著者
小沼 新
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1977, no.57, pp.61-81,L3, 1977-05-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
62

Ho Chi Minh is called Lenin in Vietnam. As is well known, he devoted his whole life to the liberation of his homeland. I cannot discuss all of his thoughts and political action in the limited space given to me. In addition, almost none of his diary is left anywhere and, as far as I know, there are only ten works or so on his biography. But each work has its own point of view.Therefore, I will offer my thesis as follows:1) I will take into consider the period from his birth to his entrance into the French Communist Party. In this period, however, his dominant thoughts is nationalism and anti-colonialism.2) He took part in the Fifth Congress of Comintern and grew to the orthodox Communist (Marxist). And he was sent, on a special mission of forming the revolutionary organization, to China, Hong Kong and Thailand. Another important fact was that the Comintern desided to form the anti-fascism united front in 1935.3) Along Comintern lines, he made the Viet-Minh in his homeland in 1941. As the result of political and army movement the Viet-Minh succeeded in the August Revolution, and grasped all political powers all over the country. But its victory was destructed by the Great-powers, so that the Indochina War begun. In this section, the emphasis is laid on his pliable strategy and tactics at many political crisis.4) In 1954 the Geneva Conference put an end to the Indochina War. But the Geneva Agreements divided Vietnam right in two which had been historically one country. Ho Chi Minh had a great agony. But finally he dicided at first to construct socialism in the North Vietnam and then, to liberate the South where U. S. A. and Ngo Dinh Diem regime begun to rule. In 1960 the South Vietnam Liberation National Front was born in the South and Vietnam War (The Second Indochina War) begun. This war ended on April 1975 with the liberation of Saigon; which although he died on the third of September in 1969 was named Ho Chi Minh operation. In this section the main stress in laid on the moralistic phase of Ho Chi Minh.
著者
高山 巖
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_48-63, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)
参考文献数
60

It was in his monographic essay titled “Westphalia and All That” that international relations scholar Steven D. krasner criticized the “orthodox” view that the peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks the end of the old medieval world and the beginning of a new era in international relations history. Leo Gross, a prominent internationa law expert, had similarly maintained that Westphalia was the starting point for the development of modern international law and that it was “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world”. Krasner rejected both the “orthodox” and Gross' views as “wrong”.Krasner's criticism is based on three propositions; 1) “History is not so neatly compartmentalized”; Westphalia was neither an end nor a beginning; 2) The basic issue at Westphalia was not so much one of building a new international order based on sovereign equality of states as a more reaistic one of how the Holy Roman Empire, which had lost the war, would satisfy France and Sweden, which had won; 3)Contrary to the “orthodox” view, Westphalia was “past-oriented”, in the sense that most of the issues taken up there were those of the feudal period, such as hereditary succession, composition of the Diet, election of the Empperor, etc.The purpose of the present study is to place the “orthodox” and Gross' views against the background of Krasner's criticism in an effort to judge which side can provide more adequate and convincing evidence for a satisfactory interpretation of Westphalia. By employing what we propose to call a “symbolic monument” approach, which “constructs” history by connecting historical evidence with interpretation, we have examined such issues as the role of “world charters”, laicization of international law, the system of collective security, and the policy of prestige and diplomatic formalities, and arrived at the conclusion that the “orthodox” and Gross' views are convincing enough to warrant full recognition, while krasner fails to “construct” his own history to make his criticism meaningful. Criticism for the sake of criticism alone does not lead to a discerning knowledge and evaluation of historical realities. “Construction” of history must accompany criticism.We fully share, however, Krasner's admonition that history is not so neatly compartmentalized, and probably it is through the sharing of this admonition with him that a diaogue will begin between us.
著者
若松 邦弘
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.110, pp.23-38,L6, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
30

This paper deals with the development of British ‘race relations policy’ and its present status in terms of the commitment of central government. Race relations policy, which is defined as public initiatives aiming at the integration of immigrants and their descendants into British society, has been encouraged mainly at local government level. Though there have been some attempts to eliminate racial discrimination by legislation, central government's initiatives have been to support the actions of local authorities. Within the mutual autonomy between central and local government, race relations policy has, at the local level, established an independent policy area which has objectives and principles of its own. In the case of central government departments, the Home Office is supposed to play the central role in race relations; its actions on this issue have been mainly from a law and order perspective and little attempt has been made to coordinate policy between departments. Generally speaking, race relations have received a low priority in the policy agenda of central government. Central government maintains a non-committal posture on race relations and has delegated initiatives as much as possible to local authorities.This explains why most academic research has focussed its attention on local authorities' initiatives so far. However the influence of central government on race relations has been increasing recently. Since the mid 1980s, against a background of restrictions in government expenditure, such measures as deregulation and transfer of social service operations to the private sector or public agencies have gradually curtailed local authorities' functions. Increasing central intervention in local authorities has influenced local policy. This is also the case with race relations. Central government has come to have more impact on overall public initiatives on race relations. Local authorities' initiatives have been subject to great alteration in the mid 1990s. In this paper reference is made to three concrete measures by central government, that is, the Race Relations Acts, Section 11 grants and inner city policy. Central government's stance on race relations revealed therein is analysed.
著者
長谷川 雄一
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1982, no.71, pp.93-108,L10, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
65

When considering the Manchukuo as a whole, we shall have to reexamine a Daikoraikoku plan conceived by SUENAGA Misao (1869-1960).Against that background, there were radical changes both at home and abroad; and a new trend toward antirationalist ideas increasingly grew out of the rationalist ideas that had been dominating since the Meiji period.Gondo Seikyo's doctrine of a Shashoku State, backed by a self-ruling society, was also based on this trend. The image of state developed in the Daikoraikoku plan was a product of this indigenous idea of his.On the contrary, concerning the international affairs of the time, we can point out three changes. Firstly, an independent movement of Koreans in South Manchuria and Primorskij Kraj became active under the influence of the 3.1. movement in Korea. Secondly, Manchuria was in a power vacuum in the midst of big change in East Asia caused by Japan's withdrawal of troops from Siberia.Thirdly, the upsurging of a trend of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, which was shown in the new immigration and land laws, made a considerable impact upon Japan and influenced the Japanese “Return” to Asia.The Daikoraikoku plan was proposed as a solution to these changes in and around Japan. And it also included the principle of Odo Seizi (Righteous Way) and Minzoku Kyowa (Racial Harmony) propounded at the time of the setting-up of Manchukuo.
著者
室山 義正
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1997, no.115, pp.126-143,L16, 1997-05-17 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
48

The Japan-US security structure was built up under the situation of East-West Cold War and Japan's loss of self-defense capability after World War II. In its structure, the role of the US Forces stationed in Japan is “directly” to defend peace and stability in the Far East; while Japan's role is to provide the US Forces with bases free of charge and to support them by sharing expenses for the USFJ as well as to guarantee them freedom of actions. Thus, Japan “indirectly” contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security not only in the Far East but also in the world.The Japan-US security system functioned well as it was essentially designed to deter the then USSR threat in the region. Under such strategic environments, the Japan-US security system can militarily cope with the threats by means of Japan's “individual right of self-defense” and the “indirect supports” given to the USFJ mentioned above. However, with the end of Cold War the security environments have changed. During the Gulf War Japan could not carry out military action in that region. Japan's huge contributions based on the principle of “indirect supports” under the Japan-US security system were hardly appreciated. It even invited criticism at home and from abroad that Japan was playing a “check-book diplomacy.” Obviously the Japan-US security system malfunctioned.Nevertheless, for the US the security system with Japan is becoming increasingly important since the world's economic center was shifting from the West to the Pacific-Asia region and the US still feel the necessity of its military control over the region. Furthermore, most immediately there is the suspicion that North Korea might be developing nuclear-weapons and there is also the concern that Japan might eventually take an independent policy from the US. Indeed, there is also a worry that China might become a threat in the region in the future. At the same time, the US itself is facing the fiscal constraints to reduce its defense expenditures. Under these circumstances, it becomes logically the central US purpose to create a new Japan-US security system based on “collective defense” and “direct supports”.But the US military presense in the region that is a key element of the new “Definition” will be reduced and the US will gradually lose the military control in the region. On the other hand, Japan will grow into an independent strategic nation and China will become a real powerful state. For the stabilization of East Asia a new framework of multilateral security system is indispensable. Such framework will ensure the US's constructive commitments in the region, China's constructive participation, Korean Peninsula's stabilization and Japan's assuming the role of an independent political actor without provoking the suspicion of the neighboring nations. In the long run, Japan's security system will be based on the UN's global security system a regional security system closely connecting with it and Japan's own exclusively defense-oriented defense system. One can forecast that the Japan-US security system will gradually change into a political, rather than military alliance.
著者
浅香 幸枝
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_113-207_129, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
40

The year 2019 was the 151st anniversary of Japanese overseas migration: mainly in the Americas but also worldwide, including Japan. According to the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad, the total number of Nikkei is roughly 3,800,000: some 2,240,000 in LAC. Firstly Brazil (some 1,190,000), then the U.S.A. (some 1,330,000 including Hawaii (240,000)), thirdly Japan (some 250,000), fourthly Canada (some 120,000), fifthly Peru (some 100,000). The Revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990, extended domestic employment privileges to second and third generation Japanese descendants who travel between Japan and LAC and contribute to exchange and interaction.Japanese overseas migration was one of the ways to resolve domestic overpopulation and poverty but national high economic growth stopped this. Later third and forth generations took their place in Nikkei societies. The “Report of the Panel of Experts on Collaborating with Communities of Japanese Immigrants and Descendants (“Nikkei”) in Latin America and the Caribbean” May 9, 2017 was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the Japanese Government has been achieving a partnership with Nikkei communities in LAC in an “All-Japan” style.This article focuses on this diplomatic policy with Nikkei communities, and will consider the impact on Japanese diplomatic negotiations through Nikkei networks in LAC and other regions, as bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. To consider such multilateral diplomatic negotiations, we have collected documents on participant observations and have analyzed three international conventions: the 19th Pan American Nikkei Convention 2017 (Lima), the 59th Convention of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (Honolulu) and the 20th Pan American Nikkei Convention (San Francisco).Analysis results: over 3 days in each convention, participants shared the same history of host Nikkei societies and formed a Nikkei consciousness by staying and eating in the same hotels, etc. On this common foundation, the network between the Americas and Japan fosters Nikkei bonding. At these conventions participants discuss what “Nikkei” means. Proof that Nikkei people reflect on their own position in changing international affairs. Therefore, when we consider a partnership with Nikkei, collaboration with them helps us find universal solutions to achieve the 2030 Agenda’s global goals, in which they can flourish and become a bridge between Japan and other countries.Specifically, how to collaborate with Nikkei people depends on each country’s situation. Considering individual differences, we can extract a type of success by Nikkei people in the Americas. They are good at technological advancement, and especially agricultural technology, development and production. Nikkei people had to improve themselves and are appreciated for their success in surviving in their host country. Their Nikkei legacy thus underlines the importance of “Gaman (patience)” and “Okagesama (gratitude)”.
著者
藤田 吾郎
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_130-207_145, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
85

Focusing on the Ashida Memorandum, this article examines the rise and fall of Japan’s security plan to station US military forces in Japan in the case of emergency. On September 13, 1947, Ashida Hitoshi, the Vice Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Katayama cabinet, in cooperation with high officials of the Foreign Ministry, submitted a memorandum on Japan’s security to Robert L. Eichelberger, the Commander of US 8th Army. This memorandum, while stating security cooperation between the United States and Japan, argued to secure Japan’s independence through US military forces stationing in islands surrounding Japan’s mainland in peacetime. Nevertheless, the Japanese government, after the submission of the memorandum, decided to request the maintenance of US forces in Japan even after the peace settlement. This article, using hitherto used and newly declassified primary sources of Japanese foreign and police officials, and paying attention to the impact of the police reform of late 1947, reconsiders the historical process up to the formation of post-war Japan’s security policy.Ashida and high officials of the Foreign Ministry, assuming US military forces would be withdrawn from Japan’s mainland after the peace settlement, sought to get a permission from GHQ regarding the reinforcement of Japan’s police forces to deal with internal communist threats. The Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur showed a positive stance toward Ashida’s attempt. On September 3, he told the Japanese government that the Japanese police forces would be strengthened. Based on this information, Ashida and MOFA staff worked out the plan of emergency stationing of US forces. In other words, in the background of the submission of the Ashida Memorandum, there was an optimistic expectation that GHQ would permit the strengthening of the Japanese police forces in advance of the peace settlement.Nevertheless, simultaneous with the submission of this memorandum, due to the change of MacArthur’s stance, GHQ chose the large-scale de-centralization of the Japanese police system as the principle of the police reform. Therefore, on September 17, GHQ directed the Japanese government to initiate this reform. In contrast to MOFA’s expectation, due to the establishment of the new Police Law in late 1947, Japan’s internal security capability was largely restricted. In these circumstances, the Japanese government was forced to depend on US military forces to maintain Japan’s internal security. Therefore, Yoshida Shigeru, after coming into power in late 1948, chose to deal with internal communist threats by maintaining US military presence in Japan’s mainland. Through examining the interrelation between internal and external issues, this article argues that internal security calculation was an important rationale behind the formation of the postwar US-Japan security partnership.
著者
ミラー 枝里香
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2022, no.207, pp.207_146-207_162, 2022-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
96

The 1973 energy crisis demonstrated the thriving influence of oil producer countries while also marking the termination of the Anglo-American led oil order. This literature examines the then Prime Minister Edward Heath’s reactions to the crisis, contending that Heath’s government formulated a two-faced oil policy. On the one hand, it supported America’s initiative to form a consumer front in order to confront the producers’ attempt to raise oil prices, while on the other hand, it developed bilateral deals in order to build inter-dependent relationships with the Arab oil producers. This admittedly challenges the accepted views in the literatures in oil history and Anglo-American history. The commentators in the former realm believe that the nature of the relationship between oil majors and the British government had been changing due to their different interests in North Sea Oil, which interrupted the government’s policy-making for the long-term basis. This resulted in Heath’s ad hoc reactions to the crisis, which forced the government to seek bilateral deals with the producers in order to cover the oil loss. In a similar vein, the commentators related to the latter tend to consider that Heath’s attempt to harmonise its Middle East policy to that of the French aggravated the Anglo-American relationship and Britain was not in a position where it took a collaborative action with the United States. This literature, however, points out a distinct chasm between research in the oil history and Anglo-American history during this period. It focuses on viewing both fields not as distinct areas but as part of the whole, thereby exposing subtle nuances in British duplicitous policy during the period. Precisely, by analysing communications between Heath, his advisors and executive members of oil majors before the oil crisis, it clarifies that most of them believed that the British interest in oil market would be aggrandised through collaborative operations with the Untied States, while Heath, seeing the changing balance of power in the oil order, developed bilateral deals with Arab oil producers in cooperation with France. It subsequently examines Heath’s Middle East policy during and after the Yom Kippur War, where the pro-American thinking was buttressed by the FCO’s idea that Britain should support the US peace initiative. Heath finally showed a middle ground based on the policymaking before the crisis, leading Britain to support America’s oil initiative while also finding its position in a new oil order by promoting the relationship with producers, the policy of which was far from extemporaneous. Despite the ambiguousness, the nuanced statecraft was imperative for maintaining British interests between the conflicting agendas of the United States, France and producer countries.