著者

松川 克彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a coup d'état in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the “colonel group” after his death.

著者

粕谷 真司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.199, pp.199_65-199_80, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

82

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This article explores the British initiative to improve European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early years of the Thatcher government. EPC was a framework for foreign policy cooperation among the member states of the European Community (EC) established in 1970. Despite Margaret Thatcher’s reputation as pro-American and opposition to European federalism, Britain played an active role in shaping EPC’s evolution. In October 1980, Lord Carrington, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, proposed EPC’s improvement. After a year of negotiation, the Foreign Ministers of the Ten adopted the London Report in October 1981. The London Report codified existing arrangements in EPC. It also contained a wide range of improvements such as EPC’s full association with the European Commission and the establishment of a crisis procedure.This article demonstrates that the British initiative had two objectives. First, Britain needed a more effective EPC in order to pursue British and wider Western interests. Britain, under Carrington’s leadership, attempted to launch European initiatives in international problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Britain’s view, these initiatives were intended to complement US diplomatic actions that would serve not only British but also Western interests in general. Therefore, Britain felt the need to improve EPC, as it was neither strong nor stable enough framework to conduct major foreign policy initiatives.Second, Britain expected to overcome its isolation in European integration process by showing its constructiveness in EPC. Since the mid-1970s, Britain had been isolated within the EC as a result of a renegotiation of its EC membership and its absence from the European Monetary System. In the early years of the Thatcher government, acrimonious disputes over the British budgetary contribution led to Britain’s further isolation. By contributing to the development of EPC, Britain tried to prove its “Europeanness” and overcome its isolation in European integration process.This article also reveals that Britain fell into a difficult situation in the course of its initiative. In January 1981, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher launched a major initiative to create a “European Union” through the establishment of “Common Foreign Policy”. The British government feared that support for Genscher’s initiative could be criticized by anti-marketeers in Conservative supporters. Also, Britain worried that Genscher’s initiative could lead to the loss of a flexible character of EPC and lessen freedom in the conduct of British foreign policy. As a result, Britain stopped overtly displaying its “Europeanness”. While Britain contributed to the making of the London Report, it failed to overcome its isolation in European integration through the initiative.

著者

中島 岳志

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.54-69,L8, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

46

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Raja Mahendra Pratap (1886-1979) was born the third son of the Mursan royal family of Uttar Pradesh in India, and received his education under strong Muslim influence in Aligarh. At the age of 21, young Raja traveled around the world through Europe, the United States, Japan, and to China.The next year (1908), having become aware of the finiteness of material wealth, Pratap established the “Prem Mahavidyalya (University of Love)” in Vrindavan.With the outbreak of World War I, Pratap went to Europe hoping to gain the support of Germany for the cause of liberating India from British rule. He joined in secret maneuvers with Germany and Turkey, and in 1915 went to Afghanistan as part of a delegation for both nations to ask the royal king to enter the war against England. The negotiations failed, and he established the Provisional Government of India in Kabul.In 1918 Pratap rushed to the post-revolutionary Soviet Union, and had a meeting with Trotsky. Since he could not continue carrying out activities in Germany because of WWI, he fled to Budapest in Hungary, and there, established the religious organization “Religion of Love.” He began to appear for the idea of “World Federalism” based on the spirit of “love.”In 1922 Pratap went to Japan in order to strengthen sympathies for the Indian independence movement in East Asia, at which time he also began to associate with R. B. Bose. His goal of visiting various nations gradually shifted to one of propagating his ideas regarding the “Religion of Love” and “World Federalism”, and to this end he published many articles while in Japan. In September 1929 he founded the “World Federation” magazine in Berlin. Moving from the United States to Japan to Manchu-kuo, he continued to publish a total of 100 issues until March 1942. His unique notion of religious ontology influenced many Japanese Pan-Asianists and produced various linkages among their ideas.Pratap settled down in Japan in November 1930, and became involved in anti-British maneuvers in Manchu-kuo. The results of these activities however did not turn out well. His social position drastically declined in the mid-1930s and he gradually lost the influence he once had in Japan. Nonetheless, Pratap kept a wide range of personal connections all over the world, and managed to maintain certain ideological associations by means of correspondence with people of different races, nations, and religions.This paper focuses on the process of how the World Federation movement, which Pratap developed, inspired connections with Japanese Pan-Asianists, and how it was used as propaganda to expand Japanese Imperialism. The relations between Pan-Asianism and both anti-colonial and religious networks that allowed Pratap to travel the globe are also discussed in this paper.

著者

野村 乙二朗

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1980, no.66, pp.155-158, 1980-11-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

ゴールドスタイン ジョシュア・S 梅本 哲也

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.85, pp.151-192, 1987-05-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

151

著者

山口 定

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.38, pp.56-85, 1969-04-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

26

著者

山口 航

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_46-188_61, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

88

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The former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established “the Comprehensive National Security Study Group” in 1979, which mainly consisted of Japanese leading scholars and government officials. However, the term “comprehensive security” was not invented by him, but was already well known to Japanese people at the end of the 1970s.Many previous studies have discussed the concept from various points of view. However, they have not explained in what ways policy-makers accepted it and regarded it as an integral factor in Japanese security policy.This study focuses on the impacts of comprehensive security on policy-makers, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which was in charge of general security issues. It clarifies the situation in which comprehensive security appeared, explains what perceptions the ministry had of the concept, and shows how international and internal factors in those days influenced those perceptions, using declassified Japanese and U.S. government documents.It also pays attention to the different forms of security, focusing the discussion on the attempt to establish the “National Comprehensive Security Council” during the Zenko Suzuki Administration at the beginning of the 1980s. Comprehensive security did not simply comprise military security – i.e. security in the narrow sense – but also economic security, food security and others, i.e. security in the broad sense. At the same time, into comprehensive security was integrated anything that did not otherwise fall into the category of security.These elements contributed to jurisdictional disputes. The differentiation of security led other ministries and agencies to become concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was interested in economic security, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, among others, was concerned with food security.At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manifest interest in comprehensive security. Its main concern was security in the narrow sense because of an administrative dispute with the Japan Defense Agency. This study shows how it started to become involved in comprehensive security, and demonstrates what impact the differentiation of security had on ministries and agencies.Previous studies have regarded the Japanese government as a single actor, and have not revealed the differences between ministries and agencies. This paper demonstrates that for the Japanese government, the concept was not monolithic. Even though ministries and agencies were allied on the surface, they had different opinions and objectives. By investigating the acceptance of comprehensive security, this study aims to clarify the implications of this concept in the context of U.S.-Japan relations in the last phase of the Cold War.

著者

安藤 実

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.38, pp.42-55, 1969-04-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

24

著者

河野 康子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.127, pp.206-215, 2001-05-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

12

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

84

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In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

著者

徐 博晨

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_136-197_151, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

39

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China’s lending to many developing countries, including countries of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, is currently of great interest. Many of these loans do not conform to OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance. This article focuses its agenda in the various occurrences in which the Chinese government’s lending policy was criticized in the international community, analyze the reaction of the Chinese government amidst such circumstances, and discuss the risk of foreign aid in the context of controversial between developed donor countries and developing donor countries.China’s external loan, which has been rapidly expanding in recent years, has been mainly invested into the infrastructure construction of developing countries. Due to the opaqueness of its policy process and the attachment with Chinese companies, there is an increasing level of criticisms both from other donor countries such as Japan and from recipient countries. Although there is a view that the “over-lending problem” could be seen as great power politics, this article wants to pay attention to the situation where lender countries, for the first time after the end of the Cold War, act with fundamentally different logic.Many of the developed countries set a strict criteria for recipient countries, and yet implement assistance that provide high-level incentives. On the other hand, China does not care as much about good governance and environment nor about human rights situation, though it does loan with relatively high interest rate. China is not bound by the framework of DAC and the Paris club. Not only does China argue that it should not be criticized for the “over-lending problem” from the viewpoint of development aid, but it even claims that the past development aid model is absurd to follow. By challenging the international norm of foreign aids, China aims to maintain its liberty in development projects and pursue its own political and economic agenda.The size of China’s foreign aid is still small and not competitive with Western donors. Compared to Japan, which has maintained the world’s top spending on aid over the 1990s, China as a donor country has only limited share in global aid expenditures. However, this article argues that the mingling of international politics and presumed agenda with the foreign aid and debt problems, loan from China is affecting international society more than any other non-OECD donors. The international regime of ODA, China’s foreign policy, as well as domestic politics of recipient countries are allowing Chinese loans to raise reaction and influence bigger than their monetary size. While countermeasures against Chinese lending were also deployed by the Western countries including the United States, this distortion that international politics brought to foreign-aided economic development would eventually cause additional risk for both donor and recipient countries.

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_101-200_118, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

48

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This paper focuses on the main theme of this 200th volume of International Relations: What is the ‘common challenge’, and what is the ‘shared approach’ among all scholars who belong to Japan Association of International Relations? The exploration of this macro-scale issue is taken by the perspective of International Cultural Relations, which seems to effectively deal with the core assumption of this theme.To start with, part 1 configures the systematic understanding of the whole questions, which takes the form of typical dialectic of universal/particular dualism of the discipline: globally universal one International Relations on the one side, and nationally divided many International Relations’ on the other. Also, part 1 pays enough attention to the recent tides of multilingualism and multiculturalism within one scholar or within one national IRs. Then it analyses recent researches on the nature of past and future IR in Japan and future vison of Global IR. Those precedent research has not reached to the further important vision of the global structure of IR, and the paper tries to construct that.Part 2 discusses one of the two main accounts of the basic structure of the discipline of science in general, by examining the researches of Hiroyuki Yoshikawa and Ichikawa Atsunobu. The first is about the theoretical aporia of IR, based on the irrelevances which stems from both the nature of social science / humanity, compared to that of natural science, and the consequence of theory making from the different views toward a given area. Also, this analysis seeks to break through such aporia by making a totally new discipline, which should be called Global Relations.Part 3 explains the second one, which is the theory of interaction between two culturally or lingually different disciplines devised by Kenichiro Hirano and Yanabu Akira. The theory is based on the premise that regards the encounter of two disciplines as mutual ‘encounter’ between the unknown, and that emphasize the unique function of Japanese language which accepts any kinds of foreign concepts through translation.Part 4 introduces the same challenge in the field of global history by Masashi Haneda and tries to acquire some useful implication for advancing the discussion. His contention about the ideal image of making global history through multilingual interaction of different system of knowledges, and rendering asymmetrical power structure between English or western languages and non-Western language including Japanese has ample implication to IR world, which has much asymmetrical relations between English language and others. The concluding section summarizes the whole argument and seeks to suggest the future vision for the future of ‘Japanese’ International Relations.

著者

上原 史子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_99-114, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)

参考文献数

56

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This article covers the development of the Austrian foreign policy shift from permanent neutrality to a strong European Engagement after World War II. After World War II, the Allies (USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) divided Austria into four zones. Neutrality was reached in long and difficult negotiations between the Austrian and the Soviet governments, granting Austrian independence on October, 26, 1955. Neutrality can be seen as the prize Austria had to pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Austrian territory after ten years of occupation. With neutrality, Austria declared not to join military alliances and would not allow military bases from foreign countries on its territory.From the beginning, Austria's neutrality has been accompanied by an active and independent foreign policy. Unlike Switzerland, Austria joined the United Nations and has played an active part on many UN commissions and committees, in addition to providing troops for several UN peacekeeping operations since 1960.Participation in the economic integration of Western Europe has hardly ever been seen by Austrian politicians to be in conflict with their country's neutrality, so in the 1960s, there were further discussions concerning membership of the European Community. But Austria's neutrality proved to be an obstacle when these discussions were abandoned in the face of strong opposition from the Soviet leadership, which at that time saw the EC as an extension of NATO.The free trade agreements concluded between Austria and the EC in 1972 were regarded as a sufficient basis for economic cooperation with the EC over the next 15 years. It was towards the end of the 1980's that the question of joining the EC was again raised by the Austrian government, with a view to participating in the EC's Single Market.While Austria prepared for membership, the question was to be answered if such a step would be compatible with the status of permanent neutrality being the core of the State Treaty (“Staatsvertrag”) from 1955.In 1988, the Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadse, was strongly against the EC membership of neutral Austria, but in 1989 its tone was softened and Soviet Union recognized Austria's right to choose its own integration policy. On 17 July 1989, Austrian foreign minister, Mock, handed in Austria's application for EC membership in Brussels.In the aide-memoire from the Austrian government to the EC in 1990, the aim of accession was confirmed: Austria was in the heart of Europe and wished to assume all the rights and obligations of a Community member. Neutrality, it went on, was Austria's “specific contribution to the preservation of peace and security in Europe”. Thus Neutrality has been redefined in order to enable Austria to conduct a policy of European solidarity.

著者

毛里 和子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.43, pp.136-154, 1970-12-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

63

著者

西谷 真規子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.128, pp.115-129,L13, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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In what situation does a chief of government regard international public opinion as important, and how does he use it?Like U. S. foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis/War, when a country forms an international coalition to threaten an enemy in a coercive way, the chief of government of that country has to rally international public opinion among coalition partners to unite the coalition. This serves to bolster the credibility of the coalition's will and capability to use coercive measures against the enemy.One way to lead international public opinion can be referred to as “symbolic appeal strategy”, which is basically the same concept as “reverberation tactics” in the logic of two-level games. This stratagem allows one to use political symbols to appeal directly to domestic public opinion in coalition countries in order to pressure coalition governments to maintain their coalition policy. During the Gulf Crisis/War, the United States-the leader of the anti-Iraqi coalition-used the United Nations Security Council, Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition and so on, as symbols to appeal to public opinion in coalition countries, particularly in the Arab world, Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan.Decision-makers' perception of international public opinion and public opinion in foreign countries is the basis for influencing international sentiment toward a given cause. Decision-makers tend to recognize the international situation based on their own stereotypes and conceptual lenses, and under high uncertainty they tend to be oversensitive to potential changes in the international community. During the Gulf Crisis/War, partly out of fear that Arab nationalists would unite and pressure Arab governments to split from the coalition, U. S. decision-makers were eager to directly engage the Arab public with political symbols and rhetoric to rally Arab opinion in support of U. S military intervention against Iraq.

著者

新垣 修

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_65-190_80, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

100

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Armed conflicts between government forces and other armed groups may become humanitarian disasters. As can be seen in the Syrian Arabic Republic, such conflicts are accompanied by large-scale displacement. How do the norms of the refugee regime deal with people who have escaped armed conflicts? This article offers some insights for exploring them by paying attention to the change and formation of norms in the refugee regime.The first section regards an idea of a new approach to fill the gap between the function of the existing norm in refugee regime and contemporary crises caused by armed conflicts. This idea shows that, if the existing norm is amended, individuals who have fled from armed conflicts can be protected as “refugees” in terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). To protect civilians out of their states of origin, this idea proposes the approach to incorporate international humanitarian law (IHL) into the interpretative standards for “refugee” in term of the Refugee Convention.The second section regards an alternative norm of the refugee regime, that is to say, the norm of a temporary refuge. It has been argued that this norm was formed to protect civilian victims such as non-combatants who fled to other states from violence and other forms of threats. One pillar of this argument is that the norm prohibits the repatriation of civilians who crossed a border from a state engaged in armed conflict, where infringements of the principles or rules of IHL frequently occur. It is an intriguing phenomenon that the norm is recently regaining attention at the forums of the United Nations and academia.The third section regards a premise to interpret the language of international law on the norms into the language of international politics. This article explains the principle to restrict access of refugees to the North. This restrictive principle functions to deter the refugee flow from the South.In the final section, this article considers the implications of two norms for refugee regime. Ostensibly, the change and formation of the norms look to extend the scope to protect so that individuals, who flee armed conflict, may be covered. However, it is important to understand how the change and formation of the norms have been promoted in the political context of the asymmetry of power between the North and the South. It is the conclusion of this article that the norms justify the refugee regime to contain people, who are afraid of the tragedy of armed conflict, in the neighboring states and in the South.

著者

佐藤 雪野

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.105, pp.201-206, 1994

著者

新垣 拓

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_68-80, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

47

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The U.S. nuclear sharing policy for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started in the late 1950s. The policy's initial objective was to enhance the NATO's defense capability and its readiness by providing the nonnuclear allies with military training for the use of nuclear weapons which were to be transferred from the U.S. custody in case of emergency. However, after the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik, the nuclear sharing was also beginning to be recognized as an effective nuclear nonproliferation measure for the European allies since Washington anticipated that it could provide further reassurance for the allies and allay their concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended deterrence. In this context, located at “the front line” and sensitive about the credibility and reliability of the US extended deterrence, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had become the most important allies that affected the nuclear sharing policy during the Cold War period.For the US government, allowing the Germans too much “access” to its nuclear weapons through the nuclear sharing arrangement might cause serious concerns of other major allies, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Therefore, finding a West Germany's fair “share” in the NATO nuclear defense and, at the same time, avoiding other allies to raise concerns against it was the critical requirement for the success of the nuclear sharing policy. From the latter half of the 1950's to the late 1960s, U.S. government tackled this NATO's nuclear problem by exploring the two different approaches: “hardware solution” or “collective nuclear force approach” and “consultation approach”.The Johnson years were the critical time because the decision was made to adopt the consultation approach, which led to the creation of NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. By focusing on the decision-making process and using newly declassified documents, this article will explain that the three deferent processes had affected the decision: the stagnation process of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, the process of gaining acceptance of the consultation approach, and the process of growing momentum to materialize the approach.

著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991

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Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.<br>This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.<br>Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.<br>Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.<br>In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.<br>Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.<br>When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the &ldquo;colonel group&rdquo; after his death.

著者

三宅 正樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.38, pp.105-133, 1969