著者
平山 勉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.1-17, 2009

The purpose of this article is to clarify the actions of the South Manchuria Railways Company (SMR) and its shareholders during the period of the 1933 SMR stock issue, using documents from the closed institutional records of its Tokyo branch. My interest in this issue is to establish how the SMR achieved this capital increase from private sector shareholders and investors in general, given the turbulent business environment resulting from the Manchurian Incident and the resulting increased scrutiny of the SMR itself. At the same time, I consider the significance of changes in the shareholder body during the take-up period by examining the reorganization of the SMR. In summary, this article establishes the following four points. First, bids for the newly-issued common stock were distributed approximately into two groups, the majority of bids clustering around the 53 yen mark, below the lower price of the offering. The record of the public offering shows that while some general investors were enthusiastic during the "Manchuria boom," others demonstrated a rather more cool attitude. Second, after the new stock came into circulation, it was rural shareholders who took up new and outstanding stock sold off by urban shareholders in areas such as Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa and Hyogo prefectures. The proportion of stock held by rural shareholders increased, and the number of shareholders also showed a greater rate of increase in rural areas than in urban. Throughout the take-up period, the relative importance of rural shareholders increased within the SMR shareholder body. Third, the sale of SMR stock by urban shareholders was triggered by political intervention in the SMR from the period of the Manchurian Incident to the time of the stock issue and the resulting management uncertainty and poor outlook. On the other hand, the reason that rural shareholders bought up the stock was that within the context of a widening loss of confidence in regional banks, an improved "environment for investment" brought about the stable circulation of reliable SMR stock which was seen as a haven for investment Finally, the transformed shareholder body successfully demanded the restructuring of the SMR to ensure the recovery of the share price and the payment of dividends Within the context of an increase of issued stock and diversification of the body of shareholders, the SMR could not ignore the specific demands of a large body of shareholders, numbering some tens of thousands of registered individuals, and as such it may be said that the shareholder body was able to exert a form of "governance" over the SMR.
著者
村松 怜
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.2, pp.35-51, 2019

<p>This article studies the Ministry of Finance's philosophy on income taxes in Meiji and Taisho Japan. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it reexamines "tax reform as social policy" in Taisho Japan. Second, it reveals aspects of the Ministry's taxation philosophy that lasted until the postwar period. Previous research on Taisho‒era tax reforms has focused on the relationship between the tax reforms and "social policy." The tax reform of 1920, considered a major example of "tax reform as social policy," has received particular attention: its inclusion of dividends in taxable income in particular is attributed to the taxation and social policy theories of the Japan Association for Social Policy Studies.</p><p>In contrast with the previous studies, this work reveals other factors leading to the 1920 tax reform by following MOF discussions of income tax going back to the Meiji period. First, the general principle of taxing dividend income did not arise out of a "social policy" context but was consistent with the income tax system envisioned by the MOF since Meiji. The MOF consistently supported a general income tax levied on aggregate income as well as differentiation of the income tax such that earned income would be taxed more lightly than unearned (capital) income. Second, for the MOF, the emergence of the "social policy" debate simply represented a "good opportunity" to bring about the general taxation of dividend income. The chief of the MOF's National Tax Section of the Tax Bureau, KATSU Masanori, who played an important role in the 1920 income tax reform, regarded general taxation of dividend income as essential for a fair tax system. He took advantage of the "social policy" debate to propose the income tax reform. In the 1930s the MOF proposed the so‒called Baba Tax Reform Plan, which attempted a comprehensive general income taxation. The Tax Bureau, moreover, regarded the comprehensive system of income tax recommended by the Shoup Mission during the postwar US occupation of Japan as the "ideal" tax system. MOF consistently embraced this tax philosophy from Meiji into the postwar period.</p>
著者
竹田 泉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.18-33, 2006-01-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

Why did the Irish linen industry, which had spread throughout the country by the latter half of the 18th century, experience a rapid decline at the end of that century? The purpose of this paper is to present a colonial image of the 18th-century Irish linen industry, by investigating the policies England forced on the Irish linen industry, and how Ireland reacted to them. England's late 17th-century measure to promote the manufacture of linens in Ireland was a typical mercantile policy that was carefully designed to pursue the national interests of England, which was, at that point, the development of the English woollen industry. However, when linen manufacturing began to develop in Lancashire in the mid 18th-century, it became unfavourable for England to encourage the linen manufacture in Ireland, because it was an obstacle to the development of the Lancashire linen industry. The persons concerned in the linen trade in Ireland rarely felt that they were dependent upon the economic conditions of England as long as they were given enough encouragement. However, once the English Parliament passed a bill that gave the Lancashire linen industry priority over that of Ireland in 1770 (the 1771 Act), they came to recognise that their industry was a colonial type. After the 1771 Act, the Irish linen industry was depressed sharply while that of Lancashire continued to expand. Furthermore, the outbreak of the War of Independence in colonial America decreased the exports of Irish linens. To overcome these difficulties, the Irish linen industry pressured the English government, and finally got the freedom to trade with the British colonies. It was ironic, however, that by acquiring this freedom, Ireland became aware that there existed many other oppressive British policies over Ireland. In Irish political history, the 1770s and 1780s, when Ireland fought for liberty from England, have been understood positively, but through this movement for freedom, the Irish linen industry realised that there existed the limits of their development, and that they were incorporated into the growth process of the Lancashire linen industry as a yarn supplier. Furthermore, at the time they clarified this recognition, the Lancashire linen industry was ending its dependence upon Ireland for linen yarns, and taking a lean forward to the manufacture of pure cottons-calicoes.
著者
竹田 泉
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.18-33, 2006

Why did the Irish linen industry, which had spread throughout the country by the latter half of the 18th century, experience a rapid decline at the end of that century? The purpose of this paper is to present a colonial image of the 18th-century Irish linen industry, by investigating the policies England forced on the Irish linen industry, and how Ireland reacted to them. England's late 17th-century measure to promote the manufacture of linens in Ireland was a typical mercantile policy that was carefully designed to pursue the national interests of England, which was, at that point, the development of the English woollen industry. However, when linen manufacturing began to develop in Lancashire in the mid 18th-century, it became unfavourable for England to encourage the linen manufacture in Ireland, because it was an obstacle to the development of the Lancashire linen industry. The persons concerned in the linen trade in Ireland rarely felt that they were dependent upon the economic conditions of England as long as they were given enough encouragement. However, once the English Parliament passed a bill that gave the Lancashire linen industry priority over that of Ireland in 1770 (the 1771 Act), they came to recognise that their industry was a colonial type. After the 1771 Act, the Irish linen industry was depressed sharply while that of Lancashire continued to expand. Furthermore, the outbreak of the War of Independence in colonial America decreased the exports of Irish linens. To overcome these difficulties, the Irish linen industry pressured the English government, and finally got the freedom to trade with the British colonies. It was ironic, however, that by acquiring this freedom, Ireland became aware that there existed many other oppressive British policies over Ireland. In Irish political history, the 1770s and 1780s, when Ireland fought for liberty from England, have been understood positively, but through this movement for freedom, the Irish linen industry realised that there existed the limits of their development, and that they were incorporated into the growth process of the Lancashire linen industry as a yarn supplier. Furthermore, at the time they clarified this recognition, the Lancashire linen industry was ending its dependence upon Ireland for linen yarns, and taking a lean forward to the manufacture of pure cottons-calicoes.
著者
シュペーラー マルク シュトレープ ヨッヘン 雨宮 昭彦 三ツ石 郁夫
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.4, pp.46-58, 2008-07-30

More than half a century after the collapse of the Third Reich, satisfactory economic explanations for the most important economic processes of the Nazi period are still lacking. That is why these economic processes are often christened "miracles" by historians. Recently, however, a group of German economic historians started the attempt to demystify these "miracles" with the help of modern economic theory and econometrics. In this review article, we present both the new methods and the new results of this research programme to Japanese scholars. In section 2, under the headline "Deformed economic miracle" we analyse the distorted macroeconomic development of the Third Reich until the outbreak of the Second World War. In section 3, headed "The 'miracle' of the armament industry", we show that the Nazis directed the German economy generally not by compulsion and the threat of violence but by setting adequate economic incentives which secured the voluntary cooperation of profit-oriented entrepreneurs.
著者
川越 修
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.3, pp.20-27, 2004-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)

本論文の課題は,19世紀末から20世紀前半にかけてのドイツにおける乳児死亡問題と母子保健制度の展開過程という限定された事例の検討を通じて,現在大きな転換点に立っている先進工業社会(=都市型社会)の制度的基盤(=制度としての社会国家)と,それが内包する問題点を歴史的に考察することにある.こうした課題設定に従って,以下,(1)19世紀から20世紀への世紀転換点に西ヨーロッパ社会がほぼ共時的に経験した社会変動,(2)世紀転換期から第一次世界大戦を経てヴァイマル共和国時代へと至る時期のドイツにおける,乳児死亡問題と母子保健問題の展開,(3)ヴァイマル期からナチ期にかけての母子保健制度の展開過程の分析から浮かび上がるナチ社会像,(4)20世紀前半のドイツ社会の歴史的経験の意味,という4点を中心に考察を進めて行くことにしよう.
著者
白木沢 旭児
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.3, pp.31-39, 2010-04-30 (Released:2017-08-30)
参考文献数
43

This paper first considers whether the controlled economy in the first half of the 1930s was directly connected with the controlled economy of wartime Japan, and second, aims to clarify the meaning of the terms "modification of capitalism" and "reorganization of capitalism". Regarding the first point, in the first half of the 1930s it was thought that a controlled economy and market monopolization were almost the same thing. However, the evils of monopolization were well recognized after economic recovery from the Great Depression, such that the view of the controlled economy as monopolization came to be criticized. Moreover, confrontation between vocational organizations intensified in the first half of the 1930s. Although control regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises existed, for example, in the form of industrial guilds, this was not available to major companies. This problem was solved at last by the 1940 Key-Industries Association Act. Concerning the second point, in the first half of the 1930s, correction of capitalism meant the abolition of laissez-faire capitalism. On the other hand, profit control at companies aiming at low prices was asserted late in the 1930s, and companies were expected not just to pursue profit, but also to work for the improvement of the public good. However, profit controls were not instituted, and bureaucrats who tried to do so in earnest were arrested. As such, controlled economy theory came to have no meaning. In contrast, I term the theory of controlled economy which prospered in 1940s Japan the Japanese-principle controlled economy theory. Controlled economy theory and profit control was not inherited in the postwar period. Consequently, it is suggested that the theory of the controlled economy was different in each of the prewar, wartime and postwar periods. Future research will focus on postwar vocational organizations and control organizations, such as industrial guilds, which continued in existence from the prewar into the postwar period.