著者
原 朗
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 : the journal of political economy and economic history (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.2, pp.1-18, 2016-01

Moritaro Yamada's "Nihon Shihonshugi Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Capitalism)" (1934), hereafter "Bunseki," is a classic that has had an great impact on Japan's social science since the 1930s. It is difficult to understand the author's true intent, however, because he used obscure language, in order to avoid censorship by the authoritarian government. The book is principally composed of three volumes that were originally part of "Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsushi Koza (Lectures on the Development of Japanese Capitalism)" (1932-1933), hereafter "Koza." We are now able to compare the "Bunseki" and "Koza" manuscripts because they were recently donated to the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo. The other Moritaro Yamada's collections are at the Archive for the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tokyo, the Institute of Social Science at Senshu University and the Library of Ryukoku University, with both of which Yamada was affiliated. It is important to compare the various manuscripts of "Bunseki" and "Koza", and particularly the "Koza" manuscripts with the published version, in order to establish an evidentiary basis for the retrospective examination of Yamada's theory and analysis. This article collates the differences between the manuscript and published versions of "Koza" where they are most divergent in content, as shown in Table 1 and 2. These Tables enable us to understand the author's intention regarding a substantial portion of the complicated terminology used in "Koza" and "Bunseki." Some results of collation are as follows. First, the original title of "Bunseki" was "Nihon Shihonshugi (tokuni Kogyo) Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Capitalism [Especially Industry])." Secondly, the third section, 'Kitei (The Basis),' which has received particular recognition, was initially titled 'Yohen (Appendix)'. Thridly, in 'Jogen (Introduction),' which compared the characteristics of Japanese capitalism with that of other countries, the author defined by 'revolution' and 'capitalism' at the beginning, and then went on to clarify by 'absolutism' and 'land ownership.' Lastly, the author changed his wording, especially in relation to 'Military', 'Police', 'Imperial Court', and 'Labor Struggle', to other unique complicated terminologies.
著者
崔 在東
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.15-31, 2011-01-30

From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, there was a ten-fold increase in fire incidents in rural Russia. In particular, from the beginning of the 20th century until right before WWI there was a two- to three-fold increase in fire incidents in comparison to the end of the 19th century. Arson was the cause of some 30 percent of these fires, but in some regions and provinces over 50 percent were caused by arson. Fires did not necessarily lead to bankruptcy for Russian peasants, but were an opportunity to receive a significant payment of insurance money that enabled them to reset their economic situation. Peasants in Moscow province actively purchased coverage in the higher zemstvo additional insurance program, the zemstvo voluntary insurance program and from fire insurance companies. As a result in 1904, more than 40 percent of those who purchased zemstvo compulsory insurance coverage received 70 to 80 percent of the registered value of the insured asset, the value of which was frequently overestimated two or three times. 50 percent of policy holders of zemstvo compulsory insurance received payouts in 1909, while more than 60 percent did so in 1914. Farmers in Russia did not consider it a shame or a crime to cause arson, if it was not harmful to others. They saw arson as a quicker and more secure way to resolve the economic difficulties of rural management than bringing issues to the courts, which took into consideration various interests, or by bringing issues forward for an administrative procedure. It was not only quicker and easier to receive a large insurance payout for fire and arson, but insurance payouts also resolved the problems more quickly. In addition, there were very few cases where a suspect of arson was tried and punished as a criminal. During WWI and the Russian Revolution in 1917, there was a sharp decrease in the number of fire incidents. The primary reason for this was that the economic gain from insurance payouts decreased remarkably due to the sudden rise of prices for building materials and of worker pay. For this reason, in contrast to the 1905 Revolution, farmers seeking to restart their businesses during the revolutionary period beginning in 1917 were extremely careful about fire and arson.
著者
本田 由紀 堤 孝晃
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.56, no.3, pp.23-33, 2014-04-30

Since the 1970s, Japan's high-school system has been characterized by a lack of institutional diversity, or in other words by an oversupply of general studies programs and undersupply of vocational programs. This paper reexamines the social context of the 1970s policy shift and proposes an alternative to the dominant view that the striking decline of high-school vocational courses in the 1970s and '80s was the inevitable result of their dysfunctions. In the 1960s, Japan's educational policy-makers pursued the institutional diversification of high schools in response both to the high demand for trained manpower in developing industries and to the increase in the proportion of students advancing to high school. Around 1970, however, educational policy made an about-face, depreciating vocational programs and promoting the flexible and individualized approach of general coursework. One possible explanation for this abrupt change in policy is that just when the Japanese government was facing serious financial challenges following the oil shock in 1973, it was also confronted with the need to establish more and more high schools, especially in metropolitan areas which had seen significant population increases during the high-growth years of the '60s. The only way to reconcile these conflicting circumstances was to establish general studies programs, the construction and operation of which were far cheaper than those of vocational courses. Another possible factor was the demand for general-studies high schools by members of the upper and middle classes, including government officials, teachers and academics, who most highly valued the path to university and white-collar careers. These factors together served to counteract and overwhelm the demand for vocational education that persisted from small and medium-size enterprises and from families that expected their children to take stable jobs after graduating high school. The result was the establishment of vertical diversification among schools and among students within general courses and the steady decline of the relevance of high-school education to occupational training. This study suggests the need for a thorough reconsideration of Japan's high-school policies, both past and present.
著者
平沢 照雄
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.1, pp.1-14, 2007-10-30

This paper analyzes the case of the Electric Lamp Glass Industry to discuss the development of Japan's economic control over medium and small companies, the industrial cooperation movement in the 1930s, and the relationship that existed between the two. I focus specifically on the official recognition accredited to the labor union, Kanto Electric Lamp Glass Industry Labor Union (KELGILU) by the trade association, Tokyo Electric Lamp Bulb Association (TELBA), and the labor agreement between them. I find that (1) TELBA acted negatively toward the official recognition of KELGILU when the union was initially established; and that (2) TELBA authorized KELGILU and entered into a labor agreement after handling the problem of the sales of surplus products to outside customers by Tokyo Electric Corporation and dealing with the labor dispute at Marusa Factory. I also find that the Industrial Cooperation Committee (ICC) was established as the management-labor consulting organization; and that the industrial cooperation movement developed after the signing of the labor agreement. Most importantly, I highlight the following: First, the mutual aid system, which consisted of sick pay, life insurance, and retirement allowance, was established through the activities of ICC. Second, standard wages common to all factories were established. Under this new system, factories that offered wages lower than the standard were obliged to raise wages, and attempts were made to improve working conditions on an industry-wide basis. Third, the sales-price control that TELBA attempted to implement at the time was not fully adhered to by the industry. ICC, therefore, pursued the application of price control via suspension of the supply of KELGILU workers to those factories that violated the control. Similarly, ICC systematically applied the labor supply suspension against factories that did not cooperate with the establishment of the above-mentioned mutual aid system and the adoption of the standard wages. I conclude that the economic control and industrial cooperation movement developed in complement as a way to bring about both stabilization of business administration and improvement of working conditions in the Electric Lamp Glass Industry.
著者
小堀 聡
出版者
政治経済学・経済史学会
雑誌
歴史と経済 (ISSN:13479660)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.3, pp.48-64, 2007-04-30

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the efforts of energy-saving developed in interwar Japan, in particular focusing on the nensho shido (technical guidance for fuel burning),which encouraged improvements in factories' fuel-burning technologies. From the end of the 1910's, against a background of not only rising coal prices but also a consciousness of the limits of domestic coal reserves, the Fuel Research Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was established and engineers and researchers interested in combustion engineering organized a group called the Fuel Society of Japan. In the second half of the 1920's, activities promoting fuel economy were implemented in several prefectures among which Osaka prefecture proved most aggressive in Japan. The Osaka Prefectural Institute for Industrial Management (OPIIM) established its nensho shido division in 1929 and provided guidance to local factories in saving fuel. OPIIM guidance focused on the methods in which the factory boiler workers burned fuel, rather than building new facilities or refitting older facilities for burning fuel. Furthermore, because OPIIM thought that in order to improve the manner of burning it was necessary for boiler workers to acquire higher levels of skill, Osaka prefecture established a qualification for boiler workers and OPIIM opened a training school for them. Osaka prefecture's development of nensho shido was considered an industrial rationalization, and therefore was imitated by several municipalities and regional organizations for industrial management. Furthermore, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which had become more interested in fuel economy from the beginning of the 1930's, started nensho shido in 1938 as the Sino-Japanese war exacerbated the tight coal supply situation. It was technicians from Osaka being posted to or sometimes visiting the other regions that promoted the spread of nensho shido. During the interwar era, nensho shido was immature because the scope of guidance was limited to burning with a boiler. However, the groups of combustion engineering technicians formed during the interwar era would later lead the development of energy-saving technology in wartime and postwar Japan. Since the interwar era, against the background of limited domestic resources, Japanese industrial rationalization has made a point of reducing production costs rather than acquiring merits of scale.