著者

高橋 慶吉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_15-202_30, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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In the field of American diplomatic history, the 1930s is depicted as an era of isolationism. It is true that the United States did not actively engage in the international efforts to maintain both the Versailles system in Europe and the Washington system in the Asia-Pacific region. However, American diplomacy in the 1930s was neither dormant nor unproductive. It successfully fulfilled some important achievements in the Western Hemisphere by vigorously developing the so-called Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin American countries.The architect of the Good Neighbor Policy was Sumner Welles, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs from 1933 to 1937 and Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943. Welles is also known for the central role he played in formulating the postwar plans of the State Department during the Second World War.By using Welles’ private papers that previous studies rarely consult, this paper examines the kind of international order Welles sought to realize in the Western Hemisphere. Before Welles joined the Roosevelt administration in 1933, the United States had made military interventions in Latin American countries repeatedly and imposed high tariffs on their commodities. Welles observed that the military interventions settled political confusion in Latin American countries only temporarily and the high tariffs prevented them from achieving economic prosperity, which Welles regarded as the fundamental factor for a sustainable stability of the society. In addition, Welles thought that the military interventions and the high tariffs induced Latin American enmity toward the United States, making it difficult for Washington to make the Western Hemisphere the solid foundation supporting American leadership in the world.Based on those observations, this paper argues, Welles tried to modify the American tariff policy and establish an inter-American conference system to manage internal and external threats to the American republics. In other words, Welles sought to create a new hemispheric order characterized by two principles: promotion of trade and joint action to keep peace in the region. Welles’ endeavors were successful and enabled the Western Hemisphere to have, in Welles’ words, “the most advanced, and at the same time the most practical, form of regional system” in the world. This paper concludes that the hemispheric system not only supported the American war efforts during the Second World War but also impacted the postwar visions created by Welles and his group as a model that other regions should follow.

著者

水野 良哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_31-202_46, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

98

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This paper sheds new light on a British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) as a prominent scholar in the international relations by focusing on his arguments about European international affairs, particularly in the late 1930s. Through the analysis, this paper also contributes to further understanding of “Liberal Internationalism” in the 1930s and deepening our thought on the contemporary international order.Toynbee is famous for his book A Study of History, where he described the development and decline of the Western Civilization, while previous studies have not addressed the role of Toynbee in international relations. It is primarily because he was criticized by E. H. Carr, who was another leading scholar in the discipline during the same period. In his classic work Twenty Years Crisis, Carr criticized his opponents by describing each of them as a utopian, who failed to grasp the reality of international politics. Among the utopians, Toynbee was included.However, Toynbee was a prominent scholar in the international relations between the 1920s and the early 1950s. I discuss this underestimated aspect of the British historian by examining how he reacted to the rising threat of a totalitarian state, namely Nazi Germany.After the experience of the First World War, Toynbee realized that the war and its related destructions gravely damaged Western Europe. In his view, the enormous power of sovereignty states would cause international anarchy and inter-state conflict. Therefore, Toynbee advanced a new idea of the international order for regulating state sovereignty and facilitating international cooperation of states.In contrast to his earlier belief, the political events which were damaging the European international relations happened in the late 1930s. Among them, the expansion of Nazi Germany appeared as the most serious threat to peace. Faced with the threat, the British government appeased toward Nazi Germany, especially in the Munich Agreement and did not immediately use serious countermeasures against it.Because of the Nazi’s aggressive behaviours, Toynbee needed to reconsider his initial political viewpoint. However, the more significant event for him was the Munich Agreement. Toynbee stood against the Agreement and stated that Nazi Germany would be a potential threat to Europe, due to its power and totalitarian ideology. Under the political circumstances, he thought that Britain had to resist against the totalitarian state. Besides, he called for the US’s diplomatic involvement in the European continent and then strategic cooperation by Britain, France, and the Soviet Union in order to prevent further expansion by Nazi Germany. By making these statements, he aimed to restore the broken balance of power and to defend democracy, and the rule of law in the European Continent.

著者

重松 尚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_47-202_60, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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After the coup d’état in 1926, Lithuania was ruled by the authoritarian regime led by President Antanas Smetona. In the late 1930s, complaints about the Smetona government was grew, especially among the opposition groups, such as Voldemarininkai, the Populists (liaudininkai) and the Christian Democrats, because they considered that Smetona government’s “neutral” foreign policies led to the ultimatum by Poland in 1938. Thus, they established a unified anti-Smetona movement “Lithuanian Activists Union” (LAS) in 1938 in Klaipėda (Memel) and criticized the authoritarian government as dictatorship. They aimed to establish a Fascism regime in Lithuania instead, as they believed that, under the Fascism regime, the whole Lithuanian nation could be involved in the policy decision making. They, nevertheless, considered the Jews and communists were “anti-national”, thus tried to exclude them. LAS pursued some democratic values, such as freedom of the press and free elections, but they criticized parliamentary democracy since they believed that it led to a split of the nation. They aimed at close relations with Nazi Germany and state-planned economy. They believed that such “Disciplined Authoritarian Democracy” should have replaced the Smetona-led authoritarian regime.

著者

工藤 芽衣

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_61-202_76, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

57

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The purpose of this article is to describe international order designed by French neoliberalism through European integration and Atlanticism and its effects on the French government’s external policies.French neoliberalism was born in the late 1930s in the struggle to retrieve the credibility of liberal economy and fight against fascism and communism by searching for a third way. In most of the literature, the birth of new economic norms and new economic policy in the 1930s is explained by the emergence of Keynesian economics and economic policies, and ‘neo-liberalism’ is often placed as a contrasting concept to Keynesian policies. However, the original neoliberalism was, like Keynesian ideas, more socially oriented. After the Second World war, French neoliberals gradually lost common ground regarding economic principles, dividing between the left (neoliberals seeking a way to reconcile liberalism and socialists) and the right (trying to return to orthodox liberal economics). However, the two groups were still united as long as it concerned European integration and Atlanticism. These two ideas on the international order maintained the unity of the French neoliberalism from its birth to after the Second World War.With regard to the European integration, its support was based on the expectation that European integration become a framework to establish an ‘institutional market’ in which liberal competition was coordinated by the rules and interventions by the international institutions.The institutional market come to reality when the EEC was established in 1957 by the initiatives of the neoliberals. Not only did they develop a campaign for the Rome Treaty, they also desired for the French economy to really participate in the liberalisation processes in Europe with financial reform to contain inflation – which was finally achieved in the Rueff Plan in 1958.The influence of the Atlanticism of the neoliberals to the French external policy was limited. In 1936, when the Popular Front government adopted the devaluation of the franc as suggested by the neoliberals in the Tripatite Agreement between France, United States, and United Kingdom, this situation represented as a French decision to unite with liberal countries, denying fascism. However it was too late and the changing international circumstances made it meaningless.In the 1960s, the neoliberal’s Atlanticism was reflected in their critiques to the international monetary system centered on US dollars. Their critical attitude to the dollar did not mean their support for Atlanticism was lost, rather, they tried to consolidate the economic basis of the Atlantic cooperation by reforming the international monetary system. However, when their call for return to the gold standard was adopted by the General de Gaulle, it was used as a tool to attack Atlanticism.

著者

北村 厚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_77-202_86, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

19

著者

亀山 康子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_87-202_96, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

11

著者

今野 茂充

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_97-202_100, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

武田 健

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.202, pp.202_101-202_104, 2021-03-29 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

藤本 健太朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_66-201_81, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

63

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This study reconsiders the Soviet policy toward Japan before the USSR and USA established diplomatic relations in 1933, especially taking American factors into account, which have been neglected in the previous studies.After the Russian Revolution and military interference by the Allied Powers, Soviet Russia and Japan began negotiations in 1920. During the negotiations, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Russian territory, while Japan sought some economic benefit in return. In order to counter this Japanese strategy, Soviet Russia signed contracts with American companies in the form of “concessions (investing with the right to develop the designated areas)” in the Far East. Since the US government refused to recognize the Soviet government however, and the negotiations with Japan had progressed, Soviet leaders prioritized the agreement with Japan. Finally, under the Japan-Soviet Basic Convention in January 1925, the USSR promised to give Japanese companies “concessions” in the Far East, and annulled the contracts with the Americans.This provided a basis for Japan to expand its influence into the Russian Far East in the late 1920s. G.V. Chicherin, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, planned to attract American companies to the Far East again, in order to indirectly restrain Japan’s expansion. At the same time, it was also thought that any diplomatic tension with Japan should be avoided, so as not to obstruct Soviet policy toward China; this finally led to the abandonment of the policy to attract American companies.At the end of 1928, it was reported that UK and Japan could ally to war with America. Soviet leaders feared that the USSR would get involved with this war in some way. L.M. Karakhan, the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to strengthen border security and affiliate with China, in order to lock the Japanese out from the Far East, and restrict them in Manchuria. He expected the conflict between Japan and America to play a minor role in this plan. The Politburo adopted his plan, and in order to incite this conflict, incorporated in their policy the “concessions” to American companies a third time. This policy, however, did not realize due to the Sino-Soviet Conflict in 1929 and the friendly relationship between Japan and America.The Manchurian Incident was a trigger for the implementation of this policy. The Sino-Soviet Conflict discontinued, allowing the Soviets to strengthen border security in the Far East. Moreover, at the beginning of 1932, I.V. Stalin and Soviet leaders judged that the United States and China opposed Japanese aggression and were inclined to reach some agreement with the Soviet Union. Finally, the USSR established diplomatic relations with these two countries, and laid “siege” to Japan by 1933.

著者

河本 和子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_82-201_97, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

79

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This essay reveals how the newborn Soviet government as the first socialist government in history treated the properties and property rights of foreigners, including concessioners, who were entitled to invest their properties in Soviet Russia. The private property system was the most important issue in the antagonism between socialist and capitalist regimes; therefore, by tracing Soviet policies on foreigners’ properties, we can ascertain how the Soviet government compromised, however insufficiently, its socialist mission to coexist with the capitalist West and then ended those compromises to build socialism in one country.The Soviet government, created by the Bolsheviks upon the October Revolution in 1917, embarked on the abolition of the private property system through policies such as the socialization of land, the nationalization of banks and enterprises, and removing the inheritance system. The government also cancelled all foreign debt for the sake of the revolution. Further, the Bolsheviks dropped out of World War I in March 1918 to make a separate peace treaty with Germany, leaving its former Entente allies behind. These actions were met with anger and distrust by the Entente, and the U.K., France, and other former allies even militarily intervened in Russia’s revolution, further intensifying its civil war. Though its government survived this war, it left Soviet Russia economically exhausted and diplomatically isolated.Despite mutual distrust between Soviet Russia and the West, economic and diplomatic relations were soon restored after the civil war. The Soviet government wanted foreign capital for economic recovery and further development, while the West sought stability in international relations and investment destinations. Particularly, Western countries demanded that Soviet Russia secure conditions for normal capitalist economic activities under its socialist government. In response, the Soviet government guaranteed property rights under certain restrictions and restored the inheritance system by enacting the Civil Code in 1922. The Bolsheviks understood this partially rebuilt Soviet market economy as a compromise with the socialist revolution.The Soviet government further called for concession projects from foreign countries and in turn granted concessions to foreigners for their economic activities. However, Soviet authorities, loyal to their socialist cause, often obstructed the concessioners to confront the concessions administrations. Furthermore, by the mid-1920s, Soviet leadership felt the country’s relations with the West were beginning to strain, which only increased the hostility to concessioners and fueled intra-party struggles. This led to Soviet Russia’s radical industrialization and construction of socialism under the first five-year plan. Accompanying this plan, most of the concessions were liquidated in the course of nationalization. The Soviet Union thus became increasingly isolated because of its soured economic and political relations with the West.

著者

宇山 智彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_98-201_113, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

63

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There is a paradox in Central Asian politics of the late Soviet period: Independence movements were feeble and political elites were basically loyal to Moscow, but the leaders of the republics swiftly decided to declare independence during the fall of the Soviet Union. While contemporary observers underlined nationalism shared not only by activists of national movements but also by leaders of the republican communist parties, it was hardly a major concern for the latter. Research on the Brezhnev era shows that political elites in Central Asia gained limited but significant autonomy during that period, but this fact alone cannot explain the process of independence. This study reexamines the relationships between the national question and politics in the Central Asian republics, especially the impacts of the four major conflicts: the Almaty events of 1986, the Ferghana events of 1989, the Dushanbe events and the Osh events of 1990. We argue that these events triggered or accelerated the transformation of politics in the republics, adding elements of mass politics to Brezhnevite boss politics in narrow elite circles and creating the republics’ own political arenas. The emergence of these arenas did not mean a growing orientation toward independence per se, but the violent suppression of demonstrations and riots, combined with repercussions of defamatory campaigns against nationalism in the early period of perestroika, which made the relationships between Moscow and Central Asia uneasy, gave centrifugal force to these arenas.At the same time, these events had varied influence on the standing of political leaders and on intra-elite cohesion and cleavages. In Kazakhstan, Gennadii Kolbin, whose appointment caused the Almaty events, had no other choice than to cooperate with Kazakh elites, who remained cohesive and subsequently supported the next leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev. In Uzbekistan, the Ferghana events facilitated the ascent of Islam Karimov, who later concentrated power in his own hands on the pretext of keeping the relative post-conflict stability. In Kyrgyzstan, the Osh events discredited Absamat Masaliev and created the opportunity for the academician Askar Akaev to become president, but it also deepened intra-elite cleavages and paved the way for the perpetuation of “pluralism by default.” In Tajikistan, Qahhor Mahkamov remaining in power despite his mishandling of the Dushanbe events seriously deepened intra-elite cleavages that later developed into a civil war. Thus, the national question and conflicts during perestroika preconditioned diverse power relations in the post-Soviet Central Asian states. At the same time, the experience of conflict strengthened the political leaders’ desire to restore order and boss politics, now without Moscow’s tutelage, leading to an inclination toward authoritarianism.

著者

溝口 修平

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_114-201_129, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

42

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In a highly patronalistic society, such as one in post-Soviet Eurasia, a popularly elected president is generally the most dominant political figure in the country. As he or she not only has great formal power prescribed by the constitution but also exercises a high degree of informal power through patron-client relationships, the president can control the political elites by giving rewards and delivering punishments. The more immense power the president has, however, the more uncertain presidential term limits will make the problem of succession. In fact, some presidents in the post-Soviet states managed to extend their stay in office beyond their mandated periods, but others failed to do so. This article explores what causes such a difference.The existing literature adopts a rationalistic approach to this problem: presidents decide whether to extend their tenure or to step down by calculating the costs and benefits to remain in power. These studies argue that presidents will succeed in the extension of their tenure, when they hold great power and resources to co-opt and threaten the elites. There have been some instances of tenure prolongation, however, where power and resources were equally distributed between the president and the opposition leader. In these cases, the rationalistic explanations have limitations.This article argues that presidents would succeed in extending their tenure by justifying their rule beyond their mandated periods and obtaining the public endorsement for it, even when they have difficulty in gaining its approval from the elites. This is because public support would affect the elites’ expectations about who would be the dominant political figure. Thus, referendums are useful tools for presidents who want to evade their term-limits.With the above in mind, this article conducts three case studies. First, in Central Asian states where presidents acquired enormous power just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the constitutional provisions of presidential term limits have been “gutted” because presidents have felt no constraint to distort the term-limit rules. Second, Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka, making use of his populist rhetoric and holding referendums, was successful in expanding his power and prolonging his tenure. Third, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma also used referendums for the sake of his own interests, but the defections from the ruling elites interrupted him from achieving his goals. As Kuchma lost public support due to the “Cassette Scandal,” the elites changed their expectations about who would be their strongest patron. In sum, in a hybrid regime where a certain degree of political competition exists, the success or failure of a president to extend his or her tenure depends on the endorsement from the public, because it will influence the elites’ behavior.

著者

水本 義彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_130-201_139, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

9

著者

西田 竜也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_140-201_149, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

11

著者

中村 文子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_150-201_153, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

池田 丈佑

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_154-201_156, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

鈴木 絢女

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_157-201_160, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

松井 康浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_161, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

飯田 敬輔 大島 美穂 大矢根 聡 酒井 啓子 中西 寛

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_175, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

著者

松井 康浩

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_1-201_16, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

49

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This special issue illustrates new horizons in Soviet studies as they have developed over the nearly 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, following the clue through this growing body of work in three keywords: memory, legacy, and empire. Memory reflects more as the distance of time or space from the given objects and phenomena grows. The idea of legacy, too, emerges after its objects come to an end and disappear. Thus, the analysis and examination of the Soviet Union in terms of memory and legacy could be introduced only after it ceased to exist in the present.The third term, empire, however, has been part of the discussion of the USSR dating back to the time before it vanished. For instance, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse’s work L’empire éclaté : la révolte des nations en U.R.S.S., first published in 1978, describes the Soviet Union as a multiethnic empire in which the central power, which inhered absolutely in the Communist Party, exercised total control over a vast space. Furthermore, it cannot be doubted that the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc in the moments immediately before and after a series of ethnic conflicts erupted within its borders expanded this discussion of the Soviet Empire. The imperial order that dominated Soviet territory, along with its regions of influence, has reemerged as an important issue. The series of studies of empire that has developed in historiography and international relations has been driving this orientation. Finally, the Soviet Union has also found its place within the umbrella of comparative studies of empires as well as an intriguing area of research.This special issue explores new horizons of research on the basis of the three concepts of the Soviet Union in memory, the Soviet Legacy, and the USSR as an empire.