著者
岩下 明裕
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_17-201_32, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
27

What do we consider as the Soviet/Russian foreign policy toward East Asia? Many historians tend to discuss its nature using an “expansionist” model in general, particularly in Europe. This may differ in terms of discourse: some have emphasized the security factor against neighbors, while others have focused on ideology as “socialist” in the Cold War era and “Eurasia” in the present day. However, the recent development of Soviet/Russian studies accents more on the “pragmatic” and “state-interested” based causes for policy orientation.As background, this paper sheds a light on comparative studies of Soviet/Russian foreign behavior toward China and Japan. In contrast with the European/Atlantic front, Soviet/Russian behaviors have been more “moderate” and “restraint” toward East Asia/Pacific before/after the Cold War period. Indeed, it depends on the difference of Soviet/Russian power influence between Europe and East Asia. How have the Soviet Union/Russia dealt with China and Japan in East Asia/Pacific? For the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been big powers to manage for security as an “enemy” or as a “friend” in triangular relations dependent on historical factors.This paper focuses on the foreign activities of Khrushchev era to Putin via Gorbachev. It is well known that Khrushchev’s foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence,” which tried to use “space” between “friend and enemy,” triggered a more pragmatic and flexible orientation than the predecessor’s dichotomy. At the time, with the Soviet Union facing territorial/border disputes with China, a communist ally, and with Japan, a potential enemy under US control, Khrushchev decided to deal with each in a different way: For Japan, a promise in the 1956 joint declaration for the handing over of two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, but for China, the ignoring of its demand for re-bordering the Amur and Ussuri rivers after the negotiations of the mid-1960s. As a result, war with China started while a deal with Japan was frozen mostly because of US pressure on Japan.The failure of Khrushchev’s foreign policy impacted his successor’s decision. The lessons brought about Gorbachev’s success on the border agreement with China in 1989 and Putin’s follow-up on finalizing the remaining border issues in 2004. It also framed Russia’s policy toward Japan. Gorbachev never recognized Khrushchev’s failed proposal of the 1956 declaration and Putin, recognizing the validity of the declaration, has strictly demanded that Japan depart from US influence as a condition of Khrushchev’s deal. As a result, Russia has enjoyed its best relationship with Japan while using the “territorial card” as a theoretical concession of the 1956 declaration to keep Japan from going against Russia.This paper draws conclusions from the transformation of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy toward China and Japan. It also suggests lessons gleaned from Russo-Japan relations for academics and foreign policy circles in Japan and Asia.
著者
地田 徹朗
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_33-201_48, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
70

The paper deals with the politics of the ‘Aral Sea problems’ during the perestroika time and its legacy after the independence of five Central Asian states. The research questions are as follows: What kind of actors did what sort of discussions in relation to the environmental, social and economic aspects of the Aral Sea problems during the perestroika? How did the authorities of the newly independent states inherit these discussions in taking measures against the problems? The paper especially focuses on the rencontres in the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Ecology and the Rational Usage of Natural Resources (1989–1991).The Aral Sea is the inland lake located in the desert area across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the territory of the former Soviet Union. It was the fourth largest lake all over the world, which started shrinking in 1960 due to the extensive development of irrigated plots and the irrational usage of water resources in the basin. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident in 1986 disclosed public voices over environmental protection matters and, with the bottom-up initiative of locals, the life-threatening issues around the Aral Sea began to be unmasked for wholesale discussion in the Soviet Union.Four types of actors engaged in the discussion and policymaking upon the Aral Sea problems. The first is the ‘framers’ in Moscow, who led the policy formation in spite of their divergence in opinions, accordantly claiming that people firstly should economize waters for irrigation. The second is the nature protection oriented writers and scientists, who condemned the hydraulic engineers and the gigantic hydraulic constructions, initially gaining support from the ‘framers,’ but breaking with them afterwards. The third is the hydraulic engineers themselves, who seemed to have experienced the downfall of their credibility, but came back to the front of policy making in the final days of the Soviet Union. The fourth is the local authorities, who intended to acquire as many subsidies as possible from Moscow to ensure the further development of the region as well as to resolve the Aral Sea problems, supporting the engineers but being antagonistic to the conservationists.These four actors argued heatedly, but accomplished almost nothing. Notwithstanding, the authorities of the newly independent states inherited these arguments during the perestroika as the framework to tackle the Aral Sea problems. They have continuously paid attention to the socio-economic and sanitary-epidemiological conditions of localities, the improvement of the water efficiency in irrigation, and the partial restoration of the lake itself. However, the Aral Sea continued to scale down. The confrontation between the upstream and the downstream countries is severe, although the basin coordination institutions were established.
著者
李 優大
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_49-201_65, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
92

Fedor Rotshtein began his tenure as the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia soon after the signing of the Soviet Iranian Treaty of Friendships on February 26, 1921. He was later succeeded by Boris Shumiatskii. This article reviews Russia’s Foreign Policy towards Iran during the “New Economic Policy (NEP)” era by examining Rotshtein’s diplomatic activities in Tehran with the aim of answering two key questions: 1) how did Soviet Russia handle the ‘tough-negotiator’ tactics adopted by Iranian diplomacy during this period; and 2) how, and under what circumstances, did the tone of Russia’s approach towards Iran change during the NEP era? This article will argue that the main feature of Soviet Diplomacy during this era lies in its historical trajectory moving between a realist policy aimed at normalizing relations with neighbouring states and a conventional revolutionary foreign policy.During his tenure, Rotshtein’s primary diplomatic engagement was the pursuit of an accord that would resolve the disputes over the Russian Empire’s oil and fishery concessions in Iran in addition to concluding a supplementary trade agreement. However, the Iranian government, cognizant of the severe famine spreading across Russia, adopted a tough-negotiator posture; including showing reluctance to ratify the Treaty of Friendships, as strategic negotiating tactic to maximize concessions from Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Rotshtein particularly concentrated on resolving the disputes over oil concessions in northern Iran. This was because at that time Soviet Russia saw the disputes as the national security issue rather than as a commercial one; formerly the Russian Empire had regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence, and Soviet Russia was concerned about Britain’s expansion in the region.Such was the importance that Rotshtein attached to deepening commercial relations with Tehran that he even helped Reza Khan suppress the revolutionary movement carried out under the auspices of Caucasian communists in northern Iran. This Rotshtein’s policy was severely criticized by David Gopner, a leftist in the Communist Party, but the criticism might have been politically inconvenient for the Soviet central government at that time because it had been prioritizing strengthening commercial relations with neighboring states over revolutionary ideology. In this context, it had profound implications for Soviet foreign policy that Boris Shumiatskii was assigned to Tehran as a successor to Rotshtein. He was an expert on Siberia, and unfamiliar with Iranian affairs. This posting was arguably a demotion for Shumiatskii, having clashed with Stalin over an ethnic issue in Buryatia, but the case was not that simple. The enthusiastic revolutionary’s transfer to Iran was a disguise to make Soviet policy look revolutionary again when, in fact, Soviet Russia had abandoned its strict revolutionary policy. Shumiatskii, however, had difficulty imposing his revolutionary policy on a country where he found himself to be a total stranger, and it is not surprising that it took only a few years before he departed the post. Overall, this article argues that Soviet Russia’s active opposition to revolutionary policy in Iran shifted to a “mild” permissive revolutionary policy.
著者
篠﨑 正郎
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_17-199_32, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)
参考文献数
96

Michael W. Doyle offers three main explanations for imperial expansion: the first being a metropolitan model, the second emphasising peripheral problems and the third based on the systemic model. The British Empire was dismantled by the early 1970s, but Britain resumed military engagement from the mid-1970s. Although this is not imperial expansion, the second explanation is appropriate: Britain renewed its commitment to the former imperial area because of its involvement in the local crises.Some crises in the former imperial area included those in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Caribbean Sea and the South Atlantic. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy had maintained its presence since 1968, and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was organised in 1974. This squadron and pro-Soviet forces in the littoral states posed a threat to Western interests. In Belize, there was the possibility of an invasion from neighbouring Guatemala in 1975 and 1977, and Britain was obliged to reinforce the garrison; Guatemala was demanding over a third of Belizean territory, and the dispute was not successfully resolved. In the Falkland Islands, the tension between Britain and Argentina increased in the late 1970s, resulting in the British government being unable to withdraw its ice patrol ship, which had merely maintained a token presence, and dispatching a task force during the 1977 crisis. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought a regime change that was no longer pro-Western. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created tension in the Persian Gulf and put both the United States and Britain on alert. Then, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 endangered the passage of merchant shipping through the Straits of Hormuz or within the Persian Gulf, resulting in the United States, Britain and France starting zonal patrols. All these crises lead to a study of Britain’s priority two commitments (i.e. its commitments outside NATO). However, it was not until the Falklands Conflict in 1982 that the British government decided to maintain its power projection capability, including three aircraft carriers.Why did Britain resume its commitment? It is difficult to find the cause in the metropolitan model, since the trade between Britain and the Commonwealth dwindled in the 1970s and the British economy was in decline, often cynically called the ‘British sickness’. It is also impossible to explain it using the systemic model, in light of the fall of Britain and rise of the Soviet Union and the Third World. Therefore, the local crises are the most persuasive argument for the reason for British engagement.
著者
山影 進
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.67, pp.5-28,L1, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
106

Starting to prevail in the end of the 1960's, interdependence studies have been much in fashion throughout the seventies. Almost all phenomena related to international relations were discussed in connection with “interdependence” despite the absence of its substantial clarification. Consequently, there were too many definitions to use it as an analytic concept; and attention shifted from interdependence proper to (1) international regime/order, and (2) policy/adaptation towards a contemporary complex world. First of all, this paper reviews a brief intellectual history of such interdependence studies as the vogue in a scholary world reflecting recent profound changes in the real world.Doubtlessly influenced by leading academic moods in America, interdependence studies became popular in the late 1970's in Japan, but an independent and isolated research on the subject had been conducted years earlier. Taking this study as a model, this paper analyzes interdependence studies as various approaches to understand international society which contains both national and non-national actors interwoven by numerous and complicated transactions, and which creates new types of problems awaiting novel ways of solution.In the course of analysis herein, the meanings of “interdependence” are redefined and compared with one another, and most importantly a theory of interdependent relations is proposed. Specifically, it attempts to explain conflict and cooperation over interests in transactions by the following factors: (1) transactions between actors, (2) actor's internal system, (3) actor's perceived cost and benefit associated with transactions, (4) actor's controllability of transactions, and (5) the international order to regulate transactions.Designing interdependence is needless-to-say extremely difficult. According to the analysis in this paper, however, the necessary fundamental structure of interdependent relations can be at least pointed out. Namely, the most basic structure which differentiates the situation of “interdependence” from other types of situations is multidimentional conflict cum cooperation over complicated transactions cum alternative regimes.
著者
勝俣 誠
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1983, no.73, pp.86-103,L12, 1983-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
33

The contemporary societies of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) are fundamentally ruled by three main relations: large scale relations with the industrialized countries, particularly with France, the former colonial power; sociocultural relations between the Maghreb states and informal Islamic institutions that structure the space of everyday life; and politico-economic relations with the Sub-Saharan African states.The present article focuses upon the first set of relations as a way of posing and examining the followng questions:(1) Why and how, even today, Maghreb's economic dependence upon industrialized economies is maintained through the emigration of Maghreb's labor force;(2) How Maghreb's external trade relations based on raw materials determine the nature of the economic and social development of the Maghreb;(3) How relations with the industrialized world can be placed in a Mediterranean geo-political context.If most studies agree on the existence of dependent relations between Maghreb society and the industrialized world, the determination of the precise components of dependence varies from one study to another. An analysis of the cultural and agricultural aspects of the movement of labor allows us to understand the motivation and role of each emigrant in perpetuating the movement. On the other hand, the anatomy of a natural resource oriented economy shows us the limited possibility of autonomous development based on the international valorization of local resources. Further, the external prospects for Maghreb society are more uncertain than ever because of the sustained world recession. That is the reason why an alternative scenario of a Mediterranean bloc is being discussed professionally as one of the regional solutions to world-wide uncertainty.This scenario corresponds with the mutually expanding interests of the EC and the Arab World. An example of the closer ties is a network of agreements which the EC has established with almost all of the Mediterranean countries, including those with the Maghreb, concluded in 1976. These treaties are restricted to economic relations. Another example is the Euro-Arab Dialogue (DEA). This idea appeared in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo in 1973. In a series of negotiations between the EC and the Arab countries, politics in the Middle East has come to the surface as a policy issue, though policies are yet to be formulated. It is obvious that the geo-political location of the Mediterranean Sea is strategically important for both the Maghreb and France. Since the late 1970s, France in particular has advocated a regional plan of cooperation based on the strategic location of the Mediterranean region. In comparison with former plans, this plan mentions that France, as the sole nuclear power in the region, is expected to make a contribution to security in the area; second, the Mediterranean countries —Southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Middle East— are located on the periphery in the structure of world capitalism. How this scenario develops still remains to be seen.
著者
川島 真
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_100-175_114, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)
参考文献数
49

This article traces the historical contexts of international politics study from the 19th century to the present in China, and explores the background and possibilities of ‘China model.’ The China model has been argued in the academic circle in China after the latter half of the 1990s, in order to interpret Chinese foreign policy more clearly and efficiently under its own historical and cultural contexts. It was the 19th century when China started to make contact with the international law and diplomacy. At first, Chinese officials recognized them as tools and device to negotiate with western countries. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese government utilized concepts of modern international relations,such as sovereignty, independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, to protect and maintain its existence as a nation. Such behavior was succeeded by the PRC, such as the five principles for peace. However, the PRC kept a distance with western concepts of international politics, and began to import a series of Marxist theories and concepts it from the Soviet Union. After the Cultural Revolution, the PRC gradually resumed to receive western theories and concepts of international politics. Thus, the PRC basically kept the basso continuo of Chinese diplomacy, such as importance of sovereignty,independent and mutual principle of equality and mutual benefit, but its main theories and concepts were from Marxist studies. After new western studies were gradually imported to China, the basic situation did not change very much. After the 1990s, the so-called rising of China, it needed to interpret and explain its policy to the world more efficiently. At that time, Chinese scholars realized that it was difficult to do so by utilizing Marxism and new western studies. Therefore, many started to explore new ways, and promoted the China model with historical and cultural contexts in China to interpret its own foreign policy. However, the arguments regarding this new model were losing its objective and their bearings.
著者
宇田川 光弘
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.186, pp.186_113-186_128, 2017-01-30 (Released:2017-04-07)
参考文献数
38

After 60 years of the history of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA), two approaches stand out as the main philosophy of Japan’s foreign aid – aid for developing nations’ self-help and human security, as recently expressed in the Development Cooperation Charter of 2015. While ‘self-help’ was much emphasized around the 1990s, when Japan emerged as a top donor, ‘human security’ has been regarded as more important element since the early 21st century.This essay argues that the relationship between self-help and human security has been ambiguous in Japan’s aid policy. While self-help is one of the key concepts in the analysis of the realist approach (such as Kenneth Waltz) in the theory of international politics, human security is in the more liberal or humanitarian tradition. Furthermore, it does not clear who makes ‘self-help’ efforts in economic development. Japan’s aid philosophy assumes that the developing state (or government) makes efforts toward development, but in reality, the government of developing states may not work for the interests of its peoples. In this case, the self-help efforts of individuals may end up with no returns for them. It is pointed out that Japan, relatively homogeneous, regards nation’s self-help as natural and normal, but the introduction of two level analysis – state level and person level – makes clear that many developing states have divisions within the state, and self-help efforts by all sectors of the state rarely happen.In recent years, Japan has more emphasized the importance of ‘human level’ in development, by adopting human security in its development aid. However, there is no coherent explanation or examination how this notion of human security relates to self-help efforts. Human security has become more important in recent years, because the state itself can become the source of threat to peoples, or the state cannot protect its peoples from the various threats, such as infectious diseases, financial crisis, terrorism, and refugees. Despite the fact that Japan introduced human security in its aid policy in the late 1990s, Japan’s contributions to human security area has not been adequately recognized, because the majority of Japan’s aid money is still spent for the establishment of economic infrastructure, and given in the form of yen loan.Emerging donors, including China, often take a similar approach to international aid, emphasizing the respect for recipient countries’ right to independently select their own path of development. It seems odd for Japan to stick to the aid principle similar to that of undemocratic emerging donors, particularly with regard to the fact that Japan’s political relations with China, which received substantial amount of Japanese aid, have been more tensional in recent years.