, and if compliance is not enforced by others. Considering the preciseness of the nuclear non-proliferation norm, the rapidly changing international environment after the end of the Cold War, and the weak sanctions for enforcing compliance when the norm has been violated, will the nuclear non-proliferation norm degenerate?By examining the results of public polls, behaviors and discourses of states which violated the nuclear non-proliferation norm, and the reactions of other states to the norm violations, this paper demonstrates that the norm is still robust. One reason for its robustness is because there is no alternative norm that can supersede it. In addition, this paper shows that the nuclear non-proliferation norm’s high level of institutionalization as well as the high density of the web of norms related to it have increased the norm’s viscosity. This viscosity is the key to understanding why the nuclear non-proliferation norm has so far not regressed and hence why nuclear non-proliferation governance will not likely collapse in the near future despite all the challenges the norm has faced.

著者

山添 博史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_110-203_125, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

52

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Russia, perceiving the U.S. political actions in Eastern Europe as threats to its vital interests there, developed the concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence.’ According to Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014, this concept means countering non-military and military threats to Russia’s interests by non-military, conventional, and nuclear means. Nuclear weapons can serve three purposes within this concept: ultimate means, conflict localization means, and narrative offensive means. Russia officially shows its readiness to use strategic nuclear forces as ultimate means to counter conventional threats to the existence of the state, and to develop conventional forces for local conflicts. When Russian officials mention the use of nuclear weapons, it serves as a narrative offensive means, which they expect will incite fear among the adversaries’ populations and weaken their united will to confront Russia, and thus fulfill the role of a non-military means of the ‘Strategic Deterrence’ framework. Russian military might think of what I call ‘conflict localization means’ in this paper, popularly known as an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, a posture of using nuclear weapons to persuade adversaries to cease further military actions in a local conflict. ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014 and other factors show little evidence of the existence of such a posture, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility. Partly to enhance a nuclear ‘narrative offensive,’ the possibility of use of nuclear weapons as a conflict localization means is made deliberately ambiguous. The Russian military did officially seek to realize the conflict localization means in the 2003 reform document, and debates on this matter continue. The ‘Grom-2019’ military exercise in October 2019 showed a possibility of forming a unified command and control not only of strategic nuclear forces but also of local-level weapons such as Kalibr and Iskander cruise missile systems with nuclear warheads. The issues of the nuclear threshold and strategic stability will depend on further development of forces and doctrines of Russia and the United States.

著者

三牧 聖子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_1-202_14, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

35

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Since the start of his presidency in 2017, Donald Trump has abandoned multiple treaties and agreements such as the Paris climate-change accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade agreement, asserting that U.S. foreign policy should put the interests and security of American people first. Trump’s “America first” foreign policy doctrine has cast profound doubt on U.S. commitment to the multilateral international system that the United States helped create and nurture after World War II. Pundits have wondered if the world has been sliding back to the chaos of the 1930s - when another war in Europe approached, the United States was reluctant to engage in world peace and tolerated the rise of fascist countries. Despite serious divide over Trump’s statesmanship, Trump’s instinct for non-intervention and his focus on domestic politics are widely shared among Americans. According to opinion polls, a growing number of Americans agree that the United States should reduce its overseas commitments.Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that America is returning to isolationism like in the 1930s. This paper explores America’s ongoing search for a new way to engage with the world, particularly focusing on the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an action-oriented think tank built as a unique hybrid of left and right-wing anti-militarists in 2019 with the purpose of laying the foundation for a more restraint foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement. Backed by the growing bipartisan support for ending the “endless wars,” The Quincy Institute fundamentally questions American bipartisan commitment to “primacy,” the notion that world peace ultimately depends on the United States asserting preponderant military power. Military restraint, The Quincy Institute argues, would give America the best chance of building deeper international cooperation against climate change and other global challenges that have afflicted humanity as a whole, as well as of reconstructing U.S. crumbling health care system.The spread of COVID-19 has had profound impacts on American peoples’ perception of national security, and made Quincy’s challenges increasingly relevant. Suffering from the epidemic, many Americans are wondering if their country has been ever more threatened, in return for lavishing taxpayer dollars on the world’s largest national security apparatus. According to recent opinion polls, especially young Americans, who have grown up in the age of unsuccessful military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and 2008 global financial crisis stemming from the collapse of the U.S. housing market and a rash of bankruptcies of financial institutions, no longer believe that the United States is an “indispensable nation.” Rather, they realize their country’s weakness exposed by COVID-19, and embrace more restraint foreign approaches and multilateral cooperation. Supported by these youth’s preferences, Quincy’s search for a systematically different world role for the United States would be continued and intensified in the future.